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***ORIGINAL ARTICLES***





# THE PRACTICE-POSITION SYSTEM AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL CATEGORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>

Elaine MATEUS\*  
Viviane de Melo RESENDE\*\*

- **ABSTRACT:** Critical discourse studies are acknowledged as an important scientific movement within the field of explanatory critique of social practices. This essay proposes epistemological considerations by means of a transdisciplinary dialogue between Critical Realism as a philosophical approach to the functioning of society proposed by Roy Bhaskar, and Critical Discourse Analysis – a theoretical approach to the social functioning of language and methodological tool to the situated analysis of texts. More specifically, the text explores the relation between social structures, practices and events, taking the position-practice system as an epistemological argument. The discussion is illustrated with two situated studies: one dealing with hybrid positions and tensions between pre-existent objective positions and their subjective occupations within a social movement; the other dealing with fluctuant positions in ELT education practices, as textured in institutional projects.
- **KEYWORDS:** Critical discourse analysis. Position-practice system. Transformational model of social activity. Epistemology.

## Introduction

This article undertakes epistemological reflections upon the transdisciplinary dialog between Critical Realism – a philosophical approach to the functioning of society proposed by Roy Bhaskar – and Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis – a theoretical approach to the social functioning of language and a methodological device for the situated analysis of texts. Considerations will be made concerning the ways particular concepts of the Critical Realism (CR), once taken as epistemological principle, would be optimized in the critical studies of discourse. Considering that potential readers would be more familiar with CDA, however, this text centers more specifically on the interface of the CR concepts, assuming that such reflections may shed light on still underexplored possibilities.

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Lying in the background of the text are the stratification of social reality as an ontological principle, the dialectical relations between elements of social practice as an epistemological premise, and the critical study of the mediating nature of language as a methodological tool. Bearing this in mind, the article is organized into three sections, the first two being more theoretically driven and the third illustrating our arguments based on two research studies carried out in Brazil. The research narratives will be further contextualized as part of our research agendas within the Brazilian contexts of teacher education and social movements. The analysis indicates how the occupation of hybridized positions is dependent on various contextual elements, including the ways social practices are already established, who is in what position and how power relations are distributed among participants. Idealist notions of social reality are problematized and implications of a realist take are presented.

### **Social critical-realist perspective: stratification as an ontological principle**

Let us begin with the stratification of social reality as an ontological principle. We assume that human agency depends not only on the social actors' wishes and intentions – as idealist models would prefer – but it is also organically tied to the social and material conditions in which their actions are performed. That is, agency is carried out in the intersection of subjective interests and wishes and objective possibilities and opportunities (COLLIER, 1994). This perspective corresponds to the social critical-realist theory adopted in Fairclough's CDA model, who states that:

The position I take is a realist one, based on a realist ontology: both concrete social events and abstract social structures, as well as the rather less abstract 'social practices' [...] are part of reality. We can make a distinction between the 'potential' and the 'actual' – what is possible because of the nature (constraints and allowances) of social structures and practices, as opposed to what actually happens. Both need to be distinguished from the 'empirical', what we know about reality. (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003, p.14).

Critical Realism (BHASKAR, 1998) asserts that (i) there is a world independent of our knowledge about it and, because of that, irreducible to what we know about it; (ii) this world both preexists as a condition for the intentional act, and it is reproduced-transformed by human action, (iii) the potentially existent causal powers in open systems, brought about by any series of contextual contingencies, produce the known outcomes, which were either experienced or predicted from casual criteria. These principles relate to three domains of reality – the **Real**, the **Actual** and the **Empirical**.

By recognizing that there are things in the world that exist independent of our knowledge about them and that there are possible objects of experience that can be asserted regardless of our perception about them, one can affirm that questions about what exists cannot be reduced to questions about what we are able to know. The reduction of the potential domain to the empirical one is called **epistemic fallacy** (BHASKAR, 1978). What exists as a liability is more comprehensive than what actually happens and this, in its turn, is more comprehensive than what is empirically observed.

The **real** domain refers to the power-generating structures and to the event-generating mechanisms. That is, it refers to “[...] whatever exists, be it natural or social, regardless of whether it is an empirical object for us, and whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature.” (SAYER, 2000, p.11). What potentially exists and what could exist in accordance with causal powers may or may not be **actualized**. This distinction between what is possible due to constraints and allowances of social structures and practices and what is **actual** is fundamental to the understanding that there is no complete and definite analysis of societies. As it will be further discussed, social movements and practices have a set of powers and mechanisms capable of operationalizing ways of (inter)acting, ways of being and ways of organizing social movements in particular directions, even if they do not happen accordingly or if they happen without being empirically perceived. Though dependent on social actors for their realization, structures preexist in relation to them and their action.

In fact, in the open and dynamic system of social life, the activation of causal powers depends on a complex group of contextual contingencies that can both enable and hinder possibilities. **Actual** thus refers “[...] to what happens when these powers and liabilities are activated and produce change.” (FAIRCLOUGH; JESSOP; SAYER, 2002, p.3). Potential powers are thus actualized when instantiated in consonant practices. But these powers can also remain as hindered potential, that is, not actual due to the contingencies present in the social world. In a relational way, changes at the practice level can change the nature of the institution, despite its durability and relative autonomy.

If the existence of what is circumscribed in the potential domain has the powers it is supposed to have, given its social structures, and if the causal powers generated in a structure co-determine events, it is possible to investigate the structures that generate the powers by means of their observable effects on events. Therefore, the **empirical** domain is defined as that of experience. In other words, it refers to what can be experimented and observed from the effects of liabilities and actualities. Although “[...] our capacity to observe social effects and actions does not exhaust what might exist or exists in fact.”, argues Resende (2009a, p.21), “[...] observation can teach us about what becomes actual and what might become actual.”

So far we have said that the different levels of abstraction of social reality – which is circumscribed in the **real**, **actual** and **empirical** domains – imply that not everything that might happen in the social world happens in fact and that not everything that is actualized in social events can be perceived by experience. The causal criterion, that is, the explanation of a process by means of the description of what produces it, consists in evidence of what is its condition-and-impediment. In other words, it consists in evidence of the resources that make it possible and of the constraints that limit it. In that lies causation as an epistemological argument in critical realism: the insights that an empirical analysis of the social (inter)actions enables us to gain, also allows us, at the same time, to explain the emergence of events in terms of non-observable causes. As Collier (1994, p.44) exemplifies:

When we find the garden muddy in the morning, we assume a real rainstorm, though we slept through it; a murder-victim implies a murderer, even though one might never be identified. Rainstorms and murderers are possible objects of experience, but their existence is in these cases asserted on casual criteria only, since they are not 'experienced' in the sense of perceived.

The author also states that it is possible both to explain events stemming from previous mechanisms and causes (as in the case of the storm and murderers) and to explain a mechanism stemming from other mechanisms (for example, when economic mechanisms explain political and ideological ones). This perspective operates towards the meaning of social process, understood by CDA as “[...] the interplay between three levels of social reality: social **structures**, **practices** and **events**.” (FAIRCLOUGH, 2009, p.164, original emphasis).

Social structures are abstract entities that define the potential, that is, the set of resources and constraints that enable the realization of events. Each structure (for example economic structure, social class, political institution, semiotic system) generates different effects on the events by means of its own mechanisms. However, as Fairclough (2003, p.23) explains, events “[...] are not in any simple or direct way the effects of abstract social structures.” The relationship between abstract social structures and concrete social (inte)relations is mediated by the (networks of) social practices.

The concept of social practice is central to CDA, and it is based on the assumption that social life is made of practices defined as

[...] habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world. Practices are constituted throughout social life – in the specialized domains of the economy and politics, for instance, but

also in the domain of culture, including everyday life. (CHOULIARAKI; FAIRCLOUGH, 1999, p.21).

The practices that mediate social structures and the individual's actions, therefore, are active processes in the production of events, which articulate several elements of social life, including discourse. To say that practices articulate several elements and mechanisms means to acknowledge the fact that practices are themselves articulated in networks and their internal aspects are determined by such external relationships. Thus, Chouliaraki e Fairclough (1999, p.24) argue that "[...] all social practice is embedded in networks of power relations, and potentially subordinates the social subjects that engage in it, even those with 'internal' power."

Texts, as elements of concrete social events, are determined by the causal relation with networks of social practices that define specific forms of acting, and that "[...] although actual events may more or less diverge from these definitions and expectations (because they cut across different social practices, and because of the casual powers of social agents), they are still partly shaped by them." (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003, p.25). Nevertheless, the author himself makes it clear that texts are not only the result of social constraints, but they also cause, potentially, social changes:

Most immediately, texts can bring about changes in our knowledge (we can learn things from them), our beliefs, our attitudes, values and so forth. They also have longer-term causal effects – one might for instance argue that prolonged experience of advertising and other commercial texts contribute to shaping people's identities as 'consumers', or their gender identities. Texts can also start wars, or contribute to change in education, or to change in industrial relations, and so forth. Their effects can include changes in the material world, such as changes in urban design, or the architecture and design of particular types of building. In sum, texts have causal effects upon, and contribute to changes, in people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world. [...] these effects are mediated by meaning making. (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003, p.8).

In this aspect, texts produced as parts of social events have a privileged place in investigations that, like ours, are aligned with a dialectic-relational approach (i) between structures' mechanisms and the ways they are instantiated in specific social practices and (ii) between language and other elements of social life, within each event (FAIRCLOUGH, 2009). The analysis of specific texts as part of specific events operates towards an analytical connection between the concrete social event and the more abstract social practices. This is because "[...] texts are not

just effects of linguistic structures and orders of discourse, they are also effects of other social structures, and of social practices in all their aspects.” (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003, p.25). More than that, as seen before, texts not only suffer the effects of social structures and practices, but they also cause effects on social life.

To have causality as an epistemological argument means that, in order to make sense of the relationships between structural mechanisms and specific forms of instantiation of social events, it is necessary to investigate what potentializes and what hinders the concrete action and that, as such, partially transforms and partially feeds the permanence of practices and structures. In fact, most of our experience in daily life is explained with reference to causal powers. As Sayer (2000, p.14) argues, a critical explanation depends, instead, “[...] on identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions.” The author also draws the attention to the fact that what explains the effects is not the regularity of frequency with which the causes are observed, but what the mechanisms are, how and in what circumstances they are activated. On the other hand, the explanation of particular mechanisms depends on the analysis of the nature of the structure which bears a certain power. As we will illustrate further, the social actors’ power to act as educators depends not only on their knowledge and qualifications, but on their being accepted by others as legitimate.

The discussion about the causal relationships as an epistemological argument is related, therefore, to the assumption that discourses have real effects on practices, institutions and social order, and that these very effects constitute what needs to be analyzed, understood and critically explained. In this sense, the investigation of the ways these effects are produced requires the analysis to start with the identification of what produces the effects and what can be observed in the concrete (inter)actions followed, then, by the attribution of causal relationships in terms of underlying mechanisms (FAIRCLOUGH; JESSOP; SAYER, 2002). The concrete actions, with their effects and causes, are what allow us, ultimately, to analyze, understand and explain the articulations of the social practices and, consequently, potentialize our capacity to unveil the structures, mechanisms and powers that operate in the events. What is instantiated, in a certain moment, in a certain place, by a certain group of people, depends on which causal powers are activated by the social world as an open system.

### **The transformational model of the social activity: the position-practice system as an epistemological category**

To treat social life as an open system means to understand that the same powers present in the structure can produce different results and that different

mechanisms can produce similar results (CHOULIARAKI; FAIRCLOUGH, 1999). This implies that the discussion about causal relationships outreaches a cause-effect mechanistic perspective. If the study of the causal relationships departs, on the one hand, from the recognition that social actors are socially constrained, it restates, on the other one, that not all their actions are socially determined. As Fairclough (2003, p.22) argues, “[...] agents have their own ‘casual powers’ which are not reducible to the casual powers of social structures and practices.”


For the Marxist theory, “[...] circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstance.” (MARX; ENGELS, 1998, p.165). However, in the CDA field, as a relational-dialectical approach following the social critical-realist theory, structures are not reducible to social actors, but rather, as discussed earlier, they exist before them. Although the elements of social practice (discourse, social relationships, material activities, mental phenomenon, according to Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s frame) maintain among themselves a dialectical relationship, structures and actions are distinct in nature.

As Ramalho and Resende (2011, p.37) argue, “[...] in a particular synchronic moment, society is not the creation of human beings, but it exists before them (although diachronically society is the result of human beings’ actions).” There is a conceptual distinction between individuals acting and the society that enables and constrains their action. Structures, though forged by previous social actions, are anterior to the social action they now constrain. This determines the transformational – and not dialectical – characteristics of the relationship between structure and action or, in Bhaskar’s terms, between society and individual. Therefore the need for the intermediate category represented in the position-practice system.

According to Bhaskar (1998), it is as much true that societies only exist as a result of human action (the humanist principle), as it is that the social context determines which actions are liable to become actual (the structuralist principle). The author states that “[...] society is both the ever-present **condition** (material cause) and the continually reproduced **outcome** of human agency.” (BHASKAR, 1998, p.215, original emphasis).

For the CR perspective, the relationship between structure and action is not dialectical, but transformational, that is, society and human practice “[...] do not constitute two moments of the same process. Rather they refer to radically different kinds of things.” (BHASKAR, 1998, p.214). On the one hand, society is means-and-end, it is material condition and result of praxis. On the other hand, praxis is both reproduction and transformation of society. This is what the author calls the *Transformational model of social activity*. He represents his model in the following way:

**Figure 1** – Transformational model of the Society/Person Connection



**Source:** Based on Bhaskar (1998, p.217); Resende (2009a, p.27).

When discussing the figure, Ramalho and Resende (2011, p.39) explain that

[...] the descending movement of the arrow represents human action as depending on rules and resources (including mechanisms and their causal powers) available in the social structure. At the same time that this structure, as a means, is a facilitator for allowing the action, it is also a constraint, as it 'regulates' conducts.

On the other hand, the ascending movement of the arrow indicates that the triggering of rules and resources of social structures by social actors can result in reproduction or transformation of such a structure as a result. Thus, action and structure constitute each other transformationally and reciprocally.

To say that society and praxis maintain an asymmetrical relationship between themselves – given that structures are always previous to the actions that, in their turn, take advantage of the preexistent forms of social orders to reproduce and transform them – suggests a conception of agency in which human actions and changes in the social structure, though mutually dependent, are categorically different. For Bhaskar (1998, p.215),


Thus one can allow, without paradox or strain, that purposiveness, intentionality and sometimes self-consciousness characterize human actions but not transformations in the social structure. The conception I am proposing is that people, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously reproduce (and occasionally transform) the structures governing their substantive activities of production. Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to sustain the capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity.

There are here, among others, two aspects that must be emphasized in the present discussion. The first concerns the historicity of social change, and the second, the relationship between social (dis)positions and existing possibilities for action.



Considering that structures always foreshadow actions, what the social actors deal with at the moment of praxis is conformed by the actions of previous actors who were also constrained by the existing structures at the time of their action. Based on this characterization, Resende (2009a, p.28) suggests “[...] a temporal relationship (in terms of synchrony/diachrony) between the two elements of the structure/agency recursivity”.

**Figure 2** – Synchronic/diachronic relationship between structure and action



**Source:** Resende (2009a, p.28).


We exist as human beings in societies full of mechanisms that condition and enable our potentially transforming action. The human activity objectified by those who came before us becomes object of our appropriation, which generates in us needs, desires and motives that did not exist in the same way in the past and that, consequently, will lead us to new objectifications and appropriations in an endless process (DUARTE, 2001).

Within this framework, whatever the historical moment, it always reveals the socio-historical conditions in which individuals exist, as well as the situational circumstances they created based on the structural allowances and constraints. Thus, the material and symbolic structures reproduced and transformed by the praxis of previous generations and appropriated by individuals in their process of insertion in social life circumscribe the possibilities and limitations of future generations. Because of that, human actions of reproduction and transformation keep the meaning of totality of the history of humankind in a never-ending process of rupture-and-continuity. In the words of Marx and Engels (1998, p.172),

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.

Therefore, the relationship between the objectified practice – that is, the one presented to the individuals and groups as structural mechanisms that enable-constrain their actions – and objectifying practice – that is, human action that reproduces and transforms society – is not linear. In fact, historicity happens in cyclical movements that neither come back to the same point, nor come in the same way. Also, they are never entirely different from the previous ones, maintaining traits of the objectified practice, though in **radically transformed circumstances**. In this sense, Figure 2 represents a new synthesis of the historical movements of the structure/agency recursivity:

**Figure 3** – Historical movements of social reproduction and transformation



**Source:** Made by the author.

In the figure, we propose a refinement for the illustration of temporal asymmetry between structure and action. The spiral movement represents loom of the mesh of the social fabric with its relationships and practice networks. The threads intertwine in conformity with the objectified practices that constitute networks of allowances and constraints for the human action which also reconfigure the social fabric in a perspective of transformation-permanence of the preexisting circumstances. Structures are placed above in different times ( $E_1, E_2, \dots$ ) to signal their abstract character of potentiality that can be taken synchronically to the actual level (by means of action), represented below, in the concrete event plan. The descending lines indicate that, in synchrony, structures provide resources and constraints to the situated action; this is how these lines connect structure and action always at the same time ( $E_1-A_1, E_2-A_2, \dots$ ). The ascending dotted lines indicate, on the other hand, the diachronic relationship, that is, the possibilities of transformation-reproduction of structures by the situated action, but always at different times: action in  $A_1$  results in structure in  $E_2$ , and then successively. The model is transformational as it comprehends this asymmetry between the structures that govern the action, always previous and conformed to previous actions, and the very action they govern. Therefore, the action in  $A_1$  is structured by  $E_1$ , but carries the potential to transform  $E_1$  in  $E_2$ . Finally, the dotted line does not have a defined start due to the impossibility of locating the “zero point”, as the Eva myth does.

In contrast to the previous ones, this illustration of the transformational model of social activity more clearly states the asymmetry between structure and action and the transformational relationship they establish, as well as the dynamics of the social change historicity.

Considering social structures exist in inter-dependence with the activities they govern, and with the meanings that social actors attribute to what they do in such activities, it is therefore necessary to have

[...] a system of concepts designating the 'point of contact' between human agency and social structures. Such a point, linking action to structure, must both endure and be immediately occupied by individuals. It is clear that the mediating system we need is that of the positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by individuals, and of the practices (activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and vice-versa), they engage. (BHASKAR, 1998, p.220-221).

This mediating system is called **position-practice system** by Bhaskar. As an epistemological principle, the position-practice system intertwines the threads that knit explanations for the events empirically captured from the preexisting conditions, and generates knowledge about the investigated social realities. It fosters choices that allow for the analysis of positioned practices' moments in their relationships of causality in the reproduction and transformation of the society. The position-practice system favors the analytical attention that should be paid to the social relationships as a basis for the explanations. It is, then, an epistemological principle capable of establishing connections between the transformational model of social activity (an ontological perspective of the Critical Realism revisited by CDA) and the method of discursive analysis put forward by CDA.

Associated with the ontological principles discussed above, this mediating system works towards the overcoming of both voluntarism, which takes social structures as a direct product of human action, and structuralism, which treats human action as totally derived from the configuration of structures. Approaching society as a network of positioned practices allows for the study of historicity within the power and agency categories.

When discussing such ontological and epistemological implications in CDA, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p.62) state that the explanatory critique of a social problem in its semiotic aspect "inevitably raises questions about power". This happens, partially, due to the fact that the analyses of specific practices treat discourse in its double function – as part of the activity or as a representation of the practice, or both – in relation to the other elements such as material activity, social

relationships and personal (dis)positions. Because of these specific relationships, people's roles and identities are internally related, so that what is possible for a social actor to realize, that is, his/her power to act, depends not only on the existing and sedimented relationships but also on those that are transformed in the becoming. In Fairclough's (2003, p.41) words,

Power in its most general sense of 'the transformative capacity of human action', the capacity to 'intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course', depends upon 'resources or facilities' which are differentially available to social actors; and Power in the 'relational' sense of the 'capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends upon the agency of the others' is also differentially available to different social actors.

Therefore, power relationships are tension relationships between those whose positions enable them to exert power on a particular practice and those who occupy positions to reproduce or resist these power structures. Changes that occur in occupied positions both influence and generate potential of change in the practices. However, as a study by Resende (2009b, p.9) shows, "[...] the change of position inside a structured institution is not a free-of-conflict process – the previous positions continue to exert pressure for the continuity of the practices inherent to the previous relationships."

In this sense, agency is constrained by the preexistent structures with their conditions and circumstances at the same time that human action affects and even changes structures in the process of changing (dis)positions. As we will discuss further, the (dis)positions of a particular social actor within particular social practices represent particular configurations for the particular participants' (inter)actions. The resulting tensions and disputes of new positions, therefore, can only be analyzed and understood inside particular social practices, with the use of particular methodological choices coherent with the ontological and epistemological stands adopted in each study.

In the position-practice system, agency is no longer conceived as in humanism conceptions, which place human agency at the core of the explanation. For Thorne (2005, p.400), "[...] agency in this sense is not a preexisting value; [...] with its concomitant components of intentionality and desire, agency is a culturally (in) formed development shaped by participation in specific social practices."

Thus, the study of the position-practice system in a particular context is the study of how, historically, social actors' (dis)positions are reproduced and transformed in contexts that include already existing hierarchies, in which the potentials to act are, likewise, previously distributed among subjects, institutions and groups. Therefore, approaching the position-practice system as

an epistemological principle means to acknowledge that changes inside social practices, as well as between them and the network of practices, are related to changes in the dynamics of the power that sustain the same practices. The epistemological nature of this principle – focus of our discussion in this article – is justified because the approach of this system, in particular cases, situated in specific practices, allows us to know the constraints and possibilities foreseen in a particular objective position and analyze, in situated events, the resulting tensions involved in the creation of new positions or the subjective occupation of preexisting positions by historically located groups or individuals.

For studies that focus on the discursive aspects of practices, CDA presents itself as a theory about the social functioning of language, and a set of methods that can map connections between specific social practices and discursive products of events associated to the practices under analysis (some of these methods can be seen in FAIRCLOUGH, 2012; PARDO-ABRIL, 1996, 2007; PARDO, 2011). As such, CDA methodological framework introduces a series of analytical categories associated to discourse as action (genres), as representation (discourse), and as identification (styles) that can be usefully applied to bodies of texts taken as analytical objects. CDA is key for the critical explanation of sociodiscursive problems (RAMALHO, 2007, 2008, 2010; PAPA, 2008; RESENDE, 2009b, 2009c, 2010; FAIRCLOUGH, 2010; RAMALHO; RESENDE, 2011).

Our focus here, however, is not the analytical method or the specific categories of analysis. In the next section, we will exemplify how the position-practice system was used as an epistemological category in two research projects: the first one implemented within a Teacher Education Program at State University of Londrina, and the other accomplished within the National Movement of Street Boys and Girls, in Brasília D.C., Brazil. We will therefore present the basic methodological framework of both studies with the aim of showing how the focus on the position-practice system enabled the observation of discursive tensions associated with particular (dis)positions.

### **Epistemological and methodological possibilities: the position-practice system in two situated studies**

Our objective in relation to the following narratives is to illustrate how the position-practice system, used as an epistemological category, fostered the analysis of positioned practices within two distinct research projects, and allowed for an explanatory critique of hybridized positions and fluctuant positions.

Resende (2008) focused on the (militancy, pedagogical, financial, political) crisis of the National Movement of Street Boys and Girls, in the Local Committee of the Federal District (In Portuguese, **Movimento Nacional de Meninos e**

**Meninas de Rua** – MNMMR/DF)<sup>2</sup>. This social movement, founded in 1985, had a fundamental role in the creation of the National Permanent Forum of Non-Governmental Entities for the Defense of the Rights of Children and Adolescents (Fórum D.C.A), in 1988, and in the design of the Statute for Children and Adolescents (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente – ECA), in 1990. However, due to several reasons, the movement faced a severe crisis from 2000 onwards. Among the discursive causes investigated were resistance to change, illegitimacy of the Movement's social cause; adhesion to determinist discourses; lack of legitimate room concerning position changes within the movement. This last aspect is the focus of the current discussion.

The illustration of how the position-practice system was epistemologically explored in the study requires contextualization. As can be read in its statute, the main ideals of the Movement are the conquest and defense of kids' and youths' rights, the development of educators and the mobilization of a community group of street boys and girls. The conquest of rights was a fundamental aspect in the work of the movement during the period just after its creation, with the pressure exerted on political representatives at the time of the writing of the 1988' Constitution, and with the design and approval of the Statute of Children and Adolescents and the councils of rights' constitution. The defense of rights is still a main focus, as "[...] dozens of MNMMR committees work as virtual centers for the defense of children, as they are a channel to express the voices of boys and girls whose rights are violated." (SANTOS, B., 1994, p.40).

The education of educators to work in the streets was based on the creation of the Development and Support Center for Educators, which used to have three branches in different Brazilian regions: the first was created in 1989 in São Paulo, the second in 1990 in Belem, and the third in 1992 in Recife. The Development Centers provided training courses for educators, activities for work professionalization and team maintenance. However, they do not operate anymore, according to information given to the researcher by educators and adolescents in individual interviews.

The organization and education of a community group of boys and girls are at the core of the Movement activities, and figures as its "[...] basic principle is the promotion of the child and adolescent as subjects of their history and citizenship." (MNMMR, 1997). These projects are carried out in nuclear bases, "[...] spaces that are co-managed by the children themselves, where they can discuss their social condition of exclusion and acquire knowledge and awareness of their rights (and available services) and think about alternative solutions for their lives." (SANTOS, B., 1994, p.31). At the back panel, based on the concept of 'juvenile protagonism', lies the principle that by means of active participation,

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<sup>2</sup> For full access, read Resende (2008).

the adolescent can get involved in the solution of problems in the community as well as in society.

However, in the beginning of the 2000's, the nuclear-based activities started to face severe crisis due to lack of resources for the maintenance of educators to coordinate the work. As a result, a group of young protagonists ('former girls', as they are called by the Movement, that is, young women who had been 'girls' nucleated in the body of this social movement and who remained connected to it as partners) took over the coordination tasks of the base nuclei of the Movement, therefore creating the position of 'girl-educators'. Such aspect is of particular interest to us. Resende's data analysis focused, among other features of the crisis, on the tensions that resulted from the creation of this new position, hybrid in its nature for articulating both elements of the position 'girl' and elements of the position 'educator'. The institutional hierarchical differences between one and other position made it difficult to reconcile.

The textually oriented analyses of interviews with two girl-educators revealed their lack of confidence when identifying themselves in the position of educators. One evident cause of such a conflict is that, although the Movement projected the position of 'girl-educator', it did not enable them full identification as educators – this being the focus of the conflict around this new position created in the practices of this movement. Once structures are previous to relational agency, there is a contradiction and tension between emergent represented positions and actualized social roles within resistant encounters. The 'girl-educator' position was a new position created in the heart of the Movement due to its financial crisis and consequent lack of human resources. However, the subjective occupation of the 'girl-educator' position is partially conditioned by the position of 'girl' previously occupied by the group members – a position that hinders the occupation of the new created position. Although the 'girl-educator' position gathered characteristics of both previous positions (girl and educator), the position of girl, with its internal historical characteristics, prevails due to the already established hierarchical relationships. Considering the broader picture, periods of crisis are periods when there is little definition of roles and identities. This is also a source of conflicts and a possible cause for the position misoccupation.

The hierarchies and the emergent position generate tension between the anteriority of the given structures and the posteriority of the implicit action in the new position. In this sense, the previously structured hierarchies function as mechanisms that hinder the agency imagined in the practices of this new position, both restricting and limiting it. This can be noticed, in the data analysis, in the contradiction between the representation of the Movement as a space where boys and girls have voice, present in all the data generated, and the silencing of the young girls' voice when they take over the role of educators,

revealed by one of the girls when she expresses dissatisfaction with her desire to be heard, valued in her role of educator. In this sense, Madalena Pinto dos Santos (2002, p.8) suggests that “[...] it is necessary to guarantee the possibility of a space of participation where the resistance to and/or transformation of what exists is possible, where the others’ contributions, beyond the ones by those already instituted with power, is not only allowed but pertinent.” This is of fundamental importance so that the several members recognize the value given to their efforts.

The difficulty to satisfactorily accomplish the change of role in the Movement also seems to be related to the interruption between participation and action, in which participation constitutes the nature of juvenile protagonism, and of the position of girl, whereas the field of action is reserved to the position of educator. Thus, although the position of ‘girl-educator’ was created, it remains circumscribed to the domain of participation. The breaking of this symbolic barrier between participating and acting seems to be one of the problematic aspects of juvenile protagonism, which ties young people’s performances to the Movement space. Maybe the creation of spaces of effective action of the Movement’s protagonists favored the organization for action also outside the institution. In terms of the position-practice system, the conflict comes from the fact that, in the new hybrid position ‘girl-educator’, at the same time that the participation as ‘girl’ is imposed, the young women get involved with some practices that are typical of the position of ‘educator’ – which refer to the coordination of a base nucleus. There is lack of definition concerning places, functions, tasks, duties and rights connected to the new created position, ‘girl-educator’, whose perception was possible, in the scope of this research, thanks to the focus on the position-practice system as a central epistemological category in the study, aligned with a multi-methodological approach for the generation and collecting of data and a textually oriented lens for the analysis of these data.

A study by Mateus and Resende (2014) analyzed issue of national policies for the adaptation of local educational practices to the globalized market and their implications for teacher education. More specifically, it focused on the Institutional Program of Scholarships for Teacher Apprenticeship (**Programa Institucional de Bolsa de Iniciação à Docência – Pibid**), inserted in a series of measures of the National Plan of Development (**Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento – PDE**) – an educational component of the Growth Acceleration Plan (**Plano de Aceleração do Crescimento – PAC**) – proposed at the beginning of the second mandate of then president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in April 2007.

Pibid emerges nationwide as a presence-based program aimed at “[...] altering the current scenario of teacher education by establishing the permanent relationship between higher education and basic education.” (BRASIL, 2008



p.16). It is a Program, therefore, developed and based on the assumption that the current practice in teacher education must be altered, indicating that what exists does not correspond to what is desired, and that the alteration of such practice is dependent on a permanent relationship between universities and schools. The normative texts describing Pibid follow a problem-solution macrotextual structure, in which the problem lies in the **quality of school teachers' pre-service education**, and the solution lies in the **integration between higher education and basic education**<sup>3</sup>. This structure sets the grounds for rules and procedures to be implemented in teacher education programs (MATEUS, 2014), and discursively projects reformulations in the teacher education position-practice systems. The prescribed texts "[...] create particular degrees of stability and durability for particular articulations, and particular potentials for articulating practices together in new ways." (CHOULLARAKI; FAIRCLOUGH, 1999, p.13).

Considering the aim of this essay, we will concentrate specifically on the aspects that deal with the processes of recontextualization related to social actors, their roles and (dis)positions as discursively stated in seven English Language undergraduate subprojects developed by five higher education institutions (HEI) when answering the Pibid's public notices published by MEC/Capes between 2009 and 2012.

These subprojects are conceived of both as actions – that inform, define and project socialization practices in accordance with what is permitted and forbidden by established rules – and as ways of representation – that assess, justify and position social practices and actors in specific ways, based on values and beliefs legitimated by particular groups. All seven subprojects follow the same problem-solution macrostructure of governmental documents, but with inverted logic – the problem is identified as lying in the basic school and in the school teachers' inability to incorporate the results of academic research, and the solution is represented by the university and the educational work it develops with basic education teachers.

The analysis of the subprojects, in dialogue with the representation theory of social actors (VAN LEEUWEN, 2008) and its functionalization categories, enabled us to design a grid of naming practices used to represent different social actors involved – named, in the study, by anchor terms such as **licensure students**, **basic education teachers** and **higher education professors**. Both the governmental public notices and the subprojects created a repertoire of positionings that led us to proposition of the concept of **fluctuating positions** as a category of analysis for the explanatory critique we conducted. By fluctuating positions we understand "[...] those positions that are densely recontextualized by

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<sup>3</sup> Excerpts in italics taken from Art. 3o of Decree n. 7.219, from June 24, 2010, about the Pibid and its objectives (BRASIL, 2010).

several classifications, which position social actors in unstable ways, sometimes with meanings close to those already consolidated, sometimes with different meanings.” (MATEUS; RESENDE, 2012, p.88).

In the case of the licensure students, the data analysis showed 10 different names associated in the public notices and 19 different names employed in the subprojects. In this positioning *spectrum* some representations are closer to the consolidated positions such as ‘student’, ‘licensure student’, ‘academic’, and others are entirely new positions such as ‘apprentice-teacher’, ‘novice teacher’, and ‘new teacher’.

For basic education teachers, 7 and 13 representations were identified in the public notices and subprojects, respectively. Here, also, they are named in a *continuum* between those historically objectified and fulfilled positions such as ‘pre-service teacher’, ‘in-service teacher’, and those created by the governmental documents and recontextualized in the subprojects like ‘supervisor-teacher’ and ‘co-teacher educator’.

Likewise, higher education professors are (re)named in 5 different ways in the public notices and in 8 different ways in the subprojects. Their (dis)positionings are also discursively recontextualized in a *continuum* from pre-existing, historically consolidated positions, such as the ones of ‘educators’ and ‘researchers’, to new ones such as ‘area coordinators’ and ‘fellow teachers’.

Beyond the relevance of classification systems, our data showed that there are tensions that emerge from the discursive instantiation of such fluctuating positionings, which are revealed by means of the density of the existing namings in the texts. In the case of the licensure students, the study shows that not only are they more diversely represented and classified, but they are also more represented in new positions and in hybrid or intermediate positionings than are basic education teachers and higher education professors. If, on the one hand, this expresses the tensions typical of those who move between the two worlds – the university world, as a student, and the school world, as a *quasi*-teacher – on the other hand, it indicates licensure students’ position is the one in which the roles are less consolidated and in which the dynamics of power relations are more important. Fluctuating positions operate, in general, towards the indetermination of the social roles and indicate non-consolidated power dynamics. In this case, the bigger the fluctuation, that is, the greater the diversity in the naming and its hybridism, the lesser the power of the particular group in the recontextualized practice.

The (dis)positioning of higher education teachers indicates other tensions that the analysis of the position-practice system as an epistemological category allows us to comprehend and critically explain. On the one hand, the public notices

and governmental official documents do not name higher education teachers as much for their pre-existing and historically consolidated positions as for their new positions, particularly the position of area coordinators and fellow teacher. On the other hand, the HEI subprojects, produced by higher education teachers, recontextualize this very same role due to the teachers' positions as educators and researchers and mitigate the new created positions, specially the one of fellow teacher. Such resistance to changes in the roles revealed in the Pibid subprojects can be understood in the light of the constraints present in the structure that tends to relocate the HEI to the role of service renderers, in accordance with neoliberal policies and practices (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003).

The discursive creation of new positions enables us to suppose that the power relations are somehow discursively relocated. That, however, operates both as a possibility of opening up to differences and as a way to highlight the permanence to adhere to a project that intends to be transformative. The recognition that structures precede actions leads to the understanding that the tensions present in the recontextualization processes are typical of practices undergoing transformations, in which the new roles and social positions, though textured, have not been subjectively fulfilled. That only happens in social events, with the configurations that are characteristic of the practices that become real in the ways of negotiating meaning, acting, interacting, representing, identifying, being identified. Wenger (1998) apud Tusting (2005, p.39), in a fresh reading of Wenger (quoted by him), states that "[...] even where reifications are imposed from above, they 'must be re-appropriated into a local process in order to become meaningful'." Thus, only ethnographic studies of such practices and of the texts they instantiate can deepen the understanding of the ways in which elements of these 'old' and 'new' positions and dispositions are articulated in hierarchically pre-existing contexts.

## **Implications**

In this study, we discussed the position-practice system as an epistemological category that allows the understanding and the critical explanation of the changing networks of social practice, as a mediating category between the durable and abstract preexistent structures and the more concrete actions. We argued that this kind of analysis is relevant to those interested in learning about the constraints and possibilities present in a particular position and in investigating, in situated events, the tensions resulting from its subjective occupation by social actors.

This innovation has some implications for CDA.

In the theoretical field, the study has particular bonds with Bhaskar's philosophy of social functioning and argues for greater clarity in the type of

discursive analysis carried out by critical researchers. This does not intend to set boundaries to all the many other possibilities of interdisciplinarity, but aims to argue for the importance of a necessary coherence in the field. The stratification of social reality as an ontological framework defines important boundaries to deal with matters such as agency and power in a transformational perspective.

In the epistemological arena, the essay presents the position-practice system as an element that allows for the analysis of discursive tensions associated with particular (dis)positions in relation to the power dynamics that support particular practices and argues that the position-practice system as an epistemological category makes it possible to critically explain empirical events based on their causal powers. This is relevant when one is willing to generate knowledge about the investigated social realities, bearing in mind the situatedness of agency and the possibilities to act within particular practices.

The power to act and the potentialities to participate in social practices, once distributed among social actors, institutions and communities of practice, bear relation to ways of participating and of reproducing-transforming these same practices. The ways social actors position themselves and are positioned, as well as the effects of their (dis)positions in the investigated practices, are important to the understanding of agency as a relational-transformational endeavor, constantly in the process of becoming by means of participation in situated practices. In this sense, it is not an individual preexistent attribute, but a potentiality. The previous research findings deal with what is possible for social actors to accomplish in relation to the consolidated practices and in relation to what is possible to be re-organized in the practice-to-come.

In the methodological field, this essay argues for analyses as processes where the elements of the social practice are taken in their situatedness, bearing in mind the aspects of the structure that orients them. The situated social practices we discussed here were investigated in relation to their more abstract sociocultural structures, as well as in relation to the events experienced by particular social actors and groups.

In this sense, our contributions are strongly committed to the methodological-epistemological-theoretical interweaveness made explicit by the indissolubility between the stratified social reality as an ontological framework, the position-practice system as epistemological choice and the critical discourse analysis as a pre-requisite for a critical explanation.

MATEUS, E.; RESENDE, V. de M. O sistema posição-prática como categoria epistemológica: contribuições para a ad. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.431-454, 2015.

- *RESUMO: Estudos críticos do discurso têm se consolidado como instrumento importante no campo da crítica explanatória de práticas sociais. Este artigo propõe uma reflexão epistemológica em torno do diálogo transdisciplinar entre o Realismo Crítico – abordagem filosófica do funcionamento da sociedade proposta por Roy Bhaskar – e a Análise de Discurso Crítica na versão de Norman Fairclough – abordagem teórica do funcionamento social da linguagem e dispositivo metodológico para análise situada de textos, e, mais especificamente, aborda a relação entre estrutura, prática e ação social, tomando o sistema posição-prática como argumento epistemológico. A discussão teórica decorre de dois estudos situados: um que trata de posições híbridas e tensões entre posições objetivas previamente existentes e sua ocupação subjetiva no contexto de um movimento social; outro que trata de posições flutuantes em contexto de formação de professores/as de inglês, conforme texturizadas em subprojetos institucionais. O texto explora implicações da categoria sistema posição-prática no campo teórico, epistemológico e metodológico, e reitera o enquadre teórico de agência situada.*
- *PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Análise de discurso crítica. Sistema posição-prática. Modelo transformacional da atividade social. Epistemologia.*

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## A PROPOSAL FOR THE STUDY OF PERCEPTION: AROUND COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS

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- **ABSTRACT:** In five decades of scientific project, the French semiotics follows the path predicted by Hjelmslev (1975, p.132-133), enrolled in the last words of “ Prolegomena ... “ : the transition from immanence to transcendence, both ruled by immanence. Within its short history, there are three “ approaches “ in the development of their methodologies : intelligible, sensitive and cognitive . In the intelligible methodology, the formalism of generative process prevails; in the sensitive one, the incorporation of a sensible body; and finally, in the cognitive methodology, there is the need to move from a flesh body to a cognitive body, introducing the cognitive activity of the individual in the apprehension of meaning. Based on the theoretical tools of French semiotics and taking the nomenclature “cognitive semiotics “, used by authors such as Klinkenberg (2000, 2001, 2010), this paper aims to address the issue of perception, proceeding with the discussions of sensitive semiotics to understand how meaning is constructed through the perspective of the cognitive approach. Thus, integrating the intelligible sensitive and cognitive approaches, the “perception semiosis scheme” is proposed to understand the meaning construction process.
- **KEYWORDS:** Sensitive semiotics. Cognitive semiotics. Perception.

### The semiotics's approach

By watching Greimas's scientific career, a career that is confused with French semiotics's own history, we could establish two phases in his academic background: a briefer matorean one, and a longer, hjelmslevian.

In a first instant, inspired by Georges Matoré's social lexicology (1953), whose project was to develop a lexicology linked to society and to history, Greimas (2000) Pointed out in his doctoral thesis (main and secondary), defended in 1948 at the University of Paris Letters Faculty, that to deal with the vocabulary is fundamental to relate the lexical phenomena and the sociological data. Greimas's proposal, analyzing the trending vocabulary of the romantic period, was to describe society's history through the vocabulary bias. It claimed, therefore, a sociological perspective. As Broden observes (2000, p.XXXII), “[...] a more familiarized reader of Greimas's further works will be astonished by the genuine interest to language

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and cultural history that already enlivened his researches a decade before, and that confirmed his other texts published by him at that time.”

Since 1956, when he publishes “*L’actualité du saussurisme*” (GREIMAS, 1956), although still defending a historic and structural linguistics simultaneously, we could say that the text, like a “Hjelmslevized Saussure”, is a milestone for a larger phase on his investigations inspired by Hjelmslev. Soon after that, in the early 1960’s, with the article “*Analyse du contenu: comment définir les indéfinis?*” (GREIMAS, 1963), the author distances himself from the historicism that marked his earlier works and moves towards the immanentism and to the development of his greater project: the semiotics.

In this greater phase, inspired by Hjelmslev<sup>1</sup>, in his little history – five decades of scientific project –, it’s amazing to observe how much, even after the death of its founder in 1992, the semiotics follows the path foretold by Hjelmslev (1975), inscribed in his last words of *Prolegômenos a uma teoria da linguagem*: the passage from immanence to transcendence, both ruled by immanence. Even if it’s implied in the text the need of a redefinition of the “immanence’ concept, the semiotics was born, lying on structuralism, on the pillars of immanence and sailing the seas of transcendence without getting lost in speculations, being guided by immanence. In these big sails, as portrayed by Ouellet (1997), there are three acts – action, passion, cognition, respectively, states of things, states of mind, body states (or incarnated feeling) – that reveal the thought of semiotics in its decades of existence, with these three moments – pragmatic, thymic, cognitive – are anchored by the enunciation, “[...] that gives the active, the passive, to the cognitive, not only its meaning, but a direction to take in the world of values in which the discourses run [...]” (OUELLET, 1997, p.9).

We will name these three moments “approaches” (the inverted commas are needed, because the attempt to set phases is a mere methodological instrument, a crude reduction, once the construction of knowledge, in the semiotic field, happens in a continuous way, gathering discoveries without discarding past experiences) in the development of its methodologies: intelligible, sensible and cognitive.

Although we set three distinctive phases, it is needed to emphasize that such approaches aren’t strictly exclusive and successive, because “[...] knowledge can be objective and subjective simultaneously.” (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 1997, p.54). Well, it is enough for us to observe in recent analysis, in which a structural or intelligible view interweaves with the sensible aspects of the discourse. Paraphrasing Fernando Pessoa (1999), to think with sensibility and to feel with thought<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore,

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<sup>1</sup> In a less formal way, we could organize, chronologically and following a family structure, the following patriarchs of the French semiotics: the “great-grandfather” Saussure, the “grandfather” Hjelmslev and “father” Greimas.

<sup>2</sup> “That which, I believe, produces in me the deep feeling, in which I live, of incongruity with others, is that most think with sensibility, and I feel with thought.” (PESSOA, 1999, p.85).

as we will see further along, the cognitive perspective was already present since the studies of elementary semiotics structure. Therefore – the reservation is once again validated –, to set three phases is a methodological tool and not a real fact of successive order.

### **Intelligible approach**

In a phase in which body and sensible are strictly banished from theory, semiotics is characterized, in its meaning description, by an exclusively formal approach, trapped by the language and text system. In the intelligible phase, semiotics are strongly linked to linguistic structuralism. It is the orthodox phase in which Greimas built his “scientific project” based on Saussure’s and Hjelmslev’s teachings, a phase that is enshrined by his famous sentence “outside the text, no salvation” (GREIMAS, 1974, p.25).

In his founding discourse, *Structural semantics*, Greimas settles that the theory should ignore the text’s expression plane to lay exclusively on the content plane. To do so, the semiotics releases the meaning generative path, main instrument used by the semioticians to work in the meaning investigations.

From the moment that semiotics notices that it couldn’t fully handle its meaning only in the formal way, a new horizon is delineated: the pathematic dimension.

### **Sensible approach**

The study of the sensible allowed the body, responsible for mediation between the outside and the inside, to intervene in the meaning description. Thus, semiotics of passions and tensile semiotics gave semiotics project a new look. But sensible is also linked to the new interest for semiotics: the expression plane.

Like Courtés says (1995), the signifier (EP) is what our eyes see, and the signified (CP), is what our spirit comprehends. Thus, we could state that EP is linked to sensation; CP to perception. Therefore, when semiotics starts to concern with EP, it enters the sensible field. In this approach, the plastic semiotics and the EP pertinence levels are highlighted, aside from the EP analyses attempts from verbal texts, as in poems (FIORIN, 2003; LOPES; ALMEIDA, 2011; PIETROFORTE, 2011), because both the text and the image belong to the visible order.

As to the proprioceptive, there is no way to make reference to aesthesis. “The works of Greimas reveal a continuous search and persistent preoccupations, even if it knows significant changes in direction.” (BRODEN, 2000, p.XXXV).

It is curious to notice that the essence of *De l'imperfection* (GREIMAS, 2002) was already present in the thesis that Greimas defended in 1948, specifically on the chapter "*Les caractères extérieurs de l'état d'âme romantique*" from his secondary thesis:

The *romantic* – and we are referring to the social kind, not the romantic poet or painter, although both kinds coincide sometimes – is not satisfied in being a depositary of the secret nature has revealed to him: to him, life around him must have a sign of this poetic or even dramatic mystery that he feels in himself and that flows through the cosmos. (GREIMAS, 2000, p.274, original emphasis).

By describing an important cultural space from the 1930's, Greimas also investigates the human spirit. His concern contained in the secondary thesis, by describing the romantic soul that seeks to distract from the boredom, is repeated in the end of his life, in his last book wrote by him alone, converting the *aesthesia* privileged moments in the poeticization of everyday life. As pointed by Ramalho and Oliveira (2009), Greimas distances himself from the **Esthetics** concept linked to **beauty** and approaching **Esthetics** like aesthesis (perception through the senses, of the outside world), an experience of pleasure, of the perception of the senses, of sensuality and sensibility.

Sensible semiotics, including the passion, aesthesis and tensiveness studies, came about out of a necessity, because "hard" semiotics, rooted in structuralism, couldn't handle the wide apprehension of the meaning. As stated by Greimas (2002, p.70), "cognitively inapprehensible", by referring to the esthetic accident.

The proprioceptive approach included the sensible sided with the intelligible. It is nothing new nowadays in the semiotic field the importance of the body in the apprehension of meaning. But the issue is that such approach is still insufficient, after all, it approaches the sensible in a peripheral way (more connected to the sensations), when, in fact, to fully understand the construction of this meaning, we depend on cognitive control, that produces the perceptive synthesis (gathering of all the information from the peripheral receptors with memory, attention, mental representations, etc.). That is where stems the necessity of advancing towards the central system, in a cognitive approach, also.

## Cognitive approach

It is not unreasonable to state nowadays, in the semiotics field, that all meaning stems from the interface between language, society, history, culture. All the instances are interconnected. But how is this junction performed? How can these

instances be gathered to form a synthesis? Fontanille (2011) says the body was excluded from semiotics theory by the formalism and especially by the logicism that prevailed in the structural linguistics from the 60's. As he says it himself, the body was hidden, but not excluded, because it represented a discriminating function. Taking as an example the generative process of meaning, Fontanille (2011) states that the passage from one level to another was always set as of logical nature, with no explicit operator. The process seems to run through the levels and to contain itself. But if these conversions are considered as phenomena and not as formal logical operations, they imply a subject that perceives the meaningful contents and that calculates and projects values into them. The same reasoning occurs when related to semiosis: both in the logical and reciprocal assumption between EP and CP relation, imply at least an implicit intervention of an operator. All of this leads Fontanille (2011) to propose an "impression semiotics" (originally "sémiotique de l'empreinte").

If there is an operator in the construction of meaning, intervention that implies a subject that perceives, like stated by Fontanille, then it is not the body (sensorial organs, or peripheral system) that synthesizes perception, but the cognitive activity of the subject (central system), because the body is just the doorway to that which will be handled by the mind. Thus, sensible semiotics end up handling the subject metonymically, the body is reduced to the receptor level. Semiotics says that there is perception, there is intervention of a subject on the meaning construction, but it is not completely addressed by it.

Beyaert-Geslin (2004), when analyzing Henri Matisse's paintings, said that the observers are required two competences: the sensible competence, from the "body-flesh" that senses the multisensory perception and requests affects that escape the narrative description, and a cognitive competence, of the "cognitive body" that reconstructs the narrative scene: "[...] the matter with inter-sensory relations undoubtedly outweighs our study framework and approaches phenomenology and cognitive sciences questionings." (BEYAERT-GESLIN, 2004, p.220).

Thus, considering the double competence required from the text's recipient, sensible and cognitive, we must defend a "embodied cognition" (VARELA; THOMPSON; ROSCH, 2001, p.195), that is, a perception that depends of the embodiment. To feel is as important as to think: *sentio ergo sum* (I feel, therefore I am).

This "cognitive body" challenges semiotics to enter a new phase: the cognitive phase, this "non-linguistic place where is located the apprehension of significance" (GREIMAS, 1973, p.15). Actually, the phase we named "cognitive" is nothing more than an extension of sensible semiotics. It fits in what some authors (GUIGNARD, 2012; KLINKENBERG, 2000, 2001, 2010; OUELLET, 1994; PETITOT,

1997) have been explicitly naming “cognitive semiotics”<sup>3</sup>. Herein, semiotics is characterized, basically, by the description of meaning. And it has been covering this goal building, scientifically, models that seek to ground analysis. But there are other parameters, aside from the scientific, for a “really ‘convincing’” analysis, falling to the recipient the final word (COURTÉS, 1995, p.262).

The analysis’s scientificity is even frailer in the artistic field, “inaccessible to the scientific analysis methods” (EDELMAN, 1995, p.254). As stated by Greimas (2002, p.70), “[...] cognitively inapprehensible, this fracture in life is, later, susceptible of all interpretations.” Entitling the first part (set of poems and narrative fragments analysis) de *De l’Imperfection*, the term “fracture” stands for aesthetic accident, constituting a isotopy rapture, a “momentary lightning in everyday life” (GREIMAS, 2002, p.26), a moment that, escaping the intellectualism logic, proposes himself to the unexpected of imperfection: esthesia.

This reassures us that analysis is not a unique, finished format, because meaning is, above all, a matter of perspective, also called “vantage point” by cognitive linguistics (FERRARI, 2011, p.67). “Meaning, in itself, is formless, that is, it is not subjected, in itself, by a formation, but it is susceptible to any formation.” (HJELMSLEV, 1975, p.70). The same object can have two functions, practical and aesthetic (FONTANLLE; ZINNA, 2005), because it is not about a determination of belongings of the element of a class by its nature, it is mainly about a judgment. “From one side of the planet to the other, the significations change, sometimes, to the point of being opposites. That is the reason why diplomacy has always been a very subtle art of interpretation.” (CYRULNIK, 1995, p.122).

Fiorin (2000) illustrates the issue of the point of view with the “Two shields apologue”. Two knights, that came from opposite paths, found themselves in a crossroad where there was a statue holding a shield. While one of the knights stated that the shield was made out of silver, the other insisted it was gold. Facing this feud, the dervish reveals that both of them were right and, at the same time, none of them, because, if each of the knights had walked to the opposite side, they would see the two distinguished sides. As the apologue metaphorizes, in a single issue, we can see many faces, in the same way that meaning is a point of view. Of course that doesn’t give us the authorization to extract delirious interpretations out of a text, because “[...] saying that a text can allow many readings doesn’t imply, in any way, to admit that every interpretation is correct nor that the reader can give the text the meaning that he sees fitting.” (FIORIN; SAVIOLI, 1995, p.104). Even though there are many possible readings, the text imposes boundaries.

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<sup>3</sup> In this text, we approach cognitive semiotics in the light of French semiotics. But there is also a greater exploration of cognition in the peircean semiotics. For more details on this approach, see: Santaella (1993, 2012), Perception laboratory (<http://www.laboratoriodepercepcao.com.br/links.html>) and the Cognitive semiotics and arts philosophy study group, linked to CIEP – Centro Internacional de Estudos Peirceanos (International Center of Peircean Studies) – PUC-SP (<http://www.filomente.com.br/index2.html>).

The issue of the point of view implies a key point that bases cognitive semiotics: every description supposes an observing subject. In other words, cognitive semiotics deals with perception, which constitutes a kind of “metameaning” by explaining the meaning formation.

We have seen that the perception phenomena was already present in sensible semiotics. Well, if perception, worked upon even in the esthetic studies, is the object of cognitive semiotics, wouldn't we be complicating things by proposing an alternative nomenclature to that which sensible semiotics already dealt with? No! Because sensible semiotics is focused on sensation – further on, the elemental semiotic structure would reflect our cognitive activity –, while cognitive semiotics engulfed sensation and perception. It is needed a parenthesis to distinguish the terms.

Although many times took as synonyms, the terms “sensation” and “perception” present specificities. Even if the concepts are inverted, giving sensation a more subjective and interoceptive characterization, and to perception a more objective, exteroceptive one, linked to perceptive organs, Courtés (2005) states rightly that the sensible covers two orders: sensation and perception. Thus, even if semiotics has, from the passions, treated the sensible, the approach has resigned to the order of sensation, leaving perception merely presupposed. Always mentioned, the studies of perception are never developed, rebuilding the meaning apprehended by the senses (or by the receptor organs).

Generally speaking, sensation refers to the five senses (touch, sight, hearing, taste and smell), while perception is the synthesis promoted by mental activity.

As to sensation, “[...] it concerns the initial process of detection and decoding of the surrounding's energy [...], such as ‘hard’, ‘hot’, ‘noisy’, ‘red’, generally produced by simple stimuli, physically isolated.” (SCHIFFMAN, 2005, p.2). As to perception, it “[...] involves organization, interpretation and meaning attribution to that which the sensorial organs initially process [...], it is the result of organization and the integration of the sensations that lead to a consequence of the objects and environmental events.” (SCHIFFMAN, 2005, p.2).

Of course that this work, once again, it is about a methodological procedure, because it is difficult to make a clear segregation between sensation and perception, because they are unified and inseparable processes. As highlighted by Schiffman (2005, p.2): “When we take a familiar object, like a book or a pencil, can we feel the pressure on the fingers and palms, independently of how we perceive the object?”. The answer is no.

Therefore, cognitive semiotics justifies itself as the study of perception by addressing, in Ganascia's (1999, p.82) terms, the “superior faculties of the spirit”.

## The cognitive sciences

It is almost a trend to use the term “cognitive sciences” or “cognitive science”. But what does all of this mean? The term “cognitive” derives from “cognition”: from the Latin expression *cognoscere* (to know, that is, relative to knowledge). With this meaning, the term “cognition” presumes a science that addresses to the general study of knowledge. However, today the term has another connotation, because “not all knowledge is cognitive!” (GANASCIA, 1999, p.82). Currently, sciences named cognitive do not include all of the set of the fields of knowledge, such as geophysics, chemistry, engineering etc. The addition of the adjective “cognitive” represents something more, it denotes “[...] the superior faculties of the spirit that produce and use knowledge, much like perception, action, comprehension or memorization.” (GANASCIA, 1999, p.82). Therefore, cognitive science is also referred to as “mental science<sup>4</sup>” (VARELA; THOMPSON; ROSCH, 2001, p.15).

To the term cognitive is, thus, related the double meaning: one, ancient, in which “cognitive” would cover the entirety of knowledge; and another more frequently adopted, when the term is restricted to particular approaches that would bring together the cognitive sciences as “spiritual disciplines”.

For the treatment of cognition, cognitive sciences call upon many disciplines<sup>5</sup>, making of the investigation a multidisciplinary task. Uniting physical and psychical, matter and spirit, mind and body, extracting the laws of biology and of the psychism, cognitive sciences “are situated in the intersection between natural sciences and human sciences” (VARELA; THOMPSON; ROSCH, 2001, p.36), gathering three poles (GANASCIA, 1999): psychical knowledge (spirit), physiological knowledge (body, matter, brain nervous system) and plural knowledge (gathering and relating communication, language, society, economy), each of them corresponding, respectively and briefly, to the psyche, to the brain and to society.

As observed by Ganascia (1999), it’s not the disciplines<sup>6</sup> themselves that are “cognitive”, but the interaction between them. Cognitive sciences have to do with the family meeting and the trades made possible by it.

Because of its origin, cybernetics and artificial intelligence, cognitive sciences deal with cognitive activity erroneously, by dealing with cognition objectively, as an information process, comparing man and machine, more specifically, to the computer. Like stated by Aamodt and Wang (2009), there are no way to compare

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<sup>4</sup> Definition of mind, according to Edelman (2005, p.159): “The totality of the conscious and unconscious processes stemming from the encephalon and giving direction to all behavior.”

<sup>5</sup> “Discipline” as in a branch of knowledge.

<sup>6</sup> Same as footnote 5.



the brain with a computer, because machines are designed by engineers to operate like a factory, in which actions follow a general plan, sequential processing of information and following a logical order, while the brain works in different parallel information channels, “[...] like a crowded Chinese restaurant – always full and chaotic, with people running around one side to the other with no apparent reason, but, somehow, in the end everything gets done.” (AAMODT; WANG, 2009, p.40). Instead of the simple **input to output** passage, there is a set of determinations that rule cognition: metabolism, neural regrouping, electrical and chemical signs, blood flow, oxidation rate, experiences, memories, meanings...

Upon this complexity, a questioning rises: how to study cognition? Scientists present different answers according to their specialty: “[...] the molecule to the biochemist, the cell to the physiologist, the lobe or the sulcus to the neurophysiologist, the perception and intention to the psychologist, the computer to the computer programmer [...]” (GANASCIA, 1999, p.43). In the case of semiotics, already being inaugurated by the studies of the sensible, the focus is in perception. Perception, in reality, is the focus of innumerable approaches: rationalism, empirics, constructivism, computational approach, neurophysiology, cognitive neuroscience etc.

To address perception, subject of interest of cognitive semiotics to understand how meaning is formed, approaches some questions that relate to it: how it's formed, in Elderman (1995) terms, the spirit? How do we acquire knowledge and conscience? Ultimately, how perceptions in formed?

### **Perception: innate or acquired?**

The question above not only involves perception, but also language acquisition, construction of knowledge and the formation of consciousness. Although it is an old controversy, it is still unresolved. For some, knowledge is innate; for others, it is acquired.

Rationalistic approaches defend the innatism. For the generative grammar, that includes linguistics in biology, “[...] to consider language a human faculty and not a social phenomena means to focus it as a psychological/biological phenomena.” (ROSA, 2010, p.54). The individual would already be born with the faculty of language, with a minimal level of knowledge (initial stage called universal grammar), an “[...] innate base that will make possible to develop any language [...]. In cognitive terms, it is possible to comprehend innate as ‘that which is not learned’ or, even better, ‘that is shown impossible to learn’ [...]” (ROSA, 2010, p.54-55).

Opposing the inatism, there are the schools that preach knowledge acquisition. Empiricism, for example, is a philosophical movement originated in the

17th century that believes in experiences as a formatter of ideas, with the mental content being the summing of sensorial experiences. Dehaene (2012) contests the idea of cultural relativism, says that the brain would be such a flexible organ that wouldn't restrain human activities in the least. With that in mind, "[...] the human brain would be compared to a virgin slate, where would be printed, through the filters of the five senses, data on the natural and cultural environment alike." (DEHAENE, 2012, p.19). To the author, our brain doesn't blindly absorb everything presented to it, it is not a **clean slate** where cultural constructs are accumulated: it is a strongly structured organ that does new things with the old.

For most disciplines<sup>7</sup> it has already been proved that no pole has the primacy, once that both of them work together in the construction of knowledge. Rosa (2010) shows that the dichotomy makes no sense, as it makes no sense to wonder how much the musician and the flute contribute to music, since music comes from both. Or, to borrow Varela, Thompson and Rosch's (2001, p.37) metaphor, nature and culture "could be compared to two legs which, without them, would be impossible to walk". Darwin's evolutionary theory (2008), despite the criticisms and the possible incoherence, lies in that relation, by showing that the species genetics modifies according to the environment.

To Dehaene (2012), the old antagonism between innate and acquired is a trap, once learning itself lies on an innate and rigid machinery. To him, human nature is limited, learning being limited, not accepting "[...] the image of a virgin brain, infinitely malleable that would content in absorbing the data of its cultural environment. With all evidence, the acquired is supported by the innate." (DEHAENE, 2012, p.19-20). By analyzing the reading process through the brain, the author defends the hypothesis that of "neural recycling", showing, based on the evolutionary theory that compares the human brain with that of other primates, that men didn't possess the reading ability. What happened was an adaptation of the brain. It is the synaptic plasticity that authorizes a partial reconversion of the primate's visual cortex architecture to the particular case by the recognition of letters and words.

Despite these controversies (innate vs acquired, mind vs body), cognitive sciences recognizes the joint role of nature and culture in perception, for the spirit (consciousness) is not built from above (idealism), but from below (relating mind and body). "Consciousness requires a body and a mind in conjunction [...]: maybe consciousness is primarily sensorial; maybe it is primarily mental." (VARELA; THOMPSON; ROSCH, 2001, p.155).

For a long time there was an opposition between biological and cultural, nature and culture, but the role of contemporary neuroscience has been showing

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<sup>7</sup> Same as footnote 5 and 6.

“[...] that in men, the cultural cannot be considered without the biological and that the cerebral does not exist with a powerful influence of the environment.” (CHANGEUX, 2012, p.9).

After reflecting about cognitive sciences, it is necessary to observe their influences on cognitive linguistics, especially the concept of categorization, that will be important in cognitive semiotics.

## **Cognitive linguistics**

In the 70's, Cognitive Sciences considered the spirit as a computational machine. Thus, cognition would be a process that would function as a machine, preset to receive and produce information in a biologically determined way. As a way to find other alternatives for this paradigm of the mind as a machine, the cognitive linguistics (CL) theorists emerged.

Currently, as linguistics relies on the contributions of cognitive science, it is more and more common to hear the expression “cognitive linguistic”, “cognitive grammar”, “cognitive semantics”, “cognitive semiotics”. Approaching the basic principles of meaning construction, CL defends the idea that meaning is constructed cognitively, hence the correspondence between language and cognitive operations, considering mental operations subjacent to the use of language. Indeed, an important part of the works on CL refer to the semantic dimension of language, therefore sometimes CL is called “cognitive semantics”.

Maybe due to its double object (language and cognition), of complex and interdisciplinary character, CL is still dispersed, lacking a real unification of its results. “More than a real articulate model, it constitutes a current that gathers a set of works with common perspectives and principles.” (GUIGNARD, 2012, p.62-63). Because of its plurality, CL must respond to the complex demands of language, cognition and categorical phenomena (GUIGNARD, 2012).

Although the initiative that would place Linguistics among the cognitive sciences has as a landmark the works of the North American Noam Chomsky (ROSA, 2010), CL is established during the 1980's in the USA as a response to the generative grammar, adopted by a group of scholars unsatisfied with the chomskyan semantics: George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, Leonard Talmy, Charles Fillmore, Gilles Fauconnier.

Even though these authors break with the generative perspective, they continue with the cognitive commitment. While the generative theory proposed the language cognitive module that is independent of other cognitive modules (such as mathematical reasoning, perception, etc.), CL “[...] adopts a non-modular perspective, that foresees acting of general cognitive principles shared by language

and other cognitive capabilities, as well as the interaction between language modules, more specifically, between linguistic structure and conceptual content.” (FERRARI, 2011, p.14).

What the non-modular perspective tells us is that “[...] language is not an autonomous faculty in relation to the other human faculties like sight, hearing, memory, the capacity to think and to feel.” (ABREU, 2010, p.9-10). Language is, before that, an integrated and complex system.

By substituting the non-modular perspective to the integrative perspective, cognition becomes rooted in sensorimotor and bodily experiences. Hence the importance of the body, an instance with which sensible semiotics is concerned. As a result of this empiricist and bodily anchorage, CL is directly linked to the study of perception, “the most anthropological and also the most psychological side of semiotics” (SANTAELLA, 1993, p.16), through the bridge that it establishes between language, brain and the natural world.

Roughly speaking, CL starts from the general hypothesis that language constitutes itself from the cognitive capacity of the human being. With such a proposal, CL works, generally, with the following themes: categorization, prototypical theory, embodied language, imagistic schemas, metaphor, metonym, iconicity, frames, scripts, blending, integration network, mental space theory, and so forth. Hereafter, we will underline only one of these schemas: categorization.

Categorization is one of the most important topics in CL. To Guignard (2012), the phenomena of categorization occupies the role of interface between language and cognition. Categorizing is the process by which we gather entities (in the broad sense of the word, including objects, animals, people, and so forth.) in given categories. By listening to a song, for example, we categorize it as rock, classical music, samba, and so forth. As observed by Klinkenberg (2000), categorization is a trait of scientific procedures, that distinguish, for instance, living and non-living things; in the living, distinguishes, animals and vegetables, and so forth.

The categories can be divided in two groups: conceptual categories and linguistic categories (DELBECQUE, 2008). The conceptual categories stem from the idea of “concept”, a kind of notion that we extract from fictional or actual reality. Each individual and culture will perceive this reality in a unique way. Based on sensible experience, each individual forms concepts and names, because “[...] a same reality can have many different names, according to the point of view prioritized in the representation.” (BORBA, 2006, p.83).

An example of denomination: the concept of “horseshoe” in different languages (DELBECQUE, 2008, p.33): “*fer à cheval*” (French): “horse’s iron”; “*hufeisen*” (German): “hoof iron”. In French and English it is as if the protection instrument is connected to the whole horse; in German, it is connected to the

body part. French and German highlight the substance that is used to make the instrument; English, the protective function.

With these examples, we deduced that the categorization is linked to the culture, for each community presents different categorizations, each culture has its own particular way of representing or interpreting the extralinguistic reality. "It seems substantially proved the thesis that the visualization of reality takes place, mostly, through a perspective provided to us by the social group in which we are inserted." (PENNA, 1982, p.169). Thus, "all of the receptive act is a social entrepreneurship" (PENNA, 1982, p.39), once that it happens according to the culturally constructed models.

Lévi-Strauss (1997), in "*La Pensée Sauvage*", when mentioning the highly advanced indigenous taxonomy, demonstrates how hard it is to address categorization: "The truth of the matter is that *the principle underlying a classification can never be postulated in advance*. It can only be discovered *a posteriori* by ethnographic investigation, that is, by experience." (LÉVI-STRAUSS, p.58, italics added)<sup>8</sup>. Categorization, like conceptual systems that constitute ways of thinking, involves two types of difficulties: (I) extrinsic: lack of knowledge of the observations – real or imaginary – of the facts and principles in which classifications are inspired; (II) intrinsic: the polyvalent nature of logics which appeal simultaneously to several types of connection. The name of a plant, for example, could be originated from the shape of the leaves, from the color, from the *habitat*, from the size, from the dimension, from the flavor, from the smell, and so forth. In other words, logics work simultaneously.

When conceptual categories are inscribed in the language, they become "linguistic categories". Linguistic categories could be exemplified by grammatical categories: number, genre, grade, time, etc. Words classes (adjective, substantive, verb, and so forth) would also be another example.

Klinkenberg (2010) considers categorization a key-concept in cognitive semiotics, by deeming it as a synonym of signification (articulate sense). To categorize would be a way of turn the discontinuous into continuous. "Our finitude, facing an infinite world, obligates us to take this finite world, under the intention of manipulating it. And this simplification is categorization [...], as simplification allowing manipulation [...]" (KLINKENBERG, 2010, p.198).

Although categorization can be helpful in the mechanics of cognitive activity, it is necessary to be cautious not to think of them as rigid concept of truth. We have already seen the insufficiency of the discontinuous (or of the discreet) in the reformulation of semiotic picture. Tensile semiotics, continuing the discussions

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<sup>8</sup> Translator's note: English version found in LÉVI-STRAUSS, C., *The Savage Mind*, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. Letchworth, Hertfordshire, The Garden City Press Limited.

raised by the studies of the passions, represented an opening to the questions regarding the part of the continuous elements in the construction of meaning, incorporating gradations.

In the semiotic square, there is a semantic, firstly, binary formed in the relations of contrariety, contradiction and implication. But in the discursive level, however, there is a complex semantics, with many values. While comparing these two levels, it is easy to understand why a text brings so many gradual semantic possibilities. While the intensive approach brings the contrast “hot vs cold” (extreme opposite terms), the extensive model brings gradual terms: hot/ warm/ fresh/ cold/ glacial. That is, many intermediary positions. Maybe this passage from discontinuous to continuous might help us in future approaches.

### **Cognitive Semiotics**

The expression “cognitive semiotics” leads us into thinking in the concept of “cognition”. At this point, we face an issue, because everything is a matter of perception.

As previously mentioned, “cognition” (from the Latin expression *cognoscere*, to know) concerns knowledge. Despite the simple nature of its definition, the word “cognition” is quite complex. It involves schools and points of view. In certain circumstances, it is difficult to differentiate cognition, consciousness and perception.

In the pedagogical context, for instance, “cognitive” is an equivalent to “intellectual”, in opposition to affective. The same definition follows semiotics. Greimas (2002, p.70) considers “cognitive” as an opposite to affective. Beividas (2000) relates them as the similar pairs sensible *versus* intelligible, affectivity *versus* cognition, to feel *versus* to comprehend. Petitot (1997) refers to cognitive signification as intelligible signification. Greimas (2000, p.374), as a matter of fact, would already address this dichotomy in “*L’actualité du saussurisme*” (GREIMAS, 1956) as “thought order” (intelligible) and “lived order” (sensible).

In the case of cognitive semiotics, these oppositions do not sustain. Firstly, because in our brain there are only two entrances (VINCENT, 2010): nervous and humoral. Nervous concerning to the stimuli detected by the receptive organs; humoral concerning the mood (“thymia”, or “to feel”, psychiatric jargon adopted by semiotics) that regulates our emotions.

Both of them, nervous and humoral, regulate our way of being, our “central fluent state” (VINCENT, 2010, p.39-40), characterized by three dimensions: bodily (flesh); extra bodily (the individual’s own world) and temporal (traits accumulated throughout the individual’s development, from birth to death). Secondly, in the

complex psychophysical of perception (nervous stimuli, memory, emotion, and so forth) reason and affection, sensible and intelligible are involved. Thus, it would be more coherent to consider “cognition” not as an opposite, but an encompassing expression. As stated by Abreu (2010, p.9), “[...] human cognition encompasses language, memory, logical reasoning, emotions and motivation.” Thus, cognition would be a synonym to perception. Hence the reason why “cognitive semiotics” could also be called “perceptive semiotics”, as Jimenez (2002, p.128) claims: the equality of the two adjectives, by referring to the representation as a result of a “cognitive or perceptive process”.

But the great mystery that provokes cognitive semiotics is the issue pointed out by Gibson (1950) as the fundamental problem with perception: how does the synthesis of perceptions occur, or in semiotic terms, how is meaning constructed? Klinkenberg (2010, p.189) makes this same question: “What is the mysterious bond established between a meaning that seems to have no physical bases and the physical stimuli stemming from the outside world, stimuli that, as such, seem to be deprived of meaning?”

To answer these questions, we must start from the assumption that perception is a complex of physical or anatomical, physiological, psychological, social and cultural origins. Upon this complexity, the solution to find answers is to meddle in interdisciplinarity.

The cognitive semiotics proposal is not to surrender itself to the allure of natural disciplines, that seem to be close to explaining the phenomena of the sense through synaptic modifications, as Bevidas criticizes (1996). To comply with neuroscience’s hypothesis that states that matter exerts great influence on the spirit is not the same as stating that it takes two neurons and a synapse to form a spirit. Cognitive sciences are aware that it is not so simple to turn the dull black box of cognition into a glass box in which you can clearly see the turn of the gears, to borrow Ganascia’s (1999) metaphor. Neuroscientists do not know exactly how many levels are involved in the mental processes, maybe the “[...] molecular levels, cellular levels, organic levels (the being as a whole) and transorganic levels (that is, communication can be of many kinds).”, as suggested by Edelman (1995, p.22). Clearly observed in this passage, neuroscience does not deny the importance of the environment in the formation of our consciousness, a social consciousness. The importance of the social environment is what Gazzaniga (1995, p.10) tries to demonstrate in his work *O cérebro social*: “Metaphorically speaking, we, human beings, are more of a sociological entity than a single unified psychological entity. We possess a social brain.” The notion that the mind is a social construction stands correct “[...] because our concepts arise from our discourse and shape the way we think.” (HARRÉ; GILLET, 1999, p.26).

The access key to the phenomena of the mind is still a challenge. As emphasized by Edelman (1995), due to the complexities that involve the human being (mental, historical, social and so forth.), human knowledge cannot be completely reducible to any description. Only hypothesis are possible for this description.

The first step has been given by sensible semiotics by attributing to the body fundamental importance in the description of meaning. With this acknowledgement, semiotics studies naturally “invite” the neurophysiological explanation of the monistic agreement, vectorizing from body to mind or the “bottom-up processes to the top-down processes” (SCHIFFMAN, 2005, p.114-115).

It is not about going from a “logic of meaning” to a “biology of meaning”, but about trying to reconcile the two approaches, pretty much the same as cognitive sciences do (linguistics, sociology, psychology, neurobiology, ultimately, human and natural sciences), in order to semiotize perception. We cannot repeat the extremism that characterized the dichotomies “mind-brain” and “innate-acquired”. What we must do, following the principles of diplomacy (HAAG, 2012), is to turn our frontiers from the classic separation-frontiers into the modern cooperation-frontiers.

Interdisciplinarity is a trait of semiotics. Of course its origins are marked by its entrenchment in linguistics: Saussure, Brondal, Ternière, Trubetzkoy, Jakobson, Martinet, Benveniste and, especially, Hjelmslev. As stated by Zilberberg (2011, p.95), “[...] as broad as the inflections may be, the gremasian semiotics’ epistemology owes greatly to Hjelmslev’s teachings.” Semiotics relies on “Saussure’s *founding* insight and Hjelmslev’s *organizing* insight.” (ZILBERBERG, 2006, p.19, emphasis added). But in its route, the extensive genealogy, receiving contributions from anthropology (Lévi-Strauss, Propp, Dumézil), philosophy (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) and from artistic and literary pieces as well Tatit (2010), while referring to the relations between Jacques Fontanille and Marcel Proust, between Zilberberg and the artistic reflections of Paul Valéry and between Ignácio Assis Silva and Pablo Picasso and René Magritte to study the metamorphosis predicted in the figures.

Why does semiotics rely so much on interdisciplinarity? Because it is the “new academic culture delicacy”, as stated by Barthes (1984, p.131)? Maybe it is because semiotics doesn’t have its own object, investigating, instead, areas of knowledge in search of clarity and consistency. In this search of that which is challenging, the meaning, once again semiotics is inspired by Saussure, that inaugurates a contemporary linguistics no longer centered in the object, but in a perspective on it.

Of course our intention in this paper, by defending interdisciplinarity, is not to turn semiotics into a “jack of all trades” of science, but to search disciplines “that allow to fill the bothersome gaps and advance towards discovery” (PAIS,



1976, p.VII-VIII), after all, “[...] the interdisciplinary coexistence is not a good neighborly charm, but the requirement for the theories survival.” (BEIVIDAS, 2002, p.16). It is not about losing the leash, it doesn't mean that we will turn human sciences into a biological science. The proposed path is not the introduction the psychophysical complex of cognitive sciences into semiotics, but on the contrary, semiotics into the natural sciences to provide a specifically linguistic contribution to a domain that is not ours. As suggested by Greimas (1995, p.123) himself, it would be beneficial the “methodological injection” from the language sciences “[...] in domains where its role stands inexistent, unknown or underrated.” He even cites, as an example, the contribution that semiotics could provide to the researches on artificial intelligence.

Thus, instead of a random interdisciplinarity, the goal is to approach common issues through a coordinating methodological instrument: semiotics. after all, perception is not just an issue in neuroscience, but also in semiotics to the extent that it interferes in the construction of meaning. Therefore, to see with other lenses the “regional ontologies” (BEIVIDAS, 2000, p.35) cut by the disciplines does not mean that the linguistic origin will be abandoned. To avoid the risk of amateurism, the solution is to consider semiotics as a coordinating methodological instrument, as suggested by Greimas (1995), and to stand strictly in the role of “scrutator of language” (LAPAIRE, 2008, p.10). As stated by Pais (2000), all research inter or multidisciplinary comprises one or two dominating disciplines that define the source perspective. In the case of cognitive semiotics, involved with the complexity of perception, the dominant subject will be the studies of linguistics. Therefore, it is necessary to preserve the semiotic concepts and methods and take the structure of the language as the starting point of the reasoning of other domains. That is what we will seek to adopt by proposing a semiosis of perception, as we will see further on.

### Semiotizing perception

To apply the principles of semiotics to the study of perception, we propose as the guiding method the scheme of semiosis of perception.

**Table 1** – Semiosis of perception scheme

EP						CP = perception
Text (exteroceptive)		Sensation (proprioceptive)		Mental representaton (interoceptive)		
EP	CP	EP	CP	EP	CP	

**Source:** Made by the author.

Such scheme is based on the Hjelmslev (1975, p. 121) concept of “connotative semiotics”, a complex sign that stems from a denotative semiotics (junction of expression and content) that becomes in its entirety the EP of a new semiotic, with a new CP. “A new connoted system is a system whose expression plane is, itself, constituted by a system of signification.” (BARTHES, 1975, p.95).

**Table 2 –** Connotation scheme


Signifier		Signified
Signifier	Signified	

**Source:** Made by the author.

Even though the study of perception involves the language facts (relation between language, subject, society, culture and history), we start from a semiotic scheme to address transcendence through immanence: “[...] the linguistic theory must recognize not only the linguistic system in its scheme and its usage [...], but also man and human society present in language and, by it, to attain the acquirement of human knowledge in its entirety.” (HJELMSLEV, 1975, p.133).

The proposed scheme is also based in Pais’ (2000, p.28) “Generative route of enunciation of coding and decoding”, more specifically, in the enunciatee’s route of interpretative doings:

**Figure 1 –** Generative route of enunciator-enunciatee enunciation



**Source:** Paes (2000, p.28).

We can simplify this route, by reformulating it in the following way:

- (i) enunciator's route: *episteme* (set of perceptions), perception and text (semiosis);
- (ii) enunciatee's route: text (semiosis), perception and *episteme* (set of perceptions)

Pais' model (2000) helps us to understand how language establishes itself in a cyclical functioning. The text forms perception, and perception, in turn, forms the text. As Gregolin (2001, p.65) puts it, "the author is always a reader that appropriates texts to compose a new text". This is why, in an enunciative approach, it is possible to construct both the images of the enunciator as that of the enunciatee of the text, once that, the text, possessing a significant and communicative character, "[...] you cannot mention signification if it is not the result of a dialogue", for the text "only acquires meaning insofar as it is directed toward another subject that, because it is the recipient of the message, it interferes in it." (CORTINA, 2006, p.27). As Bakhtin puts it (1992, p.113), "[...] every word possesses two faces. It is determined for both the fact that proceeds from someone, as by the fact that is directed at someone."

The scheme of semiosis of perception here proposed is an attempt of sketching a possible global architecture of cognition, describing perception as a syncretic content resulting of the exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive instances. All of these instances interrelate to form a perception. Thus, the meaning is the result of a perceptive syncretism: physical proprieties (sound, image, text, smell), memory and so forth.

Previously, we used the exteroceptive-proprioceptive-interoceptive triad to address the three semiotic macro-phases (or approaches). We rely, now, on the same triad not to employ it in the description of historical or methodological phases, but to include them as instances of the semiotization of the perceptive system.

Expression plane:

- Exteroceptive instance: text
- Proprioceptive instance: sensation
- Interoceptive instance: mental representation

Syncretic content plane:

- Synthesis (multimedia or syncretic) of perception

The first instance (exteroceptive), having the text as its starting point, would be the "provoker" or all cognitive activity. Reminding that to semiotics the text "[...] doesn't address only linguistic texts, as commonly believed, but to everything that is materialized in any sensitive order (visual, hearing, tactile [...])." (TATIT,

2011, p.132, emphasis added). The instance of sensation (proprioceptive), through the body, would be the responsible in promoting the connection between the exteroceptive and the interoceptive: the meaning proceeds of the meanings. There is nothing new about the fact that currently in semiotics the importance of the body in the apprehension of meaning, because since “The Semiotics of Passions” (released in 1991), the mediation of the body in the meaning is highlighted. It is the body that “[...] makes the sensible sensed, [...] that gives us immediate clarity of our existence in the world.” (DORRA, 1997, p.187). But the issue is that such approach is still insufficient, after all, it approaches the sensible peripherally (strongly linked to the sensations), when in reality to fully comprehend the construction of this meaning we depend on the cognitive domain. Hence the need to advance towards the central system: the interoceptive instance. As Klinkenberg (2010, p.189-190) puts it, “the cognitive semiotic thesis is that meaning and cognition are tightly connected.” The perceptive thesis, directly linked to the categorization, is the discontinuous extracted from the continuous, is formed by the gathering of the instance’s totality: (i) text (information derived from the peripheral receptors); (ii) sensation (apprehends the text and converts it into stimuli); (iii) mental representation (memory, experiences, emotion, reason).

The concept of “mental representation” serves to exclude any kind of hypothesis in which cognitive activity is the result of a mere decoding of physical stimuli, treating the mind in a statically, devoid of any historical link to its own past, patiently waiting for a new physical stimuli, derived from the outside world, to decode the information. On the contrary, cognition, even upon a primary sensorial stimuli, involves the combination of many factors (NICOLELIS, 2011), hence the reason why we characterize as syncretic:

- (i) internal dynamic state of the brain in the moment of encounter with new stimuli;
- (ii) evolutionary and perceptual history accumulated that summarizes the multiple previous encounters of the nervous system with similar and distinguished stimuli;
- (iii) adaptive ability of the brain, that allows it to modify its internal expectations from the encounter with a new perceptual experience;
- (iv) emotional value associated with stimuli.

That is the reason why, based on the three instances, we can say that the meaning (perception or categorization) of a text is ruled and influenced by three factors:


- (i) sensation: perception varies according to the sensory systems;
- (ii) mental representation: here we would be close to that which Klinkenberg (2010, p.200) calls ideology, “[...] an useful categorization to a certain social group, and

that this group tries to impose to every semiotic community according to its own interests.”;

- (iii) attention or interest: acting as a central manager, attention promotes a selection of that which our senses receive. “The attention span allows the human being to keep the objective, the necessary data and the strategies of processing to reach the final goal present (in his mind).” (JOU, 2001, p.22). Attention would be a cognitive mechanism that controls other mechanisms. During our state of consciousness, something dominates: it is our “focal consciousness” (FIUZA, 2011, p.142), coordinated by attention. There are two types of attention (FIUZA, 2011): (i) automatic attention: that which stands out, something new that arises (for example, an animal running in the street, the fire department siren); (ii) voluntary attention: when we seek, for example, an object among many others, a search mechanism and so forth.

These factors that influence perception help us to understand the cycle of perception, following the example to what Pais’s (2000, p.28) “Generative process of enunciation of codification and decoding.” relative to the cyclical functioning of language. Perception is an update of meaning, is a reconstruction of meaning. If perception is perception of perception, it is our sensorial experiences that feed and modify (update) our mental representations. Thus, perception is the passage of a state of virtualization (mental representation), passing through the update (sensation), until it reaches realization (perception).

**Figure 2 – Ways of existence**



**Source:** Made by the author.

What the perception studies try to demonstrate is that meaning is not only constituted from the transmission of nervous impulses by the sensory system to specific regions of the brain. There is a lot to be discovered! The study of perception seems to leave us empty-handed, as if everything we try to reach out for slipped

through our fingers, leaving us under the impression that there is nothing to reach out for. Then, a question rises again: how to study perception?

The issue with this “spectrum” is comparable with enunciation. Enunciation, a psychological-social-historical-linguistic complex, a presupposed reality that can only be accessed through the enunciate. Likewise, the complex of perception can only be accessed by the text (“board” in which our experiences are recorded) and by the sensations that apprehend it.

The semiotics stood for a long time in the “primary significance” (textual meaning), a description of universal nature and formulated in algorithmic patterns. Until the intertextual level, it can offer effective instruments Generative Process for the textual level; levels of pertinence of Fontanille’s EP (2011) and Edward Lopes’ theory of interpretants). But, if even in the intertextual level it was able to “calculate”, the great issue is the perceptive sense, the “secondary significations” referred by Courtés (1995, p.144), already pointed out by Gibson (1950) on the synthesis of perception. There are procedures and schemes, but all of that in a quite disperse manner. Maybe this is the great challenge of semiotics today.

In this ascending scale of freedom, in the words of Jakobson (1973), from the lexical to the perceptive sense, there is a decrease in the possibilities of formalization of meaning. In every level they are present in the dimensions of the system, of the subject and of the history, the three places of meaning referred by Mari (2008), but in more elevated levels the incidence of these dimensions is more direct, hence the difficulty in systematization.

Thus, in the perceptive level, all of the other levels are presupposed, after all, cognition presupposes a speaking, social, cultural, historic being. In the same way that a gymnast unites many skills (strength, flexibility, motor coordination, mental state, and so forth), a text is composed of many elements: system, subject, history, culture, after all, “the material of a work is not the work” (FLOCH, 2004, p.154), but all of its complexity involved.

Finding a formula to systematize the perceptive level is the same as finding a formula to end with the global crisis. This is not our proposal. We are aware of our limitations.

## **Final remarks**

We believe that, in the sensible semiotics, the issue of perception, referred by Gibson<sup>9</sup>, constitutes a great issue to be resolved by semiotics.

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<sup>9</sup> “If all of which we perceive comes to us upon the stimulation of our sensory organs, and if, despite that, certain things do not have counterparty in the stimulation, it is necessary to assume that these latter are, somehow, synthesized. How this synthesis happens, is the issue with perception.” (GIBSON, 1950, p.24).

The scientist is then led, naturally, into dedicating himself to the interdisciplinary projects, ground to a fertile and slippery time, in which the frontiers are barely delineated – if they really exist –, seeking in the related disciplines the epistemological grounding, the methodological instrumentation and the complementation of the models, that allow to fill the bothersome gaps and advance toward discovery. (PAIS, 1976, p.VII-VIII).

Considering the theoretical path of semiotics, interspersed with interdisciplinarity, the aforementioned excerpt points a path to the resolution of this deadlock. This path could be in the relation of semiotic with cognitive studies. With the semiotics being the “lighthouse of sciences”, paraphrasing Bouquet (2009), it must take charge of everything it touches to the construction of meaning, intimately connected to perception.

Therefore, in our research, instead of restricting ourselves to report just about the developments of what has been called “Cognitive Semiotics” (that follows the tendency of great growth due to the influences of cognitive sciences, a current concern), we sketch a preliminary way of understanding the issue with perception suggesting the “scheme of semiosis of perception”.

Inspired in Greimas’ suggestion – of introducing semiotics in other domains – and based in some specifically semiotic propositions that study perception (PAIS, 2000; KLINKENBERG, 2000, 2010; OUELLET, 1997, 1994; PETITOT, 1997), cognitive semiotics emerges, to prophetically take the last words that Greimas employed in his doctorate thesis in 1948, like “a stone to the gigantic work that awaits the future researchers” (GREIMAS, 2000, p.8).

SILVA, F. M. da. Uma proposta para o estudo da percepção: em torno da semiótica cognitiva. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.455-482, 2015.

- **RESUMO:** *Em cinco décadas de projeto científico, a semiótica francesa trilha o caminho vaticinado por Hjelmslev (1975, p.132-133), inscrito nas últimas palavras de “Prolegômenos...”: a passagem da imanência à transcendência, ambas governadas pela imanência. Dentro de sua pequena história, são três “abordagens” na elaboração de suas metodologias: inteligível, sensível e cognitivo. Na inteligível, impera o formalismo do percurso gerativo do sentido; na sensível, a incorporação de um corpo que sente; na cognitiva, por fim, há a necessidade de passar de um corpo-carne para um corpo cognitivo, introduzindo a atividade cognitiva do sujeito na apreensão do sentido. Com base no instrumental teórico da semiótica francesa e tomando a nomenclatura “semiótica cognitiva”, usada por alguns autores, como Klinkenberg (2000; 2001; 2010), a proposta deste artigo é pensar o problema da percepção, dando continuidade às discussões da semiótica sensível para entender como o sentido se constrói pelo viés da abordagem cognitiva. Assim, integrando as abordagens inteligível, sensível e cognitiva, propõe-se o “esquema da semiose da percepção” para entender o processo de construção do sentido.*
- **PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Semiótica sensível. Semiótica cognitiva. Percepção.*

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# ARGUMENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF AN *ACÓRDÃO*: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, DOXA AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN A JUDICIAL GENRE

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- **ABSTRACT:** In this paper, we propose to analyze an *Acórdão* produced within a criminal case filed against a woman accused of committing the crime of self-induced abortion. To this end, we mainly built our analysis on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996) and their argumentative categories developed in New Rhetoric, and Amossy (2006), who studies argumentative discourse. When starting this analysis, our aim was to understand the research object in its argumentative structure, trying to identify and correlate aspects of the institutional framework that shapes the practice of argumentation in this rendering, the input channels of doxa elements, manifestations of visible discursive heterogeneity, the presence of social representations, construction and circulation of images of oneself and the other in discourse, and stereotyping processes. We concluded that the *Acórdão* genre is subject to a framework of strong generic and institutional constraints that shape and determine speaking conditions. We also concluded that the *Acórdão* is a genre composed by voices from the legal field (the standard speech, legal science speech and discourses produced in other Courts), and doxa elements circulating in the social environment. Therefore, there is no neutrality of the judging instances because the judicial members are also subject to shared beliefs, conventional wisdom and circulating stereotypes, like any other subject living in a society at a given time.
- **KEYWORDS:** Discourse analysis. Legal discourse. Argumentation. Doxa. Social representations.

## Introduction

In this paper, we intend to build a linguistic-discourse analysis from an *Acórdão*<sup>1</sup> produced within a judicial process, instituted to investigate a suspected crime of abortion.

The *Acórdão*<sup>2</sup> is configured as its own discursive genre within the legal field. It has an argumentative and decision-making nature, as it closes a certain stage of a

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<sup>1</sup> The analyzed appellate decision is available at <<http://www.tjmg.jus.br>>. Accessed June 12<sup>th</sup> 2009.

<sup>2</sup> An *Acórdão* is the equivalent of an appellate decision in an appeals court/higher court (MINAS GERAIS, 2009).

trial, and it is characterized by its deeply dialogic nature, for composing a network interspersed with the voices of the subjects that handled the case in the First and Second Instances of Justice (charge, defense and judgment, witnesses and defendant). It also contains the voices of legislation, legal science and judgments made in other courts.

For the proposed linguistic-discursive analysis, we relied on different authors in order to provide comprehensive theoretical and methodological instruments for the specific study of argumentative discourse. We relied on Aristotle (1998) studies, mainly regarding *topoi* or places of speech, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996), from who we will use the argumentative categories developed in New Rhetoric, and Amossy (2006), who promotes a redefinition of Perelman's rhetoric as one of the branches of linguistic discourse.

Based on Amossy (2002), we will look for linguistic features of speech in their enunciation and pragmatic aspects, referring to the situation of enunciation, the addressee's function, the common knowledge, and to the assumptions that authorize verbal interaction, as well as the efficiency of the word defined in terms of action. We are thereby adopting the "in situation" language analysis perspective, in its inter-subjective dimension, where *I* implies a *you*, even when this is not explained by linguistic marks, considering that all enunciation is necessarily directed to the addressee, looking to guide us in the ways of seeing and thinking.

We also clarify that we adopt a theoretical-methodological approach that understands criminal proceedings, to which the *Acórdão* genre belongs, as a system of articulated genres to perform activities, as postulated by Bazerman (2005). This way, we realize that during the proceedings established for the trial of a concrete case, many of the produced acts and procedural documents are interconnected, composing a dialogical argumentative web in which one's speech is present in the other's speech, constituting it to be confirmed or, else, refuted.

Applying the analysis categories to the selected *Acórdão*, we observe that the set of doxics that determines the speech situation in this pleading, acts by conditioning the subjects, who shape their word, without being fully aware of its dimension. This set is composed by the knowledge of the legal field – scientific knowledge, legitimated by the instances of producing discourses of that nature, such as academies, courts, and legislative institutions – and also by social representations on abortion, male and female genders, and the role of the judiciary in society.

## Regarding the corpus: The *Acórdão* genre and its position within criminal proceedings

The *Acórdão* selected for this analysis was produced in a criminal case, instituted for the trial of a woman who supposedly had a self-induced abortion. The court record states that the woman, presumably two months pregnant, would have introduced a probe into her uterus to end an unwanted pregnancy, contracting, with it, a serious infection, which would take her to look for help at a health care unit in the city where she used to live.

When treating the woman, the hospital's medical staff suspected an attempted abortion, and called the police. From there, an inquiry for investigation was instituted, and the inquiry turned into a criminal case, proceeding which followed the procedure of the Jury Court. Yet, according to our country's current legislation, self-induced abortion is considered a felony crime against life, and crimes of that nature are judged by a Popular Jury.

From the moment the *notitia criminis* was taken to the police until the end of the procedure, under the ritual of the Court Jury, a profusion of procedural acts and parts was produced, which, in the end, formed an argumentative dialogical network. Based on this network, the truth about the behavior attributed to the defendant was built and rebuilt by the procedural subjects.

Thinking about the prosecution from which the here analyzed *Acórdão* was taken, we can observe the formation of a genre network, consisting of several acts and pleadings. This way, the police inquiry, whose head is the Chief of Police, aided by the Civil and the Military Police, is a prerequisite for the District Attorney to submit the denunciation. It is based on the narrated facts and the evidences produced during this investigation that the Prosecutor charge drafts the denunciation document. Likewise, all subsequent parts somehow make reference to the Police Inquiry, as well as the *Acórdão* analyzed by us, in which the announcers quote excerpts, documents, testimonies that are collected there.

Therefore, the criminal proceedings can be considered as a system of genres, once the texts that make up their records cannot be analyzed separately; they are part of a network constituted by other texts that help to perform specific activities, whose responsibility belong to the participants of the system. These participants – the Law operators – use several documents that can be recognized by specific functions and forms, configuring themselves in discursive genres which are interrelated with the purpose to reach an end.

We observe that in this network, in which genre sets produced by various procedural subjects overlap, an act or document cannot be prepared without the latter. There is a strong interdependence between the practices, regulated by

criminal procedure law. This is the theoretical and methodological design that guides the analysis proposed here.

### **Enunciative conditions of the *Acórdão* genre**

In order to have a better understanding of the *Acórdão* genre and its enunciative conditions, we had an initial conceptual issue: what is an *Acórdão*? The word *Acórdão* comes from “*acordam*” (“agreeing”), which is used to start the decision text and means “get in accordance”, “are in accordance”, as to a particular factual and legal matter submitted to trial. In article 163 from the Code of Civil Procedure, we found that the *Acórdão* is the judgment delivered by the court judges (BRASIL, 1973). According to Federal Constitution, Judges who act in State Courts of Justice are called appeals court judges (BRASIL, 1988). Linking these information together, we have the first mention of this genre’s authorized producers – the appeals court judges –, as well as the institutional framework where it is produced – Courts of Justice.

According to legal definition, we can still see that the *Acórdão* is a coherent entity, even if the conviction result emanates from three judges. During a trial session held at Court, the Supreme Court Judges vote regarding the concrete case they are submitted. The final text will be drafted by a Rapporteur minister, who is drawn for this purpose.

The Court’s Internal Charter determines that the *Acórdão*, drawn up by the court reporter, will contain the identification of the president, the court reporter himself and the other judges, and also the other votes will be added to theirs. In the case analyzed here, as the judgment was unanimous and there was only a written vote of the court reporter with the other judges’ manifestation who “agreed”, only this vote was fully published. In other words, the Rapporteur minister’s vote embodied itself in the final text of the ruling.

In this text, all the essential requirements defined by the understanding of various articles are contained: article 165, combined with articles 458 and 563, from the Code of Civil Procedure and article 82 from the Internal Charter (BRASIL, 1973). They establish that the *Acórdãos* must contain: a summary (votes summary); an overview; an indication of the authority where the ruling was pronounced; a report, which identifies the names of the parts, the amount of requests and answers of the defendant, as well as a register of the main events that happened along the trial; the foundation, through which the magistrate will examine factual and legal questions; the arrangement, in which the magistrate will tackle the questions submitted by the parts.

The articulation’s final result of all parts is a full pleading, which receives the generic name of *Acórdão*, written in an extremely formal and specialized language,



full of quotations from legal texts, famous quotations from Law Scholars, references to other parts of the process itself. All these elements make it very difficult for laymen to understand it.

Still, it is interesting to clarify that the *Acórdão* is a sentence, but uttered at a second jurisdiction level. Regarding the enunciative conditions, we observe a quite clear difference between both: if on one hand, a sentence is the result of the conviction from a judge only, on the other hand an *Acórdão* is the result of a deliberation of three Supreme Court Judges, at a superior instance, that will give the final words regarding the initiated conflict.

For the argumentative analysis of the *Acórdão*, it is necessary, at first, to pay attention to the institutional framework that shapes and determines the discursive function of a genre turned towards persuasion.

In the criminal justice procedure discourse of the Jury Court, we have an argumentative framework similar to a rhetoric/dialectic game. Prosecution and defense present their thesis in an attempt to secure the judging body's adherence: the Court judge, in the first phase of the process; the appeals court judges of the Court of justice, at the appeal stage; the Jury, during the Judgment session at the Court of justice.

For Amossy (2006), the use of persuasive speech is conditioned to the socio-institutional place of its production and circulation, having the distinction between judicial, deliberative, and epideictic genres as a consequence. Thus, argumentation finds itself in a dependent relationship regarding the field from which it emerges and with the genre where it is inserted, adopting the persuasive modalities that are more relevant to it.

Thus, in criminal justice discourse, the persuasive game submits itself to rules as much as to the conditions of who can take the player's role, as well as to the proper functioning of the game. Therefore, its discursive productions are themselves subjected to severe law restrictions, and regulations and procedures from the legal field.

Considering that the factual truth is not previously given in the procedural situation, and might not even be reached at the end of legal procedures, prosecution and defense look at gathering everything that is trustworthy from their point of view, using language resources in order to persuade the judge of their thesis' plausibility. The judging instance's only role is to position itself in favor or against one side or the other side, as the State cannot avoid judgement. In fact, by accepting one thesis or the other, it builds a new version of the facts, resulting from his interpretative activity, and it is that version that acquires value of truth, thanks to the power relations overarching the functioning of the judicial institution.

Fuzer and Barros (2008) clarify that some genres, within a criminal proceeding, can only be used for a certain procedural subject. Similarly, Travaglia (2002) states that in strict institutional frameworks, there are “expected producers” of some kinds of texts. The *Acórdão* genre has the appeals court judges as authorized announcers. They are, in Bourdieu’s (2008) words, subjects that hold a social status that guarantees considerable symbolic power regarding public audiences, even in the face of first instance magistrates, given the hierarchical position they hold within the judicial structure.

The entity of interlocution in this pleading is vast, and it contains addressees who are directly interested in the referral of the matter submitted to trial. Thus, as a direct addressee, we have the defendant, whose guilty or innocent status depends on the unfolding of the trial’s proceedings. We also have the defense attorney, who can be considered as the mediator between defendant and judges, as in his role of attorney, it is him/her who stands for the accused. In fact, although he is the main stakeholder in the proceedings, the defendant is heard in specific moments, such as during the interrogations. In most situations, it is the attorney who speaks in his/her name, through pleas.

As immediate addressees, we also consider the first instance Judge, the Prosecutor, and justice attorney. As mediate addressees, we list other public servants, court office employees who will give fulfillment to the commandments of the decision and, at a broader level, society, as the main function of Law is to keep social peace.

To illustrate, we elaborated the following enunciative framework:

Frame 1: Enunciative conditions of the *Acórdão*

### **Argumentative strategies mobilized in the *Acórdão* genre**

Once the participants who operate in this rhetoric/dialectic game are established, we can reflect on the argumentative strategies they use in order to persuade. In classic rhetoric, it is considered that the speaker, based on a topic (a set of common places), tries to make his interlocutors adhere to the theses he shows them.

We should, however, consider, unlike logics or mathematics, which act inside a system of closed elements, that in argumentative speech the speaker builds up his/her arguments from various sources, which include elements of common sense as well as specialized elements from a specific subject.

These elements, generically called doxical elements by Amossy (2006), are defined as a set of beliefs and collective knowledge, constituent of the points of agreement that underlie any argumentation, and on which the persuasion effect

depends. According to the author, the study on doxical elements is justified to the extent that they contribute to the understanding of a discursive operation whose central purpose is the adhesion of an opponent, in a determined communicative situation.

This way, in the theories that study argumentation in their rhetorical aspects, to which the *perelmanian* theory and Amossy's analysis of argumentation in discourse affiliate themselves, it is considered that argumentative discourse is built on points of agreement that are established between speaker and audience. Hence, Amossy points out "[...] it is always in spaces of shared opinions and beliefs that he tries to solve a dispute or to strengthen a point of view. Shared beliefs and social representations are, therefore, the foundation of any argumentation." (AMOSSY, 2006, p.99)<sup>3</sup>.

It is interesting to observe that, according to Amossy (2006), the argumentative discourse anchors itself in a *doxa* which pervades the argumentative subject without him being aware of it. Thus, the author relativizes the rhetorical notion of the subject, according to who it would be a sovereign entity, which uses the proceedings to an explicit purpose.

Amossy also embarks on the task of giving the *doxa* concept and its correlates, such as "*topoi*", "stereotype", "conventional wisdom", "shared opinion", "social representations", a detailed marking, given the complexity and universality of these notions. Thereby, in her proposal to analyze the argumentation in discourse, the author links the idea of *doxa* or common opinion to the places of speech, conventional wisdom, social representations and stereotypes, which are the channels where it emerges in a concrete way.

Next, we will talk about these *doxa* entrance channels in the analyzed *Acórdão*.

## Places of speech and references from one field to another

In their studies on *doxa*, Amossy and Herschberg-Pierrot (1997) go back to Aristotelian *topoi* and, like other authors, such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996) and Ducrot (1989), operate a new methodological systematization around concepts of common and specific places.

The authors define the common place (*topos/topoi*) as a formal structure, a logical-abstract scheme with no determined content, which shapes the argumentation. As formal schemes, common places can be turned into the most diverse modalities, such as: "what is true for less is true for more". As a result of

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<sup>3</sup> [...] c'est toujours dans un espace d'opinions et de croyances collectives qu'il tente de résoudre un différend ou de consolider un point de vue. Le savoir partagé et les représentations sociales constituent donc le fondement de toute argumentation. (AMOSSY, 2006, p.99).

this common place, we have thoughts like: if a person can dedicate his/her time to help neighbors, he/she certainly can dedicate time to help his/her own family; the one who's good to someone, can be even better to someone closer. This concrete application of the places implies the predominance of certain values, at a given time, in a given context.

While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996) build a classification of Aristotelian places, defining them in their relation with values and hierarchies, and with the degree of compliance that they generate in the audience. Thus, they state that to support values or hierarchies, or reinforce the intensity of compliance they induce, it is possible to relate them to other values and hierarchies, but it can also be resorted to general premises, called places.

The authors make a distinction between the common places, which are wide affirmations about what is supposed to be worth more in any domain, and the specific places, which determine what is worth more in a specific domain.

To the common places, they add quantity and quality places. Places of quantity are understood as places that claim that something is better than something else for quantitative reasons. On the other hand, the places of quality appear in the argumentation when the merit of the numbers is challenged.

Applying these formulations to the studied *corpus*, generally speaking, we may claim that, in the criminal procedural discourse from the Jury trial, the *doxic* set that determines the situation of argumentative speech acts by conditioning the subjects and shaping its word, without being aware of its dimension. This set consists of their own knowledge from the legal field – scientific knowledge, legitimated by the instances of discourse production of this nature, such as academies, courts, legal institutions – and also by social representations on abortion, from the male and female genders, and the role of the judiciary in society nowadays.

In the analyzed *Acórdão*, we can see how common and specific places are invoked to support an argumentation in the context of a Criminal Procedure.

Throughout the rendering, we found many textual sequences in which the announcer makes literal quotations of excerpts from legal doctrine works, legal arrangements and jurisprudence, originating from Courts of Justice as well as many other Courts. We highlight, in these sequences that many generic statements were included, such as the one we wrote below:

Everything that is licit will be suitable to project the real truth.  
(jurisprudence STJ, fls. 123)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *Tudo que lícito for, idôneo será para projetar a verdade real.* (jurisprudência do STJ, fls. 123)

All proof is relative: none will have a decisive *ex vi legis* value or necessarily a greater prestige than the other (Guidance contained in the Statement of Reasons of the CPP, mentioned in the STJ jurisprudence, fls. 124)<sup>5</sup>

All proofs should be equally considered, with no existing hierarchy among them. (STJ jurisprudence, fls. 125)<sup>6</sup>

These are broad statements, being the result of a reasoning elaborated for a specific situation, but that are written in a way that they can be used in any enunciative situation where the same theme is approached. Therefore, due to their high level of generalization, they can be separated from the original situation in which they were produced, and fit in other enunciative situations, in order to endorse a particular case coming from a general knowledge (AMOSSY, 2006).

We also observe that, in the generic enunciation analyzed above, the rule discourse (resulting from legislation) and judicial discourse (the ones produced in situation of litigation trials), are invoked to support the reasoning of the judge who elaborated this *Acórdão*.

Maingueneau (1997, p.117) supports that “references from one field to another”, materialized in quotations, implicit schemes or captions, are really useful for a discursive efficiency, because:

[...] confronted to a discourse from a certain field, a subject finds elements that were elaborated somewhere else, which, intervening subsequently, create a proof effect. We can see a metaphor, a generalized transposition from one field to another (but not from any field to any other field), without being able to define the place of origin, literally. (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.117)<sup>7</sup>.

The “field” to which the author refers corresponds to a vast discursive domain: political, juridical, religious and philosophical. By analogy, we observe that, even inside a single field, in which there are other subfields, these references are recurrent. In the legal field, for instance, which includes a great variety of subdomains of a vast nature (such as rule discourse, discourse about

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<sup>5</sup> *Todas as provas são relativas: nenhuma delas terá ex vi legis valor decisivo ou necessariamente maior prestígio que outra. (orientação constante da Exposição de Motivos do CPP, citada em jurisprudência do STJ. (fls. 124).*

<sup>6</sup> *Todas as provas devem ser igualmente consideradas, não existindo, entre elas, hierarquia. (jurisprudência do STJ, fls. 125).*

<sup>7</sup> “[...] confrontando com um discurso de certo campo, um sujeito encontra elementos elaborados em outro lugar, os quais, intervindo sub-receptivamente, criam um efeito de evidência. Assiste-se a uma metáfora, a uma transposição generalizada de um campo a outro (mas não de qualquer campo para não importa qual outro), sem que seja possível definir um lugar de origem, em “sentido próprio”. (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.117).

Law Science and judicial discourse), transposition activities from one place to another are essential.

Authier-Revuz (2004), analyzing the presence of the “other” in the discourse, elaborates the concepts of shown and constitutive heterogeneity<sup>8</sup>. In the first case, it is about “[...] defined formulas that give the other a linguistically describable place, clearly delimited in the discourse.” (AUTHIER-REVUZ, 2004, p.21)<sup>9</sup>. The constitutive heterogeneity, in its turn, is identified by other dispersed, missing forms that are not so easy to retrieve from speech.

In the same way, Maingueneau (1997, p.75) states that:

The first [shown heterogeneity] concerns the explicit manifestations, that can be recovered from the diversity of enunciation sources, whereas the second [constitutive heterogeneity] approaches a heterogeneity that is not defined by surface, but that DA can define, formulating hypotheses, through interdiscourse, regarding the constitution of a discursive formation<sup>10</sup>.

The author understands that elaborating an exhaustive categorization of heterogeneity marks is a risky task, which can lead to errors. Therefore, he chose to elaborate an empiric classification, in which he divides, in two sets, the mechanisms that he considers useful for Discourse Analysis. This way, the polyphony mechanisms, presupposition, negation, reported speech, quotations, speaker’s metadiscourse, paraphrase, free indirect discourse, irony, and authority argument are treated by Maingueneau (1997) as facts of heterogeneity<sup>11</sup>.

We observe a manifestation of heterogeneity that can be seen in a textual sequence which will be shown later. Here, the reported speech strategy includes the arrangement, by the announcer, of other voices to report an enunciation.

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<sup>8</sup> Authier-Revuz ancora sua reflexão no dialogismo de Bakhtin, mas também na teoria psicanalítica de Jacques Lacan. Em nosso trabalho, utilizamos apenas alguns elementos descritivos propostos pela autora.

<sup>9</sup> “[...] formas marcadas que atribuem ao outro um lugar linguisticamente descritível, claramente delimitado no discurso.” (AUTHIER-REVUZ, 2004, p.21).

<sup>10</sup> “A primeira [heterogeneidade mostrada] incide sobre as manifestações explícitas, recuperáveis a partir de uma diversidade de fontes de enunciação, enquanto a segunda [heterogeneidade constitutiva] aborda uma heterogeneidade que não é marcada em superfície, mas que a AD pode definir, formulando hipóteses, através do interdiscurso, a propósito da constituição de uma formação discursiva.” (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.75).

<sup>11</sup> A heterogeneidade discursiva é abordada por Maingueneau (2008) no nível do interdiscurso. A noção de interdiscurso é desenvolvida por esse autor paralelamente aos conceitos de formação discursiva e intersubjetividade enunciativa. Em nosso trabalho, optamos por não adotar essa vertente como instrumento de análise. Por uma questão de coerência à concepção de processo penal como um sistema de gêneros articulados para a realização de atividades, em uma perspectiva sistêmico-institucional, utilizaremos apenas alguns elementos descritivos da proposta de Maingueneau na descrição e explicação da dimensão institucional do discurso jurídico.

In the excerpt below, taken from the analyzed *Acórdão*, the announcer makes a literal quotation of an author who enjoys great prestige in the legal sphere, who seems to corroborate, so far, the thesis defended by him. The announcer writes:

Therefore, teachings of JÚLIO FABBRINI MIRABETE: Sometimes, infringements do not leave traces or these aren't found, disappear, do not remain, making a direct examination impossible. Are cited, as an example, manslaughter by drowning on the high sea in which the dead person's body isn't found, the theft in which the taken object is not recovered, the rape and violent sexual assault when the case is taken to the competent authorities, days after it occurred, etc... (fls.122, free translation)<sup>12</sup>

We draw the attention to the fact that the name of the author highlighted in the sentence was put in capital letters, to underline the prominent position he occupies in the legal sphere. Here, the legal science speech is used to support the reasoning, confirming the truthfulness of the thesis defended by the speaker.

The literal quotation, which it is one of the modalities of reported speech, is considered to be one of the most classic manifestations of enunciative heterogeneity, in a way that "direct discourse [literal quotation] is characterized by the apparition of a second 'speaker' within the statement imputed to the first 'speaker'" (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.85, free translation).<sup>13</sup>

It is a "dramatization of a previous utterance", without necessarily being absolutely similar. This way, it would be naïve to believe that direct speech only intends to faithfully recount the quoted words.

When assessing the speaker's compliance degree to what is being stated, Maingueneau identifies a fundamental ambiguity to the quotation phenomenon. This aspect consists of a variation of the speaker's distancing level, explained below:

The cited speaker seems to be, at the same time, as the not-me, regarding to what the speaker delimits himself, and as the "authority" who defends its assertion. It can be said that 'what I say is true because I'm not the one saying', as well as the opposite. In the end, what is 'authority' in terms of discussion, if not the name of an absent

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<sup>12</sup> *Neste sentido, ensinamentos de JÚLIO FABBRINI MIRABETE: Por vezes, as infrações não deixam vestígios ou estes não são encontrados, desaparecem, não permanecem, impossibilitando o exame direto. Citem-se como exemplo o homicídio praticado por afogamento em alto-mar em que o corpo da vítima não é encontrado, o furto em que a coisa subtraída não é recuperada, o estupro e o atentado violento ao pudor quando o fato é levado ao conhecimento da autoridade muitos dias após a ocorrência, etc.. (fls. 122).*

<sup>13</sup> *"[...] o discurso direto [citação literal] se caracteriza pela aparição de um segundo 'locutor' no enunciado atribuído a um primeiro 'locutor'." (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.85).*

person? If the invoked authority were present, it would expose itself to the discussion and would cancel itself as such. (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.86).<sup>14</sup>

In the excerpt transcribed above, the distance level between the judge (announcer) and the author quoted by him (Mirabete) seems minimal, while the adhesion of the first to the other's assertion reaches the maximum level.

After the direct quotation of Mirabete's lessons, the announcer brings another element to confirm his thesis. This time, he literally transcribes the excerpt from an *Acórdão* chronicled by a Minister of the Higher Court of Justice, related to the trial of another case:

It is worth highlighting the venerable HIGHER COURT OF JUSTICE's position, in the lapidary appellate decision narrated by Min. Vicente Cernicchiaro: 'body of defense, according to the classic definition of João Mendes, is the set of sensible elements of the criminal act. It is said to be direct when material elements of the imputed act are gathered, and indirect, if, by any means, evidence to the existence of the criminal act. The Constitution of the Republic safeguards that the proofs can be admitted as long as they are not forbidden by the law. Thus, it remains allocated to the final clause of art. 158, CPP, or in other words, the confession cannot be fit to vie for the body of defense exam. In a modern case, there isn't a hierarchy of proofs, not even specific proofs for given cases. Everything that is illicit will be unfit to project the real truth (...)'. (fls.122)<sup>15</sup>

At a micro contextual level, in which we can note the linguistic structure of the quotations, Maingueneau (1997) points out that verbs that introduce reported speech, as "[...] depending on the chosen verb (suggest, state, claim...), the whole interpretation of the quote will be affected." (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.88).<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> *O locutor citado aparece, ao mesmo tempo, como o não-eu, em relação ao qual o locutor se delimita, e como a 'autoridade' que protege a asserção. Pode-se tanto dizer que 'o que enuncio é verdade porque não sou eu que o digo', quanto o contrário. O que é afinal 'autoridade' em matéria de discussão, senão o nome de um ausente? Se a autoridade invocada estivesse presente, expor-se-ia à discussão anulando-se como tal. (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.86).*

<sup>15</sup> *Vale posicionamento do colendo SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA, em lapidar acórdão relatado pelo Min. Vicente Cernicchiaro: 'Corpo de delito, na clássica definição de João Mendes, é o conjunto dos elementos sensíveis do fato criminoso. Diz-se direto quando reúne elementos materiais do fato imputado. Indireto, se, por qualquer meio, evidencia a existência do acontecimento delituoso. A Constituição da República resguarda serem admitidas as provas que não foram proibidas por lei. Restou, assim, afetada a cláusula final do art. 158, CPP, ou seja, a confissão não ser idônea para concorrer o exame de corpo de delito. No processo moderno, não há hierarquia de provas, nem provas específicas para determinado caso. Tudo que ilícito for, idôneo será para projetar a verdade real (...)'. (fls. 122).*

<sup>16</sup> *"[...] em função do verbo escolhido (sugerir, afirmar, pretender...), toda a interpretação da citação será afetada." (MAINGUENEAU, 1997, p.88).*



In the quotation transcribed above, the announcer introduces the speech of the Minister of the Court of Justice with the following expression: “It is worth highlighting the venerable SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE’s position, in the lapidary appellate decision narrated by Min...”<sup>17</sup>. In this case, the verb “to be worth” conveys the assumption that the opinion of the quoted announcer endorses the view of the one who quotes, being, therefore, useful to avoid any doubt that could subsist on the fact.


It is also highlighted that the qualifier used to designate where the quotation comes from – the “Venerable SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE”<sup>18</sup> – strengthening the correctness of the proposition and the argumentative value of the authority of who said it. This way, it is also worth the note that the degree of remoteness between the appeals court judge and the quoted author is minimal, while the acceptance level of the first to the proposition of the latter is highest.

To understand the arrangement mechanism of voices in this last excerpt transcribed, we will call the appeals court judges that made the report  $l_1$  (announcer 1) and the analyzed *Acórdão* will be called  $A_1$  (*acórdão* 1).  $A_1$  and  $l_1$  will serve as examples. The other locutors arranged by  $l_1$  will be called  $l_2, l_3$  and so on. We will see how different announcers fit, in different enunciative situations, in a pleading with a view to persuade the audience.

$l_1$  quotes another *acórdão* ( $A_2$ ), produced by another announcer ( $l_2$ ), which was a decision-maker in another legal action, but in a different enunciative situation, to support its argument. In this quoted *acórdão* ( $A_2$ ),  $l_2$  builds his arguments based on the teachings of renowned authors of legal science; he mentions the provisions of the law, mainly the Federal Constitution and Criminal Procedure Code and also mentions a third *acórdão* ( $A_3$ ).

As follows, we have a schematic table of these direct and indirect quotations:

**Table 1** – Reported speech in the *Acórdão*



**Source:** Made by the author

<sup>17</sup> “vale posicionamento do colendo SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA, em lapidar acórdão relatado pelo Min...”.

<sup>18</sup> “Colendo SUPREMO TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA”

Regarding dialogism in the formation of the judgment, we transcribed the explanatory note of Bittar (2009, p.316-317):

If no discourse comes *ex nihilo*, it is because there are rules and coercion that prevent the arbitrariness of a unilateral decision, so that, close to any decision, a conjuncture of elements that ends up characterizing its own corporeality is invoked. Proofs, writings, documents, texts, rule and fact interpretations are found to form a set of instruments through which, and this within rules (procedural proceedings) that discipline the means, moments, ways, techniques... of affecting the rational persuasion of the judge. Other rules also govern the means of appraising proofs, texts, rules... by the judging entity, from the moment that, coming from within that textuality, he extracts the decision-making judicial discourse.

Continuing the analysis on the use of reported speech in our *corpus*, we proceed to approach, from this point on, how it works as an argumentative manifestation mechanism of social representations and stereotypes in speech.

### **Reported speech, social representations and stereotypes**

Within the fluid and undetermined set of the familiar and shared “already known”, “already said”, Amossy (2006) draws the attention to the social representations that emerge from speech, in a more or less implicit way.

Based on Moscovici (2003), Leyens (1986) defines social representation as “[...] a social construction process of reality that, schematically, tries to explain and categorize the reality around us.” (LEYENS, 1986, p.362)<sup>19</sup>. The author emphasizes that social representations are not only beliefs, but also a way to shape reality and, as such, affect our behaviors.

In the argumentative analysis proposed by Amossy, such as in the French tradition of Discourse Analysis, social representations that emerge in a more or less implicit way during the speech are understood by the notion of stereotype:

[...] In the narrow sense of the word, stereotypes can be defined as a simplified and frozen collective representation or image of living beings or things that we inherit of our culture, and that determine our attitudes and our behaviors. Considered as a belief and as an

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<sup>19</sup> “[...] um processo de construção social do real que, de maneira esquemática, tenta explicar e categorizar o real que nos rodeia; este processo vai, por sua vez, regular a dinâmica da sociedade.” (LEYENS, 1986, p.362)

opinion, it always falls within the pre-constructed and often related to prejudice. (AMOSSY, 2006, p.121)<sup>20</sup>

The stereotyping elements, in turn, are identified through their discursive components, such as lexical choices, circulating images, and the study of what is implicit.

Amossy and Herschberg-Pierrot (1997) point out that in all subjects we can observe a tendency to treat stereotyping as something pejorative, which makes it difficult to freely understand the reality, as well as to produce something original and innovative. Differently, the authors propose to replace the ideological analysis of stereotypes by an approach in which it is considered an inevitable phenomenon, without which the operation of categorization, generalization or identity construction of the interlocutors would be possible (AMOSSY, 2006).

For the efficiency of the word, in this case measured based on its power of persuasion, stereotyping is very important, as well as other *doxical* elements. Stereotyping consist of thinking reality through a preexisting cultural representation, in which the community evaluates and sees the individual and classifies him according to a pre-built model. Thus, “[...] stereotypes allow to designate the ways of thinking belonging to a certain group and the global contents of the doxa sector in which it is located.” (AMOSSY, 2005, p.126)<sup>21</sup>. From this perspective, a subject can only represent the others if relating them to a social, ethnic or political category, such as, for instance, the social, communist, liberal, feminist class, etc.

The stereotype is not always uttered with all its attributes, which requires a “deciphering” activity by the interlocutors, in which the characteristics of the target group must be identified and related to an already existing cultural model, which results in the dialogical character of stereotyping.

Amossy (2006) states that, in most cases, the discourse data are indirect or implicit, sparse and lacunar, in such a way that stereotypes need to be reconstructed from different elements, to identify a typical feature. In the same way, Authier-Revuz (2004, p.17-18, free translation) postulates:

In the case of the (or, without a doubt ‘various’) free indirect discourse(s), irony, euphemisms, imitation, allusion, reminiscence, stereotype (...) the presence of the other is not explicit by its sole

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<sup>20</sup> “[...] au sens restreint du terme, le stéréotype peut se définir comme une représentation ou une image collective simplifiée et figée des êtres et des choses que nous héritons de notre culture, et que détermine nos attitudes et nos comportements. Considéré tantôt comme une croyance et tantôt comme une opinion, il relève toujours du préconstruit et s’apparente souvent au préjugé.” (AMOSSY, 2006, p.121).

<sup>21</sup> “[...] o estereótipo permite designar os modos de raciocínio próprios a um grupo e os conteúdos globais do setor da doxa na qual ele se situa.” (AMOSSY, 2005, p.126).

presence in the phrase: the 'mention' that doubles the use that is done of the words is only possible to recognize, interpret, from the recoverable proofs in the discourse dependent of its exterior.<sup>22</sup>

According to Authier-Revuz (2004), this way of "playing with the other" operates in the implicit, unrevealed, enigmatic space, and is used a lot in speeches of a rhetorical nature. It is a risky activity, because "deciphering" can be given in accordance with the announcer's project, or not. For instance, a possible need of "deciphering" in the analyzed *Acórdão*:

In the case of the records, we can see that medical proof was striking, not only in the depositions of the doctors, alarmed by the rising numbers of abortion cases in the city, but also by adding the sheets, corresponding to the interment of the Appellant [woman accused of self-induced abortion] at the ER, all of this because of the complications that would come from an abortion. (fls.126).<sup>23</sup>

In this excerpt, we can see that there was a shared belief that women were, increasingly, submitting themselves to self-induced abortion procedures in the city where the trial was submitted. This belief was disseminated among the people participating to the procedural relation and was used at the opening of the Police Inquiry, when *Santa Casa* employees were summoned to testify. On the basis of this belief, the announcer of the analyzed rendering (appeals court judge) produced the above statement.

In a deciphering activity of the lacunar elements, we can say that the defendant was related to a group of women who, hypothetically, had been practicing self-induced abortion in the city. These women shared the characteristic of being economically and socially disadvantaged, as they used dangerous devices to provoke fetal death, such as the introduction of a probe into the uterus or ingestion of abortifacient drugs, submitting themselves, in all cases, to serious risks of death.

When suffering complications of these risky procedures, those poor women would look for medical care. The public employees' attitude to denounce the defendant to Police authorities is related to the belief that there needs to be a

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<sup>22</sup> "No caso do (ou, sem dúvida, 'dos') discurso(s) indireto(s) livre(s), da ironia, da antífrase, da imitação, da alusão, da reminiscência, do estereótipo (...) a presença do outro não é explicitada por presenças unívocas na frase: a 'menção' que duplica o uso que é feito das palavras só é dada a reconhecer, a interpretar, a partir de índices recuperáveis no discurso em função de seu exterior". (AUTHIER-REVUZ, 2004, p.17-18).

<sup>23</sup> No caso dos autos, constata-se que a prova médica foi contundente, não só nos depoimentos dos médicos, alarmados com o crescimento dos casos de aborto na cidade, bem como na juntada da ficha correspondente ao internamento da Recorrente [mulher acusada de fazer o autoaborto] no Pronto-Socorro, tudo por causa das complicações que teriam nascido de um quadro de aborto. (fls. 126).

punishment for those who practice a socially reprehensible conduct, eventually to serve as an example to other women<sup>24</sup>.

The need for stereotyping is higher to the argumentative functioning than plausibility to check the presented arguments. In the case of the woman being investigated in this trial, when identified as belonging to a determined female group, the addressee's deductive reasoning does not cause estrangement, reasoning according to which: many disadvantaged women were inducing on-site abortion. The defendant had abortion symptoms. Therefore, the defendant voluntarily interrupted her pregnancy.

In the argument typology of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996), we believe that this form of argument would receive the classification of almost logical argument, built on the basis of a transit relationship, according to which it is possible to claim that there is the same relation between terms "A and B", "B and C" and "A and C". This kind of construction is known as a rhetorical syllogism, although it isn't a perfect reasoning, as its premises are distorted making it difficult to acquire a logical aspect.

There is another excerpt from this *Acórdão* that seems interesting to illustrate a reconstruction activity of lacunar clues speech. See hereunder:

Hence, as strong clues exist on the authorship and materiality, there was no other solution for HE Judge of the lower court than to denounce, preserving the constitutional competence of the Jury trial (CF/1988, art. 5, XXXVIII). (fls.131).<sup>25</sup>

In this fragment, the appeals court judges associates the first level magistrate (HE Judge of the lower court), who produced the defendant's decision to arraign, to the social group composed of judges invested by the State, having the responsibility to strive for law enforcement and the proper working of the judiciary system. As a member of such a prominent and select group, this magistrate wouldn't be able to remain inert when confronted to self-induced pregnancy proofs: his/her role, as a law enforcer and guardian of society and the judiciary institutions, is to put the suspect on trial, leaving little or no space for showing his/her subjectivity regarding law enforcement.

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<sup>24</sup> Nesse sentido, parece interessante registrar a conclusão de Debuyst, em pesquisa sobre as representações sociais da Justiça em Portugal, em que o autor identifica um sistema de filtragem do aparelho judiciário, responsável pela criação de bodes expiatórios: "[...] por um lado, existe uma zona, a que chamamos de 'infrações ligeiras' que poderiam ser facilmente descriminalizadas e face às quais o aparelho judiciário aparece como inadequado. Por outro lado, [...] existiria uma outra zona (as infrações graves) em que se deveria sobreinvestir ao nível da repressão e da vigilância." (DEBUYST, 1986, p.374).

<sup>25</sup> *Daí que, existindo fortes indícios sobre a autoria e a materialidade, outra solução não restava ao MM. Juiz a quo que pronunciar a denunciada, preservando a competência constitucional do Tribunal do Júri (CF/1988, art. 5, XXXVIII). (fls. 131)*

In some texts, on the other hand, the stereotype is seen in an explicit way, when we realize that its constituents are shown in a visible way. Therefore, there is no need for the addressee to go into the more complex “deciphering” activity, or filling gaps. In the analyzed *Acórdão*, we highlighted, to this purpose, the treatment forms used to refer to the judges, prosecutors, appeals court judges, attorneys and lawyers, in opposition to the forms used for the defendant. As her place is devoid of any prestige, there are no qualifications for the defendant, other than the ones established by law, such as: defendant, accused, investigated, indicted, nominated, investigated plaintiff and examined.

As for Members of Justice, who carry a great symbolic capital, already crystallized formulas are used, repeated for a very long time without announcers questioning their meaning and that can, usually, be arbitrarily abbreviated, as the recipients of the rendering are able to automatically recognize their meaning.

In the same way as the subjects who are members of Justice, their acts, bodies and renderings are also frequently followed by qualifiers, such as: HE Judge; Honorable District Attorney; Eminent court decision; [venerable] Supreme Federal Court; [distinguished] Court of justice of Minas Gerais; Illustrious Prosecutor.

Until now, we spoke about the function of stereotyping for the plausibility of the argumentative speech. Here, we propose a reflection on the role of stereotypes during the image building process of ourselves or others, which circulate in the argumentative speech.

### ***Ethos* and stereotyping**

Based on Amossy (2005), we can affirm that the image construction process happens like this: in the constitutive relation between argumentative parts, the *doxa* acquires the meaning of prior knowledge that the audience has of the speaker. By starting to speak, the speaker gets an idea of his audience and how he/she will be perceived; thus supporting his/her arguments on *doxa* and shapes his/her *ethos* based on the collective representations, which he/she believes to have a positive value in eyes of his/her audience. According to the author:

The speaker adapts his self-presentation to the collective schemes that he believes to be internalized and valued by his target audience. He does not only do this regarding his own person (frequently, it is not fashionable to speak of ourselves), but also by the modalities of his enunciation. Only then, he tasks the receptor with getting an impression of the speaker relating him to a known category. The

discourse gives him all the elements he needs to compose a portrait of the addressee, but he presents them in an indirect, disperse, lacunar or implicit way. (AMOSSY, 2005, p.126-127).<sup>26</sup>

Thus, in the excerpt analyzed above, when the appeals court judge states that “there wasn’t any other solution for HE the Judge of the lower court than to pronounce the accused”, he/she is offering clues so that the addressee has a positive image of the judge, linking him to the category of members of the Judiciary Power, which carries out its duties with care and attention. The same way, when agreeing with the position defended by this “competent and cautious” judge, the appeals court judge also claims the same virtue for himself/herself as for the one he attributes to his/her colleague of an inferior instance.

In the same way, the qualifiers used to name members of Judiciary and the acts they perform during a trial can be understood in their argumentative function of building positive images of the main procedural subjects, in opposition to the defendant, whose image was linked to categories usually suffering prejudice in the social environment during the action (in the case records from where the analyzed *Acórdão* was taken, it says the accused is a black, single, homeless and jobless mother, and that she had already been sued for drug trafficking).

When explaining the role of the stereotype as a scheme activated by the receiver and linked to a known cultural model, Amossy (2006) has, however, a proviso regarding its contribution to the efficiency of speeches with a persuasive aim. Relativizing its effects, the author defends that stereotypes favor the enterprise of persuasion, but can also impair it some situations, as we can see below:

If, indeed, the addressee easily detects the social representations that belong to an adversary group in the discourse or that, for one reason or another, it seem inadmissible, the sole presence of the stereotype will be enough to disqualify the positions of the arguer. If, on the other hand, he adheres to the images that are presented to him, he can let himself get carried along by the argumentation that feeds on the representations coming from his own vision of the world. (AMOSSY, 2006, p.123).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> “O orador adapta sua apresentação de si aos esquemas coletivos que ele crê interiorizados e valorizados por seu público alvo. Ele não o faz somente pelo que diz de sua própria pessoa (frequentemente, não é de bom-tom falar de si), mas também pelas modalidades de sua enunciação. É então que ele incumbe o receptor de formar uma impressão do orador relacionando-o a uma categoria conhecida. O discurso lhe oferece todos os elementos de que tem necessidade para compor um retrato do locutor, mas ele os apresenta de forma indireta, dispersa, lacunar ou implícita”. (AMOSSY, 2005, p.126-127).

<sup>27</sup> “Se, com efeito, o alocutário detecta facilmente no discurso as representações sociais que pertencem ao grupo adverso ou que, por uma ou outra razão, lhes parecem inadmissíveis, a simples presença do estereótipo será suficiente para desqualificar as posições do argumentante. Se, ao contrário, ele adere às imagens que são

It seems interesting, at this point, to think about the word efficiency problem, by the articulating discourse, mainly in the argumentative modality, subject status and institutional network.

According to Bourdieu (2008), to be heard and respected is a matter of authority, that depends on the status that the announcer holds in the social structure. Maingueneau (2008), in his turn, understands that the enunciators themselves define their “status” and “way of speaking”, putting themselves and the listener in a certain social position, stating their relation with a given knowledge and legitimating their speech. As for Amossy (2005), the speaker’s status and institutional frame in which he speaks are important, but do not, per se, guarantee the effectiveness of the word. Therefore, the image building mechanism becomes essential to the enterprise of persuasion.

Regarding the analyzed case-files, judges, prosecutors, appeals court judges, as well as members of the Judiciary, due to their own status and the position they occupy in the Judiciary institution, seem to have a great advantage compared to the defendant, regarding previous images of her circulating in the social environment. However, this is not enough to guarantee the success of their thesis in any argumentative struggle defined by the case’s boundaries. The prior image needs to be corroborated by discursive elements, as those shown above.

In order to “strengthen” the prior image through discursive elements, we believe that the strategy used by the appeals court judge in the analyzed statement is the quotation of renowned legal literature authors, Court decisions uttered in other cases, and legal provisions. As shown before, the voice arrangement mechanism is important in order to give plausibility to the thesis defended by appeals court judge. However, it also seems to have consequences for the constitution of his/her good image of studious jurist, committed to the evolution of Legal Science, which seeks to base his/her decisions on the latest doctrine and jurisprudence.

## **Final Considerations**

For the linguistic-discursive analysis of the selected *corpus*, we worked with Amossy’s theoretical construction, which studies argumentation in discourse, together with Perelman’s argumentation theory, known as New Rhetoric, without excluding other theories which could contribute to a deeper and broader view of the complexity of our research object.

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*colocadas sob seus olhos, ele poderá se deixar levar pela argumentação que se alimenta das representações procedentes de sua própria visão de mundo”. (AMOSSY, 2006, p.123).*



When we analyzed the *Acórdão*'s argumentative structure, we tried to identify and correlate aspects such as the institutional framework that shapes the argumentation exercise in this kind of utterance, the input channels of doxical elements, manifestations of shown heterogeneity, the presence of social representations, construction and circulation of images of oneself and others during speech and the stereotyping processes. All these "categories" were analyzed according to how they were used in a discourse of persuasive aim, as is the *Acórdão*.

We broadly concluded that the *Acórdão* genre, produced within a legal discourse field, is submitted to strong generic and institutional restrictions. As we took into account how the institutional complex works for characterizing discursive activity, word efficiency could not be approached, except through the articulation of speech, especially in the argumentative modality and institutional complex.

We also concluded that even an utterance coming from voices inside the legal field (rule discourse, Legal Science discourse and discourses produced in other trials), which intends to be neutral and impartial, is impregnated with values and doxical elements coming from the social environment.

Therefore, as much as there is an alleged impartiality or neutrality of the judging instances regarding the submitted cases, this is an unachievable ideal, as the judicial members are also exposed to shared beliefs, conventional wisdom, circulating stereotypes, like any other person who lives in certain society, at a certain time.

PAULINELLI, M. de P. T.; SILVA, A. dos R. Análise argumentativa de um acórdão: quadro institucional, doxa e representações sociais em um gênero judicial. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.483-505, 2015.

- *RESUMO: Neste artigo, propomos a elaboração de uma análise linguístico-discursiva de um Acórdão, produzido no interior de um processo criminal instaurado para apurar suposta prática de aborto voluntário por uma mulher. Para isso, apoiamos-nos principalmente nos constructos teóricos de Amossy (2006), de estudo da argumentação no discurso, em paralelo com a Teoria da Argumentação de Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996), conhecida como Nova Retórica. Ao emprendermos essa análise, objetivamos a compreensão do objeto de pesquisa em sua estrutura argumentativa, buscando identificar e correlacionar aspectos como o quadro institucional que modela o exercício da argumentação nesse proferimento, os canais de entrada dos elementos dóxicos, as manifestações de heterogeneidade mostrada, a presença das representações sociais, a construção e a circulação de imagens de si e do outro no discurso e os processos de estereotipia. Concluímos que o gênero Acórdão está sujeito a um quadro de fortes restrições genéricas e institucionais, que modela e determina as condições do dizer. Concluímos ainda que se trata de um gênero formado a partir de vozes provenientes do próprio campo jurídico (discurso da norma, discurso da ciência do direito e discursos produzidos em*

outros Tribunais), e de elementos dóxicos circulantes no meio social. Portanto, por mais que se postule uma pretensa neutralidade das instâncias julgadoras diante dos casos que lhes são submetidos, esse é um ideal inatingível, pois os membros do judiciário também estão sujeitos às crenças compartilhadas, às ideias recebidas, aos estereótipos circulantes, como qualquer outro sujeito que viva em dada sociedade, em certo momento histórico.

- **PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Análise do discurso. Discurso jurídico. Argumentação. Doxa. Representações sociais.*

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# THE MEANINGS OF WRITING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: TEXT PRODUCTION IN THE DISCOURSE OF TEACHERS AND STUDENTS FROM PORTUGUESE AND ENGLISH GRADUATION CLASSROOMS

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- **ABSTRACT:** Following a growing tendency of works in the field of language studies and education that investigate the written text production of students in Higher Education and the difficulties they present to produce texts that are communicatively relevant and successful, we aim at examining the work with text genres in the production of written texts in Higher Education. In this sense, we will focus particularly on the exam of two issues: the purpose of the text genres produced by students of Portuguese and English graduation courses and the possible interlocutors of these genres produced by them. Data were collected through questionnaires given to students and teachers of a public Higher Education institution. This paper adopts the conception of language as a process of interaction and the reflections on discourse genres from the studies of the Bakhtin Circle, as well as discussions about the genres and their teaching presented by other scholars. The results show that the teaching of text production in the context of Higher Education classroom caters mainly to the discipline specificities, revealing yet few initiatives that enable authentic situations of communicative interaction.
- **KEYWORDS:** Text genres. Higher Education. Portuguese and English graduation course. Teachers and students.

## Introduction

The written text production of Higher Education students and the difficulties they present to produce texts that are communicatively relevant and successful have been widely discussed in academic area by researchers in the field of

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language studies in its various branches, and also by education scholars. Among researchers interested in this subject, are, in the field of language studies, researchers of the *Grupo de Pesquisa em Produção e Ensino do Texto* (GPET), which, besides the diagnosis of the writing difficulties of students in Higher Education, has been devoted to the investigation of the written texts of this level of education, contemplating issues that vary from the study of the product of this writing – focusing, for example, in citation forms, paraphrasing strategies, enunciative responsibility, semantic processes, argumentative processes – to the treatment given to the genres, teaching methodologies, among others.

As Higher Education Teachers, engaged in the studies of text, discourse and textual-discursive analysis, we intend in this paper to present empirical data about the work with text genres<sup>1</sup> in the practice of written text production in Higher Education. To do so, we will focus on the examination of two issues in particular: the purpose of genres produced by graduation students of Portuguese and English languages and the possible interlocutors of the text genres produced by them. In other words, following discussions on the production of texts, especially those made by Geraldi (2002) in the 80s, we intend to examine the meanings that the students in Higher Education, specifically those in Portuguese and English graduation classes, found for the texts they produce. If Geraldi (2002) pointed out that, in that decade, the texts produced at school level configured an artificial use of language, we intend to observe how the written text production develops in Higher Education nowadays, especially after the most recent discussions of genres and teaching, also investigating whether this practice sets, to some extent, a situation of authentic, real language use.

The data presented here constitute part of the data from the institutional research *The social function of the texts worked in mother and foreign language teaching: a study about the discourse genres adopted in Secondary and Higher Education (A função social dos textos trabalhados no ensino de língua materna e estrangeira: um estudo acerca dos gêneros discursivos adotados no Ensino Médio e Superior*, SOUZA, 2008), linked to the *Grupo de Pesquisa em Produção e Ensino do Texto* (GPET), from the Portuguese and English Department of the *Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte/ Pau dos Ferros Campus*, whose general objective was investigating the work done by teachers and students of Portuguese (mother language) and English (foreign language) on the discourse genres in Secondary and Higher Education classes.

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<sup>1</sup> Although acknowledging the existence of discussions on the distinction between the terms “text genres” and discourse genres and the implications of this, we chose not to establish any distinction between them in the present work. Even aware that the theoretical-methodological perspective of the Bakhtin Circle, which we also adopt here, uses the term “discourse genres”, the two terms are taken here as equivalent. The term “text genres” is more used in this study because, in relation to teaching, most authors to whom we turn here use it, since they are, in our view, most affiliated with the theoretical perspectives that think the didactic transposition of genres.

As part of this exploratory and descriptive research, the data presented here were collected through questionnaires (with open and closed questions) applied to graduation teachers and students from the 7<sup>th</sup> semester of the Portuguese and English graduation courses of a public university in 2008. In the work, we tried to correlate the responses of teachers with those given by the students to the two issues cited above. It is important to emphasize that we are dealing with the words of our informants. Thus, we believe that if the discourses of these informants do not necessarily reflect what happens in the classroom practice, such sayings refract, in different ways, the way these individuals see the work with the text in the classroom.

For theoretical basis, this work, along with the research from which it results, adopts the conception of language as interaction arising from studies of the Bakhtin Circle, and its reflections on discourse genres, and also discussions about genres and their teaching based on authors like Dolz and Schneuwly (2004), Antunes (2002), Cristovão (2002), Paltridge (2001), among others.

### **The text production and the teaching of text genres**

In the last decade, more specifically after the publication of the National Curriculum Parameters (*Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais*, PCN, BRASIL, 2001), studies on text genres began to echo in the research developed in our country, especially in the field of Text and Discourse Studies, focusing on the relation with language teaching and learning. Such studies have contributed, among other things, to: i) prioritize communicative interaction between the individuals involved in the actual communication process; ii) defend the meaningful work with texts in language teaching and learning process; and iii) present the educational proposals that contributed to the reflection about the teaching of text production, at schools and in Higher Education.

Particularly with regard to the production of written texts in Higher Education, we believe it is of great importance to guide our teaching activities based on the understanding that our students must produce texts that materialize living discourses, verbally interacting with each other through utterances and not through isolated sentences or single words. This comprehension finds support in the idea that any production of texts must be based on the interaction with others, in real situations of interaction. It is an understanding that is shared by Bakhtin (2003, p.265), according to whom “[...] language enters life through concrete utterances (which manifest language) and life enters language through concrete utterances as well.”

From this conception comes the conviction that if the concrete utterances comprise the diverse genres produced in social spheres, as postulated by Bakhtin

(2003), the work with the production of written texts in school cannot escape the commitment to the exploration of the genre diversity to which the individuals resort in order to interact with each other. In this sense, many scholars have proposed works with genres, especially in terms of what is proposed by the group of researchers from Geneva, among which are Bronckart, Schneuwly and Dolz.

Schneuwly and Dolz (2004, p.74) associate genres to language teaching, based on the assumption that “[...] it is through the genres that language practices are materialized in the activities of the learners.” They also state that the educational setting should be an appropriate place to make the situations of text production and reception authentic, not like those in which the teacher asks a student to write a letter to the editor, a letter that will not be sent, or write an article for a site that will not be published etc., common situations in classrooms at all education levels. Within authentic situations of language use, conceiving the work of students with the production of oral and written texts is a big challenge for many teachers, and has called researchers of the area, as those of the group of Geneva and others like Paltridge (2001), Antunes (2002), Marcuschi (2008) Biasi-Rodrigues (2002) and Cristóvão (2002), to think about some alternatives. Although these authors are situated in different theoretical perspectives and they do not necessarily focus on the teaching of genres in Higher Education, they integrate this work because we understand that the reflections they bring allow us to have a more panoramic and representative view of important approaches of genre teaching. Besides this, we believe that many of the reflections on the work with texts at schools pointed out by these scholars, excluding their specificities, also enable us to preview the work with genre in Higher Education. Our belief is that all the proposals presented by these authors cannot be ignored by education professionals, including the ones in Higher Education, since we comprehend that much of what is proposed for the work with texts at school level can be applied (with appropriate adaptations) in Higher Education, in a successful way.

For Cristóvão (2002), whose theoretical line is shared by the group of scholars of Geneva, when the work is based on the “[...] didactic model of genres”, students and teachers can engage in reflexive actions such as: analyzing the context in which it is inserted, describe pedagogic actions, report what underlies these actions, confront the choices made and thus reconstruct the practice of the classroom.

Even though many teachers claim to teach according to these assumptions, observations seem to reveal that in classrooms changes are not so significant. According to Antunes (2002, p.67), at school level, “[...] in some aspects, they continue to do what they used to do before. However, now, words and phrases studied are no longer conveyed separately, but taken from texts [...]”, which thus serve only as a pretext to teach the same things as before: digraphs, nouns etc.



In this sense, the author lists some benefits of teaching based on the work with text genres. According to the author, working with text genres can promote:

- a) apprehension of “communicative-linguistic facts” and not the study of virtual “grammatical facts,” fuzzy, decontextualized, objectified by determinations of a “program” previously set and established from the inherent properties of the language system;
- b) apprehension of strategies and procedures to promote the adequacy and effectiveness of texts, or language teaching with the explicit and determined aim to improve the competence of individuals so that they can produce and understand appropriate and relevant (oral and written) texts;
- c) consideration of how these procedures and strategies are reflected in the surface of the text, reason why one cannot, inconsistently, use any words or adopt any text sequence;
- d) correlation between the operations of textualization and the pragmatic aspects of the situation in which the verbal activity happens;
- e) expansion of perspectives in the understanding of the linguistic phenomenon, overcoming the simplistic and narrow parameters of “right” and “wrong” as indicative of good linguistic realization. (ANTUNES, 2002, p.71).

The author emphasizes, therefore, aspects which must be considered by the teacher in the language teaching, encompassing linguistic-communicative events and the work with text focusing on the improvement of the student’s text competence.

Besides advocating that the school work in the field of language production inevitably occurs according to genres (DOLZ; SCHNEUWLY, 2004), many scholars in the field have argued that the appropriation of genres at school begins in basic education, considering that “[...] genres are the instrument of mediation of any teaching strategy and the material that is necessary and inexhaustible for the teaching of textuality.” (DOLZ; SCHNEUWLY, 2004, p.51).

There are many educational suggestions presented by language scholars for the work with genres. Antunes (2002, p.72-73) suggests a selection of items and contents for each unit worked during the school year, based on a “[...] particular genre, which would be the central object of the moments of discourse, of writing, of reading, of linguistic analysis and systematization in classroom.” The selection of genres should follow the social and cultural parameters of learners. Thus, at the end of the semester or at the end of the year, the students would have had the chance to study different genres.

Such a proposal, according to the author, does not rule out the work with other genres and can be extended to various levels of education, including Higher Education. For Antunes (2002, p.73), it is really pertinent that the teaching of language helps “[...] the exercise of human interaction, of social participation, as a way of being and feeling acknowledged recognized, despite the inevitable conflicts and misunderstandings in the world of nature and culture, where everything regains meaning and relevance.” Didactically, this can only be possible if we confer importance to the work with genres.

Besides Antunes’s suggestion, another proposal that should be emphasized in this perspective is the one elaborated by Paltridge (2001). In the author’s point of view, the knowledge about text genre can provide language learners the awareness and skills they need to successfully communicate in particular discourse communities, and provide access to different forms of language in society.

According to Paltridge (2001), the text genre can be the organizing principle for the development of language teaching programs. In this sense, he points out some peculiarities of that approach. There, for example, the units are neither too short, like the ones of a structural or functional-based program, nor too long, like the ones of a skill-based program. According to the author, an approach based on genres is relevant because:

- it emphasizes the communicative purposes;
- it presents typical models of text organization and linguistic organization;
- it enables a curriculum planning that gathers texts with similar purpose, organization and audience;
- it gives learners the knowledge that is necessary for them to organize their writing, whether in academic, whether in professional environment;
- it covers the organization of units beyond the grammatical and lexical boundaries, but does not exclude them from the overall program;
- it is developed based on a genre, such as the global guidance of the program, but also includes other language aspects such as grammar, functions, vocabulary and communicative and linguistic abilities. (PALTRIDGE, 2001, p.3-4).

Accordingly, we believe that the combination of these principles, which include discussions about the communicative purposes of text genres, the context in which they occur, their structural organization, their supports, among other aspects, helps learners to understand why genres are written or spoken the way they are and what their roles in their discourse community are.

From the perspective outlined by Paltridge (2001, p.5), we infer that it is important for teachers to realize that “they are teaching trends and no fixed shape models”, developing in learners the ability to understand the communicative practices of real world and actively participate in them. This trend of the work with genres also dialogues with the ideas of Swales (1990, p.45), for whom “[...] it is indeed possible to use genres for teaching purposes without reducing courses to narrow prescriptivism or formalism and without denying students opportunities for reflecting upon rhetorical or linguistic choices.”


Freedman (1994), in turn, asserts that it is pertinent that genres are taught emphasizing the need for an analysis of those genres used in professional environments where students act. Thus, the learning of genres will be useful, according to the author, if, among the motivations for learning and the real needs in professional or academic life, there is a convergence that justifies such a teaching. For that reason, it is important to choose the genres carefully, so that the students can associate them to their personal and/or professional life.

From all that has been said above, it was clear that in the teaching work with text genres, it is essential that the teacher is aware, among other things, of the communicative purposes of the genres he/she is working with and their contexts of social production and circulation, as a way of enabling, within the classroom, authentic situations of language use.

## **Genres in written text production in Higher Education**


One of the necessary conditions to understand the work with text genres in the written production of graduating students of Portuguese and English Language, focusing on the purpose and possible interlocutors of the text genres they produce, is presenting, initially, the text genres these students produce. Based on the analysis of questionnaires answered by graduating students of Portuguese and English Language, we noted that in both courses the most requested genres are those of the academic-scientific domain, and that there is a greater diversity of genres explored among graduating students of Portuguese, according to the following charts.

**Graphic 1: Genres worked in Textual Production classes – Portuguese Graduation Course**



**Source:** Adapted of Souza (2008).

**Graphic 2: Genres worked in Textual Production classes – English Graduation Course**



**Source:** Adapted of Souza (2008).

The data above show that the variety of genres explored in the teaching of text production in Portuguese and English Graduation classes generally covers the academic-scientific genres, since the paper, the review, the summary, the project, the annotations and the report (teaching report certainly) are among

the most cited genres by students, although genres from other domains, such as fictional (short stories, chronicles, *cordel*) and interpersonal (notes, emails), are also explored. The data thus show that the privileged genres belong to two domains, the academic-scientific<sup>2</sup> and fictional, what seems to reflect the specificity of these students' Higher Education, in the Portuguese and English Graduation Courses.

Having studied these genres, we focused on how the work with written text production in classes of Portuguese and English graduation Courses happens, in order to answer the following questions: for what and to whom do the students write the texts requested by the teacher? That is, why do they write and who are the possible interlocutors of their texts? To illustrate our analysis, we consider the responses of teachers<sup>3</sup> and students<sup>4</sup>, among which we selected those we consider most recurrent and representative, in relation to the information gathered<sup>5</sup>.

To deal with the question related to the possible interlocutors, we first present the answers given by teachers, among which we highlight those that follow:

- (1) My student writes to me. (HET1<sup>6</sup>)
- (2) We conduct our practices in a continuous way, with the belief that the text and/or the written production of the student go through stages and can be improved as the rewriting process is put into practice. The English language learner writes to both the academic community and the community in general, depending on the requested work. (HET2)
- (3) The students write for/aiming producing scientifically and meeting the requirements of the course's assessment and also those of institutional nature. (HET3)

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<sup>2</sup> We want to emphasize that, although they assume different settings and permeate various communicative situations of social life, genres like the Review and the Summary, when worked in Higher Education classroom, tend to be restricted to that sphere's canonic model, following the guidelines proposed by the manuals of scientific methodology and technical norms, thus lending itself more to the evaluation of the readings undertaken by students.

<sup>3</sup> During the research, 6 from the 13 questionnaires sent to teachers in Higher Education were given back. In the analysis undertaken here, we consider the responses of these teachers to the following questionnaire question: for what and to whom do the students write the genres you request in your classes (English or Portuguese classes, according to each graduation course)? Based on the answers they presented, we selected those passages that are sufficient to illustrate the research findings satisfactorily, in our point of view.

<sup>4</sup> From a total of 31 questionnaires sent to students, 22 of them were sent back. In this study, we bring the answers the students gave to the following question: for what and to whom do you write the genres requested by the teacher during the classes (English or Portuguese classes, according to each graduation course)? In the current analysis, we bring the passages that best illustrate the most recurrent data from the answers given by the students.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to say that the repetition of the answer of a teacher during the work occurred because the issues related to the purpose and the possible interlocutor of the texts came from the question, so that the repetition of the answer was necessary in order to prevent misunderstanding.

<sup>6</sup> The code HET indicates the following: HE = Higher Education; T = teacher; Number 1 = order of the questionnaire collected.

- (4) It is also very variable. In the subject Monograph Seminar I (*Seminário de Monografia I*), written production aims at developing the research project, an academic genre that requires the student's knowledge on skills in scientific writing addressed to the teacher and to the student's possible supervisor. In the subject Textual Production (*Produção Textual*), students' written production is usually intended for the teacher and classmates, and aims at developing the necessary requirements for successful writing skills. (HET4)
- (5) The written activities are done in the student's house, corrected and then discussed in classroom with the student. The student usually needs to redo some of the work that was obscure. He writes for producing knowledge, that is, analyses and writings about the works that other academics or school students can read. (HET6)

Based on the answers, we can see that, during the text production activities, the students write to a definite interlocutor: the teacher of the subject (HET1, HET3 and HET4), or the possible monograph supervisor (HET4), or classmates (HET4 and HET6) or even the academic community and the community in general (HET2). About these answers, it is important to emphasize the need to consider the specificities of text production in certain subjects, since, as HET4 points out, in the subject Monograph Seminar I, the monograph project was written by the student to the teacher of that subject and the student's possible supervisor.

Although the most part of the answers indicate the teacher himself as the main interlocutor of the texts produced by the students, other interlocutors take part in the text production activities, such as the academic community, which represents the possibility of a productive work with the teaching of written text in Higher Education classroom, considering the consequent expansion of the social circulation of texts.

Therefore, given the requirements of a text produced to circulate in a setting of social movements such as the academic community (and even the community in general), it happens to be possible for the student to plan his/her text production, its content and its language, the making and remaking of this text, since he/she writes motivated by the belief that there will be someone to interact with him/her about what he/she writes. In this sense, one can say that, in relation to the desirable interlocutor the students have when they write, the work with the production of texts in Higher Education classrooms allows the production to happen, sometimes, within the authentic situations, about which Schneuwly and Dolz (2004) talk about. We surely do not agree that the work with genres always happens in situations like these, for, as we know, we must consider that bringing genres to the classroom, in any education level, implies some kind of simulation of the communicative situation, with consequences for the destination of the texts produced, for example.

For dealing with the issues related to the students' purposes while they write in Higher Education, we present some of the most representative answers of teachers and students. At first, we highlight the answers of teachers (as shown in passages 6, 7 and 8), which then are related to the students' answers (shown in passages 9, 10 and 11). Here is what teachers say:

- (6) Students write for/aiming producing scientifically and fulfilling the requirements of the course's assessment and also those of institutional nature. (HET3)
- (7) [...] to produce knowledge, develop the necessary skills for a successful written production or more specifically for the elaboration of the research project, an academic genre that requires the student's knowledge on skills in scientific writing addressed to the teacher and to the student's possible supervisor. (HET4)
- (8) In the subject Textual Production (*Produção Textual*), students' written production is usually intended for the teacher and classmates, and aims at developing the necessary requirements for successful writing skills. (HET4)

Based on the teachers' answers, we found that the production of texts in Higher Education intends to cater mainly to the specificities of the academic domain, that is, produce knowledge, what seems natural since the genres of this domain are the most explored in the written production activities, according to the teachers.

We can say that the work with the students' production of written texts presents well-defined goals, and the answers given by some teachers enshrine the specificity of the subject, as we can see, for example, in HET4, who highlights that, in the subject Textual Production, students' written production usually aims at "developing the necessary requirements for successful writing skills" and that in the subject Monograph Seminar I, the student writes for producing knowledge and for developing "the skills on scientific writing".

Among the answers given by the teachers, it is also important to highlight the one which punctuates the students' production of texts aiming at meeting the requirements of the course's assessment and also those of institutional nature, that is, the production is a consequence of the evaluation, what is also confirmed in most answers given by the students, among which are the following ones, used to illustrate our analysis:

- (9) The productions of written texts are not always conducted to provide the student with satisfaction, because they are often done to obtain grades. (PHES2<sup>7</sup>)

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<sup>7</sup> The code EHES2 indicates the following: E = English (the ongoing graduation course); HE = Higher Education; S = student; 2 = order of the questionnaire collected. In other passages, where E is replaced by P, it means that Portuguese is the graduation course.

- (10) The most part of times we write in order to get a grade. (PHES8)
- (11) We always write to be evaluated and so that the teacher can know his/her students' degree of progress or learning. (EHES1)

Although other purposes are added, and the student affirms that he/she writes “so that the teacher may have a perception of the degree of progress or learning of the student” (EHES1), the tendency is writing for a grade, for being evaluated, as PHES2, PHES8 and EHES1 reveal. If we consider the existing theories on text production in the field of language studies, this procedure adopted by the teacher represents a way of restricting the writing of texts within the classroom. It restricts because it considers assigning a score as the single purpose of this production, without considering the process of writing and rewriting (although some teachers claim to practice the activity of rewriting), the interlocution and the subsequent circulation of the text produced by the student. Even considering that, in Higher Education, the specificity of academic-scientific domain implies, to some extent, that the texts produced by students (eg, review, summary and annotations, which are among the most requested) have an evaluative purpose and that they are addressed to the teacher, it is really possible to think of a work with written text production in which the activities of interlocution are more explored in the context of the classroom. As we can see below, in the words of EHES4, there is enough space in the classroom for the achievement of authentic situations of text production:

- (12) He [the teacher] creates fictional situations in which we act as a fictitious sender writing to a fictitious receiver, with a fictitious purpose. (EHES4)

It is necessary to emphasize that, at some point, the situation of written production is fictional, and while, in most cases, the purpose is evaluative (as occurs mainly with genres like the annotations and the summary), in other moments, a concern with the functionality of the students' writing is shown, especially when they are asked to write a text – a scientific paper, for example – also aiming at presenting it in an academic event, as shown in the students' answers transcribed below:

- (13) The texts produced are reviews and articles; they are supposed to be presented in “local academic events” and other meetings related to scientific studies. (PHES4)
- (14) The written production is usually used by the teacher as a way of evaluating the students, and it can be presented in conferences on Portuguese and English languages. (EHES3)
- (15) The immediate interlocutor is the teacher, who writes first to accomplish the academic tasks and second to allow a possible socialization of knowledge through the publication of works in conferences. (EHES5)



As we can see, it is clear that, besides meeting an evaluative requirement of the subject, the student of Portuguese and English graduation course writes for the circulation of the knowledge produced in the academic community in which he/she is, so that the written production starts to be considered not just as an end in itself, since, when it is presented and published in academic events, the student's production acquires a more dialogic, inclusive perspective, with other interlocutors besides the teacher and the classmates.

Thus, the student produces texts in Portuguese and English graduation classrooms to achieve specific goals, predominantly those that involve the specificities of the subjects, while others deviate from the authentic situations of communicative interaction, as they are restricted to an evaluative purpose and to classroom environment and interaction between teacher and student and among students, while some others are intended for publication in academic events.

We realize then that there is not yet, in a satisfactory level, what Antunes (2002) considers a systematic study of genres so that it can cover the socio-cultural elements of the students' formation, especially when we consider, as pointed by the questionnaire answers, that the work with written production requested by teachers in Higher Education do not fully include the pragmatic aspects inherent to all forms of verbal activity.

It is evident that, on the one hand, the answers given by the teachers indicate the teaching of text production based on a variety of text genres (predominantly genres of the academic and scientific domain), as suggested by the authors in this field, but on the other hand, the treatment given to the production with regard to the communicative purpose and the possible communication partners still limits, in many instances, the possibility of experiencing authentic interaction situations.

## **Conclusion**

The data analysis undertaken reveals that the students' text production in Portuguese and English graduation classrooms comprises a variety of text genres, mainly the genres of academic-scientific domain, such as scientific paper, review and summary, what seems natural, considering that students are in a sphere whose demands include a materialization of the systematized knowledge in genres like the scientific paper, for example.

We note that the genres produced by the students have well-defined goals and interlocutors. The teachers remind that students write for the following purposes: to be evaluated (to get grades), to improve their writing skill, develop the academic and scientific production and expand knowledge. In relation to the interlocutors of the texts produced by the students, informants point out that they are: the subject teacher; the classmates; and the academic community in general, in the case of publications of texts produced in academic events.

In this sense, we are led to believe that the teaching of text production in the context of Higher Education classroom caters primarily to the specificities of the subjects, if we consider that the purpose of student's writing is almost always meeting the requirements of academic writing, aiming at developing the theoretical basis and meeting the evaluative requirements, having the teacher as the main interlocutor, still with timid initiatives that enable authentic situations of communicative interaction.

Thus, we understand that while the classroom space in Higher Education has promoted a work with genres in the activities on written text production and, at times, the text written by the student has real purpose and interlocutors, – indeed consisting of a process of communicative interaction – a lot still needs to advance in the treatment given to the written text in Higher Education towards the discovery of a sense for what our students write at college. Initiatives such as producing an academic text to publish it in academic and scientific conferences can certainly be a step towards this direction. We believe that initiatives such as these, if explored more and correctly, will contribute to the improvement of students' writing of communicatively relevant and successful texts. However, this has a cost; it fundamentally presupposes a greater commitment of teaching professionals, what first comprises a deeper understanding of the genre approaches, including those for specific purposes.

QUEIROZ, M. E. de; BESSA, J. C. R.; JALES, A. M. Os significados de escrever no ensino superior: a produção textual no discurso de professores e alunos de um curso de letras. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.507-522, 2015.

- *RESUMO: Seguindo uma tendência crescente de trabalhos que, no campo dos estudos da linguagem e da educação, investigam a produção textual escrita de alunos do ensino superior e as dificuldades que estes apresentam para produzir textos comunicativamente relevantes e bem-sucedidos, objetivamos aqui examinar o trabalho com os gêneros textuais na prática de produção de textos escritos no ensino superior. Nesse sentido, focalizaremos particularmente o exame de duas questões: a finalidade dos gêneros textuais produzidos por alunos de um curso de Letras e os possíveis interlocutores dos gêneros textuais por eles produzidos. Os dados foram coletados por meio de questionários aplicados a alunos e professores de uma instituição pública de ensino superior. O trabalho adota a concepção de linguagem como processo de interação e as reflexões sobre gêneros do discurso advindas dos estudos do Círculo de Bakhtin, bem como as discussões acerca dos gêneros e de seu ensino apresentadas por outros estudiosos. Os resultados apontam que o ensino de produção de textos no contexto de sala de aula do ensino superior atende fundamentalmente às especificidades das disciplinas; revelando ainda poucas iniciativas que possibilitem situações autênticas de interação comunicativa.*
- *PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Gêneros textuais. Produção textual. Ensino superior. Letras. Professores e alunos.*

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## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN *NEGATION* AND *IMPOLITENESS* IN THE EXCHANGES D'INFORMATION IN FRENCH

Ruth de OLIVEIRA\*

- **ABSTRACT:** In this paper, I seek to analyze linguistic impoliteness in ordinary conversation in French and, more specifically, in the exchange of face-to-face information. Thanks to its functional structure (i.e. question-response), the exchange of information is a privileged type of interaction, in which we can observe the relationship between language and culture. Throughout a study of interactional mechanisms involving the recurring negative sequence (a) *Je ne sais pas moi* (literally : I don't know, me), I interrogate what distinguishes (a) to the sequence (b) *Moi je ne sais pas* (literally : Me, I don't know). Why and in which situations, or at which point in an interaction, does the speaker employ (a) rather than (b) or vice versa? What are the socio-interactive effects? What emerges from these comparisons in relation to the speaker's style? My suggestion is to bring out some response elements throughout a theoretical and methodological combinatory approach inputs from the linguistic polyphony, conversational analysis, the grammar of the emotions and the concept of [im]politeness.
- **KEYWORDS:** French. Language-culture. Verbal interaction. Polyphony. Linguistic impoliteness.

### Introduction

In the field of teaching and learning French as Foreign Language (FLE), French cultural aspects are almost invariably linked to French politeness rules. This link between language and culture emerges at the very beginning of French teaching and learning by combining French *savoir-faire* & *savoir-vivre*. As an illustration, it is notorious the importance attached to the distinction between the uses of *tu* (you, informal singular)/ *vous* (you, formal singular) and their network of titles and forms of address. We therefore can see that the concept of politeness occupies a central place in the FLE manuals.

Moreover, the popularity of politeness is only matched by the unpopularity of impoliteness, which is, however, well ingrained in the language, manifesting itself in daily life through many linguistically diverse resources. In sum, impoliteness is not taught but it remains a remarkable linguistic phenomenon that deserves,

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as pointed out by Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2010), to be subjected to the rigors of full examination.

Given that, I propose to study linguistic impoliteness in French ordinary conversation, and more specifically in the exchange of information. Thanks to its functioning (i.e. question–answer sequences), this type of interaction gives us a privileged place to observe the reports between language and culture. My premise is that, like the fiction dialogue, the exchange of information is a place “[...] where conversational laws are featured to be shown, seen and heard, and not as in daily life, implied, covert or unconscious” (UBERSFELD, 1996, p.79)<sup>1</sup>

In this precise framework, throughout a study of interactional mechanisms, especially involving the recurring negative sequence/answer (a) *Je ne sais pas moi* (I don’t know, me), I probe what distinguishes this construction to the sequence (b) *Moi je ne sais pas* (Me, I don’t know). Why and in which situations, or at which point in an interaction, does the speaker employ (a) rather than (b) or vice versa? What are the socio-interactive effects of these sentences? What emerges from that in relation to the speaker’s profile?

To attempt to answer these questions, I first present the theoretical framework upon which the negative remarks as Dialogic Marker are based (DUCROT, 1972, 1984). Secondly, while taking into consideration the theoretical principles described by the Grammar of Emotions (PLANTIN, 1999, 2013, 2014) I look at key syntactic distinctions between left/right dislocation. Then, I examine these types of emotional constructions in the light of the Principle of Cooperation (GRICE, 1975), which allows us to see the manifestations of impoliteness and its implications in the language-culture relationship (KERBRAT-ORECCHIONI, 2005, 2010).

## The enunciative heterogeneity of negation<sup>2</sup>

The conception of language as a dialogic phenomenon is drawn from the “Bakhtin circle”<sup>3</sup>. Since then, the appropriation of the circle’s ideas by various researchers in different disciplines has been entailing major theoretical

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<sup>1</sup> In French : «*le lieu où les lois conversationnelles sont en vedette, exposées pour être montrées, vues et entendues, et non pas comme dans la vie quotidienne, sous-entendues, subreptices ou inconscientes*» (UBERSFELD, 1996, p.79).

<sup>2</sup> The English translation of the French vocabulary referring to Ducrot’s works comes from his Slovenian Lectures, which are available on: <<http://old.btk.pt.e.hu/tanszekek/francia/mater/ducrot.pdf>>. Access in: 31 aug. 2015.

<sup>3</sup> The “Bakhtin circle” refers to a group of friends who, in 1920-30, used to meet and work together. In addition to Bakhtin, there were Matvej Isaevich Kagan (1889-1937); Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev (1891-1938); Lev Vasil’evich Pumpjanskij (1891-1940); Ivan Ivanovich Sollertinskij (1902-1944); Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov (1895-1936). The controversial question of the texts’ authorship was treated by JP Bronckart and Bota (2011) in Bakhtine démasqué: *Histoire d’un menteur, d’une escroquerie et d’un délire collectif*.

differences around the notion of polyphony<sup>4</sup>. These fluctuations are due to both the incompleteness of the work undertaken by the circle<sup>5</sup> and the reformulations and changes undergone by Bakhtin's work when translated from Russian into other languages<sup>6</sup>.

The fact is that Bakhtin's (1974, 1978) thoughts are no longer limited to the literary domain. Indeed, "polyphony [also] conquered Linguistics and for the last twenty years it has become the central concept in several studies of languages" (LA POLYPHONIE..., 2009, p.3)<sup>7</sup>. Despite, or thanks to, the proliferation of these approaches in linguistics—not quite compatible or totally incompatible—it is now possible to make the Bakhtinian principle operational within the theoretical and methodological proposals of, at least, three major schools of thoughts. Namely, the Geneva model of discourse analysis (ROULET; FILLETTAZ; GROBET, 2001)<sup>8</sup>, the Praxematic (BRES et al., 2005; BRES; NOWAKOWSKA, 2006)<sup>9</sup> and the Scandinavian theory of linguistic polyphony (FØLTTUM, 2001; NØLKE, 2001)<sup>10</sup>. The latter, the ScaPoLine, has been expanding the theoretical model proposed by Ducrot (1972, 1984)<sup>11</sup>, or the model that led to the creation of a properly linguistic polyphonic theory. In addition, the Ducrot's theory has been adopted as a basis to combine studies in domains such as Argumentative, Text Linguistics, and Conversation Analysis. These combinations enhance listening and bring out voices other than the speaker's in a given speech. As a result, the participants are able to improve their reports in a verbal exchange.

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<sup>4</sup> In what follows, the goal is to bring up the theoretical framework on the enunciative heterogeneity of negation. For this, in addition to the cited references in the text, I consulted "La polyphonie linguistique" (2009); The thesis of Øyvind Gjerstad (2011); and the thesis of Malin Roitman (2006).

<sup>5</sup> «*Chez Bakhtine, la polyphonie relève de toute une série de notions développées au travers de la globalité de son œuvre ; il s'agit d'une longue entreprise non terminée dont le début et l'apogée souvent sont attribués à la première version de la Poétique de Dostoïevski, datant de 1929. Depuis la publication des derniers Carnets [Dans Estetika slovesnogo tvortchestva (Esthétique de la création verbale), Moscou 1979, Gallimard, Paris 1984 (...)] de Bakhtine ainsi que du grand essai du début des années 20, «L'auteur et le héros», probablement interrompu en 1922 [Texte d'archives (1920-1930), non repris par l'auteur et resté inachevé (...)], on peut cependant constater que le début de l'entreprise se situe, sinon avant, au moins à l'époque de la rédaction de ledit essai.*» (HOLM, 2003, p. 95).

<sup>6</sup> Consult Regine (1987) and Seriot (2005).

<sup>7</sup> In French: «la polyphonie a [aussi] conquis la linguistique et depuis les vingt dernières années elle est devenue la notion centrale s'imposant dans plusieurs études linguistiques» (LA POLYPHONIE..., 2009).

<sup>8</sup> For an overview of this model, consult Laurent Filiettaz and Eddy Roulet (2002).

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion on enunciative and dialogic approaches of the language, and on the existence of convergences between both approaches see Rosier (2006), Bres and Nowakowska (2007), Bres and Rosier (2007), Dendale and Coltier (2006).

<sup>10</sup> For a definition and discussion, consult H. Nølke (2001).

<sup>11</sup> While the ScaPoLine is also interested in literary polyphony, like Bakhtin, Ducrot is more inspired by the work of Bally, in which, polyphony is perceived not through texts but through small structures. Moreover, it is also true that Ducrot is inspired by the literary theory of Genette and his distinctions between narrator, author, speaker and locutor.

Also, Ducrot integrates the *pragmatic semantic* (*la pragmatique sémantique*) into an enunciative conception of the language. In this context, which is, basically, that of the Speech Acts<sup>12</sup>, there are “sentence” (*phrase*) (theoretical, meaningful object, invention of the grammar) and “utterance” (*énoncé*) (empirical phenomenon whose meaning is constructed upon the instructions of the meaning convey by the utterance act).

His hypothesis is that every utterance constitutes a semantic image of the utterance itself. As well, he says that *semantics* is not limited to carry a truth claim. To account for the enunciative duality, Ducrot refers to pragmatics as “what the word, according to the statement itself, is supposed to do,” and offers to see two [pragmatic] levels: a primitive, or virtual level, properly semantic: a real level, a fact of social interaction, unpredictable if analyzed only from semantic instructions. For example, if the sentence “*Il fait beau/the weather is nice*” (DUCROT, 1984, p.181) gives instructions to find the location the speaker refers to while admitting that the weather is nice at the time of the utterance, the statement “*Il fait beau/the weather is nice*” may then cause secondary pragmatic effects. Therefore, the meaning (of a sentence) is composed of a literal meaning plus a derived meaning. From there, Ducrot distinguishes two acts, those of “stating” and “presupposing”.

The fact that his theory has allowed him to identify and describe linguistic mechanisms that are likely to show different voices unfold, also led Ducrot to call into question the idea of “the unity of the speaking subject” (DUCROT, 1984, p.171). Thus, in terms of the negation as polyphonic marker, Ducrot’s hypothesis is that any negative statement refers to a positive statement, attributed to an enunciator from which the speaker distances himself (DUCROT, 1984).

In sum, according to Ducrot’s theoretical model of linguistic polyphony, the truth-conditional and the reference are nothing but possible side-effects whereas the meaning is fundamentally argumentative (ANSCOMBRE; DUCROT, 1983).

These positions are then the starting point of my [re]search of linguistics’ traces of impoliteness in the exchange of information in French. Taking into account the principle of utterance’s heterogeneity of negative statements, we assume that the sequence *Je ne sais pas* (I don’t know) refers to the positive statement *Je sais* (I know).

My assumption is that when the negative statement occurs within a right dislocated construction involving pronominal repetition, that is to say *Je ne sais pas moi* (I don’t know, me), the speaker distances himself from the enunciator who says *Je sais moi* (I know, me). In this case, the statement *Je ne sais pas moi*

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<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the key notion of Ducrot’s work is the performance in language, this refers to the theories of speech acts developed by JL Austin in 1962, and then by J. Searle. Briefly, these theories propose that an individual speaks to another in the idea of doing something (transform representations of things and / or goals) rather than saying something.



(I don't know, me) refers to something other than the contrast (positive-negative); it tells us something about the discursive positioning of the speaker: his/her contentment<sup>13</sup>, or annoyance<sup>14</sup>.

In the development and expansion of this postulate—since Ducrot seeks not to explain actual interpretations but to identify a primitive pragmatic, separate from side pragmatic effects (DUCROT, 1984) – my analysis combines Ducrot's approach with:

- i. theoretical contributions of Praxematic and principles of the Grammar of Emotions, which I incorporate into an analysis of dislocated structures;
- ii. interactionist approaches, in order to clarify the framework/scene in which these structures are carried out;
- iii. studies on linguistic [Im]politeness, while attempting to validate my premises on the socio-discursive effects and implications produced by these structures.

## Emotional syntax and dialogisation

According to Plantin, “[...] in terms of syntax organization (or disorganization), we attribute to emotion the reorganizations of the basic form of a statement, that is to say emphasis, *break* constructions, inversions” (UNIVERSITÉ LYON, 2014)<sup>15</sup>. In regards to dislocated sentences, it is a syntactic-semantic phenomenon well attested and categorized, which has resulted in numerous studies (BLASCO-DUBELCCO, 1997, 1999; APOTHÉLOZ; COMBETTES; NEVEU, 2009; BRES; NOWAKOWSKA, 2006; OLIVEIRA, 2013). Observed from both spoken and written languages, dislocation allows syntax a great liberty of pace, affects various grammatical categories in their multiple functions, and produces many effects of meaning.

The concept most often invoked to describe the semantics of these structures is undoubtedly that of *theme* and its variants (topic, thematic subject, or even psychological subject). Apothéloz (1997) and Riegel, Pellat and Rioul (1996) see the dislocation as a tool allowing for the assignment of one element. Where the subject is detached, the effect produced is that of a “strong emphasis,” the subject is “highlighted.” In French, among the elements participating in this process of

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<sup>13</sup> The expression of *contentment* includes a number of nuances such as pride, joy, happiness, eagerness, enthusiasm, well-being, good humour, ease, enjoyment, pleasure, gladness, jubilation, delight, complacency and so on (ATILF, 2014).

<sup>14</sup> Note that the expression of *annoyance* includes nuances such as: “impatience, irritation, restlessness, excitement, agitation, nervousness, frustration, tension” (ATILF, 2014).

<sup>15</sup> In French: «[...] au niveau de l'organisation (ou de la désorganisation) syntaxique, on attribue à l'émotion les réorganisations de la forme considérée comme basique de l'énoncé: emphase, ruptures de construction, inversions.»

marked insistence, personal pronouns are used according to verbal subject, whose alternated handling of disjunctive/conjunctive forms<sup>16</sup> in a given sequence is never meaningless. That said, I suggest below the hypothesis thhat these sequences constitute a commonplace of emotions manifestations, which are relatively fixed in their forms and benefit from a certain degree of plausibility (PLANTIN, 1999).

To proceed with the analysis of the emotions conveyed by dislocation in order to see their social interactive implications in the exchange of information, the starting point is (1):

(1) – Vous savez où se trouve... ?<sup>17</sup> (Do you know where is...)

1a – Je sais./I know.

1b – Je ne sais pas./I don't know.

1c – Moi je sais./ Me, I know.

1d – Je sais moi./ I know, me.

1e – Moi je ne sais pas./Me, I don't know.

1f – Je ne sais pas moi./I don't know, me.

The first finding is that (1) admits answers as diverse as 1a-b-c-d-e-f. In terms of 1a and 1b, Grice's Cooperative Principle in the exchange of information is respected (GRICE, 1975). In other words, the information given (by 1a and 1b) is enough but not excessive according to the "maxims of quantity"; these answers are taken as true and made wisely in accordance with the "maxims of quality"; relevance is obvious according to the "maxim of relation"; the language is clear and concise in accordance with the "maxims of manner." We can then speak of "maximum efficiency of information exchange." This is however not the case with dislocated structures 1c-1f, which can each be characterized as being responsive to a different interpretation of (1) and echoing some interpretative subjectivity from the speaker.

In an attempt to understand the meaning of 1c-1f statements, I distinguish—with Bakhtin (1974, 1978) – external dialogism (that is, dialogue) and inner *dialogisation* of the speech. The latter is particularly interesting for the fact that its manifestations are situated at a micro-textual level (BRES, 2005), that is to say, at sentence-statement level, whose approach takes into account the discursive formation of discourse, situated at a macro-textual level. This is basically a global-to-local shift, where the discursive materiality of dialogism manifests itself (BRES, 2005). As we shall see, the discursive formation of discourse reflects both a *recovery of* (dialogism constitutive) and a *response to* (interdiscursive and interlocutive dialogism) other speech (BRES, 2005).

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<sup>16</sup> In French : conjointes/disjointes, fortes/faibles, atones/toniques.

<sup>17</sup> Or : is/are there...? - y a-t-il...? etc.

In the interaction (*recovery of/reply to*), we perceive the “split” mode of saying [*le mode dédoublé du dire*]. This accounts for a kind of internal dialogue, not exactly a dialogue with others but linked to them. This is what Bakhtin envisaged as a form of dialogism “between the speaking subject and his own word” (AUTHIER-REVUZ, 2003, p.87). Suffice to say that all of those statements (1) are affected by the *dialogisation*. Observing the discursive materiality of the *dialogisation* allows us to capture something about the movements of emotion in the organisation of speech.

In short, the affirmative/negative assertions 1a (Je sais/I know), 1b (Je ne sais pas/I don't know) have a neutral objective value: it comes to say *Yes* or *No*, while the 1c-1f structures convey each additional information. With respect to 1f, my above-mentioned assumption is that when the speaker states *Je ne sais pas moi* (I don't know, me) he also says his annoyance, departing from the principle of politeness and breaking the contract of cooperation, which may result in strained relations between the exchangers of information. Following that, before the development of this assumption, I approach some facts and concepts around linguistic [im]politeness.

## **Linguistic [im]politeness and culture**

From the period of classical rhetoric to the dialogues of the Italian Renaissance (WAUTHION; SIMON, 2000), politeness crossed the romantic nineteenth century as a social component of speech, ritual, norm, and valued social competence. Nowadays, in the context of the interactional approach, understood in a dialogic perspective, linguistic politeness acquired a status of “relevant scientific object” and became “a component of honor in discourse analysis” (KERBRAT-ORECCHIONI, 2005).

As each period of history has its standards of politeness, and having these standards their specificities in each community, the concept of politeness is a privileged field of investigation when it comes to establishing relationships between language(s) and culture(s). For the purposes of discussion, I emphasize some basics of this concept as follows.

Thanks to the emerging field of Conversation Analysis in the 1970s, researches on politeness have expanded the literary context to that of verbal interaction (GRICE, 1975; LAKOFF, 1973; GOFFMAN, 1973, 1974; BROWN; LEVINSON, 1978).

In the late 1980s, while developing her pioneering research, Lakoff (1989) observed the fundamental fact of a theory and description of politeness focusing on the form and function of acts of language in daily conversation. From there, Lakoff has expanded her field of investigation in politeness by looking at other

types of speech than ordinary conversation. Her findings show, among other things, that if, for example, disagreement and conflict are inherent to a debate as systematic and natural elements, such elements are seen as menacing behavior in ordinary conversation.

However, the study of verbal interactions “[...] cannot ignore what is perceived as polite/impolite socially. This is for the analyst to focus on the discursive strategies that are used by the interaction participants in the light of social codes prevailing at the time these exchanges take place.”<sup>18</sup> (JOBERT, 2010, p.8).

To such variable factors (type of interaction, profile of participants, time in history, codes and social places) should be added, with Grice, the constant factor. The cooperative principle is developed into a set of “maxims of conversation” that every speaker is deemed to comply with. This scheme illustrates the point:

(1) – Vous savez où se trouve... ?/Do you know where is... ?

1a – Je sais./I know.

1b – Je ne sais pas./I don't know.

Through (1) it was found that the meaning of the sentences (1a and 1b) speaks directly to this compliance. In this way, the answers (1a or 1b) to question (1) are satisfactory (under ordinary circumstances). I also pointed out that these rules are intended to “maximize the effectiveness of the exchange of information” and that therefore, they prioritize the informative function of discourse. In this context, the speaker is guided by the language [and behavioral] choices dictated by the principle of politeness. This is not limited, in principle, to the repertoire of formulas but must extend to “[...] all aspects of the speech which are subject by rules, and whose function is to preserve the harmonious nature of the interpersonal relationship” (KERBRAT-ORECCHIONI, 1996, p.50).

However, in this type of interaction, as in others, the relational issue (or «interpersonal relationship») includes an identity issue. This issue guides the participants, according to their needs or the needs of the situation, in negotiations and in the planning of *places* in the interactive space. Nevertheless, in case of conflict, – real or perceived – participants can adopt an inconsistent linguistic behavior while deviating from the principles of cooperation and of politeness, going to a deterioration of relations. My analysis of the negative statement *Je ne sais pas moi* (I don't know, me) illustrates this type of deviation and its social implications. To support my assumptions, I rely on the fact that (Brown and Levinson) any competent adult member of society has an image of

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<sup>18</sup> In French: *Il s'agit, pour l'analyste, "de s'intéresser aux stratégies discursives qui sont utilisées par les différents participants à une interaction à la lumière des codes sociaux en vigueur au moment où ces échanges ont lieu."* (JOBERT, 2010, p.8).

himself that he tries to argue in his interactions. This image, the face, includes two complementary aspects:

- the negative side, connected to the private domain, with feelings of independence and freedom of action;
- the positive face, covering the narcissistic need to be recognized and valorized socially.

To develop these assumptions, let's consider:

1c – *Moi je sais./Me, I know.*

1d – *Je sais moi. I know, me.*

1e – *Moi je ne sais pas. Me, I don't know.*

1f – *Je ne sais pas moi. I don't know, me*

With regard to 1c and 1e, beyond their role of *recovery of/response to*, these statements often have an expressive contrast value. Indeed, as stressed by Lambrecht (1994, p.183).

The left dislocation construction is often used to mark a shift in attention from one to another of two or more already active topic referent. This explains the frequent occurrence of PRONOMINAL NPs in detached position (*Me, I'm hungry, Moi, j'ai faim*). Such detached lexical or pronominal NPs often have a "contrastive" function, in which case they may be referred to as CONTRASTIVE topic NPs [...].

That said, by stating in (1c & 1e), the speaker establishes a contrast with the utterer of (1a-b). Similarly, 1c and 1e are "echoing responses" because they comprise the idea that (1c) "the others do not know" or "the others think that I do not know while *Moi, je sais./Me, I know*"; (1e) "the others think that I know but *Moi je ne sais pas (Me, I don't know)*".

On the other hand, right dislocations such as (1d) *Je sais moi/I know, me*, and (1f) *Je ne sais pas moi (I don't know, me)* – are also able to assume a contrastive function vis-à-vis (1a-c). In sum, through (1d & 1f) the speaker says something other than "yes"/"no": in fact, while establishing a contrast he/she shows his contentment (1d), its annoyance (1f). From the perspective of the dialogic approach, these movements of emotions may be motivated by the following voices:

- My answer was negative (*Je ne sais pas /I do not know* followed or not by *Moi, je ne sais pas/Me, I do not know*) but my interlocutor insists (e.g. – Are you sure ?) and then I say, *Je ne sais pas moi (What do I know?)*;

– This is the umpteenth time that I am asked the same question and then I say *Je ne sais pas moi/I do not know me*;

– I am asked the question for the first time – I may know the answer – but I say *Je ne sais pas, moi./I do not know, me*.

In these three cases, the speaker (1f) shows his wish to be left alone, while informing his positioning (*opposition to*) in the interaction. He takes his distances, as in the four following situations:

Situation I. At the reception desk of a tourism office.

- Bonjour. Vous savez où on peut trouver un bureau de tabac dans le quartier ?/  
Good morning. Do you know where can I find a Tabaco shop in the neighborhood?
- Je ne sais pas. I don't know.
- Et un bar-tabac? /How about a Tabaco-bar?
- *Je ne sais pas moi* ici on ne renseigne pas les gens sur ce genre de choses./I do not know, me. Here, we do not inform people about these kind of things.

Situation II. At the counter of bus company. The passenger points to a bus to the receptionist.

- Est-ce que ce bus s'arrête en ville, près du casino? /does this bus stop in town, close to the casino?
- Je ne sais pas. Je ne connais pas les trajets des bus. / I don't know. I don't know the buses routes.
- Vous savez tout de même s'il fait des arrêts en ville ?/ You may anyway know if this bus stops in town ?
- *Je ne sais pas moi* c'est au chauffeur qu'il faut demander ou alors (la réceptionniste pointe vers un panneau d'affichage) regardez là, tout est là./I don't know, me, you must ask the driver or (the receptionist points to a billboard) look there, everything is there.

Situation III. At the reception desk at a train station.

- Bonjour. Il vous reste encore des places dans le train de nuit ?/ Hi, are there still available seats on the night train ?
- Je ne sais pas. Le système [informatique] est en panne./I don't know. The [computer] system is down.
- Bon alors vous pensez qu'on peut y monter et puis voir ça avec le contrôleur ?/ Ok, then, do you think we can go in and then see it with the ticket inspector ?
- *Je ne sais pas moi*. Ne me faites pas dire ce que je n'ai pas dit. Si vous prenez le train sans votre billet c'est à vos risques et périls./I do not know, me. Don't make me say what I didn't. If you take the train without your ticket is at your own risk.

Situation IV. At the reception desk of the City Hall.

- Bonjour. Vous savez si Madame Untel de l'état civil est là ? Je suis venu chercher mon livret de famille./ Good morning. Do you if Mrs so-and-so is here? I came to collect my family record book.
- Je ne sais pas. Je ne l'ai pas encore vu ce matin. I do not know. I have not seen her this morning.
- Vous pensez que sera là bientôt ? Je dois repartir au bureau./Do you think that will be there soon? I have to go back to the office.
- *Je ne sais pas moi* je ne suis pas sa secrétaire./ I do not know, me, I am not her secretary.

### Some final considerations

The aim of this work was to demonstrate traces of linguistic impoliteness in the exchange of information in French in order to see its interactive social implications and thus contribute to studies on the relationship between language-culture. To do this, I proposed to analyze a highly frequent negative French sequence, namely the right dislocation *Je ne sais pas moi*./I don't know, me. Throughout a combinatory approach of this sequence, I have arrived at the following conclusions:

- (i) in a given interaction (fig. 1), right dislocations (1d & 1f: *Je...moi*... me) as well as left dislocations (1c & 1e: *Moi, je/me, I*) establish a contrast – real or potential – and constitute a *recovery of/responses* to 1a & 1b, which are canonical sequences of the assertive statement positive/negative.
- (ii) right dislocations however differ from left dislocations: these, thematize the subject and validate a position of contrast (*Moi je.../Me, I*), while right dislocations say something other than a *opposition to*. Indeed, these voices tell us the discursive positioning of the speaker: his contentment, his annoyance.
- (iii) by stating *Je ne sais pas moi*/I don't know, me the speaker/informant shows his annoyance, his negative face (BROWN; LEVINSON, 1978), an image that refers to the private realm, feelings of independence and freedom of action. This is a linguistic trace of his desire to be left alone, which is incompatible in the context of the exchange of information, a place that reflects our everyday social behavior and where everyone has, more here than elsewhere, to comply with the principle of cooperation.

OLIVEIRA, Ruth de. Du rapport entre la négation et l'impolitesse dans les échanges d'informations face-à-face en français. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.523-537, 2015.

- **RÉSUMÉ** : Dans cette contribution, nous nous proposons d'aborder la question de l'impolitesse linguistique en français dans le cadre de la conversation ordinaire et plus précisément dans l'échange d'informations. De par son caractère éminemment fonctionnel, l'échange d'informations constitue un lieu privilégié d'observation des rapports entre langue et culture. A travers une étude de mécanismes interactionnels (i.e. question-réponse), notamment de la séquence/réponse négative récurrente *je ne sais pas moi*, nous nous demanderons ce qui distingue cette construction-là de celle-ci *je ne sais pas* ; pourquoi et dans quelles situations, ou à quel moment de l'interaction, le locuteur emploie celle-là plutôt que celle-ci ou vice-versa ? Quels sont les effets socio interactifs produits ? Qu'en ressort-il au niveau du profil du locuteur ? Les éléments de réponse que nous apporterons à ces questions s'appuient sur une approche théorique et méthodologique combinatoire des apports de la polyphonie linguistique, l'analyse conversationnelle, la grammaire des émotions et le concept d'impolitesse.
- **MOTS-CLÉS** : Français. Langue-culture. Interaction verbale. Polyphonie. Impolitesse linguistique.

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# OBJECT-VERB ORDER IN BRAZILIAN PORTUGUESE: A MECHANISM FOR THE EXPRESSION OF SUBJECTIVITY

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- **ABSTRACT:** In this paper, based on the theoretical interface between Functional Linguistics and Cognitive Linguistics, we intend to demonstrate that the relationship between word order and subjectivity, which can be observed in several languages, also occurs in the use of the object-verb order (OV) in Brazilian Portuguese (BP). By analyzing the occurrences of OV order in the speech of 12 participants from the city of Rio de Janeiro, we noticed that: (i) the principal function of OV order in Brazilian Portuguese is that of resuming a topic, or an aspect of a topic, in order to predicate about it; (ii) this function is composed, in fact, of three subfunctions: to establish contrast, to mitigate a previous statement, and to reinforce a topic that is being discussed; (iii) the principal function, mentioned above, and its subfunctions are mechanisms for expressing subjectivity in BP.
- **KEYWORDS:** Subjectivity. Word order. OV order. Brazilian Portuguese.

## Introduction

This paper represents an additional phase in our research concerning subjectivity and word order in Brazilian Portuguese<sup>1</sup> (BP). In light of the theoretical interconnection that exists between Functional Linguistics and Cognitive Linguistics, herein we focus on object-verb order (OV), which is one of the types of variation that is observed in relation to the canonical/neutral order of BP, the Verb-Object order (VO). In light of the evidence we encountered in our research regarding the application of word order in BP (ABRAÇADO, 2013, 2003, 2001; PEZATTI, 1993; VOTRE, 1992; BRAGA, 1984; PONTES, 1987, among others), we propose to demonstrate that: (i) the principal, or most prevalent, function of OV order in BP is that of resuming a topic, or an aspect of a topic, in order to predicate about it; (ii) this function is composed, in fact, of three subfunctions: to establish contrast, to mitigate a previous statement, and to reinforce a topic that is being discussed; (iii) the principal function, mentioned above, and its subfunctions are mechanisms for expressing subjectivity in BP.

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<sup>1</sup> The following undergraduate research scholars contributed to the completion of this study: Marthina Scardua Ferreira (Paper) and Amanda Dib (PIBIC/UFF).

This paper is organized according to the following structure: firstly, we present the OV order discursive functions that were identified by previous studies; we then address issues related to the notion of subjectivity and the relationship between subjectivity and word order. Analysis results of the data are then discussed, and, lastly, we present our conclusions and observations based on the results that were found.

## Discursive functions regarding OV order identified in previous studies

One of the main functions of the OV order in BP, according to Votre (1992), Braga (1984) and Pontes (1987), is that of establishing contrasts. The recurrent use of OV order in BP has been previously identified, and it is generally characterized as a process of topicalization with the aim of establishing contrasts, in accordance with the following example:

- (1) [...] *era um é uma menina, não é? Uma moça- é muito bonita a história. Eu, quando comecei assistir, não estava fazendo muita fé, mas meu marido disse: “essa novela vai ficar boa.” É uma menina que o pai era muito rico. Mas era um homem rico em terras, entendeu? Tinha muita terra, tinha muito dinheiro nas propriedades, **mas dinheiro mesmo ele não tinha entendeu?*** (FAL 30).

[...] it was a it is a girl, isn't it? A young lady- the story is quite lovely. When I began watching it, I didn't think it would be very good, but my husband said: "this soap opera is going to get better." It's about a girl whose father was very wealthy. But he was a man that was rich in terms of land, understand? He had a lot of land, he had a lot of money in real estate, *but he didn't really have any money, understand?* [literal translation: *but money really he did not have, understand?*] (FAL 30).

In contrast, Braga (1984, p.216) argues that establishing contrasts constitutes merely one of the roles that are played by OV order. According to this author, OV order is also employed in BP, “[...] to return to a topic, or an aspect of the topic, that was referred to directly before, to reinforce the topic that is being considered”. In cases such as these, states Braga, the use of a demonstrative is commonplace:

The combination of these aspects – the use of the demonstrative and a deviation from the neutral order – suggests that these topicalizations were employed to reinforce the topic that was being discussed. Consider the following example:

So, I feel that the... the... cook should exist over there as he exists, isn't that right? You're going to the army, you're going there, you're the cook, right? In the hotels everyone... Women are more for helping

out than anything else! Cut potatoes and wash the dishes, right? More easy-going work. I think that *this kind of heavy duty work*, you know, shouldn't be done by women, no sir [literal translation: this work heavy, you know, the woman should not do, no]. (BRAGA, 1984, p.216, emphasis added).

In addition, Braga (1984) points out another discursive function of the OV order in BP: that of mitigating a previous statement. The use of OV order, in this respect, tends to occur after an umbrella statement and serves to mitigate it, to shatter the reader's expectations. As such, if the preceding statement was affirmative in nature, the OV order will tend to present a negative statement, and vice-versa. The author proffers the following example to illustrate this function:

I am his second wife. There are these two children, that, here, no one knows about my life. That I live here... If you ask me the name of that neighbor next door, I don't know it. I know who he is, but, *his name*, I don't know. (BRAGA, 1984, p.217, emphasis added).

However, in our opinion, these examples do not provide sufficient evidence for the notion that OV order performs three distinct discursive functions. We know that there is only one principal function that is composed, in fact, of three subfunctions. Our understanding is based on the fact that, in each of the examples that were presented, independently of the "function" that they illustrate, one can observe the resumption of a topic, or of an aspect of the topic, that was mentioned directly before in order to justify it, whether by establishing a contrast, by mitigating a preceding statement, or even by reinforcing a topic that is being discussed.

Having established this, we can conclude that the most prevalent function of the OV order is to resume a topic, or an aspect of a topic, in order to predicate about it. As such, to establish a contrast, to mitigate a preceding statement and to reinforce the topic under consideration, all operate, in fact, as subfunctions of the first function.

Another aspect that is directly related to the previous finding also called our attention: the OV order occurs in portions of the discussion where the opinions and perspective of the speaker manifest themselves. This indicates that a relationship exists between the use of OV order and the expression of subjectivity. This relationship is examined below.

## **Subjectivity and word order**

Although the concepts that involve subjectivity have garnered much attention in current linguistic research, mainly regarding studies that are based,

theoretically, on Functional Linguistics and Cognitive Linguistics, those concepts are still unclear and contain significant gaps. This makes comprehending the concepts themselves, and their significance to language, all the more difficult, and, furthermore, favors the emergence of a range of issues of varying nature. One of the questions that we ask is: does subjectivity involve human language, is it an inherent characteristic of the process of conceptualization, is it a type of motivation, a mechanism or a process of linguistic change? In other words – what is subjectivity really? In the following sections, we will make arguments for possible answers to this question in order to restrict and support the discussion of the object of this study.

### **(Inter)subjectivity: conceptualization and delimitation**

Subjectivity in language, a subject that has been widely examined recently in linguistics, has previously been presented and discussed by other scholars, as mentioned by Silva (2011, p.95):

Going beyond what was proposed by Bréal, Bühler or Jakobson, one of the most notable concepts was proposed by Benveniste, who introduced the notion of the “subject of enunciation”, and the recognition that language [...]

[...] it's so profoundly affected by the expression of subjectivity that one wonders, if it were constructed differently, if it could still function AND be known as language. (BENVENISTE, 1966, p.261).

Lyons, a more recent contributor to the issue, has defined subjectivity as:

[...] the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent's expression of himself and of his own attitudes and beliefs. (LYONS, 1982, p.102).

One can observe that, while Benveniste (1966) views subjectivity as an intrinsic characteristic of language, Lyons (1982) describes it as a recourse, which exists in natural languages, that affords the locutionary agent a means by which to express himself, his attitudes and his beliefs.

In more recent studies, which have taken into account the functionalist and cognitivist perspectives, which are discussed below, discrepancies in the characterization and investigation of subjectivity have also been identified.



## Subjectivity according to functional linguistics

Traugott (2010), based on Lyons's (1982) definition of subjectivity, according to which subjectivity refers to the means by which natural languages, in their structures and normal manner of functioning, provide the locutionary agent with a means for expressing himself and his attitudes and beliefs, associates intersubjectivity with the way in which natural languages, in their structures and normal manner of functioning, provide the locutionary agent with a means of expressing his opinion with regard to the attitudes, beliefs, and, most significantly, the "face" or "self-image" of the listener.

In addition, in reference to a branch of her work, completed during the last 25 years, regarding the study of the semanticization of subjectivity as a function of time, Traugott (2010) regards as (inter)subjectification the diachronic process of the semanticization of (inter)subjectivity. Traugott indicates that a distinction must be made between the synchronic ((inter)subjectivity) state and the diachronic process ((inter)subjectification). Based on evidence that has been found in historic texts, Traugott assumes that the linguistic change represents a change in usage.

Traugott also assumes that a distinction exists between semantics and pragmatics and, based on this distinction, defends the hypothesis that subjectification and intersubjectification both involve a reanalysis and the conventionalization of pragmatic meanings that arise as contexts within which speaker and listener negotiate meanings. As such, subjectification is the development of meanings that express the attitude, or opinion, of the speaker, while intersubjectification is the development of meanings regarding the speaker's awareness of the listener's self-image.

According to Traugott (2010), subjectification and intersubjectification are the mechanisms by which:

- a. meanings are adopted to codify and regulate the attitudes and beliefs of the speaker (subjectification);
- b. once subjectified, such meanings can be adopted to codify meanings that are centered on the listener (intersubjectification).

Traugott and Dasher (2005), in turn, demonstrate to what extent subjectivity, which explicitly expresses the opinion of the speaker, is capable of, according to its linguistic usage, codifying new meanings. According to these authors, the most subjective expressions are involved in contexts within which the following are prevalent: clear temporal and spatial deixis; explicit attitude markers of the speaker regarding what is said, including epistemic attitude for the proposition; explicit attitude markers of the speaker regarding the relationship between the parts of the text; the principle of relevance.

Traugott and Dasher (2005) add that subjectivity depends on cognitive principles; however, in the context of communication and rhetorical strategies, it is related to competitive impulses that exist between speakers (to be informative) and listeners (to construct the inferences that are suggested) – in other words, subjectivity inevitably involves, to some extent, intersubjectivity. It is a metonymically-based process through which the speaker adopts meanings to transmit the information that will be reworked during communication.

This emphasis on the context of communication, that is, on each of the linguistic clues that appear in the surroundings, made Traugott (2010) view subjectification as a subtype of semantic reanalysis (related to metonymic processes).

Alternatively, as we will examine below, from the cognitivist perspective, the context is not emphasized so much so as the subject of the conceptualization.

### **Subjectivity according to cognitive linguistics**

According to Cognitive Linguistics, subjectivity can be characterized in accordance with a fundamental principle of this line of thought, as explained by Verhagen (2007, p.48):

A fundamental principle in Cognitive Linguistics is that semantics is, indeed, primarily cognitive and not a matter of relationships between language and the world (or truth conditions with respect to a model). This principle becomes especially manifest in the research into facets of meaning and grammatical organization which crucially makes use of notions such as ‘perspective’, ‘subjectivity’, or ‘point of view’. What these notions have in common is that they capture aspects of conceptualization that cannot be sufficiently analyzed in terms of properties of the *object* of conceptualization, but, in one way or another, necessarily involve a *subject* of conceptualization.

Langacker (1999, 2003, 2006), basing his argument on the process of conceptualization, explains subjectivity and subjectification in terms of perspectives, or points of view, that can be observed in the asymmetrical relationship between the subject that observes/conceptualizes and the object that is observed/conceptualized:

One entity or situation is *objectively* constructed as it is placed “in scene” and observed from outside, as a specific point of focus, as an object of perception; it is *subjectively* constructed the longer it

remains “off scene”, as a subject that is not conscious of itself and implicit in terms of per/conception (Langacker, 2006: 18; 2008: 77). *Subjectivity* is, therefore, a property of concepts that are off scene, or implicit, insofar as *objectivity* is a property of concepts that are in scene, or explicit. *Subjectification* is, by extension, a process through which an entity transitions from the ‘object’ to the ‘subject’ of per/conception, and, consequently, the conceptualizer/speaker (one or the other element of the act of locution) ceases to be an observer/external element and begins to form part of the content of conceptualization. (SILVA, 2011, p.98, emphasis added).

In other words, for Langacker, subjectivity does not refer to linguistic expressions *per se*, but the way in which an element of a conceptualization is constructed within a perspective, in other words, whether objectively or subjectively:

For example, the difference between *Vanessa is sitting across the table from me* and *Vanessa is sitting across the table* according to Langacker is that the same content (here: the speaker as the landmark of the *across*-relation) is ‘objectively construed’ in the former because it is put on stage by the expression *me* (similarly to another nominal expression [...]), whereas it ‘subjectively construed’ in the latter because it remains offstage as the implicit locus of conception. (VERHAGEN, 2007, p.74).

Within this line of thought, Langacker uses the term *subjectification* to refer to an increase in subjectivity, that is, an increase in the conceptual perspectivization of some idea, which corresponds to a “realignment of a given relationship from the objective axis to the subjective axis” (LANGACKER, 1990, p.17). In these terms, the subjectification occurs in conjunction with a process of semantic bleaching of the objective concept, which occurs because the subjective component (the perspective of the conceptualizer) is immanent to the objective concept, because it is part of the conceptualization process itself.

Furthermore, Langacker (2006) also discusses the relationship between subjectification and grammaticalization, demonstrating it through reports of various cases, such as, for example, the evolution, in English, of the future meaning of the verb *to go*. Subjectification, according to Langacker (1999), is a gradual and multifaceted phenomenon that is related to the following parameters of change: (a) a change of state (current > potential; specific > generic); (b) a change in the focus of attention (profiled > unprofiled); (c) a change of domain (physical interaction > social interaction); (d) a change in the source of activity (entity is “in scene” > entity is “off scene”).

Although implicitly, Langacker, in his model, also foresees the intersubjective dimension:

[...] the intersubjective dimension is inherent to Langacker's model. The very notion of *perspectivation*, as a process of joint attention between the speaker and the listener vis-a-vis the object of conceptualization, evokes both dimensions: not only the dimension within which the conceptualization 'object' is structured, but also the dimension of intersubjective coordination between the conceptualization 'subjects', i.e., the speaker and the listener. (SILVA, 2011, p.99, emphasis added).

### **Subjectivity: the point of view adopted in this paper**

Despite the discernible distinctions that exist among the perspectives regarding subjectivity that have been discussed, we are not in disagreement with any of them, for we understand that these divergences are due to inherent differences in the perspectives that are adopted. Benveniste (1966) analyzes subjectivity as an intrinsic characteristic of human language, since his principal focus is, in fact, language. While for Lyons (1982), as well as for Traugott and Dasher (2005), subjectivity, viewed from a phenomenological perspective, corresponds to mechanisms that exist in the natural languages, through which the speaker expresses his beliefs and attitudes. In parallel, Traugott and Dasher also consider intersubjectivity to be a mechanism that serves, however, to express the opinion of the speaker regarding attitudes, beliefs and, more specifically, the "face" or "self-image" of the listener. Furthermore, Traugott (2010), who calls attention to the distinction between (inter)subjectivity (synchronic state) and (inter)subjectification (diachronic process), associates subjectification and intersubjectification to processes of change. Alternatively, Langacker (2006), who emphasizes the process of conceptualization and, by extension, the conceptualizing subject, explains subjectivity in terms of conceptual perspectivation: the manner in which the element of a conceptualization is constructed within a perspective, in other words, whether it is constructed objectively or subjectively.

In light of the above, we consider it necessary to determine, firstly, in accordance with which perspective is subjectivity dealt with in this paper. To do so, we must explain that the focus of our study is a type of mechanism for manifesting subjectivity, observed within a particular language, or, more specifically, within BP. As such, in light of the specific characteristics of this study, we will base ourselves on Lyons's definition (1982). We postulate, therefore, that subjectivity refers to mechanisms that exist in the natural languages that allow their users to express themselves, their attitudes and their beliefs.

The following is also necessary in order to restrict the scope even further. Although it is understood that subjectivity and intersubjectivity are inherently linked, and that, therefore, only on a phenomenological level, in an evaluation that is based on linguistic clues, can one address them separately, due to the reduction in scope that we chose to perform in this study, we will only deal with subjectivity in the remainder of this paper.

Having defined the approach to subjectivity that has been adopted, we shall transition to an examination of the relationship between subjectivity and OV order in BP.

### **Subjectivity and OV order in bp**

The relationship between subjectivity and OV order in BP (which can also be observed in the previous examples) is exemplified in the following passage:

- (2) *Quer dizer que ele (riso i) sofreu o diabo, entende? Sofreu! Mas agora <aga-> felizmente já está- se <recuperou> se recuperou quase, não é? E ele é muito assim, ele é <muito> ele é assim muito bom <amigo>.É até parecido comigo, sabe? [Ele é muito]- ele é muito de mim. Eu acho que **isso eu transmiti para ele** (FAL 30)*

You mean that he (laughter) suffered like the devil, know what I mean? Yes, he suffered! But now fortunately, he has already <recovered> almost recovered, right? It's typical of him, he is <very> he is like, very good <friend>. He's even like me, ya know? [He is very]- he's very much like me. I think that *I passed this onto him* (literal translation: I think that *this I passed onto him.*) (FAL 30).

As one can see, in this and in previous examples, the occurrences of the OV order happen during moments in which the speaker speaks of himself, of his own feelings or, perhaps, when he proffers comments about someone or about something that happened.

Thompson and Hopper (2001, p.53) had already shown that the low transitivity that was detected while analyzing data from conversations is due to the fact that our conversations mainly concern themselves with “how things are according to our point of view”, that is, devoid of feedback from the subjectivity in our daily use of the language. To emphasize what these authors postulate, the majority of the OV order cases that we registered occurred in dialogues. Furthermore, it should also be emphasized that the relationship between word order and subjectivity that we observe in BP can also be found in other languages. According to Traugott (2010, p.21, emphasis added):

A growing number of studies have suggested that as they are subjectified linguistic elements are used in increasingly peripheral positions. Typically the shift is leftward in VO languages, and rightward in OV languages. In English many discourse markers are associated with left (sometime right) periphery, and their use in this position can be correlated with subjectification of their meaning (see e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002 on *indeed, in fact, actually*, Brinton Forthcoming on *I mean*). It has further been suggested that subjectified meanings of adjectives are to be found in the left periphery of the NP, see e.g. Adamson (2000) on the development from descriptive to affective meanings of *lovely* as in *a lovely little example*, and Breban (2006) on the word order correlations of subjectification and grammaticalization in the development of adjectives like *different, distinct*. Likewise, in Japanese many items that are subjectified or intersubjectified come to be used on the periphery of the clause.

Furthermore, we emphasize that, with respect to BP (whose neutral order is (S)V(O)), the OV order can be perfectly classified within the standard that is described by Traugott above. In our view, the occurrence of subjectified linguistic elements in peripheral positions (changing from the left in VO Languages and to the right in OV Languages) is related to that which was stated by Givón (1985), who said that the canonic/neutral clause must convey the basic idea regarding the events/actions/states, and, furthermore, express who did what for whom, when, where, how or why, and for what purpose. As a result, the performance of other important communicative functions would be left to the types of variation that are commonly recorded with respect to the canonic/neutral clause.

Within this line of thought, we conclude that the OV order serves the discursive strategy of expressing subjective enunciations, separating them from the other basic ideas that are normally expressed by the canonic/neutral clause.

Furthermore, in light of the fact that the use of the OV order refers to a principal mechanism that makes three different manners of expressing subjectivity possible, we postulate that: (i) the principal function of OV order is that of resuming a topic, or an aspect of a topic, in order to predicate about it; (ii) this function is composed, in fact, of three subfunctions: to establish contrast, to mitigate a previous statement, and to reinforce a topic that is being discussed; (iii) the principal function, mentioned above, and its subfunctions are mechanisms for expressing subjectivity in BP.

Each one of the subfunctions constitutes, therefore, a distinct way of expressing subjectivity. The resumption of a topic, or an aspect of a topic (principal

function), should, therefore, occur in discursive situations in which the speaker: looks to promote certain entities via the establishment of contrasts with others; reconsider, or mitigate, a previous statement; or, still, emphasize his point of view, or opinion, with respect to some topic that was being examined.

## Analysis of the phenomenon

The examples that were presented up to this point illustrate the occurrences of OV order that we found in the data that was analyzed. In each case, one can observe the use of OV order to express subjective enunciations, such as in the following examples:

- (3) *O presidente- está aí, eu gosto desse presidente nosso. Eu gosto muito dele, eu gosto. Porque eu acho que [ele]- [ele]- ele tem [muita]- muita vontade de fazer muita coisa, mas a- o pessoal todo tem que ajudar, não é? Que se não ajudar, ele sozinho não pode fazer grande coisa. **Vontade ele tem.** (FAL 30).*

The president – he's there, I like this, our president. I like him a lot, I like him. Because I believe that [he] – [he] – he has [a lot] – a lot of desire to do many things, but peo- everyone has to help, right? Because if not, he himself can't do much. *He wants to help, though.* (literal translation: *Desire he has.*) (FAL 30).

As one can notice in any of the given examples, in the periphery of the OV order occurrences, linguistic clues exist, such as the presence of the first person singular tense of verbs such as *gostar, querer, saber, achar (to like, to want, to know, to guess)*\_ the latter word is employed as a cognitive verb\_, which confirms that we are faced with portions of the discourse within which, in accordance with Lyons (1982), the speaker expresses himself, his attitudes and his beliefs. We believe, therefore, that the conclusion stating that the OV order serves the discursive purpose of expressing subjective enunciations has not been adequately explored.

Such examples, as well as the data that we analyzed, were extracted from speech samples provided by 12 participants from the city of Rio de Janeiro, whose interviews are contained in the *Amostra Censo*, a database that was produced by *Projeto Censo da Variação Linguística no Rio de Janeiro (PEUL/ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)*<sup>2</sup>. The following table contains the code, gender and ages of each of our participants.

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<sup>2</sup> Each of our participants had 11 years of schooling or less.

**Table 1 – Participants**

<b>INF</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>GENDER</b>
<b>FAL 49</b>	7	M
<b>FAL 50</b>	8	F
<b>FAL 1</b>	18	M
<b>FAL 4</b>	25	F
<b>FAL 9</b>	39	M
<b>FAL 7</b>	41	M
<b>FAL 30</b>	43	M
<b>FAL 43</b>	42	M
<b>FAL 16</b>	56	F
<b>FAL 8</b>	57	M
<b>FAL 34</b>	62	F
<b>FAL 46</b>	62	M

**Source:** Made by the author.

As shown in Table 1, for our study, we collected speech data from participants whose ages ranged from seven to 62 years. From the participants' speech, we extracted a total of 79 OV order occurrences within a total of 415 items of data<sup>3</sup>. These results showed that, in 100% of the cases, that is, in all of the OV order occurrences that were identified, each one was a subjective enunciation.

It is also notable that each participant, regardless of their age, made use of OV order in their speech. To illustrate this point, Table 2, now containing the percentage of occurrences of OV order by age interval, is provided below:

<sup>3</sup> In addition, considering the neutral order occurrences, the data revealed the following: VO = 336 (80,9%); OV = 79 (19,1%). Having performed the Chi-Square Test, the distribution of the data that was analyzed was proven to be statistically significant. The  $X^2$  result was equal to 159.14, a value that is much higher, therefore, than the critical value of 3.841 for a degree of freedom equal to 1 (the higher the  $X^2$  result, the more statistically significant is the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable).



**Table 2** – Occurrences of OV order by age interval

Age interval	Inf.	Age	OV	Total	
				N	%
1 <sup>a</sup>	FAL 49	7	2	18	22,8
	FAL 50	8	3		
	FAL 1	18	1		
	FAL 4	25	9		
2 <sup>a</sup>	FAL 9	39	12	42	53,2
	FAL 7	41	8		
	FAL 43	42	4		
	FAL 30	43	13		
3 <sup>a</sup>	FAL 16	56	3	19	24
	FAL 8	57	5		
	FAL 34	62	7		
	FAL 46	62	3		
Total				79	100

**Source:** Made by the author.

Returning to the object of this study, to calculate the percentage with respect to each of the subfunctions that are performed by the OV order, we have separated the occurrences into three categories: I – the establishment of contrasts; II – the mitigation of a previous statement; III – the reinforcement of a topic that is being discussed. Examples regarding these three categories are provided below:

- (4) I – the establishment of contrasts:

*Eu não fiz todas as séries. Tem primeira, não é? (est) CA, jardim, não? (est) até CA não tem, não é? só assim primeira- e primeira- (hes) é. [Primeira], não é? primeira, CA, (est) eu não fiz, não. só fiz a segunda, porque eu estudei num outro colégio, Abeu Filgueiras, lá em Nilópolis. (FAL 50).*

I did not complete all of the series. There is a first one, isn't there? CA, garden, isn't there? up to CA there isn't, right? only in that manner first- and first. [First], right? *first, CA, I didn't do it*, no. (literal translation: *first, CA, I didn't do, no.*) I only did the second one, because I studied at a different school, Abeu Filgueiras, over there in Nilópolis. (FAL 50).

- (5) II – the mitigation of a previous statement:

*Ela é chatinha também. [ela]- Ela não gosta muito de- ela não come nada, é chata mesmo. Uma coisinha como nunca vi. Gosta mais um pouquinho de sopa. (voz da filha) Sopa ela gosta.* (FAL 30).

She is also a bit annoying. [she]- She doesn't very much like- she doesn't eat anything, she's really annoying. Something I've never seen before. She likes soup a bit more. (daughter's voice) *She likes soup.* (literal translation: *Soup she likes.*) (FAL 30).

- (6) III – the reinforcement of a topic that is being discussed:

*Então, com treze anos, eu comecei a trabalhar na obra com meu pai. Meu pai era construtor- (latido longe) eu ia para a obra com meu pai, <papa...>, comecei ajudar meu pai, pintava uma parede, pintava isso, pintava aquilo. Eu sei até assentar tijolo, botar cerâmica, **essas coisa assim, dentro duma casa, eu sei fazer.** Trocar um cano d'água, (est) ver um fio, fazer uma instalação, colocar uma bucha numa parede, **isso tudo, eu sei fazer.*** (Fal 7).

So, when I was thirteen years old, I began to work on the construction site with my father. My father was a construction worker- (far off bark) I used to go to the construction site with my father, <papa...>, I started to help my dad, I would paint a wall, paint this, paint that. I even know how to lay bricks, install ceramic tiles, *I know how to do stuff like that, inside a house* (literal translation: *those things like that, inside a house, I know how to do*). Change a water pipe, install wires, build household installations, install a washer in a wall, *I know how to do all that stuff* (literal translation: *all that stuff, I know how to do*). (Fal 7).

Table 3, containing the results that were obtained, is shown below<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> The distribution of the data was shown to be statistically significant by means of a Chi-Square test;  $\chi^2$  was equal to 17.18, which was greater than the 5.991 value that corresponds to the critical value for a degree of freedom equal to 2.

**Table 3** – Subfunctions of the OV order

<b>Subfunctions</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>I</b>	12	15,2
<b>II</b>	25	31,6
<b>III</b>	42	53,2

**Source:** Made by the author.

As can be seen in Table 3, the percentages concerning the three subfunctions show that the OV order is utilized more in the subfunction of reinforcing a topic that is being discussed. Next, in decreasing order, the OV order is used to mitigate a previous statement and, finally, it is adopted for the subfunction of establishing contrasts. Our data revealed that the subfunction of establishing contrasts, considered in some studies to be the principal function of OV order, appears as the one least frequently used.

### **Final considerations**

By adopting the concept that subjectivity refers to mechanisms that exist in natural languages, which make it possible for their users to express themselves, their attitudes and their beliefs, this paper has examined the relationship between OV order and the manifestation of subjectivity within BP. We have presented evidence that the function of resuming a topic, or an aspect of a topic, in order to predicate about it, is the principal and most widespread function of OV order in BP. As such, this function is composed, in fact, of three subfunctions: that of establishing contrasts, that of mitigating a previous statement and that of reinforcing a topic that is being discussed.

In quantitative terms, we were able to identify the following trends: (i) that 100% of the OV order occurrences corresponded to subjective enunciations; (ii) that the subfunction of reinforcing a topic that is being discussed occurs most often; (iii) that the second most often used subfunction is that of mitigating a previous statement, which is followed, in terms of frequency of use, by the subfunction of establishing a contrast; (iv) that the principal function and the OV order subfunctions constitute mechanisms for expressing subjectivity in BP.

ABRAÇADO, Jussara. Ordem objeto-verbo no português do Brasil: mecanismo de expressão de subjetividade. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.539-555, 2015.

- *RESUMO: Neste trabalho, pautado na interface teórica entre Linguística Funcional e Linguística Cognitiva, pretendemos demonstrar que a relação entre ordem de palavras e subjetividade, verificada em pesquisas realizadas em diversas línguas, verifica-se também no uso que se faz da ordem objeto-verbo (OV) no português do Brasil (PB). Analisando as ocorrências da ordem OV na fala de 12 participantes da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, constatamos: (i) que a principal função da ordem OV no PB é a de retomar um tópico ou aspecto de um tópico para se predicar sobre ele; (ii) que tal função se subdivide em outras três: a de estabelecer contraste, a de atenuar uma afirmação precedente, e a de reforçar um tópico sob consideração; (iii) que a função principal e suas subfunções constituem mecanismos de expressão de subjetividade no PB.*
- *PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Subjetividade. Ordem de palavras. Ordem OV. Português brasileiro.*

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## **“SÓ”, “EXCLUSIVAMENTE” AND THEIR POSITIONS IN THE SENTENCE**

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- **ABSTRACT:** In this paper, I examine some properties of higher and lower adverbs to suggest that the focusing *só* ‘only’ belongs to the first group. I argue that the behavior of exclusive *só* in Brazilian Portuguese is better explained on syntactic grounds, i.e. in terms of its position in the universal hierarchy. The key to arrive at this conclusion comes from the distribution of the focusing *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’ which is also an exclusive adverb but behaves differently from *só* with respect to some syntactic properties which discriminate between lower and higher adverbs. I will show that Bever and Clark’s (2008) predictions that Semantics would be responsible for the asymmetries between quantificational adverbs and the exclusive *só* is not accurate inasmuch as exclusive *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’, in Brazilian Portuguese, goes together with quantificational adverbs as far as some syntactic properties are examined.
- **KEYWORDS:** Focusing adverbs. Exclusive adverbs. Quantificational adverbs. Functional hierarchy. Cartography. Generative Syntax.

### **Introduction**

Kayne’s (2005) “One Feature, One Head Principle” undoubtedly became one of the fundamental tenets of the cartographic endeavor in syntax. This principle captures the initial idea which has motivated cartographic studies in the Principles and Parameters theory from its first works in the nineties (CINQUE, 1994, 1995, [and especially] 1999; RIZZI, 1997): the assumption that the atoms of syntax should not be reduced to words or morphemes that generativists were used to representing in syntactic trees (e.g. vP, IP/TP, CP, etc. for the sentence; and DP for the nominal expression). The cartography project has shown that the IP/TP would actually consist of approximately 40 functional projections; and the CP zone would be formed by almost fifteen functional projections. Abney’s (1986), Szabolcsi’s (1987), Pollock’s (1989) and Beghelli and Stowell’s (1997) works should also be recognized as the major precursors of the cartography enterprise in Syntax. These works paved the way for the investigation of the small-forming units of syntactic structures and their main phrases.

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In this context, it is worth remembering Cinque's (1999) work, whose efforts focused on determining the position of different classes of adverbs, which constitute almost 40 classes, that would correspond – surprisingly (for that time) – to different classes of functional heads (also in the order of 40). In his seminal work, Cinque not only brought important contributions to the syntax of adverbs and the architecture of the clause – Cinque's theory offers an interesting approach to the generative *Middlefield*, which pays enormous attention to descriptions that typologists have been doing on languages from different families – but also brings two major theoretical and conceptual contributions to Generativism: (i) how one could understand the principles that would be shared by all languages (as inherited by Universal Grammar); and, related to (i), (ii) how one could explain the interesting issue of parametric variation – which, for him, is linked to Merge operations, i.e. external Merge (what is merged with morphophonological material and what gets unpronounced (MOURA, 2005)) and internal Merge (the different height, in the hierarchies, that displacements target in distinct languages).

If cartographic studies are on the right track, it is expected that not only those classes of adverbs described in Cinque (1999), but also focusing adverbs like *only*, *also*, *mainly*, etc. (which correspond to about five semantic (sub)classes) be rigidly ordered, i.e. that they occupy a fixed position in the universal hierarchy of functional elements in the clause.

This work brings a contribution to the cartographic endeavor, in the sense that it seeks to show, based on the syntactic distribution of a class of focusing adverbs – the exclusive AdvPs *só* 'only' and *exclusivamente* 'exclusively' in Brazilian Portuguese – that such adverbials not only are rigidly ordered with respect to other adverbs of the Cinque hierarchy but are also ordered among themselves.

Some syntactic properties of higher AdvPs are brought to light: (i) higher AdvPs cannot be recovered by the elliptical VP in Portuguese, (ii) they do not allow the extraction of their associated focus, (iii) they cannot appear in the sentence-final position. These properties are tested against focusing *só* 'only' to see whether it behaves as a higher or lower adverb. The conclusion is that *só* 'only' also occupies a position among higher adverbs.

The syntactic behavior of exclusive adverbs like *exclusivamente* – which surprisingly behaves as quantificational adverbs, and not as the focusing *só* (which, as will be seen in due time, belongs to another syntactic class in spite of its semantics) – leads us to suggest that there exists (at least) two positions for exclusive focusing adverbs, one among high adverbs and the other among low adverbs.

The obvious corollary of this duality is the acknowledgment that the different behaviors of exclusive and quantificational adverbs cannot be purely accounted



for on semantic grounds. Yet, it should find its explanation in the structure. What explains the different behavior of exclusive and quantificational adverbs is the position they occupy in the hierarchy. In other words the question is related to the architecture of the clause.

In the next section, I present Cinque’s (1999) cartographic approach to adverbs and clausal structure. Further, my attempt is to determine the position that *só* ‘only’ occupies among the adverbs of the Cinque hierarchy. Next, the syntactic properties of higher adverbs will be tested against those of focusing *só*. Then I will compare the properties of quantificational adverbs with those of focusing *só* ‘only’. Subsequently, I will discuss the syntactic behavior of lower adverbs, including the quantificational ones. As will be shown, higher adverbs behave like *só*. I further propose a position for the lower exclusive adverb *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’. A general summary of the work will be presented in the penultimate section. In the last section, I will make the acknowledgments.

### Theoretical framework

Based on the relative distribution of adverbs from different semantic classes in different languages, Cinque (1999) proposes that Chomsky’s (1986) IP (or “TP” in the minimalist tradition (CHOMSKY, 1995)) would actually correspond to the following functional distinctions:

(1) The Universal Hierarchy of Functional Projections of the IP (Cinque (1999, p.106), modified in Cinque (2006))

[*frankly* Mood<sub>SpeechAct</sub> > [*surprisingly* Mood<sub>Mirative</sub> > [*luckily* Mood<sub>Evaluative</sub> > [*allegedly* Mood<sub>Evidential</sub> > [*probably* Mod<sub>Epistemic</sub> > [*once* T<sub>Past</sub> > [*then* T<sub>Future</sub> > [*perhaps* Mood<sub>Irrealis</sub> > [*necessarily* Mod<sub>Necessity</sub> > [*possibly* Mod<sub>possibility</sub> > [*usually* Asp<sub>Habitual</sub> > [*finally* Asp<sub>Delayed</sub> > [*tententially* Asp<sub>Predispositional</sub> > [*again* Asp<sub>Repetitive(I)</sub> > [*often* Asp<sub>Frequentative(I)</sub> > [*willingly* Mod<sub>Volition</sub> > [*quickly* Asp<sub>Celerative(I)</sub> > [*already* T<sub>Anterior</sub> > [*no longer* Asp<sub>Terminative</sub> > [*still* Asp<sub>Continuative</sub> > [*always* Asp<sub>Continuous</sub> > [*just* Asp<sub>Retrospective</sub> > [*soon* Asp<sub>Proximative</sub> > [*briefly* Asp<sub>Durative</sub> > [(?) Asp<sub>Generic/Progressive</sub> > [*almost* Asp<sub>Prospective</sub> > [*suddenly* Asp<sub>Inceptive</sub> > [*obligatorily* Mod<sub>Obligation</sub> > [*in vain* Asp<sub>Frustrative</sub> > [(?) Asp<sub>Conative</sub> > [*completely* Asp<sub>SgCompletive(I)</sub> > [*tutto* Asp<sub>PlCompletive</sub> > [*well* Voice > [*early* Asp<sub>Celerative(II)</sub> > [(?) Asp<sub>Inceptive(II)</sub> > [*again* Asp<sub>Repetitive(II)</sub> > [*often* Asp<sub>Frequentative(II)</sub> > ...

Unless an informational structure-related feature (Topic, Focus, etc.) has to be valued, the adverbs in (1) occupy a fixed position in the structure and do not move from the position where they are externally merged. Thus, adverbs are diagnostics for the movement of other constituents of the sentence (e.g. the V, auxiliaries, modals, V arguments, etc.).

To arrive at the Universal Hierarchy of clausal functional projections, Cinque (1999) first turns to transitivity tests, which involve adverbs from different classes. He takes combinations of two adverbs from different classes in the two possible relative orders (see (2-3)) to determine their position in the hierarchy.

- (2) a. AdvP<sub>A</sub> > AdvP<sub>B</sub>  
 b. \*AdvP<sub>B</sub> > AdvP<sub>A</sub>
- (3) a. AdvP<sub>B</sub> > AdvP<sub>C</sub>  
 b. \*AdvP<sub>C</sub> > AdvP<sub>B</sub>

By combining (2) and (3), it follows that AdvP<sub>A</sub> precedes AdvP<sub>B</sub>, which in turn precedes AdvP<sub>C</sub>. Below, this mechanism is illustrated on the basis of English data involving four higher adverbs: *speech act*, *evaluative*, *evidential* and *epistemic* adverbs. The examples are taken from Cinque (1999, p.33).

- (4) Speech act adverbs (*honestly*) > Evaluative adverbs (*unfortunately*):  
 a. Honestly I am unfortunately unable to help you.  
 b. \*Unfortunately I am honestly unable to help you.
- (5) Evaluative adverbs (*fortunately*) > Evidential adverbs (*evidently*):  
 a. Fortunately, he had evidently had his own opinion of the matter.  
 b. \*Evidently he had fortunately had his own opinion of the matter.
- (6) Evidential adverbs (*clearly*) > Epistemic adverbs (*probably*):  
 a. Clearly John probably will quickly learn French perfectly.  
 b. \*Probably John clearly will quickly learn French perfectly.

Transitivity tests have also been applied to functional heads (in various languages) by Cinque. (7), for instance, presents auxiliary verbs in English and Spanish, which have been considered core categories of Inflection (IP):

- (7) a. These books *have been being read* all year. (CINQUE, 1999, p. 57)  
 b. Esos libros *han estado siendo leídos* todo el año. (= 7a)

In (7), *have* (a) and *han* (b) lexicalize the head of Tense; *been* (7a) and *estado* (7b), the perfect aspect; *being* (7a) and *siendo* (7b), the progressive; the lexical verb, given the passive construction, derivationally lexicalizes Voice (*read*, in (a); *leídos*, in (7b)). Given (7), we can infer the following partial ordering (cf. 7'):

- (7') Tense > Asp<sub>Perfect</sub> > Asp<sub>Progressive</sub> > Voice ... (> V) (CINQUE, 1999, p.57)

Since adverbs and functional heads match (each other) in terms of number, relative order and semantic classes, it is possible to propose that adverbs are an

integral part of the functional structure of the clause. This is precisely one of the innovations Cinque (1999) brings to the theory of grammar.


Since the past active participle can occupy a position to the right and to the left of each one of the low adverbs in Italian, Cinque suggests that there would be only one head between each two adverbs, an argument in favor of its proposal for the location of AdvPs in Spec (CINQUE, 1999).

### What about focusing adverbs?

Despite its empirical and conceptual coverage, Cinque’s (1999) universal hierarchy presented in (1) is not equipped with dedicated positions for focusing AdvPs of distinct semantic classes. Yet, Cinque (1999, 2004) recognizes that they can be treated along the lines of Bayer (1996) and Kayne (1998).

Munaro (2012) also provides a “cartographic” treatment of focusing adverbs by taking them to be merged as the head of one of the peripheral focus projections (in the CP area or in the lower IP area (i.e. in the vP)). In Munaro’s account, which also follows Kayne (1998), the focusing adverb attracts the focus to its Spec (this is represented by step (1) in figure 1, below), followed by the movement of the focusing adverb to the head immediately above (see step (2) in the figure), and, subsequently, by the movement of the remnant (see (3) in figure 1).

**Figure 1** – Munaro and Kayne’s treatment of focusing adverbs



**Source:** Made by the author.

Attractive by its simplicity – as focalization by adverbs actually reflects the (more) general process of focalization (with the focusing adverbs occupying the head of one of the two focus projections) –, Munaro’s proposal apparently does not

provide a structural reason for the existence of a hierarchy of different semantic classes of focusing adverbs, given the fact that it assumes only two positions (in the CP and vP domains) for these adverbs, regardless of their (semantic) class.

Recent advances in the Cartography Project (CINQUE; RIZZI, 2010) and references cited there) lead us to ask the following question: “which position(s) do different (semantic) classes of focusing adverbs occupy in terms of functional hierarchies?” One way to approach the syntax of focusing adverbs in line with the cartographic enterprise would be by recognizing that each one of the different classes of these AdvPs would have a distinct position of Merge, in line with the “One Feature, One Head Principle” (KAYNE, 2005). This strong view will be the one assumed here.

The following data suggest that different classes of focusing AdvPs are also rigidly ordered among each other and with respect to the other adverbs of the Cinque hierarchy:

- (8) a. O Mané até só falaria inglês se precisasse.  
The Mané even only would-speak English if he-had to  
'Mané would even only speak English, if he had to'
- b. \*O Mané só até falaria inglês se precisasse.
- (9) a. ?He'd even only speak English, if he had to.
- b. \*He'd only even speak English, if he had to. (KAYNE, 1998, p.162)
- (10) a. Ti ho chiesto di leggere anche solo un capitolo. [Italian – G. Cinque, p.c.]  
You I-have asked to read even only a chapter  
'I've asked you to read even only a chapter'
- b. \*Ti ho chiesto di leggere solo anche un capitolo.
- (11) a. Ion manânce (chiar) si numai pâine. [Romeno – A. Bleotu, p.c.]  
Ion eat even only bread  
'Ion even only eats bread'
- b. \*Ion manânce (chiar) numai si pâine.
- (12) a. [lian<sub>1</sub> mohuoke zheme miren de yuyan<sub>F1</sub>]<sub>1</sub> ye zhiyou<sub>2</sub> zhangsan<sub>F2</sub> zai yanjou t<sub>1</sub>  
even Mohawk so attractive DE language YE only Z. Prog study  
'Only<sub>2</sub> Zhangsan<sub>F2</sub><sup>1</sup> is studying even, such a fascinating language as Mohawk<sub>F1</sub>.'
- b. \*zhiyou<sub>2</sub> zhangsan<sub>F2</sub> [lian<sub>1</sub> mohuoke zheme miren de yuyan<sub>F1</sub>]<sub>1</sub> ye zai yanjou t<sub>1</sub>.  
(<sup>OK</sup>lian>zhiyou ; \*zhiyou>lian [Chinês (SHU, 2011, p. 124)]

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<sup>1</sup> The indexes F<sub>1</sub> and F<sub>2</sub> refer to the focusing adverbs which have scope over the constituents numbered as 1 and 2, respectively. Notice that in Chinese the scope relation among the focusing adverbs must be captured by Syntax. Thus, there is a pre-*Spell-Out* movement of a portion of the clause, indicated by the index “i”, which contains the modifier 1 and the focus F<sub>1</sub>. To the present discussion, it is important to point out that the surface ordering “[1 F<sub>1</sub>]<sub>1</sub> [2 F<sub>2</sub>] ... t<sub>1</sub>” exactly reflects an underlying hierarchy where Adv<sub>1</sub> > Adv<sub>2</sub> (the same ordering seen in (8-11)).

- (13) a. Chulsu-nun yeksi tansunhl uss-ess-ul kussita [Korean]  
C. -TOP also merely/only smile-past-EPIST  
'Chulsu also only smiled'  
b. Chulsu-nun tansunhl \*(,) yeksi uss-ess-ul kussita. (Sung Yun Cho, pers. communication)
- (14) a. ta shuobuding zhi qu-guo xinjiapuo. [Chinese (SHU, 2011, p.160)]  
he maybe only go-Exp Singapore  
'He has maybe only been to Singapore.'  
b. \*ta zhi shuobuding qu-guo xinjiapuo  
he only maybe go-Exp Singapore  
a'. Ele talvez só foi para Cingapura. (= 14a,b) [Brazilian Portuguese]  
b'. \*Ele só talvez foi para Cingapura.<sup>2</sup>
- (15) a. O José come provavelmente só arroz.  
The José eats probably only rice  
'José probably only eats rice'  
b. \*O José come só provavelmente arroz.
- (16) a. O Mané só já limpou o banheiro.  
The Mané only already cleaned the bathroom  
'Mané only already cleaned the bathroom'  
b. \*O Mané já só limpou o banheiro.
- (17) a. Ha solo già mangiato la pasta. [Italian]  
(S/he-)had only already eaten the pasta  
'S/he had only already eaten pasta'  
b. \*Ha già solo mangiato la pasta. (Guglielmo Cinque, pers. communication)

(8-17) suggests the following template:

- |   |
|---|
| <p>(18) (i) provavelmente/talvez &gt; só &gt; já<br/>probably/perhaps &gt; only &gt; already<br/>(ii) também &gt; só<br/>even &gt; only</p> |
|---|

<sup>2</sup> One of the anonymous reviewers considers only marginal, but not ungrammatical, the sentence given in (i.b):

- (i) a. Ele talvez só tenha ido à padaria.  
He perhaps only had gone to the bakery  
'He perhaps only had gone to the bakery'  
b. ?Ele só talvez tenha ido à padaria.

For me, (i.b) is ungrammatical, unless *só* 'only' is "prosodically marked". For the purposes of this work, in the production of grammaticality judgment tests, it is necessary to create "reliable minimal pairs", that is, sentences with 'flat intonation'. If the adverb *só* 'only' in (b) is prosodically marked, (b) no longer forms a minimal pair with (a) and both sentences have to be excluded from the data.

For the sentences given in (8-17), it is important to remember that, in the Cartographic tradition, the adverbs under consideration occupy the position of specifiers at the sentence level. Thus, for a given AdvP like *probably*, for instance, it is assumed to always occupy [Spec, Mod<sub>Epistemic</sub>P] – except in the cases of homonymy for which the same lexical form is merged in more than one position with different semantic specifications for each distinct position –. Thus, *provavelmente* ‘probably’ (see 19a,b,c) always occupies the same position in the sentence structure. The same is true of *só* ‘only’.

- (19) a. O José provavelmente só comeu arroz.  
 The José probably only ate rice  
 ‘José probably only ate rice’  
 b. O José provavelmente comeu só arroz.  
 The José probably ate only rice  
 ‘José probably ate only rice’  
 c. O José comeu provavelmente só arroz.  
 The José ate probably only rice  
 ‘José ate probably only rice’

Some empirical facts support the contention that, even in cases like (19c) – which hides an interesting ambiguity briefly described below –, the adverb is still merged in the extended projection of the verb and does not enter the derivation as an adjunct of the DP. The discussion of the verbal ellipsis phenomenon in Portuguese (cfr. the sentences in (36-39) and related text) should help us understand why those theories arguing that an adverb can be directly adjoined to a DP may not be correct. If the adverb cannot be recovered by the elliptical VP (in VP ellipsis constructions), that amounts to saying that the AdvP cannot be an adjunct of the DP. That is a good reason for completely abandoning the possibility of free and direct adjunction of AdvPs to DPs and other constituents of the clause.

Furthermore, (19c) and similar sentences are ambiguous in both Brazilian (BP) and European Portuguese (EP) (see TESCARI NETO (2013) chapter 5). In one reading, the adverb in (c) may only modify the DP (as seen by the paraphrase in (19c’), below). In the other possible reading the adverb in (c) modifies all the VP as well (given the acceptability of (19c’’)).

- (19) c’. O José comeu provavelmente só arroz, não feijão.  
 The José ate probably only rice, not bean (narrow scope)  
 ‘José probably only ate rice, not beans’  
 c’’. O José comeu provavelmente só arroz, não bebeu leite.  
 The José ate probably only rice, not drink milk (wide scope)  
 ‘José probably only ate rice, he didn’t drink milk’

## Where is the adverb *só* ‘only’ located in the Cinque hierarchy?

Bever and Clark (2008) and Shu (2011) recognize that focusing adverbs are classified into the following semantic classes (see the table below):

exclusives: only, just, merely, ...
non-scalar additives: too, also, ...
scalar additives: even
particularizers: in particular, for example,...
intensives: really, totally,...
minimizing downtoners: kind of, barely, hardly,...
maximizing downtoners: at most, at best, at the maximum,...

As previously stated, considering the seven classes of focusing adverbs mentioned in the above table, the paper only investigates the position of exclusive adverbs with respect to the other AdvPs of the Cinque hierarchy. At the end of the work, I will show that these adverbs actually correspond to two distinct syntactic classes – which are realized in two different and non-adjacent projections – due to their distinct position in the hierarchy. This fact explains their different behavior regarding a range of syntactic properties.

From Cinque’s (1999) work, it is known that habitual adverbs (*solitamente* ‘usually’) precede presuppositional negation (*mica*), which in turn precedes *più* (‘more’):

(20) *solitamente* > *mica* > *già* > *più* ... (CINQUE, 1999, p.6)

If one considers the position of focusing *só* ‘only’ with respect to the adverbs in (20) (cfr. (21) and (23)), they get the (partial) picture shown in (22) and (24):

- (21) a. Non ha mica solo mangiato la pasta. [Italiano]  
Not Aux NEG only eaten the pasta  
‘He hasn’t only eaten pasta’  
b. \*Non ha solo mica mangiato la pasta. (G. Cinque, personal communication)
- (22) ... *solitamente/usually/geralmente* > ‘*mica*’ > *solo/only/só* > *già/already/já* ...
- (23) a. Lui ha solo completamente distrutto una cosa, la sua casa. [Italian]  
He has only completely destructed one thing, the his house  
‘He only has completely destructed one thing: his house’  
b. \*Lui ha completamente solo distrutto una cosa, la sua casa. (G. Cinque, pers. com.)

Since *completamente* ‘completely’ is a VP adverb, i.e. it is located above vP, we can add the generalization in (24):

(24) *solo/só/only* may be located in the lower zone of the IP, but still above the vP.

Given the transitivity relations discussed above, there is one intriguing question to ask in the present context: where is *só/solo/only* located among the adverbs of the Cinque hierarchy? The data presented above and the sentences in (25-26), below, suggest that the focusing adverb *só* ‘only’ occupies a position in between the high adverbs and the low adverbs in the hierarchy in (1) (see, for this, (27)).

(25) T<sub>Anterior</sub> *já/already/già*:

A: – O que o José já limpou?

What that the José already cleaned

‘What has José already cleaned?’

B: – Ele só já limpou a casa.

He only already cleaned the house

‘He’s only already cleaned the house’

B’: – \*Ele já só limpou a casa.

(26) Asp<sub>Continuative</sub> *ainda/still/ancora*:

a. \*Ele ainda só não limpou a casa.

He still only not cleaned the house

‘He hasn’t only cleaned the house yet’

b. Ele só ainda não limpou a casa.

(27) *solitamente/usually* (Asp<sub>Habitual</sub>) > *mica* (presuppositional negation) > *solo/only* (Foc<sub>Exclusive</sub>) > *já/già/already* (T<sub>anterior</sub>) > *ainda/ancora/still* (Asp<sub>Continuative</sub>)

By applying transitivity tests involving *só* ‘only’ and the adverbs located near the habitual aspect, one can specify the position occupied by *só* ‘only’ in the hierarchy of IP adverbs. *Só* ‘only’ must necessarily follow the tardive aspect adverb *finalmente* ‘finally’, the predispositional aspect adverb *tendencialmente* ‘tendentially’ and the repetitive aspect adverb *novamente* ‘again’ (cf. 28a-c, respectively).

(28) a. \*O José só finalmente perdeu a cabeça.

The José only finally lost the head

‘José only finally lost his head’

a’. O José finalmente só perdeu a cabeça.<sup>3</sup>

The José finally only lost the head

‘José has finally only lost his head’

<sup>3</sup> For one of the reviewers, after much insistence, the sentence (ia) below – which forms a legitimate minimal pair with (ib), as defined in note 2) – is not ungrammatical, but only marginal:



- b. \*O José só tendencialmente perde a cabeça do nada.  
The José only tendentially lost the head out of nowhere
- b'. O José tendencialmente só perde a cabeça do nada.  
The José tendentially only loses the head out of nowhere  
'José tendentially loses the head out of nowhere'
- c. \*O José só novamente perdeu a cabeça.  
The José only again lost the head  
'José has only again lost his head'
- c'. O José novamente só perdeu a cabeça.  
José has again only lost the head

Regarding the frequentative (28d,d'), the volitional (28e,e') and the celerative (28f,f') adverbs, it seems that it is not possible to establish a relative order between each one of them with respect to the adverb *só* 'only':

- (28) d. O José só frequentemente perde a cabeça (não raramente!)  
The José only frequently loses the head (not rarely!)  
'José only frequently loses his head'
- d'. O José frequentemente só perde a cabeça.
- e. O José só voluntariamente fez a tarefa.  
The José only willingly did the homework  
'José only willingly did the homework'
- e'. O José voluntariamente só fez a tarefa.
- f. O José só rapidamente lava a louça.  
The José only quickly does the dishes  
'José only quickly does the dishes'
- f'. O José rapidamente só lava a louça.

- 
- (i) a. ?O João finalmente só fez a capa do trabalho.  
The João finally only did the title page of the paper  
'João has finally only finished the title page of the paper'
  - b. \*O João só finalmente fez a capa.

For me, even (i(a)) is grammatical. However, it is worth observing that, in spite of the fact that both sentences present some level of degradation in the referee's judgment, his/her feelings on the differences between (a) and (b) are very clear, as the symbols "?" and "\*" before them would suggest: (a) is less degraded than (b), the latter considered completely ungrammatical by the reviewer.

In the present context, it is important to bring to the discussion the sentence given in (ic), which has also been provided by the referee.


- (i) c. O João finalmente fez só a capa.  
The João finally did only the title page  
'João has finally finished only the title page'

For the theoretical and methodological purposes of this study, sentences like (ic) should be disregarded for one reason: (ic) does not form a minimal pair with (ib), given the fact that the adverbs in (ic) are not in contiguity. The contiguity is extremely important here – whether the AdvP is before an auxiliary or even the lexical verb or if the AdvPs is before one of the arguments of the V – because the movement of the remnant can mask the ordering of the adverbs, creating the illusion that it is not possible to establish a rigid and fixed order among them. For this reason, it is necessary that AdvPs be contiguous.

- g. O José só já lavou a louça.  
 The José only already did the dishes  
 'José only already did the dishes'  
 g'. \*/??O José já só lavou a louça.

This free ordering is apparent but not real. If one assumes Kayne's (1998) analysis of focusing adverbs (see Tescari Neto (2013)), they can infer that, after the attraction of the constituent under the scope of *só* 'only', the other adverb may or may not move to the left as part of the remnant, creating the impression that it is not possible to establish a rigid and fixed order between the two adverbs. See Fig. 2, 3 and 4 below, where Fig. 2 corresponds to what is common to the derivations of all these sentences; Figure 3 (see further in the text) corresponds to the final steps of the derivational history of (28d,e,f) and Fig. 4 (even further in the text) to the derivation of (28d',e',f'). However, the fact that *só* 'only' necessarily has to precede *já* 'already' (cfr. (28g,g')) is an important piece of evidence to the idea that *só* 'only' occupies a rigid, fixed position in the hierarchy, necessarily after *novamente* 'again' (cf. (28c,c')).

**Figure 2** – The first steps in the derivation of (28d, d'; e, e'; f, f')




**Source:** Made by the author.

As suggested in Figure 2 (see also the footnote 3), before the Merge of the frequentative adverb in the specifier of the corresponding functional projection

(according to the Cinque hierarchy), a probing head  $K^0$  attracts to its specifier the constituent under the scope of the frequentative adverb, along the lines of Kayne (1998) (see the step indicated as (1) in Fig. 2). After the movement of the constituent to be focalized, the adverb enters the derivation in the specifier immediately above, following the Cinque hierarchy. After that, remnant movement takes place (see the step indicated as (2) in Fig. 2), thus restoring the previous order. The movement of the remnant creates the illusion that there was no movement. These steps are common to derivational history of all instances of (28d/d' -f/f').

To derive the sentences where *só* precedes the other adverb, the steps of the derivation would basically be the same: if the scope of the adverbs is assigned in Narrow Syntax through movement (KAYNE, 1998; TESCARI NETO, 2013), before the Merge of *só*, a probing head attracts to its specifier the constituent – containing the adverb *frequentemente/voluntariamente/rapidamente* – which bears the focus feature, followed by the Merge of *só* 'only' in the specifier on the left and by remnant movement (see Figure (3) below).

**Figure 3** – The ordering *só* plus AdvP




**Source:** Made by the author.

In those cases where *frequentemente/voluntariamente/rapidamente* precedes *só*, the first steps of the derivation are the same as those described in Fig. 2. The difference has to do with the material which will be moved to the specifier of

the probing head<sup>4</sup> and with the material moved as remnant: the former will not contain the adverb *frequentemente/voluntariamente/rapidamente* which will be moved as part of the latter, thus, again, creating the illusion that it is not possible to establish a rigid and fixed order between the focusing *só* ‘only’ and the adverb *frequentemente/voluntariamente/rapidamente*. (see Figure (4) below).

**Figure 4** – The derivation of the order AdvP<sup>5</sup> – *só*



**Source:** Made by the author.

<sup>4</sup> In Kayne (1998), this probing head would be lexicalized by the focusing adverb which, after the movement of the focus to its specifier, would also raise and adjoin to the head above. The modification made here – which keeps Kayne’s original idea and the same derivational process – departs only partially from his analysis: here, the probing head is not filled by the adverb but by an unpronounced head, in Portuguese. As noted by Tescari Neto (2013), there is (morphosyntactic) evidence for the assumption of this probing head in Syntax, whenever a scope-inducing/focus-sensitive element (focusing adverbs, higher adverbs, etc.) enters the derivation. Shu (2011, p.132) mentions the existence of an ‘agreement marker’ *cai*, in Chinese, which may appear with a focusing adverb in that language. The indexes  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  indicate the focus of the associated focusing adverb bearing the same index.

- (i) *Chinese* (SHU, 2011, p.132)  
 A: – zhangsan changchang mai xigua  
 ‘Zhangsan often buys watermelons.’  
 [B: – bu. ta zhi(you)<sub>1</sub> [ouer<sub>2</sub>]<sub>F1</sub> cai mai xigua<sub>F2</sub>.  
 no he only sometimes CAI buy watermelon  
 ‘No. He only<sub>1</sub> buys watermelons<sub>2</sub> [occasionally]<sub>F1</sub>.’

Thus, I take *cai*, when it appears with a focusing adverb, to be the probing head associated with the focus. As such, *cai* attracts the focus, in this case *ouer* ‘sometimes’ to its Spec, followed by the Merge of its associated focusing adverb, namely, *zhi(you)*. In Brazilian Portuguese, this probing head is silent.

<sup>5</sup> One could ask why the same expedient used for *frequentemente* can no longer be used with *já* ‘already’. That is, whether the movement of the remnant drags along the adverb *só* ‘only’ or not, thus producing two possible

The data presented so far show that *só* ‘only’ occupies a position between Asp<sub>Repetitive(I)</sub> ‘again’ and Asp<sub>Frequentative(I)</sub> ‘frequently’ (see (29) below). Hence, it would only be a higher adverb. There are some syntactic properties of higher AdvPs that are also valid for *só* ‘only’, as we are going to see in the next sections.

(29) [*frankly* Mood<sub>SpeechAct</sub> > [*luckily* Mood<sub>Evaluative</sub> > [*allegedly* Mood<sub>Evidential</sub> > [*probably* Mod<sub>Epistemic</sub> > [*once*

### Some syntactic properties of higher adverbs

In the literature on adverbs, there is some confusion regarding their syntactic status: if they are high/sentential/IP adverbs or low/VP adverbs. The confusion increases even more when a ‘high’ adverb has scope over a verbal argument (see the discussion on the data in (19c,c’,c’), above). Such confusion is very clear in a language like BP where a high adverb can be linearized in different positions in the sentence:

- (30) (Provavelmente) o Brasil (provavelmente) ganhará (provavelmente) a Copa do Mundo  
 (probably), Brazil (probably) will-win (probably) the World Cup

The position of the adverb between the V and the DP-complement (“ganhará provavelmente a Copa...”) seems to be problematic to formal theories, according to which *provavelmente* ‘probably’ occupies a higher position the IP space (it is traditionally adjoined to the IP – see JACKENDOFF, 1972). This apparent problem stems from the fact that one cannot derive the appearance of the adverb in between the verb and its complement by simply moving the V across *provavelmente* ‘probably’, given the ungrammaticality of (31):

- (31) \*O João mente provavelmente  
 The João tells-lies probably  
 ‘João probably tells lies’

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orders. For the time being, there seems to be no answer to this question. However, from the viewpoint of a strong cartographic line – which is the one assumed here –, this unique behavior of the adverbs in (28d,d’:e,e’:f,f’), *frequentemente* ‘frequently’ included, is highly revealing: the adverbs in (28d-f), which are located below *só* ‘only’ (cfr. (29)) in the hierarchy, can move or not to the left of *só* as part of the remnant, whereas *já* ‘already’ and the AdvPs located below cannot. This different behavior of the adverbs in (28) with respect to *só* and *já* suggests the existence of syntactic operations (internal Merge (‘displacement’), in this case) which are only available to some adverbs belonging to a certain portion of the hierarchy. At first sight, there is no semantic explanation for the distinct behavior of the adverbs in (28d-f) with respect to *já* regarding the possibility of being part of the remnant or not: the adverbs in (28d-f) include aspectual AdvPs (*frequentemente* ‘frequently’ and *raramente* ‘rarely’) and a volitive adverb (*voluntariamente* ‘willingly’); *já* ‘already’ is a tense adverb in Cinque (1999). Thus, the answer must be found in the structure, i.e. in the position occupied by the adverb in the hierarchy. These facts would suggest that there is no alternative to Cartography.

As shown by Cinque (1999), the active past participle cannot move across high adverbs in Italian. Tescari Neto (2013) discussed the test presented by Cinque, suggesting that its validity is absolute if one only takes unergative verbs such as *mentir* 'to lie'. This is so because unergative verbs undoubtedly lack internal arguments. Hence, as we have already pointed out, the appearance of the lexical verb to the left of the adverb in sentences like (32) is the result of the movement of the remnant containing the V.

- (32) O Eduardo comeu provavelmente o bolo.  
The Eduardo ate probably the cake  
'Eduardo probably ate the cake'

Although for Cinque (1999) the syntactic status of an adverb (i.e. if it is a sentential AdvP, taking under its scope/being adjoined to the IP, or a VP adverb) appears to be of little relevance, the author classifies them into two big groups, each one including adverbs from different classes, i.e. from different projections of the hierarchy. One is the group of high adverbs and the other that of low AdvPs. Being "high" not only means that the adverb is merged in a high position in the Middlefield, but also that it cannot be linearized on the right of the active past participle in Italian. Conversely, being "low" means that the AdvP enters the derivation in a medial-low position in the Middlefield. In this case, it can appear to the right of past participle. In the sequence, I present some syntactic properties mentioned in Tescari Neto (2013) as being common to those adverbs called high AdvPs by Cinque (sentential adverbs in the general literature). These properties are crucial for the present argumentation as they help us showing that the AdvP *só* 'only' behaves as a high adverb, while quantificational AdvPs and, surprisingly, the exclusive AdvP *exclusivamente* 'exclusively' behaves like low AdvPs.

The *first property* has to do with the impossible appearance of a high adverb in the sentence-final position. High adverbs can only appear sentence-finally if de-accented (BELLETTI, 1990; CINQUE, 1999; ERNST, 2002; LAENZLINGER, 2002; TESCARI NETO, 2013). Note that (33a,a') are ungrammatical: the high adverb appears in the sentence-final position, but it is not prosodically marked (flat intonation for these sentences). (33c,c') are grammatical: the low adverb can appear in the sentence-final position. The appearance of a high AdvP in the sentence-final position is only possible if it is de-accented (cfr. (33b,b') where the comma tries to capture in the writing the fact that the sentence adverb is de-accented). (33a,b,c) are sentences from Italian whose correspondents in Portuguese are given in (33a',b',c').

- (33) a. \*Gianni mente probabilmente  
 G. tells-lies probably  
 'G. tells lies probably'
- a'. \*O Pedro mente provavelmente.  
 Pedro tells-lies probably  
 'P. tells lies probably'
- b. Gianni mente, provavelmente.  
 G. tells-lies, probably
- b'. O Pedro mente, provavelmente.  
 Pedro tells-lies, probably
- c. Gianni mente sempre/bene/ancora.  
 G. tells-lies always/well/still  
 'G. always/well/still tells lies'
- c'. O Pedro mente sempre/bem/ainda  
 Pedro tells-lies always/well/still

Remember that the AdvP *só* 'only', according to the transitivity tests already applied here, occupies a position among the higher adverbs in the Middlefield. Concerning the first property, it also behaves exactly as *provavelmente* 'probably':

- (33) e. \*O Pedro mente só.  
 The Pedro tells-lies only  
 'Pedro only tells lies'
- e. O Pedro mente, só

The *second property* has to do with the ability that low AdvPs have in allowing the extraction of the constituent modified by them. High AdvPs do not have this ability. Given the "Critical Freezing" (RIZZI, 2004), the constituent modified by a high adverb cannot be extracted (BEVER; CLARK, 2008; TESCARI NETO, 2013):

- (34) a. O Pedro comprou provavelmente uma BMW.  
 The Pedro bought probably a BMW  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW'
- b. \*O que<sub>i</sub> o Pedro comprou provavelmente t<sub>i</sub>?  
 What<sub>i</sub> the Pedro bought probably t<sub>i</sub>?  
 'What did Pedro probably bought?'

It is important to note that ungrammaticality of (34b) is related to the reading where the adverb takes scope over the *wh*-constituent *o que* 'what', which has been extracted in that sentence. It is not related to the interpretation where the adverb modifies the VP. (34a) and (34b) are ambiguous. The paraphrases in (34a', a'') illustrate the two possible readings for (34a). This ambiguity has already been mentioned at the beginning of this section.

- (34) a'. O Pedro comprou provavelmente uma BMW, não um Fusca. (narrow scope)  
 The Pedro bought probably a BMW, not a Volkswagen Beetle  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW, not a Volkswagen Beetle'
- a". O Pedro comprou provavelmente uma BMW, não alugou um carro (wide scope)  
 the Pedro bought probably a BMW, not rent a car  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW, he didn't rent a car'

If one considers the reading where the adverb in (34b) has wide scope, i.e. scope over the VP (as paraphrased in (34a') to (34a)), (34b) may be considered grammatical. For the purposes of this study, it is crucially important to exclude this wide scope reading (namely, the scope over the VP). This is so because such reading should always be possible, given that the adverb is necessarily found in a position higher than the landing site of the V (which cannot raise past high AdvPs, as already mentioned in the discussion of (31) and (33)).

The exclusion of (34b), repeated below –

- (34) b. \*O que<sub>i</sub> o Pedro comprou provavelmente t<sub>i</sub>?  
 What<sub>i</sub> the Pedro bought probably t<sub>i</sub>?  
 'What did Pedro probably bought?'

for which it is to be borne in mind, again, that the relevant reading involves modification of the extracted constituent by the AdvP and not modification of the whole VP –, serves as a criterion to distinguish between high and low AdvPs, since only the constituent modified by a low adverb can be extracted. As I will show later, the constituent modified by a low adverb can be extracted with no risk for the grammaticality of the sentence. From now on, for the cases of extraction to the left periphery, only the narrow scope reading will be taken into account.

Returning to the second property, whereby constituents under the scope of a high adverb cannot be extracted, the same pattern described above for the adverb *provavelmente* 'probably' is also valid for the focusing adverb *só* 'only': the focus associated with *só* cannot be extracted (JACKENDOFF, 1972; KAYNE, 1998; BEVER; CLARK, 2008; TESCARI NETO, 2013) (see (34) and (35b)):<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The following data present an adverb being linearized between the subject and the lexical verb. The post-Pollockian tradition understands that adverbs occupy fixed positions and that the other constituents move in the sentence. Since adverbs occupy fixed positions, they are reliable diagnostics for movements.

- (i) a. O Pedro provavelmente compraria melões.  
 The Pedro probably would-buy melons  
 'Pedro would probably buy lemons'
- b. O que o Pedro provavelmente compraria? (<sup>OK</sup>wide scope; \*narrow scope)  
 What the Pedro probably would-buy  
 'What would Pedro probably buy?'



- (35) a. \*Mary<sub>i</sub>, he only likes x<sub>i</sub>. (BEVER; CLARK, 2008, p.160)  
 b. O Pedro comprou só uma BMW.  
 The Pedro bought only a BMW  
 'Pedro only bought a BMW'  
 c. \*O que (que) o Pedro comprou só t?  
 What (that) the Pedro bought only t  
 'What has Pedro only bought t?

The *third property* of higher adverbs states that they cannot be recovered by the elliptical VP in Portuguese (TESCARI NETO, 2013), since they occupy a position above the landing site of the V (on its movement to INFL):

- (36) O Pedro comprou provavelmente uma BMW e a Maria também comprou [-].  
 The Pedro bought probably a BMW and the Mary also bought [-]  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW and so did Mary'  
 [-]: \*bought probably a BMW  
 [-]: bought a BMW

In the present context, it is necessary to discriminate between what actually is the syntactic phenomenon of VP ellipsis in Portuguese and other syntactic constructions involving the deletion of constituents, such as 'stripping'. For a correct understanding of the phenomenon, it is also necessary to distinguish VP ellipsis in English from VP ellipsis in Portuguese. Sentences like (37) are clear examples of stripping, which is different from VP ellipsis:

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Even (ia) is ambiguous. In one reading, the adverb can take scope over everything following it (see the paraphrase (ia')). This reading resembles what is referred to here as 'the wide scope reading' or scope over the VP. The other possible reading is the one where the adverb has scope only over the most embedded constituent (cfr. paraphrase (ia'')), a typical case of 'narrow focus' (CHOMSKY, 1971).

- (i) a'. O Pedro provavelmente compraria melões, não (os) pediria emprestado.  
 The Pedro probably would-buy melons, not (them) would-ask-borrow  
 'Pedro would probably buy melons, he wouldn't borrow them'  
 b'. O Pedro provavelmente compraria melões, não maçãs.  
 The Pedro probably would-buy melons, not apples  
 'Pedro would probably buy melons, not apples'

The ambiguity is preserved in the sentence where the constituent is *wh*-extracted (ib): *provavelmente* 'probably' may have scope over either the entire VP (formed in this case by the verb plus the unpronounced copy of the *wh*-extracted constituent) or only over the *wh*-extracted constituent. For me, only the reading where the adverb has wide scope (i.e. scope over the VP) is possible. If one has in mind the reading where the adverb has scope over the extracted constituent (as in (ib') above), such reading should be ungrammatical. In the examples shown in the sequence, the reader will realize that, in the formulation of the test, we prefer locating the adverb on the right of the lexical verb, as in (34a) and (35b). This is only a methodological choice motivated by the fact that the speakers consulted prefer the narrow scope reading in declaratives where the adverb is found between the verb and its complement (as in (34a) and (35b)). Likewise, speakers tend to prefer the 'wide scope reading' for (ia), above. This is only a question of preference, as these sentences are always ambiguous.

- (37) O Pedro provavelmente comprou uma BMW e a Maria também [-].  
 The Pedro probably bought a BMW and the Maria too  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW and so did Mary'

(37) differs from real cases of VP ellipsis given that, as already known of syntacticians working on BP, stripping cannot appear within an island (CYRINO; MATOS, 2002) (see (37')). On the other hand, VP ellipsis is possible within islands (see (36')).

- (37') \*O Pedro provavelmente comprou uma BMW quando a Maria também [-].  
 Pedro probably bought a BMW when Maria also [-].  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW when Maria also bought a BMW'

- (36') O Pedro comprou provavelmente uma BMW quando a Maria também comprou [-]  
 The Pedro bought probably a BMW when the Maria also bought [-]  
 'Pedro probably bought a BMW when Maria also did [-]

Since Matos's (1992) work on elliptical constructions in Portuguese, it is known that one of the points that distinguish the VP ellipsis phenomenon in (European and Brazilian) Portuguese from the same phenomenon in English is the fact that the lexical verb can license VP ellipsis in Portuguese, but not in English. That explains the reason for the ungrammaticality of (38a), from English, and the grammaticality of the Portuguese sentence in (38b).

- (38) a. \*John starts reading that book and Mary starts [-], too. ((18) em Cyrino e Matos (2002, p.183))  
 b. O João começou a ler aquele livro e a Maria também começou [-]. (= (38a))  
 The João started to read that book and the Maria also started  
 'João started reading that book and so did Maria [-]'

The ungrammaticality of (38a) is justified in terms of the absence of verb movement to, say, INFL in English (POLLOCK, 1989). The presence of a constituent endowed with a [+V] feature in INFL is a necessary condition for the VP ellipsis phenomenon. As English has no V movement to INFL, elliptical constructions are possible only if an auxiliary or a modal verb is present in the numeration. This verb is directly merged in INFL, and, from that position, it can license the ellipsis of the VP in English (see (38c), below).

- (38) c. John is reading that book and Mary is [-], too

(Brazilian and European) Portuguese exhibits V movement to INFL (CYRINO; MATOS, 2002; MATOS; CYRINO, 2001; CYRINO, 2013). Once the lexical verb is in INFL, it can license the deletion of all constituents c-commanded by it (say,

the deletion of the whole VP, which may contain adjuncts, VP complements and the unpronounced copy of V, whose pronounced copy will be spelled-out in INFL). This is an important difference between VP-ellipsis facts in English and Portuguese. For this reason, VP ellipsis is a *bona fide* test to detect if an adverb is low or high in Portuguese, as high adverbs will necessarily occupy a position above the landing site of the V in Portuguese. Auxiliaries, even in English, can move past high adverbs (POLLOCK, 1989). Hence, they cannot help us discriminating between high and low adverbs.

The observations made on the adverb *provavelmente* 'probably' of (36), namely, that this adverb cannot be recovered by the elliptical VP in Brazilian Portuguese, are also valid for the adverb *only* in English (BEVER; CLARK, 2008) and its correspondent (*só*) in Portuguese. Brazilian Portuguese speakers to whom focusing *só* 'only' can only be a higher AdvP never recover this adverb in the second element of the coordination in VP ellipsis constructions (Lílian Teixeira, personal communication):

- (39) O Pedro comeu só arroz e a Maria também comeu [-].<sup>7</sup>  
Peter ate only rice and Mary also ate [-].  
'Pedro only ate rice and so did Mary'
- a. [-]: \*ate only rice  
b. [-]: ate rice

Therefore, as we have seen in this section, *só* 'only' behaves like a high adverb, as far as the three properties generally attributable to high AdvPs are concerned.

### Exclusive *só* 'only' vs. quantificational adverbs

Bever and Clark (2008) observed that the (narrow) focus associated with quantificational adverbs, unlike the one associated with an exclusive AdvP (e.g., *only*) can be extracted and moved to the left periphery. In this section, some data that led Bever & Clark to propose a semantic analysis for the differences between exclusive *only* and quantificational adverbs will be shown. The data involve *wh*-extraction, focus movement, cleft sentences, adjunct fronting – syntactic processes traditionally assumed in the literature as involving displacement of constituents to the left periphery. In the following sections, the spectrum of analysis will be expanded, by including other classes of low and high adverbs to show that Bever

<sup>7</sup> Here lies one of the differences between Brazilian and European Portuguese, which Cyrino and Matos (2002) mentioned in their text: (39) is ambiguous not only between a VP ellipsis interpretation for the gap ("[- ]"), naturally ungrammatical if the adverb gets recovered (39a), and a null object interpretation (39b), which is possible in both Brazilian and European Portuguese. It is still compatible with a reading where the verb *comer* 'to eat' is treated as a monoargumental V, having an implicit argument. The reading where the gap is interpreted as a null object or the one where the verb *comer* 'to eat' is monoargumental in Brazilian Portuguese do not invalidate this test. It only shows that, if the VP ellipsis test is applied, for instance, to (39), the result should be ungrammatical (39a), being the adjunct above the position reached by the verb.

& Clark's data are only epiphenomenal: the focusing adverb *only* is just a high adverb. Therefore, it behaves like other high adverbs with respect to the extraction possibilities, the recovering in VP-ellipsis, and the impossible appearance in the sentence-final position (this latter property was not mentioned in Bever and Clark). Unlike higher adverbs – here included the exclusive focusing *só/only* –, quantificational AdvPs, being merged in lower positions, have an opposite behavior with respect to these properties. The conclusion reached at the penultimate section will be that the differences between exclusive and quantificational adverbs cannot be simply reduced to a semantic problem: in fact, the reason is structural and related to the position the adverb occupies in the hierarchy.

1. WH-Extraction: While quantificational adverbs allow the extraction of the constituent associated to them (cfr. (40a, 41a)), focusing *só/only* does not allow such extraction (cfr. (42a, 43a) whose paraphrase cannot be extended to (42, 43) respectively):

- (40) *What* do you think Kim *always* gives his mother? (= 41) (BEVER; CLARK, 2008, p.165)
- a. 'What is the thing such that Kim gives that thing and nothing else to his mother?'
  - b. 'What do you think that Kim gives his mother and no one else?'
- (41) O que você acha que o José sempre deu para a sua mãe? (= 40)
- a. Qual é a coisa que o José (sempre) deu aquela coisa e nada mais para a sua mãe?
  - b. O que você acha que o José (sempre) deu para a sua mãe e para ninguém mais?
- (42) *What* do you think Kim *only* gives his mother? (= 43)
- a. \*What is the thing such that Kim gives that thing and nothing else to his mother?
  - b. What do you think Kim gives his mother and noone else?
- (43) O que você acha que o José só deu para a mãe dele? (= 42)
- a. \*Qual é a coisa que o José só deu aquela coisa e nada mais para a mãe dele?
  - b. O que você acha que o José só deu para a mãe dele e para ninguém mais?

2. Focalization: Contrastive focalization involves movement to the left periphery, i.e. to a dedicated position in the CP domain (see, for instance, Miotto's (2001) work on the Brazilian Portuguese split CP domain). Note that the interpretation given to (44a) in (44a') is grammatical, i.e. the focus associated with the frequentative adverb can be extracted. *Só*'only', on the other hand, does not allow the extraction of its associated constituent (see the paraphrase of (44b) in (44b')).

- (44) a. Fishsticks, I believe Kim *always* buys. (BEVER; CLARK, 2008, p.165)
- a'. 'I believe that Kim *always* buys fishsticks and nothing else'
  - b. Fishsticks, I believe Kim *only* buys.
  - b'. '\*I believe that Kim buys fishsticks and nothing else.'

Again, quantificational AdvPs behave differently from focusing *só/only*, which, in turn, behaves like a high adverb, as we are going to see.

3. AdvP fronting: Quantificational adverbs allow the displacement of another AdvP modified by them (see (45) and the paraphrase in (45a')).

- (45) a. *On Sunday*, I thought you *always* went to the store.  
a'. 'I thought that you went to the store on Sunday and no other day'

The adverb *só* 'only', on the other hand, does not allow the fronting of an AdvP modified by it (see the paraphrase of (45b) in (45b')), which shows that (45b) cannot receive the interpretation where "On Sunday" is fronted).

- (45) b. *On Sunday*, I thought you *only* went to the store.  
b'. '\*I thought that you went to the store on Sunday and no other day'

As will be discussed in the next section, high adverbs do not allow the fronting of the AdvP modified by them.

### **Low adverbs behave as quantificational AdvPs; high adverbs as *só* 'only'**

In this section, it will be shown that the polarization in two major groups should not be "quantificational adverbs" versus "focusing *só/only*" – as suggested in Bever and Clark (2008) – but, rather, "high adverbs" versus "low adverbs". Selecting two points on a continuum, where focusing *only* would be placed on one end and quantificational adverbs on the other, is only part of the whole story. Focusing *only* is just a representative of the class of high adverbs; quantificational adverbs are representatives of the so-called low adverbs, i.e. those adverbs that are merged in medial/lower positions in the Middlefield. Hence, Bever & Clark's polarization (*only* vs. adverbs of quantification) is reductive. To argue against them, it will be shown that there is a class of exclusive adverbs that behaves as low adverbs and not as exclusive *only*, which occupies, as previously seen, a higher position in the Middlefield. The motivation is structural and it is related to the position of the adverb in the hierarchy.

1. Focalization: high adverbs behave like focusing *só/only*, i.e. they do not allow the extraction of the constituent under their (narrow) scope. Thus, (46) is ungrammatical if the adverb has narrow scope. Yet, the constituent modified by a low adverb (47) can be moved to the left:

- (46) \*Carne assada<sub>i</sub>, eu acredito que o José come provavelmente  $t_i$  (, não fritura)...  
 Pot roast<sub>i</sub>, I believe that José eats probably  $t_i$  (, not fried meal)...  
 'Pot roast, I believe that José probably eats (, not fried meal)'
- (47) Carne assada<sub>i</sub>, eu acho que o José come *ainda/frequentemente/rapidamente/ etc.*  $t_i$  (, não fritura).  
 Pot roast<sub>i</sub>, I believe that José eats *still/frequently/rapidly/etc.*  $t_i$  (not fried meal).  
 'Pot roast, I believe that José still/frequently/rapidly/etc. eats (not fried meal).'

2. Adjunct fronting : Adjuncts cannot be fronted too if they are associated with a high adverb (48). When associated with a low adverb, their movement is possible (49):

- (48) \**De domingo*<sub>i</sub> que eu achava que você fosse às compras provavelmente  $t_i$ , não um outro dia.  
 On Sundays<sub>i</sub> that I thought that you were shopping probably  $t_i$ , not another day  
 'On Sundays I thought you were probably shopping, not another day'
- (49) *De domingo*<sub>i</sub> que eu achava que você fosse às compras *ainda/frequentemente/ etc.*  $t_i$ , não um outro dia.  
 On Sundays<sub>i</sub> that I thought you were shopping *still/frequently/etc.*  $t_i$ , not another day  
 'On Sundays I thought you were still/frequently/etc. shopping, not another day'

3. Cleft sentences: Cleft structures also involve movement to the left periphery. Hence, it is only possible to cleave the constituent modified by a low adverb (51). The constituent modified by a high adverb (50) cannot enter these structures.

- (50) \**Uma Skol*<sub>i</sub> é que eu acho que o Zé bebia provavelmente  $t_i$ . (não uma Brahma)  
 A Skol<sub>i</sub> is what I think that José used-to-drink probably  $t_i$  (not a Brahma)  
 'A Skol is what I think José used to drink probably (not a Brahma)'
- (51) *Uma Skol* é que eu acho que o Zé bebia *frequentemente/ainda*  $t_i$ . (não uma Brahma)  
 A Skol<sub>i</sub> is what I think José used-to-drink frequently/still  $t_i$  (not a Brahma)  
 'A Skol is what I think José used to drink frequently/still (not a Brahma)'

4. Wh-extraction: It is also possible to *wh*-extract the constituent under the scope of a low adverb (53). The one associated to a high adverb can never be extracted (52).

- (52) \*O que<sub>i</sub> você acha que o José deu provavelmente  $t_i$  para a mãe dele?  
 What<sub>i</sub> you think that the José gave probably  $t_i$  to his mother?  
 'What do you think that José probably gave to his mother?'

- (53) O que<sub>i</sub> você acha que o José deu frequentemente/ainda/etc. t<sub>i</sub> para a mãe dele?  
 What<sub>i</sub> you think that the José gave frequently/still/etc. t<sub>i</sub> to his mother?  
 'What do you think José frequently/still/etc. gave to his mother?'

5. Relative clauses: Since relativization also involves movement to CP, it is also a bone fide test to discriminate between high and low adverbs. Low adverbs allow the relativization of the constituent modified by them (see (55)), whereas high adverbs react to such extraction (cf. (54)).

- (54) \*Eu vi a menina<sub>i</sub> que o João beijou provavelmente t<sub>i</sub> (não a outra).  
 I saw the girl<sub>i</sub> that the João kissed probably t<sub>i</sub> (not the other).  
 'I saw the girl<sub>i</sub> João probably kissed t<sub>i</sub> (not the other girl).'

- (55) Eu vi a menina<sub>i</sub> que o João beija frequentemente/ainda/etc. t<sub>i</sub>.  
 I saw the girl<sub>i</sub> that the João kissed frequently/still/etc. t<sub>i</sub> (not the other).  
 'I saw the girl<sub>i</sub> João frequently/still/etc. kissed t<sub>i</sub> (not the other girl).'

So far, I have shown that exclusive adverbs (*só/only*) behave like high adverbs with respect to the extraction possibilities of the constituent they modify. High adverbs and focusing *só/only* do not allow the extraction of the constituent modified by them. If semantics were responsible for the asymmetries that put focusing *only* on the one side and quantificational adverbs on the other, we should not find cases of exclusive adverbs that also behave like quantificational adverbs regarding, for instance, the extraction of the constituent modified by them to the left periphery. This is what will be shown in the next section. The conclusion is that what Bever & Clark thought should receive a semantic explanation should actually receive a structural (i.e. syntactic) explanation.

### **Actually, there are two positions for exclusive adverbs**

The interesting fact that one and the same sentence can have two exclusive focusing adverbs in BP, namely *só* 'only' and *exclusivamente* 'exclusively', respectively) suggests the existence of two distinct positions for this class:

- (54) A Mara só tinha limpadado exclusivamente o banheiro (não tinha lavado a sala/  
 não a cozinha).  
 Mara only had cleaned exclusively the bathroom (not had washed the room/the  
 kitchen)  
 'Mara had only cleaned exclusively the bathrom (she hadn't washed the room/  
 the kitchen')

*Exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’ seems to be an option, in BP, to fill the lower position. Some speakers never recover *só* ‘only’ in VP ellipsis (cfr. (37), repeated as (55) below).

- (55) O Pedro comeu só arroz e a Maria também comeu [-].  
 The Pedro ate only rice and the Mary too ate [-]  
 a. [-]: \*ate only rice  
 b. [-]: ate rice

Curiously, but not surprisingly, speakers of this group do recover the focusing adverb *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’:

- (56) O Pedro comeu exclusivamente arroz e a Maria também comeu [-].  
 The Pedro ate exclusively rice and the Maria too ate [-]  
 ‘Pedro exclusively ate rice and Maria did too [-]’  
 a. [-]: ate exclusively rice  
 b. [-]: ate rice

In their grammar, the constituent associated with the focusing adverb *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’, unlike the one associated with *só* ‘only’, can be extracted:

- (57) O que<sub>i</sub> que o Pedro comeu exclusivamente t<sub>i</sub>?  
 What<sub>i</sub> that the Pedro ate exclusively t<sub>i</sub>?  
 ‘What did Pedro exclusively ate?’

Thus, there is good reason to defend the existence of two syntactic positions for exclusive adverbs (a high position, between the higher adverbs of the Cinque hierarchy, and a low one, which has *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’ behaving as a low AdvP).

Further evidence in favor of a lower position for exclusive adverbs comes from the phenomenon of verb movement in BP. Judging by Galves (1994), V movement is mandatory to the left of the adverb *completamente* ‘completely’ in BP:

- (58) a. O João acabou completamente o seu trabalho.  
 The João finished completely the his work  
 ‘João completely finished his work’  
 b. \*O J. completamente acabou o seu trabalho.

Hence, it is expected that the exclusive adverb *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’ – or *só* ‘only’ (if there is a lower *só* in some grammar of BP) for those who also accept its recovering in VP ellipsis structures – occupies a position above  $Asp_{\text{SingCompletive}(t)}$  since *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’ can precede the V in BP:



- (59) a. (?)A Mara exclusivamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.  
The Mara exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom  
'Mara exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom'  
b. A Mara usa exclusivamente Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.

Note that (59b) is undoubtedly more acceptable than (59a) which is not ungrammatical, nonetheless. The fact that (59a) is acceptable to some extent leads us to conclude that only the lower exclusive adverb necessarily occupies a position to the left of *completamente* 'completely', which, as shown in (58), has to appear to the right of V, i.e. V must move past it.

*Exclusivamente* 'exclusively' has to follow *brevemente* 'briefly' (Asp<sub>Durative</sub>) (60), *quase* 'almost' (Asp<sub>Prospective</sub>) (61), *repentinamente* 'suddenly' (Asp<sub>Incoative(II)</sub>) (62), *obrigatoriamente* 'obligatorily' (Mood<sub>Obligation</sub>) (63), *em vão* 'in vain' (Asp<sub>Frustrative</sub>) (64), which, by turn, precedes the completive *completamente* 'completely' in the hierarchy:

- (60) a. A Mara brevemente exclusivamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.  
The Mara briefly exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom  
'Mara briefly exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom'  
b. \*A Mara exclusivamente brevemente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.
- (61) a. A Mara quase exclusivamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.  
The Mara almost exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom  
'Mara almost exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom'  
b. \*A Mara exclusivamente quase usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.
- (62) a. A Mara repentinamente exclusivamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.  
The Mara suddenly exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom  
'Mara suddenly exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom'  
b. \*A Mara exclusivamente repentinamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.
- (63) a. A Mara obrigatoriamente exclusivamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.  
The Mara obligatorily exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom  
'Mara obligatorily exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom'  
b. \*A Mara exclusivamente obrigatoriamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.
- (64) a. A Mara em vão exclusivamente usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.  
The Mara in vain exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom  
'Mara in vain exclusively uses Q-boa to clean the bathroom'  
b. \*A Mara exclusivamente em vão usa Q-boa para limpar o banheiro.

As far as the lower position of the so-called exclusive adverb is concerned, the data presented in this section lead us to conclude that it is located between the frustrative aspect (lexicalized by the adverb *em vão* 'in vain') and the completive

aspect (*completamente* ‘completely’), in accordance with the template given in (64’).

(64’) ... [*obligatorily* Mod<sub>Obligation</sub> > [*in vain* Asp<sub>Frustrative</sub> > [**exclusively/only** Foc<sub>Exclusive(II)</sub> /  
 [(?) > [*completely* Asp<sub>SgCompletive</sub> > ...

Therefore, there is good reason to propose a lower position to Merge an exclusive adverb too. In this use, the exclusive *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’, unlike the high adverb *só* ‘only’, is recovered by the elliptical VP – as are the other low adverbs (cfr. (65-66)). It can also appear in the sentence-final position (as is the case for low adverbs) (cp. (67a) and (67b)) and allow the extraction of the constituent under its scope (wh-fronting (68a,b), cleft-sentences (69a,b)).

(65) O Pedro limpou o banheiro cuidadosamente e a Maria também limpou [-].

The Pedro cleaned the bathroom carefully and the Maria too cleaned [-]

‘Pedro cleaned the bathroom carefully and so did Maria’

a. [-]: cleaned the bathroom carefully;    b. [-]: cleaned the bathroom

(66) O Pedro limpou exclusivamente o banheiro e a Maria também limpou [-].

The Pedro cleaned exclusively the bathroom and the Maria too cleaned [-]

‘Pedro exclusively cleaned the bathroom and so did Maria [-]

a. [-]: cleaned exclusively the bathroom;    b. [-]: cleaned the bathroom

(67) a. O Pedro limpou o banheiro exclusivamente.

The Pedro cleaned the bathroom exclusively

‘Pedro exclusively cleaned the bathroom’

b. O Pedro limpou o banheiro cuidadosamente.

The Pedro cleaned the bathroom carefully

(68) a. O que<sub>i</sub> o Pedro limpou exclusivamente t<sub>i</sub>?

Whati the Pedro cleaned exclusively ti?

‘Whati did Pedro cleaned exclusively ti?’

b. O quei o Pedro limpou cuidadosamente ti?

Whati the Pedro cleaned carefully ti?

‘Whati did Pedro cleaned carefully ti?’

(69) a. Foi o banheiro<sub>i</sub> que o Pedro limpou exclusivamente t<sub>i</sub>.

It was the bathroom<sub>i</sub> that the Pedro cleaned exclusively ti

b. Foi o banheiro<sub>i</sub> que o Pedro limpou cuidadosamente ti

It was the bathroom<sub>i</sub> that the Pedro cleaned carefully ti

(65-69) show that the exclusive adverb actually behaves as a low adverb, given its syntactic properties. If the interpretation of Bever & Clark was correct, one would expect that, because of its semantics, the exclusive adverb *exclusivamente* ‘exclusively’ should behave as its “relative”, the exclusive *só* ‘only’. I have shown

that what is at stake is actually the position that the elements occupy in the structure. Low adverbs (whether quantificational or not (including the exclusive focusing *exclusivamente* 'exclusively')) share a set of syntactic properties: (i) they can appear in the sentence-final position, (ii) the constituent they modify can be extracted, (iii) they are recoverable by the elliptical VP. Such properties are not shared by high adverbs and focusing *só* 'only'.

### **In guise of conclusion**

Were Semantics responsible for the asymmetries Bever and Clark (2008) observed when comparing quantificational adverbs and exclusive adverbs, one should expect the same pattern for both exclusive adverbs, *só* 'only' and *exclusivamente* 'exclusively' independently of their position.

The proposal has the advantage of explaining the same set of data discussed by Bever and Clark. Besides that, it can also explain why focusing *só* 'only' behaves as other high adverbs (in their focusing use).

Furthermore, the unexpected behavior of the low exclusive adverb (*exclusivamente* 'exclusively') is also accounted for by the cartographic analysis presented here by means of a sole structural analysis.

All in all, the paper offers some contribution to studies on the cartography of syntactic structures, when it shows that there are clear differences in the syntactic behavior of constituents by only considering the position that these elements occupy in the hierarchy (i.e. the position where they are externally merged). Saying that what is responsible for the asymmetries that set apart high adverbs (including *só* 'only') and low adverbs (quantificational adverbs and the exclusive *exclusivamente* 'exclusively' included) is the position of these items in the hierarchy does not mean that semantic explanations should be ignored. It only shows the work developed by syntax.

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TESCARI NETO, Aquiles. “Só”, “exclusivamente” e suas posições na sentença. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.557-588, 2015.

- *RESUMO*: Neste artigo, examino algumas propriedades de advérbios altos e baixos para mostrar que o focalizador só pertence ao primeiro grupo. Sugiro que o comportamento do advérbio de exclusão só no Português do Brasil é melhor explicado do ponto de vista da Sintaxe, isto é, em termos da sua posição na hierarquia universal. A pista para chegar a tal conclusão vem da distribuição do focalizador exclusivamente, que também é um advérbio de exclusão, mas se comporta de forma diferente em relação a só no que diz respeito a algumas propriedades sintáticas que põem de um lado os advérbios altos e de outro os baixos. Mostro que a previsão de Bever and Clark (2008) de que a Semântica seria responsável pelas assimetrias entre os advérbios quantificacionais e o exclusivo só não é correta, na medida em que o focalizador de exclusão exclusivamente, no Português do Brasil, compartilha propriedades sintáticas com advérbios quantificacionais.
- *PALAVRAS-CHAVE*: Advérbios. Advérbios focalizadores de exclusão. Advérbios quantificacionais. Hierarquia funcional. Cartografia. Sintaxe Gerativa.

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# ***INTERVIEW***





## NEW CONVERSATIONS WITH JACQUES FONTANILLE

Jean Cristtus PORTELA\*

- **ABSTRACT:** This interview, carried out from February to May 2014, deals with the most recent developments of Jacques Fontanille's work, French semiotician and one of the most prominent figures in European semiotics. In this testimony, the theorist revisits the semiotics of practices and the notion of forms of life, theme of his latest book, still unpublished. Throughout these conversations, which are a continuation of an interview performed in 2006 (PORTELA, 2006), Fontanille discusses the current state of semiotics in France, the relationship between semiotics and the human sciences and the role of the intellectual in society. For J. Fontanille, semiotics should seek to address crosscutting theoretical issues and respond to questions that are on the agenda in society, not focusing only on the aporias and on questions intrinsic to the semiotic currents as institutional groups. Thus, the biggest challenge for semiotics nowadays is to find new alternatives to reinvent itself as a discipline of predictive and strategic vocation.
- **KEYWORDS:** Semiotics. Practices. Forms of life. Human sciences. Epistemology.

*This new interview with Jacques Fontanille echoes that which originally appeared in the Brazilian journal Alfa: Revista de Linguística [Alfa: Journal of Linguistics] (PORTELA, 2006), in 2006. If it can't be said that the intellectual landscape of semiotics has greatly and radically changed in recent years, it must be recognized, however, that the disciplinary, academic and social atmosphere has undergone significant changes.*

*The language science disciplines have become increasingly specialized, particularly in the field of theories of discourse. Based purely on a strict logic of theoretical and methodological selection, they have become accommodated within increasingly restricted perimeters and are often cornered in a defensive position, asserting their identities and rejecting even the most obvious close links: from close cousins to complete strangers, from an institutional point of view (groups, journals, seminars), discourse analysts, supporters of pragmatics, rhetoricians and semioticians, among others, have built up an epistemological rhetoric of difference and specificity – which has not always been tolerant, it must be said.*

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*The Semiotics which is called post-Greimassian has failed to escape its sectarian temptations: semiotic trends have been consolidated, and despite the apparently friendly dialogue between areas, bibliographical references of studies and their way of considering certain aspects of theory testify to a lack of in-depth dialogue, beyond the labels of schools. It is as if semiotics, fallen in love with itself, “contemplates its theoretical navel”, as says J. Fontanille, and has renounced developing contact strategies to make contact with peers or, even worse, with the surrounding world.*

*To this scenario add technocratic universities and a society, in economic and axiological crisis and even permanent ideological crisis, which continues to seek solutions to increasingly complex dilemmas from a technological, aesthetic and ethical point of view. What is the role of the humanities in this context? What can semiotics do when confronted with the strength of the “hard” sciences? What kind of semiotics for the future?*

In this interview, Jacques Fontanille, as a man who has spent his “career observing the declining role of ‘intellectual’ in the life of the city”, as he himself reminds us, elaborates on these current issues, without neglecting, of course, his work as a theorist of kaleidoscopic lucidity who dreams of pursuing a semiotics “at the level of man”, where the study of the practice, ethics and forms of life helps us to think, through language, the very meaning of the adventure of life.

*Limoges-Araraquara, February-May 2014.*

## **First of all, Semiotics**

*Jean Cristtus Portela: We can just start where everything often ends for us: semiotics. Since our last conversation, in 2006, eight years ago, how do you see the present situation of semiotics?*

Jacques Fontanille: Semiotics seeks new paths. At the end of the twentieth century, it consisted of two paradigms, Peircean and Greimassian, and the second consisting of theoretical “currents” that were both more or less struggling against each other and were also complementary: ‘standard’ semiotics, morphodynamic semiotics (Petitot), subjectal semiotics (Coquet), socio-semiotics (Landowski), interpretive semantics (Rastier) tensive semiotics (Zilberberg), among others. Today, these paradigms and currents are intertwined, the boundaries have blurred, and these differences have partly lost the institutional support that allowed them to remain separate and in competition. Despite the efforts of semioticians who would have liked, mainly for “socio-political” reasons, these currents to be incompatible, we have seen that their contributions can be combined and harmonized.

Instead of these weakened theoretical divisions, we can see the emergence or re-emergence of horizontal issues, whose unity is far from certain, and not even in view: semiotics of perception, semiotics of practices and forms of life, semiotics of the media and communication, semiotics of experience, etc. The previous “paradigms” and “trends” have been diluted in these horizontal issues, and, in order to address these problems, one can call upon, simultaneously and with equal effect, tensive, morphodynamic, Peircean, semantic-cultural, narrative, passionate, experiential and other elements.

Semiotics no longer dares ask whether it is still generative or interpretive, it rather questions the posture of immanence, the principles of textuality and wonders what attitude to adopt towards new mining methods and the automatic analysis of large databases that do not follow the principles of textuality. The irreducible heterogeneity of new types of large digitalized corpora has become a problem and a challenge which is at the moment still insurmountable to semioticians. More generally, the new horizontal issues (perceptions, practices, forms of life, sense experience) pose formidable methodological problems when it comes to forming corpora, to gather pertinent “observable” elements beyond the texts themselves. This is an urgent task for a science that, in the tradition of Saussure, Hjelmslev and Greimas, is by definition an empirical science.

Semiotics is also reluctant and slow to interrogate itself about its role among the sciences of culture, the sciences of the mind, and the human and social sciences in general. This is the time of doubt (often useful, sometimes fruitful) as to the epistemological and methodological foundations, and is also that of a profound interrogation on the identity of semiotics as a field of knowledge, and / or as a disciplinary field.

Personally, I had welcomed this substitution of *problematic issues* instead of trends and theoretical paradigms. It was even the theme and the aim of a conference of the French Association of Semiotics that I organized in 2001 to usher in in some way the twenty-first century! I would have loved to help organize a theoretical and epistemological device able to receive this transformation; I have tried with the problem of the planes of immanence and the typology of planes of expression. But the attempt itself was overwhelmed and diluted in the process of transformation, and it has now become one issue among others. So the general framework of this new state of semiotics is still to be invented, as are its methodologies.

*J.C.P.: What about the institutional anchoring of semiotics in France?*

J.F.: Semiotics no longer has almost complete autonomous and visible institutional anchoring in France. Nationally, there are no longer any semiotic team research projects at CNRS, and all the semiotics teams (Lyon, Limoges, Toulouse, Paris), are

often restricted to a very small core of researchers and belong to multidisciplinary laboratories which also deal with many other research programs as well as semiotics. This fosters scientific and disciplinary intersections, but partly masks the presence of semiotics in the university.

From the point of view of training, the list of the titles of undergraduate degrees and masters proposed by French higher education institutions has been streamlined and updated in 2013-2014, and none of them uses the word “semiotics” because no French curriculum deals just with semiotics. This does not mean that semiotics is no longer taught, but that it is included in broader areas (language sciences, information and communication, marketing, aesthetics, etc.).

This situation is critical: if compared with that of mathematics, which are highly developed in interfaces with physics, computer science, climatology or economics, but are clearly identified as such and independently, semiotics has almost no key research programs where, for example, the theoretical and methodological issues outlined above would be studied. The intersemiotic seminar in Paris, currently led by Denis Bertrand and Jean-François Bordron, is probably the only place where this fundamental exercise is still possible collectively, and with all semioticians visiting Paris, especially Brazilians. It is hoped that other research programs will develop to respond to existing or future theoretical alternatives.

The anchoring of semiotics is nevertheless that of the *programmes* (research programmes, training programmes) and is no longer that of the *degree course*. It must be said that: it is no longer possible, at least in France, to take a *degree course* in research and / or get a degree by only practicing semiotics. There has been a kind of dilution and dispersal that echoes my earlier remarks on the theoretical situation, but it's also a new responsibility for the actors: a *degree course* is supported by sustainable institutions, whose power and long-term prospects do not permit the participants to take initiatives; a *programme*, however, can always be affected by the initiative of one or more participants who decide to conceive it, defend it and carry on with it for a specified period, known in advance. The seminar in Paris has been working for fifteen years on this principle, with the thematic programmes, and this is why it has survived the dilution of the *degree course*.

*J.C.P.: In this context, what is the future of semiotics as a profession?*

J.F.: The professional field has narrowed considerably in academic institutions, and inversely has expanded and diversified in businesses and private organizations. The positions of professors and researchers in public institutions are fewer (and not only for semiotics!). In France, the situation of linguistics in general is very worrying from this point of view, because most positions that are offered are for French as a Foreign Language (FLE) and Natural Language Processing (NLP). Proposals for positions in semiotics therefore obey the new conditions mentioned

above: their maintenance or creation depends on the existence of active research teams, initiatives of other colleagues, and programmes they develop (or do not!).

By contrast, in private agencies, the need for semiotics has not weakened as semiotics has been more adaptable than its competitors (sociology, psychology, anthropology and philosophy) to the new requirements of the market of studies called “qualitative”. And the ethnologists and sociologists who work in these agencies mostly present themselves as “semiologues”, which is a way of recognizing both that semiotics “sells itself” better in commercial activities, and especially that the job of a semiotician has a *generic value and position* in the field of qualitative research. The profession is that of the “semiologue” and it includes the “socio,” “psycho,” “ethno”, “marketing”, “com”, skills etc.

One can thus define the profession as being that of the “semiotician” or “semiologue”, realizing that it can cover many different specialized skills. Even those who do not know what this exactly includes know that it is a profession, with skills, expertise, and focus areas. The minister who has chosen me as his chief of staff for the past two years (2013-2014), openly introduced me as “My semiotician,” and everyone seemed to understand, even without knowing what it had to do with my work, that it was my core profession, whatever my duties were. This issue of the profession is strange: if I have achieved at least one thing during forty years of professional activity, it is that one day a minister can proudly present his chief of staff to other foreign politicians as “*My semiotician*”.

*J.C.P.: I do not know whether you've heard our dear colleague Pierluigi Basso trying to answer or ask a question by saying, “And if things were considered from a slightly more ‘diabolical’ point of view...” How can we actually conceive of semiotics in a “diabolical” way?*

J. F.: No, I have not heard that. But he is capable of it! I don't know what he meant by a “diabolical point of view.” Is it a strategy for impertinence and provocation? An evil postulation? A posture of immanence and a method of systematic revolt against transcendence (rebellion against God)? Does he think that semiotics has something in common with a satanic cult? I think Pope Pius X, who was vehemently opposed to all “modernist” positions inspired by the principle of immanence (sic) would not have hesitated to think so. He even tried to show in the encyclical *Pascendi* that modern methods (in 1907!!) of the reading of sacred texts were the work of the devil. Personally, I prefer the “Luciferian” view: Lucifer, the “light bearer”, with critical activity that results from “throwing light on” of the semiotic preconditions and the phenomena underlying meaning.

*J.C.P.: In this sense, the “diabolical” and “Luciferian” views return to the same point: what is at issue is the courage, freedom above all, the critical and independent spirit*

*of the semiotician – that which surprises or disturbs those who wish for “angelical”, obedient and tidy semiotics. As a “Luciferian”, do you distrust semiotics?*

J.F.: The critical view was that of semioticians at the time of structuralism; I will have the opportunity to return to the attitude of Barthes and Greimas. This critical role was weakened or even forgotten, in the competitions between theoretical “schools”: critical activity was entirely devoted to internal debates. In addition, the foundations of the Hjelmslevian bases of our semiotics do not help to develop a critical perspective on cultural and social phenomena, because they focus attention on the consistency of the theory itself and on the adequacy of descriptions. Yet this critical exercise is part of the business of a semiotician, always on the lookout for implicit, unthought-of, outcrops of meaning effects that return to deeper immanent structures.

Recently, Viviane Huys and Denis Vernant (2012), in their book *L'indisciplinaire de l'art*, have proposed to define their approach as “indisciplinary”. But it is the “indisciplinary” status of art, not of semiotics. If there is indiscipline in semiotics, it is not because it would be unable to be formed as a discipline (the Hjelmslevian and Greimassian bases are disciplinary in nature), but because the descriptive posture it offers is always a challenge in terms of the agreed readings and “institutionalized” cultural and social interpretations of phenomena. This is the heuristic virtue even of semiotics, and this heuristic is assessed in proportion to the differences, shifts and movements of attention that causes the analysis. And I add that the principle of immanence is the mainspring of this heuristic.

*J.C.P.: Personally, I think the semiotician does not excel in the art of doubt and we need to stimulate critical thinking especially among young semioticians. History could play an important role. Not history as chronicle, as a “family portrait” – which give us more certainties -- but historiography, a “meta” look on the way we think and do semiotics. Has not the time come for a “history of semiotic ideas”?*

J.F.: I have long resisted this idea, which I thought was a temptation towards domination and closure: that which, carried out by the historian of a field of knowledge or discipline and who is tempted to regard them as completed, to freeze the results and processes, and, when all is said and done, to produce a *doxa*. But as you remember, there is another way to make the history of ideas, which can be beneficial for the ideas themselves and for those who handle them.

The main benefit of a recent history of semiotics would be a refocusing of the successive contributions of each of them. Today, semiotic research progresses blindly, at the base of a completely biased system of reference. If you look at the references used in articles or research works in semiotics, you can find two kinds: some are explicit, and these are the “grand masters” (Aristotle, Saussure, Cassirer, Peirce, Kant, Husserl, Levi-Strauss, etc.); the others are implicit, and are all more

recent works, which in some way make up the undifferentiated “common fund” and which support the “trends” and the lines of force of semiotic thought. Greimas is still hardly directly quoted: doubtless he’s too recent!

As a result, semiotic research advances and multiplies without real progress. Gardeners will immediately understand the following image: when a tree or shrub continues to grow from its base, thanks to shoots that grow from old stumps, it soon forms a bush, a thicket, a bunch of small trees stuck together, but not a real tree. We also know that the shoots that grow from the stump prevent the tree from having vigorous flowers and fruits, and in general they are coppiced each year. In short, we must choose between using the wood of the shoots and harvesting fruit: this is the case, for example, of the chestnut trees in Limousin, which can either be exploited for their timber (coppice stumps and shoots) or for their fruits, chestnuts and marrons (on large majestic trees). Today, the semiotic “shoots” proliferate from the stump, each cultivates and nourishes in the short-term shoots, to the detriment of the tree and its fruits in the long term, and only an objective historical perspective would allow us to re prune the tree to restore some vigour.

Establishing a history of semiotic ideas, understood as recent ideas, might allow us to change this hopeless collective practice which consists of indefinitely redoing semiotics by giving voice to the founding fathers, even periodically choosing new founding fathers, to forget what contemporary authors have brought to semiotics, and thus ignore the successive achievements. This practice clearly distinguishes semiotics, particularly within what used to be called the “School of Paris”, from all other social sciences. It partly explains this general feeling of trampling, of rehashing and of dilution that one sometime feels from the outside when one has contact with semioticians.

*J.C.P.: In Pratique Sémiotiques [Semiotic Practices] (FONTANILLE, 2008), you updated certain hypotheses that have been dear to you since the late 1990s: the opening of semiotics to enunciative praxis and finally to practices, the question of relevance levels, the place of forms of life within the theory, dialogue with the social sciences, the problem of ethics, among others. How do you evaluate these proposals today?*

J. F.: A lot of questions in one! For levels of relevance, I have already answered above, and I will return to it. For dialogue with the humanities, the movement is in progress, it has only been sketched out, and it is impossible to evaluate but it is clear that after having once claimed to impose itself as a “general methodology” of the human sciences, and having failed in this, today the road ahead is tough!

There remain *praxis*, practices, ethics and forms of life. This forms an inseparable whole for me, that of a *semiotics “at the level of the human being”*. For by dint of cultivating a “high regard”, which would place the semiotician

beyond any grasp of reality, and all intervention in the facts of meaning themselves, semiotics is in great danger of becoming an inhuman science (without being either “hard” or “exact”). Jean-Claude Coquet and Eric Landowski have always resisted, in their own way, this dehumanization of semiotics, the first in terms of epistemological and methodological “realism”, and the second in terms of sensory experience.

Praxis and practices cannot be thought of without an actant immersed in the doing, inherent in their own acts, an actant who is constructed the same time they act: this particularly is the first thing taught in sociological practices according to Bourdieu. From this submerged point of view, semiotic forms provide an outlet to individual and collective initiative, the process interacts with the system, and operators of the process may modify the system. And ethics always has the possibility, from these actants and the same point of view, to invent, giving them a coherent individual or collective form, value systems and rules of conduct. Life forms, finally, are vast, consistent and congruent semiotic configurations, which serve as individual and group identity markers, which the actors can give themselves, invent, distort and confront, without having to refer to implicit or explicit classifications that would be imposed by social determinations.

*J.C.P.: Especially in terms of levels of pertinence, there are three points, it seems, to which one often returns to ask questions or find problems. First, the manner in which you use the concepts of “form” and “substance” to describe properties that move from one level to another. Then, the place and the appropriateness of the level of support-object along the path you take. Finally, the role of life forms as the top level, leading...*

J.F.: The path of the levels of relevance (or “planes of immanence”) seems regular and hierarchical, but in fact they are neither one nor the other. Linear and hierarchical representation is more simple and practical, but other types could be used, because the different types of semiotic objects are very heterogeneous. The hierarchical linear layout is nevertheless particularly effective to explain the constraints and to identify critical issues. It is basically a tool to ask questions.

As a linear representation, it requires us, for example, to foresee ‘syncopes’ when the integration processes “jump” one or more levels (e.g., when a *sign* such as a logo incorporates by condensation all the properties of a *practice* or a *form of life*). When Pascal proclaims “Kneel and you will believe,” he is making a syncope between the general level of life forms (faith) and that of practices (prayer) or even bodily signs (kneeling). This proclamation is a rhetorical figure, which makes a provocative integration and substitution between two planes of immanence: to account for it, the theory must include both the distinction



between the planes, and the changeover and “jump” from one plane to another. In a non-linear representation, the syncopation would be useless, so we must ask whether they bring something to the description, before giving up a hierarchical arrangement.

The other constraint is that of the number of levels: this linear arrangement raises the question as to whether these six levels are enough to account for all the “semiotic objects” that represent a culture. For me, the question remains open. For example, some have attempted to add the level of the media, which does not strictly correspond to any of the levels. I remain doubtful, because the media can be treated, depending on the point of view adopted, as texts, as support-objects, as strategies, or as forms of life. But the fact remains that we must try to locate the media somewhere in the hierarchy, and that this does not work.

There is in this case a choice between two options: (i) the problem is eliminated by deciding that, since the hierarchy of levels of immanence has the problem of accommodating the media, this hierarchy should be abandoned; (ii) treating the problem by asking whether the media are homogeneous “semiotic objects” and relevant within a continuous analysis, and thus can be placed on a single plane of immanence. The second solution then uses the critical and problematic ability of the hierarchy of the planes of immanence: can we consider that a media is a “semiotic object” in this sense? I think not: a media is a socio-economic system that includes many different semiotic objects, one inside the other, and therefore, the path of the “planes of immanence” is not the most appropriate theoretical perspective to account for them as a composite whole, but it is perfectly suited to each of the semiotic objects (text, media, practices and strategies) that make up the media.

As for my use of substance and form, it is probably not very orthodox, but it envisages a point that is essential on the hierarchical path: certain properties, combined with relevant figures from a given level, are not themselves relevant to that level, but may become so at a higher level. At the level where they are not relevant, they participate in the *substance*. And at the level where they are relevant, as they take part in the *form*. For each “plane of immanence”, there are thus both exploited forms and exploitable substances. And for each property, there must be a substantial aspect and a formal aspect.

This is the case of plastic properties associated with figurative signs: in iconology, for example, the properties of colour or texture do not participate in the relevance of iconic signs, and one has to go to the level of the relevance of visual texts for these properties to become relevant. The Mu Group talks about “plastic signs”, but these plastic signs can only function as such if they are integrated into a visual text: in isolation, they can mean nothing except in the case of fixed and symbolic convention (of the type “purple = cardinal”). The

same for the support object: on the one hand there is a formal support, in that it adopts relevant properties for the inscription of a text (surface level, framework, dimensions, proportions, lines, orientations, etc.), and on the other it has a number of physical properties (size, 3D shape, weight, hardness, deformability, resistance, etc.), which are not relevant in terms of the texts and their inscription supports, but may become so at the higher level of practices.

In terms of this object level, I should have clarified that all may not necessarily work as supports for writings and texts. Yet all can potentially work, as shown by the example of fly-posting practices on posts, mailboxes, walls and doors. They are also frequently so through the use and patina that they make lasting inscriptions, on the surface and on the material form of objects, of the succession of practical enunciations in which they participate: these accumulated traces are then decipherable, as texts, by experts, historians and archaeologists.

Finally, life forms are presented as the last level of the construction of cultures, because they are defined *to be such*. If we can still doubt it, it is that the definitions I propose are not explicit enough, and not because they are not the ultimate level of immanence cultures. It is indeed to conceive what could be called the *immediate constituents* of cultures (as one speaks of the “immediate constituents” of the sentence). When a sentence is segmented, what one immediately obtains in the first analysis are syntagms, some autonomous, others not so. When segmenting a society, we initially obtain, before everything else, according to the point of view and society, social classes, castes, communities or social styles, etc. When segmenting a culture, one must obtain before everything else, and from the semiotic point of view I propose, “forms of life.”

This intuition came to me while reading Lotman: he handles all kinds of semiotic objects, since he considers all to be texts. Poems, anecdotes, historical events, social groups, lives of historical figures, cities. But he fails to manage to coherently integrate them into the semiosphere and rather converts them by analysis into recognizable “modes of cultural existence”, which confront each other. Under this condition, in the semiosphere, the life of a princess can dialogue with a poem by Pushkin, or the military tactics of the Russian nobility with the urban structure of St. Petersburg. These are the coherent modes of cultural existence which I try to grasp as “life forms”.

In the theory of forms of life, there are three hypotheses that should be discussed separately in the following order: (i) cultures can be segmented into immediate constituents, (ii) these immediate constituents are forms of life (modes of cultural existence), and (iii) life forms are macro-semiotic objects (with a level of expression and a level of content). If one rejects the first hypothesis, there is no need to consider the other two.

*J.C.P.: You're writing a book about life forms. How much have you written? Did you anticipate that this concept would be so successful today?*

J.F.: The book is finished ("completed", I'm not sure...). I did not anticipate the success of the concept. Ten years ago I just decided to follow (alone or with others, depending on the occasion) a research program that would be based on the levels of immanence and the different types of semiotic objects, and to end up with the immediate constituents of culture, life forms. I have reached this last stage.

*J.C.P.: Semiotic practices pose a very old problem and yet one which is very present, the problem of textualization. Recently at the Paris 2013-2014 Semiotics Seminar, Maria Giulia Dondero made an excellent presentation on the subject. In summary, she reframes the textual approach to analyse practices, advocating a more focused approach on practice itself. How to have access to them?*

J.F.: I personally neither question the textual approach, nor, moreover, the approach by signs or objects. The principle of the path of the planes of immanence is precisely to give each of them, under conditions to be defined, and in a manner to be clarified, the chance to be relevant. The textual approach has become dominant with Greimassians because it clearly differentiates them from Peirceans; but this is a theoretical and political tactic. I argue that semiotics has lost something by not focusing on the "smallest unit of meaning", the signs.

And this is why it would be another error (also of a "tactical-political" nature, and not strictly scientific) to return the textual approach to oblivion on the grounds that there is a new interest in practices. Anyway, when the practices manipulate texts, and this is very often the case with human practices, the textual approach is needed at some point in the analysis.

In addition, access to the practices themselves is something that is rather more delicate. This is the general problem of individual and social cognition: we have to find means to open up the "black boxes", where practices are piloted. Bourdieu proposed problematizing and characterizing access to the meaning of practices, for a sociologist necessarily immersed in the practices themselves: access that could only be, in his opinion, "reflexive." But Bourdieusian reflexivity does not allow us either to open up the "black boxes", or to establish a corpus and gather comprehensive observable information that would be necessary for the description of a practice: he did not actually intend to make a semiotic description of practices!

Take the issue of translation: you can describe the textuality of the source to be translated and the target which has been translated, and compare the two. But this comparison will bring you nothing in terms of translation, because in order to

assess the degree of equivalence between them, you would have to initially have an ideal translated target reference text, and only the confrontation between both translations might usefully be considered in terms of textuality.

Because translation is a practice, and to access this practice, one must be able to observe what happens in the brain of the translator. There are all kinds of sophisticated observation devices in translation science, but none provides access to the “black box”. So there is no other solution, if you want to access the practice itself, not just in this simulacrum which seeks our own introspection, other than constructing an “observatory” and a questionnaire, which will collect verbalizations, gestures, behaviour, interactions, images and videos, various institutional information, and all this should be confronted with the source and target text translation.

Remember the observation questionnaire for metro users which was the origin of the study of Jean-Marie Floch, published under the title “Are you surveyors or sleepwalkers?” in *Sémiotique, marketing et communication* (FLOCH, 1990) [*Semiotics, marketing and communication*] (PUF). From notes taken on the metro, the users followed by investigators equipped with tables of observations, individual interviews, video recordings of the most typical behaviour, etc. This is the price to pay for access to practices. Obviously this is less convenient than making textual analysis of a photograph or a piece of news. But for a form of life, it is even more complicated, and I must admit that, at the moment, I have not proposed a questionnaire to collect data to describe a form of life (this is probably why my book is finished ... but not completed).

*J.C.P.: With regard to the so-called tensive semiotics, it seems to me that you have started to follow along this track of thinking. You use certain principles, especially the virtues of the tensive model, which allows you to articulate and clarify some very interesting aspects of the analysed object. I think of this when I consider your path and the road taken by Claude Zilberberg since Tension et Signification [Tension and Meaning] (FONTANILLE; ZILBERBERG, 1998).*

J.F.: Yes, Claude Zilberberg has been in semiotics for the last thirty years. He was in the eighties (1980) with the *Essai sur les modalités tensives* (ZILBERBERG, 1981), and he is still around in this decade (2010) with the *Des formes de vie aux valeurs* (ZILBERBERG, 2011). It is his work, his semiotics. *Tension et signification* was conceived and written by both of us as the meeting between tensive semiotics and the semiotics of passions. We deliberately made an inventory of certain concepts that are at the intersection of these two types of research, and the book was co-written at the intersection between the two, to join their respective achievements.

After *Tension et signification*, we each again went back to our own programmes, he in tensive semiotics, and I in semiotics of the body (an extension

of the passions) and then the practices and forms of life (an extension of textual studies). Zilberberg concentrated more and more on affect and its resulting passions, and I frequently exploited the descriptive potential of the tensive structure. The meeting was thus fruitful for us both.

What I remember most from tensive semiotics is not a new source of speculation or a new kind of formalism or schematism, but rather a way to examine the texts, practices and forms of life. Underlying the segmentation units, according to the structure and the relationship of opposites that give them meaning, there are other phenomena which may affect us directly, and which are in immanence of the order of *dependence*, in the sense of Hjelmslev. This dependence is both from the difference and from the interdependence. What we sense, in the core of the isotopies, are the trends, the directions of development, the flows that compete but remain dependent on each other. The tensive structure allows us to deepen the quest for immanence. As Zilberberg said in the eighties: "What is there behind the semes?" The reply in 2014: "Interdependent tensions between the competing flows".

*J.C.P.: In Zilberberg, praise of affect is generalised as to call into question the centrality of the narrative, which now becomes an epiphenomenon, somewhat superficial. What is your opinion on this?*

J.F.: The two are not at all the same level of explanation. Narrativity, understood as passionate, is involved in the explanation of the process and of its manifestation, and it consists of cultural patterns (such as canonical narrative schema) which search for, in the words of Greimas, the "meaning of life": in this sense, life forms prolong and reinforce the idea of narrativity as syntagmatic forms of the paths of life, as I believe, constitute the level plan of expression of the forms of life.

The affect, however, is at the centre of ante-predicative conditions of meaning. I have recently discovered a little known French philosopher, Michel Henry, who built all his work on the relationship between the manifestation and its deep "essence". To access this essence, he adopts a posture of radical immanence, and at the deepest point of this immanence, he discovers "life itself". But the immanence of *life itself* is nothing but an *affect*, a pure feeling of existing, whether joyful or painful. And this affect does not have an origin; it is itself the beginning, since the living flesh is not characterized by the fact that can "self-affect". Both affecting and affected, the living flesh 'feels' life and living. Living and self-affecting are the same thing.

The fate of the affect can then, approaching the manifestation, borrow from many channels, those of intensity, of course, but also those of the extent, from the start of the process, in time and in space. This is why Claude Zilberberg can explore tensive variations of the affect over a very long time, without even using

narrativity, making the intellectual effort to stay as deeply as possible in the perspective of this radical immanence. With narrativity, the semiotics of Greimas is much closer to the manifestation and is thus linked to the collective regulations and cultural formations. Tensive semiotics may encounter narrativity, but it can also ignore it definitively: is enough to cultivate the “shoot” instead of the tree.

*J.C.P.: This happens differently in Eric Landowski, for example, who continues to expand the narrative model with other types of routes, actants, junctions and unions...*

J.F.: Eric Landowski has taken the side of experience (and not of narrativity in the Greimassian sense), and it is, in my opinion, a path for semiotic practices in the broadest sense: it is no longer a question of a textualist approach to narrativity, but rather immanent approaches (a non-radical immanence) of interactions. And to avoid the pitfall of observatories and other protocols to constitute practical data (see above), Eric Landowski makes his research on facts which are nevertheless textualised, but also fragments of experience, “motives” taken from life daily and processed in the manner of ethnosemiotics.

Eric Landowski also worked very close to the event, and his results are easily integrated into a general semiotics that makes room for experience as much as perception or cognition. Experience, for Landowski, is also “life itself”, but on the side of the sensible manifestation in all its unpredictable diversity, not within the limits of the fundamental immanent affect.

*J.C.P.: Does not the denial of the primacy of narrative rationality seem to you to be somehow the denial of an access deemed too easy to intentionality?*

J.F.: I'm not quite convinced that, at the level of radical immanence of basic affect, one can speak of intentionality. Deleuze has also contributed to this problem, in “L'immanence. Une vie” [Immanence. A life], his last published text, and he equally radically identifies immanence and life as the essence of a level of immanence, but stating that in this kind of immanence, there are only singularities and intensities, and there is no possibility of actantiality and intentionality. Thus a semiotics of the affect, completely free of the process, the manifestation, and their cultural formations, is in the most radical sense a semiotics without intentionality.

*J.C.P.: In this fairly diverse landscape, it apparently becomes more difficult to teach semiotics. Eight years ago, you were already in favour of the classics: Saussure, Peirce, Hjeltmslev, Benveniste, Greimas and Eco. In terms of the generative trajectory, Courtés, enunciative instances, even the modalities, Coquet ... What has changed in your teaching?*

J.F.: I cannot answer this question at the moment, because since the last interview, I have taught very little, just a Masters course each year to present my latest research. I have been totally occupied by my “political and administrative duties”. But these functions have allowed me to make experiments (very unusual for a semiotician), and these experiences can be found in part in the guidelines and case studies of the book *Formes de vie*.

*J.C.P.: Des images à problèmes [The Semiotic Challenge of Scientific Images], written by Maria Giulia Dondero and yourself (DONDERO; FONTANILLE, 2012), is a very unusual book among your works, and in terms of objects analysed (the scientific image, mathematics, popularisation) and the theoretical basis (the purpose of broadening the concept of utterance, at least in the visual field). You begin the book by determining the difference between “image” and scientific “imagery.” Can you return to it? And what did you think of this experience with the scientific image?*

J.F.: The book you mention was written from a collaborative research program with French, Italian and Belgian teams, who are devoted to scientific images. It was a collective challenge, which originated in discussions at a visual semiotics conference held in Venice in 2009, and a proposal by Paolo Fabbri. The challenge was twofold: that of scientific expertise, and that of the opacity of technology. The challenge was initially of disorientation, as semioticians, including visual artists, are in principle familiar with humanistic culture, arts and communication, and this familiarity is of no use to understand scientific images. Of course, we saw that some were struggling to go beyond their implicit aesthetic limits, but that was the challenge.

Regarding the competence, it must be reported, especially in a position of immanence: it was necessary to understand how the readers of these images understand them, and thus reconstitute their competence, even though this was not that of the analyst. For other types of images, the analyst believes it is possible to neutralise differences in competence based on a shared and implied competence, a kind of diffuse cultural heritage. This is a general problem with the immanent method: one might be tempted to think that, since it is agreed not to seek external explanations, semiotic analysis has a true competence over the “substance” of the analysed object. But immanence is not an encouragement for naivety!

For the scientific image, the difference in competence is an obstacle, a theoretical and methodological problem. In short, *an immanence without collusion*. It's also a way to remind all semioticians that in semiotic analysis there are always two types of skill involved, two intertwined areas of knowledge: semiotic competence itself, and the disciplinary competence attached to the object itself.

The two are not necessarily united by each semiotician/analyst, but they should be integrated in the analysis.

On the side of the opacity of technologies, the challenge was also theoretical. When one reads a novel, you believe you can ignore or regard as irrelevant the fact that it was written by hand, by machine, dictated to a secretary, etc. When you contemplate a painting, you begin to focus on the specifics of touch and the line, but you take little interest in whether the paint was placed with a brush, a knife, a brush, a stencil, a manual or mechanical spray gun. With the scientific image, this bracketing technique is not possible, because it participates directly and centrally in the understanding of the image.

That's why, in the book with Maria Giulia Dondero, we used "imagery" as much as "image". The imagery is the technical device, and the whole, /imagery + image + operators + readers/, participates in a scientific or medical practice. We must first build the semiotics of this practice of imagery to understand how the image itself is determined and configured. This is a case of the image where the practice cannot be "transparent" and where it should be seen as part and parcel of textuality.

And that's why we had to revise even the conception of the visual utterance and enunciation in general. It is no longer a case of just putting the system in action, and of making the language exist by putting it into operation. We must anchor the enunciation in a sensible, scientific, and technical experience and rethink the process of enunciation as one of the exploration of this experience. In the case of visual enunciation, the exploration sequence "tells" in some way the stages of an interaction between the "energies" and the "matter". The energy can be that of photons, electrons, quanta, ultrasound, radio radiation, etc. And the phases are principally the excitation of the material, the response signal of this material, its transduction into other forms of energy, and into other materials, to the final stage of visualisation.

*J.C.P.: After reading this book, which is also less difficult than it seems, my first reaction was, "This is a book that all scientists should read..." A few seconds later, I realized the challenge: I had, it was first necessary that it be "translated" for them!" How do you see this, if every time something takes place, there is the fear of misunderstanding?*

J.F.: Once a book has been written and published, I always say that its future escapes me. There are always regrets I had stopped, maybe too fast, but I accept without qualms this separation after delivery. And when a child is born, this is where it all starts, because it is necessary to bring it up and support it through life. On the contrary, a book has to live without its author among other books and readers. I have no fear of being misunderstood, because misunderstanding



is the basic rule: it is on this misunderstanding that every reader will build their own appropriation of the book, a necessarily partial and personal appropriation, which is a function of the interests and skills of the moment. It is always better that the first impression of the reader is that of misunderstanding: if he has the impression of immediately being able to take in everything, he will never make the effort to understand and do little with the book.

*J.C.P.: We have just talked about the reader's misunderstanding. I would like to discuss this misunderstanding or rejection of semiotics vis-à-vis the new objects of analysis. You know I am working on the history of the semiotics of comics. Since the 1970s, when they attracted the attention of the semiologists of the period, comics have been both a known and unknown object to semioticians. In France, apart from J.-M. Floch and J. Courtés, the Greimassians have shown little interest in the subject. What do you think are the reasons for this rejection?*

J.F.: I do not feel that comics have been rejected. They were left aside after an initial period of considerable interest. The pioneers of the analysis of comics in France have all but disappeared without forming disciples in the area, and in any case, almost all of them (Floch being the first) were interested in many things other than comics. I think comics suffer from two handicaps. The first is in their simultaneous marginal and playful cultural status: they are not part of "serious" cultural objects, despite the enthusiasm of the public who read them as a leisure activity. The second, more importantly, is that of their academic status: there are departments of visual arts, communication or film and television in the universities, but not departments of comics. Visual semioticians obviously move towards topics that provide opportunities for jobs!

*J.C.P.: Do you read comics? What do you see as the challenges of the semiotician in the analysis of comics?*

J.F.: I sometimes read comics, but less and less. As leisure reading, I think the comic does not work: either it is too short a read (compared to reading a novel), or it is a reading of contemplation and appropriation of visual detail, and then it is no longer leisure reading. A matter of taste and lifestyle...

The challenges of the semiotician who takes as an object comics are numerous. Firstly, the two handicaps that I mentioned above come together to unite in one: to design and develop a semiotics of comics, one must first have a thorough knowledge of all contemporary productions, and this knowledge, as seen in literature or cinema, involves a long accumulation of collective tasks. From this point of view, after decades of neglect, there is a long way to catch up.

In addition, the dominant orientations of contemporary comics are much more diverse than in the period from the sixties to the eighties, when in France, Floch

and Fresnault-Deruelle published their work. The comic is still “narrative”, but it’s not necessarily the pleasure of reading stories which is initially required. The plastic and compositional dimension is now the subject of countless fascinating research in aesthetics, there are diverse graphic styles, and the fashion in manga has had a lasting effect on the recent history of plastic choices and graphic styles. Comparing comics to the cinema, for example, it is clear that whereas films are constrained by the use of human actors and natural or realistic sets, comics can invent all kinds of figuration of live beings without being called “experimental” or eccentric. This plastic inventiveness is inherent to the genre itself. The grammar and the method of description of these different aspects, which are specific to comics, have still to be invented.

Another challenge is the nature and forms of visual, thematic and narrative links between the different components (illustrations, bubbles, etc.) on a grid and between grids. The narrative reading imposes in principle linear chains; plastic and tabular reading proposes other forms. And in this regard, the comic has a great latitude for invention, which allows it to multiply the combinations and types of tensions between these two modes (at least) of reading. This very fact, the organization of formal support, left to the initiative of each author and each utterance, maintains conflicting and negotiable relationships with the achieving of a narrative organization. But the tension between two modalities of practice (moreover, observable through modern observation technique of eye movements and fixation) is by definition the source of passionate affects and effects. So there would be a passionate component specific to comics, a pressure for a sequential reading, entering at the heart of tensions, on the one hand, and on the other, the proposed tabular readings. This would be comparable to the tension between the image of the reel and the film soundtrack in the cinema, but yet more “dramatic” than in the cinema, since it takes place inside the only visual sphere.

## **Semiotics among the human sciences**

*J.C.P.: The 2013-2014 Semiotics Seminar once again examines an interdisciplinary subject: “Semiotics and Human Sciences II: The principle of immanence and the pragmatic surroundings”. The intervention you made last December was entitled “Semiotics faced with new social challenges in the human and social sciences”. You have apparently chosen to draw conclusions as regards the humanities, putting aside the question of immanence. This strategic choice suggests the direction of your current approach...*

J.F.: The question of immanence interests me in the highest degree, and I made my contribution to the publishing programme of Luisa Moreno and Alessandro

Zinna on this issue, but, when talking about the relationship of semiotics and the humanities, the question of immanence is not a priority, because it crosses the entire field of knowledge, and must be raised at a different moment.

I wanted to ask a question that baffled many who attended the seminar, in part because it was not the question asked by the organizers. The seminar focused on the relationship of semiotics with other humanities. But what interested me was rather the challenges to the humanities by all the current movements in the fields of knowledge, *small-sized* challenges such as the future of humanity, our societies and our planet. And within this general question, I wondered if semiotics had the opportunity to take part in the response of the humanities. In other words, not only was my interest in what lies beyond or on this side of science, but also more in the relationships with the exact sciences and the natural and life sciences than in the relations with the human sciences.

Disciplines and research programs are always defined and designed in response to the expectations, needs, and horizons of collective questioning. When universities were detached from the religious institutions in the Middle Ages, and especially when they managed to become autonomous, it was not for the sole reason that it was necessary to develop other fields of knowledge than those allowed by the theological power. It was because it was necessary to answer a diffuse expectation aroused and maintained by other authorities (royalty, nobility, the bourgeoisie, etc.). Similarly when a discipline withers and dies, when it has hardly any more members and candidates, we must assume that it no longer meets these expectations, and that its horizon of questionings is now empty.

This is the gist of my presentation: there are today expectations and horizons of questioning for the humanities, and can semiotics make them its own? When Barthes and Greimas came to the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, they responded to two types of expectations of this nature: (i) the invention of a new humanism after the collapse of humanistic values during the Second World War and the Holocaust, and on the horizon of a Cold War that seemed to be permanent; and (ii) the development of a critical method to deal with the new socio-economic functioning of the Western world installed on both sides of the Atlantic by the “Marshall Plan” and the “thirty glorious years” that followed, particularly in Europe.

We had to rebuild the economy of Europe devastated by war, keeping alive a capitalist economy threatened by Soviet influence, and in order to do this, we had to obtain a general socio-cultural adhesion to the massive distribution of American and then European consumer goods, supported by the American investment. In this strategy of rebuilding the global balance, socio-cultural support was inseparable from what we began to call the “consumer society”. Full support, which was particularly seen in the massive and unquestioning consumption of

tangible and intangible goods. The human sciences (anthropology, sociology, philosophy and semiology . . . in particular) thus made a fresh start to rethink the relationship between society and individuals, on the one hand, and tangible and intangible goods on the other, but also to rethink the place of man in the elaboration of knowledge.

It is no coincidence that at the core of the anthropological theory of Levi-Strauss there is a theory of exchange and communication of material and immaterial goods. It is no coincidence that the narrative theory of Greimas is a permanent questioning of the values involved in narrativity. It is even less a coincidence that the most successful and best-known book of Barthes, *Mythologies* [*Mythologies*], was a proposal for critical method with respect to our relationship to material and immaterial goods. No, it was not coincidence, this is what has been retained and valued of all the works of research, and among all the other proposals, because this is what echoed the horizons of the questions of the time, and the need for a critical approach to understanding this “democratization” of unconditional support and consumption.

I therefore repeat my question by dividing the question into: (i) what are the horizons of inquiry addressing the human sciences? and (ii) what are the issues and semiotic work that can now be identified and valued because it echoes and responds to these questions?

*J.C.P.: Your presentation was very programmatic, you said there are some important areas where the semiotician can intervene, as well as the types of interventions that could be made. In your opinion, where are we?*

J.F.: First of all, if one wants the humanities and semiotics to be taken seriously when assessing needs and expectations, it is necessary that this assessment take into account the qualitative aspects of human existence, and not only of the GDP! These qualitative aspects, support, trust, a sense of personal fulfillment, the experienced impact of the ongoing or foreseen transformations, social adaptation to and/or participation in change and its consequences on the emotional lives of people, are related to the “objectification of the subjective,” and most of these elements have a semiotic dimension.

Thus, if we wish to influence the evolution of things themselves, not just intervene as an afterthought to understand what happened, it is necessary to work on the processes of choice and decision-making: understand the processes that determine behaviour and its modifications, in both individual and collective terms, including, and especially, when they seem irrational or unmotivated, and understand the mechanisms of formation and accumulation of opinions. But this is not enough, because it must also be able to help develop models of public decision-making, be able to analyse controversies, and also all the emotional and

passionate collective and/or public decision factors. It seems to me that semiotics is not without weapons when facing these questions.

But there are also more specific challenges, where collaboration with other sciences is required, provided that semioticians have built a clear and explicit intervention position: for example, the challenge of new forms of sociality related to aging populations and the reorganization of the lives of seniors, that of social integration, especially due to research on education. Research on the practices and forms of life can help semiotics to reply.

There are also recurring questions which belong to all periods, but which have become acute in the 21st century, partly because of globalization. Access to cultural heritage and its preservation are not only technical and economic issues, as it is useless to keep a heritage that people no longer understand, where certain types and genres have been forgotten, and whose codes have become inaccessible to decipher. In addition, when we look at safety and risks, it is not enough to devise systems of prevention, monitoring and protection: it is also necessary to know what to protect, and one does not only protect that which we place value on! Safety and risk prevention are first and foremost about axiological values and choices. In both cases, semiotics can play a decisive role.

*J.C.P.: You have said that collaboration with other sciences is required. Indeed, interdisciplinarity is a subject on the agenda. Nevertheless, we know that interdisciplinary work is not always a bed of roses, especially when working with one's nearest neighbours . . .*

J.F.: The above remarks do not apply to *interdisciplinarity*, because what is “between” the disciplines does not allow one to reply to the “great challenges” of our time. What is “between” the disciplines, are boundaries established from a tactical and institutional point of view, each discipline requiring a defined “perimeter” to identify its objects and implement its own hypotheses and methods. It is customary to remember that the great advances in science have taken place in these “in-between” areas when the boundaries move or are changed. This is what happens, for example, when genetics makes an alliance with mathematics and statistics, and invents a new field of knowledge, systems biology.

However, when problems on the horizon of major challenges in society are addressed, we know immediately that none of them properly belongs to a single discipline, and this is when it is a *multidisciplinary* issue. Multidisciplinarity consists of treating a problem through a number of disciplines. For example, historians of Imperial Rome have found that a significant part of the Roman population died from lead poisoning, and their first interpretation, in isolation, vaguely attributed this poisoning to the use of crockery and cookware containing

lead. Meanwhile, geophysicists analysing ice cores from the North Pole found traces of lead pollution in the layers of ice in this period. The link could have been established that when archaeologists specialized in industrial techniques and installations were able to show that gold factories located in Spain at the same time used lead in their furnaces, which gave off a large amount in the atmosphere ... right to Rome and the North Pole.

This is an example of multidisciplinary scientific inquiry, and a division of roles that is perfectly clear: the story asks the question, geophysics finds an answer, and industrial archaeology provides evidence supporting the relationship between question and answer.

Semiotics can find a place in such scientific scenarios. For example, all national radioactive waste treatment agencies must address long-term problems (that of the length of life of radioactivity); and among the many technical difficulties of landfill, protection and contention, there is one that speaks directly to semiotics: what kind of support, with what forms of inscriptions, and under what semiotic features, can these landfills be reported to the populations and civilizations of a future that is itself inaccessible to our forecasts, projections and imagination? Thomas Sebeok already tried to answer, creating a genetically modified animal species that would be sensitive to radioactivity! This unreliable suggestion (genetic modifications are themselves modifiable in the long-term and species disappear in the medium-term) has not been accepted! Currently, an international multidisciplinary network has been established, in which CeReS Limoges takes part, to go back to the question.

So these are the issues that attract multidisciplinary, and not disciplines. Let us put ourselves in the "problem solving" mode, and we will find all sorts of other useful disciplines, and not just other human sciences. Basically, whether we face the frontiers of knowledge, in *interdisciplinary* mode, or deal with horizontal issues, in *multidisciplinary* mode, it is with the other human sciences that interactions are less fertile and less useful. You are right, we must get out of the family business.

*J.C.P. : Still on your presentation at the seminar, on the question of immanence, you limited yourself to saying "semiotics should not only be interested in itself, in man as it imagines him, as it conceptualizes him, even in the sex of immanence!" That's a fairly provocative image.*

J. F.: It's easy to provoke. Making people understand is a little more difficult. Immanence is a question that interests me, but as long as it is not a mere opportunity for the semiotician to contemplate his theoretical navel and persist in his habits of thought. Immanence becomes interesting when you understand that it crosses all fields of knowledge and culture: it can be found in philosophy, of course, but also in religion, law, politics and economics. And in any case, it is an

intellectual strategy of resistance to explanations and especially impositions and regulations from outside of the life of every man, and from above (transcendence).

Immanence is a form of life, or rather, it is what makes possible the construction and free choice of life forms “at the level of man”. Immanence is a humanistic strategy. It begins with Thomas Aquinas in religion and philosophy, continues with the Renaissance in cultural practices, with the Enlightenment to the invention of democracy, and it leads to the twentieth century, and after structuralism, in the invention of a new humanism. For me, immanence unites the directions I wanted to give my research on practices, ethics and life forms.

*J.C.P.: You have spent your entire career developing theoretical models and analysing a variety of objects, always somewhat oriented towards language, to the work even of the semiotician as pure purpose, let us say. And now you say, “To arms, semioticians!”...*

J.F.: In order to sing “To arms, semioticians!” now. But at least there must still be some semioticians to hear this. I have spent my whole career, as have other colleagues of my generation, especially in Brazil, for here there are still some real semioticians to hear the call to arms. I have also spent my entire career observing the declining role of “intellectuals” in the life of the city: Sartre was heard in the sixties! Which intellectual is listened to today? And before you finally shut me up, I feel the need to publicly say: we have power and the duty to publicly intervene! The chats “between peers,” semiotics “among friends”, is not enough to justify the salaries they pay us, even if they are not so very high!

*J.C.P.: You mentioned Brazilian semiotics. Since when have you worked with Brazilian semioticians? Based on this experience, how do you see the development of Greimassian inspired semiotics in Brazil?*

J.F.: My first contact was with Diana Luz Pessoa de Barros, a young and brilliant semiotician who came from São Paulo to attend the Greimas seminar. I arrived (from not so far, Limoges), also for my first year with Greimas and his group, in 1977. Greimas set up a “literary semiotics workshop,” in which Felix Thürlemann was responsible for the animation, and where Diana and I worked on the analysis of a fable by La Fontaine, *Le dépositaire infidèle* [*The faithless depositary*]. A co-authored article resulted from this, which was published in an American journal (long disappeared!).

And then, exchanges and mutual visits with Diana but with many others too, have been taking place for thirty years. Brazilian semiotics greatly resembles French semiotics, but is much bigger: there are well-structured research teams, dedicated publications, strong semiotic networks between universities, and a variable balance between an anchoring in language sciences and development

with the science of communication and media. And it is much larger: there are more universities, more researchers, more doctoral students and Ph. D.s, and a vitality that pays credit to Brazilian universities. For me, the reception of my work in Brazil has always been a crucial test: I knew right away what was successful and what was not. And in return, in Brazil topics that the French dare not or no longer approach, or badly or seldom address, are emerging: fashion, design, comics, didactics, TV shows, social interactions, cultural interactions, among others.

*J.C.P.: In the last twenty years or so, you have been the founder and director of the Centre de Recherches Sémiotiques, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, President of the University of Limoges, President of the Centre for Research and Higher Teaching Limousin Poitou-Charentes, Vice-President of the Conference of University Presidents, and, until recently, you were Chief of Staff of the Minister of Higher Education and Research, Geneviève Fioraso. You are obviously a politician. But in what sense exactly?*

J.F.: I am in politics within the strict limits of my academic skills and my academic legitimacy: to chair a university to develop reforms and organizations I believe useful as a result of all my previous experiences, and to participate in a government to take these reforms and organizational principles to a higher level of action, has for me always been and still is the job of a university. Otherwise, we must accept that this political work is done by others, without any experience or academic legitimacy. And believe me, I have met many in the ministries of these professionals of reform and these professional of organizations, just waiting for one thing: that academics do not bother with political work and let them take their places, and so that they themselves can take care of academics!

The feeling of participating in a moment of the history of one's country can be exhilarating, but it's just a personal satisfaction, and I am under no illusions about the importance of my role. I know exactly, and humbly, why, when and how I acted so that such a decision is made rather than another. But I also know that this might have happened the same way if I had not done anything, or if others had done so.

I can also specify that I take part in political action without being the member of any political organization of any kind whatsoever, except of course the International Association of Semiotics, the International Association of Visual Semiotics, and the French Association of Semiotics! This does not mean I do not have opinions and positions on political matters. I believe that political action is too important to be made a partisan affair.



J.C.P.: You know, of course, the Eco/Tabucchi controversy on the role of the intellectual in society. Tabucchi describes Umberto Eco's proposals as follows: "When the house is burning, Eco says, the intellectual can only try to behave like a normal person, using good sense, like everyone else, but if he considers that he has a specific mission, he is mistaken, and he who invokes it is a hysterical person who has forgotten the number of the firefighters" (TABUCCHI, 1997, p.39).

J.F.: In the posts I have held, I have sometimes been forced to be a firefighter, but I have more taste and talent to prepare the ground before to prevent the spread of fires: in this area, I've learned a lot. And with regard to Eco, when he describes himself as capable of acting in politics as a "normal person, with good sense," a big smile comes to me, from one ear to the other: I see it always as an irony, including with regard to his own person... But he forgets that in business and political circles, "normal people, with good sense" are a very rare and valuable species, whose minds should be competed for by the whole world.

### **Lighter (but not so much) questions**

J.C.P.: *A theoretical regret?*

J.F.: I have not found the semiotic opportunity to prove the existence of God. Only that of Lucifer. It's a bit disappointing, isn't it?

J.C.P.: *A key concept?*

J.F.: *Immanence* and *catalysis*, the only way to go under the meaning without undressing it.

J.C.P.: *An underestimated concept?*

J. F.: *Mutation*: commutation and permutation. No one longer tests the validity of the hypotheses by the operations invented by structuralism. We have lost the sense of falsification. So we hold forth, without worrying about making any kind of verification whatsoever, like the good old days of the medieval gloss.

J.C.P.: *An overrated concept?*

J.F.: *Discourse*: I have manipulated this notion a lot to have something to say about a subject that fascinated the competition (i.e., the "discourse analysts"), and to refer to Benveniste. Finally, I must admit that Per Aage Brandt, who told me one day that "discourse" not only did not exist but was of no use in semiotics, was partly right. "Discourse" is an out-dated concept, which we learn to go without although we never realize it.

*J.C.P.: The imponderable of analysis?*

J.F.: *Intuition*: a critical trap. It has an irreplaceable heuristic quality, but it transforms analysis into a process that cannot be replicated, whereas it would need to be the opposite of what it is, in equal initial conditions, always reproducible. Intuition is the initial imponderable condition.

*J.C.P.: An object not yet explored?*

J.F.: Political life in a ministerial cabinet. It resembles a soup of excited electrons at a very high temperature. I am waiting for the temperature and excitement to fall in order to explore it.

*J.C.P.: The nightmare of the semiotician?*

J.F.: A psychoanalyst who wants to explain to him why he does semiotics. Or a specialist in “gender studies” who insists that he recognises that the semiotic square is a macho invention.

*J.C.P.: There are people who may think that an interview like this can be a kind of hagiography. Is it bad or pretentious to say that these people have never read Plato's dialogues?*

J.F.: Have you told me what you expected? Have I delivered your truths?

*J.C.P.: But no! You play quite the stubborn Socrates...*

PORTELA, Jean Cristtus. Novas conversas com Jacques Fontanille. *Alfa*, São Paulo, v.59, n.3, p.591-617, 2015.

- **RESUMO:** *Esta entrevista, realizada de fevereiro a maio de 2014, trata dos desdobramentos mais recentes da obra de Jacques Fontanille, semioticista francês que é uma das figuras de destaque da semiótica europeia. Neste depoimento, o teórico revisita a semiótica das práticas e a noção de formas de vida, tema de sua última obra ainda inédita. Ao longo destas conversas, que dão continuidade a uma entrevista realizada em 2006 (Alfa: Revista de Linguística, v. 50, n. 1, 2006), Fontanille discorre sobre a atual situação da semiótica na França, sobre a relação entre semiótica e ciências humanas e sobre o papel do intelectual na sociedade. Para J. Fontanille, a semiótica deve procurar enfrentar problemáticas teóricas transversais e responder a questões que estão em pauta na sociedade, não se concentrando somente em aporias e em questões internas às correntes semióticas enquanto grupos institucionais. Desse modo, o maior desafio para a semiótica em nossos dias é buscar novas alternativas para se reinventar como disciplina de vocação preditiva e estratégica.*
- **PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Semiótica. Práticas. Formas de vida. Ciências humanas. Epistemologia.*

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## PAPER SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

### *Alfa: Revista de Linguística*

#### 1. Editorial policy

**ALFA – Revista de Linguística** – the linguistics journal of the São Paulo State University (UNESP), sponsored by the Research Provost, publishes papers authored by professors, researchers, and PhD students in co-authorship with professors and researchers from national and international institutions of learning, teaching and research. Maximum number of co-authors should be 3. Regular issues are organized in a “continuous flow” system, and special issues are edited according to the organizers’ convenience. The journal publishes papers, book reviews, interviews and translations with a substantial contribution to any of the various branches of Linguistics.

Contributions in the form of articles should be original and unpublished and cannot be simultaneously submitted for publication in other journal. Only reviews of books published in Brazil in the last 2 years and abroad in the last 4 years should be submitted for publication in the journal. Translations should be preferably of scientific articles and book chapters published within twelve months of submission; interviews should be conducted with researchers with academic prestige acknowledged in Brazil and abroad.

All submissions are read by two anonymous referees. Authors’ identities are not revealed to the referees. Should the judgment of the two referees be inconsistent, a third referee will be called in. Once the refereeing process is concluded, the review copies are sent to the author, or to the first author of co-authored papers, with the appropriate instructions.

Papers can be written in one of the following languages: **Portuguese, English, French, Spanish, or Italian**. In papers written in **Portuguese**, *TÍTULO, RESUMO*, and *PALAVRAS-CHAVE* should come before the body of the paper, and their English versions, *TITLE, ABSTRACT*, and *KEY-WORDS*, after it. In papers written in any of **the other languages**, the corresponding elements that come before the body of the paper should be written in the same language the paper was written; the corresponding elements that come after the body of the paper should be written in **Portuguese** for papers written in **English** and in **English** for papers written in **French, Spanish, or Italian**.

All articles are published in a bilingual format, with English necessarily as the second language version. Authors who submit for approval an article originally in English must, in case it is accepted, provide its version in Portu-

guese, following the same guidelines indicated for the English language. Only articles with accepted versions in Portuguese (or another chosen language) and English will be published. If both versions are not accepted, the article will not be published.

The journal editor reserves the right to return a manuscript if it departs from the style requirements. When applicable, a personal letter will be sent to the author, asking for improvements and adaptations.

Authors are responsible for the data and concepts expressed in the paper as well as for the correctness of the references and bibliography.

## 2. Online submissions

To submit a paper, authors must be registered on the journal's website. To register, create a login name and a password by clicking **Acesso** (Access) on the journal's website. After logging in, fill in the profile by clicking **Editar Perfil** (Profile Editing) and start the submission process by clicking **Autor** (Author) and then **CLIQUE AQUI PARA INICIAR O PROCESSO DE SUBMISSÃO** (Click here to start the submission process). Follow the **five-step submission process** below:

Step 1. Confirm the agreement to the Journal Policies (**Condições de submissão**) and the Copyright Terms (**Declaração de Direito Autoral**) by checking the appropriate boxes. Select either **Artigo** (Paper) or **Resenha** (Review paper). Save the form and go to step 2.

Step 2. Enter metadata: first name, last name, e-mail, bio statement, and paper title are obligatory. Save the form and go to step 3.

Step 3. Upload the paper file. Go to step 4.

Step 4. If necessary, upload supplementary files such as appendixes and annexes with research tools, data and tables, which should conform to the ethical standards of assessment, sources of information usually unavailable to readers, and pictures or tables that cannot be inserted into the text itself. Go to step 5.

Step 5. Confirm the submission.

After confirming the submission, authors will receive a confirmation e-mail from the journal editor. After submission, authors can follow the process up, from submission and acceptance, through assessment and final version preparation, to on-line publication.

After submission, articles will be assigned to reviewers by the Editorial Board or special issue editors. The journal's Editorial Board and Editors are responsible for the policy of paper selection, which is available at the link **Sobre a Revista>Processo de Avaliação por Pares** (About the Journal>Peer Review Process).

## 3. Preparation of manuscripts

### 3.1. Presentation

Authors should ensure that their electronic copy is compatible with *PC/*

*MSWord*, and use *Times New Roman*, 12-point size. The page size should be set to A4 (21cm x 29.7cm), and the text body should be one-and-a-half spaced throughout. Leave 3 cm from the top of the page and on the left margin, and 2.0 cm from the bottom of the page and on the right margin. Articles should have a minimum of 15 pages and not exceed **30 pages**, including bibliography, appendixes, and annexes. Two versions of the paper must be submitted: one containing the name and academic affiliation of author(s), and one in which all references to the author(s), including citations and bibliographical references are erased.

### 3.2. Paper format

The format below should be followed:

**Title.** The title should be centered and set in **bold** CAPITALS at the top of the first page. Runover\* titles should be single-spaced.

**Author's name:** The name of each author follows the title and should be given in full with the surname in CAPITALS and aligned to the right margin, on the third line below the title, with a footnote marked by an asterisk referring to metadata in the following order: acronym and full name of the institution to which author(s) is(are) affiliated, city, state, country, zip code, e-mail.

**Abstract.** The abstract, which must summarize the contents of the paper (goals, theoretical framework, results,

and conclusion), should conform to the following: it should appear on the third line under the name(s) of the author(s), contain at least 150 and at most 200 words, be single-spaced, and, with no indentation for the first line, be preceded by the word ABSTRACT in CAPITALS in the same language of the paper,

**Keywords.** Each keyword (seven, at most) is followed by a period. They should be preceded by the word KEYWORDS in CAPITALS, and appear two lines below the abstract. The Editorial Board suggests that the keywords should match general concepts of the paper subject domain.

**Body of the paper.** The body of the paper should be one-and-a-half-spaced throughout. It begins on the third line below the keywords.

**Subsection titles.** The subsection titles should be typeset in **bold** and aligned to the left margin. They should not be numbered. There should be two one-and-a-half-spaced blank lines before and one one-and-a-half-spaced blank line after each subsection title.

**Acknowledgements.** Acknowledgements should conform to the subsection title layout, and should be preceded by the word "**Acknowledgements**" set in **bold**.

**Title in English.** For papers written in Portuguese, French, Spanish and Italian, the title in English (with no capitals and no bold) should be placed two blank single-spaced lines after the paper text body.

**The abstract in English.** For papers written in Portuguese, French, Spanish and Italian, the abstract in English should be typeset in *italics*, be preceded by the word *ABSTRACT*, typeset in *italics* and in CAPITALS, with no indentation for the first line, be single-spaced, and be placed three blank single-spaced lines after the title in English.

**The keywords in English.** For papers written in Portuguese, French, Spanish, and Italian, the keywords in English should be typeset in *italics*, be preceded by the word *ABSTRACT*, typeset in *italics* and in CAPITALS, and be placed three blank single-spaced lines after the abstract in English.

NOTE: For papers written in English, the title, abstract, and keywords referred to in 7, 8 and 9 above, respectively, should be written in Portuguese.

**References.** The subtitle **References** should be set in **bold**, with no indentation for the first line, and placed two blank single-spaced lines after the keywords. The reference list should be single-spaced and ordered alphabetically and chronologically (see 3.3.1 below), placed three blank single-spaced lines after the keywords in English. **12. Bibliography.** The bibliography list, if essential, should come after the reference list. The word “**Bibliography**” should be set in **bold**, with no indentation for the first line, and placed three blank single-spaced lines after the reference list, aligned to the left. It will include all works not mentioned in the paper or in its footnotes.

### 3.3. Further instructions

**3.3.1 Reference guidelines** Both reference and bibliography lists should be ordered alphabetically by the last name of the first author. A single space should separate one reference item from the other. The names of the translators must be specified.

Examples:

#### Books

AUTHIER-REVUZ, J. **Palavras incertas:** as não coincidências do dizer. Tradução de Cláudia Pfeiffer et al. Campinas: Ed. da UNICAMP, 1998.

CORACINI, M. J.; BERTOLDO, E. S. (Org.). **O desejo da teoria e a contingência da prática.** Campinas: Mercado das Letras, 2003.

LUCHESE, D. **Sistema, mudança e linguagem:** um percurso na história da linguística moderna. São Paulo: Parábola Editorial, 2004.

#### Book chapters

PÊCHEUX, M. Ler o arquivo hoje. In: ORLANDI, E. P. (Org.). **Gestos de leitura: da história no discurso.** Tradução de Maria das Graças Lopes Morin do Amaral. Campinas: Ed. da UNICAMP, 1994. p.15-50.

#### Thesis and dissertations

BITENCOURT, C. M. F. **Pátria, civilização e trabalho:** o ensino nas escolas paulista (1917-1939). 1998. 256 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) – Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências

Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 1998.

### **Papers in journals**

SCLiar-CABRAL, L.; RODRIGUES, B. B. Discrepâncias entre a pontuação e as pausas. **Cadernos de Estudos Linguísticos**, Campinas, n.26, p. 63-77, 1994.

### **Online papers**

SOUZA, F. C. Formação de bibliotecários para uma sociedade livre. **Revista de Biblioteconomia e Ciência da Informação**, Florianópolis, n.11, p. 1-13, jun. 2001. Disponível em: <...> Acesso em: 30 jun. 2001.

### **Newspaper articles**

BURKE, P. Misturando os idiomas. **Folha de S. Paulo**, São Paulo, 13 abr. 2003. Mais!, p.3.

EDITORA plagiou traduções de clássicos. **Folha de S. Paulo**, São Paulo, 4 nov. 2007. Ilustrada, p. 6.

### **Online publications**

UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA. Coordenadoria Geral de Bibliotecas. Grupo de Trabalho Normalização Documentária da UNESP. Normalização Documentária para a produção científica da UNESP: normas para apresentação de referências. São Paulo, 2003. Disponível em: <...>. Acesso em: 15 jul. 2004.

### **Paper in edited volumes, conference proceedings, and working papers**

MARIN, A. J. Educação continuada. In: CONGRESSO ESTADUAL PAULISTA SOBRE FORMAÇÃO DE EDUCADORES, 1., 1990. **Anais...** São Paulo: UNESP, 1990. p. 114-118.

### **Films:**

**Macunaíma**. Direção (roteiro e adaptação) de Joaquim Pedro de Andrade. Filmes do Serro/Grupo Filmes/Condor Filmes. Brasil: 1969. Rio de Janeiro: Videofilmes, 1969. Versão restaurada digitalmente, 2004. 1 DVD (105 minutos), color.

### **Paintings, photographs, illustrations, drawings:**

ALMEIDA JÚNIOR. **Caipira picando fumo**. 1893. Óleo sobre tela. 17 cm X 23,5 cm. Pintura pertencente ao acervo da Pinacoteca do Estado de São Paulo.

PICASSO, Pablo. [**Sem título**]. [1948]. 1 gravura. Disponível em: <<http://belgaleria.com.br>>. Acesso em 19 ago. 2015.

### **Music CDs (as a unit or tracks)**

CALAZANS, T. **Teca Calazans canta Villa Lobos**. Rio de Janeiro: Kuarup Discos, 1999. 1 CD.

CALAZANS, T. Modinha. In: CALAZANS, T. **Teca Calazans canta Villa Lobos**. Rio de Janeiro: Kuarup Discos, 1999. 1 CD.

### 3.3.2. In-text references and quotations

For references in the text, the surname of the author should be in CAPITALS, enclosed in parentheses; a comma should be placed between the author's last name and year, e.g. (BARBOSA, 1980). If the name of the author is part of the text, only the year is enclosed in parentheses: "Morais (1955) argues..."

Page numbers follow the year and are preceded by "p."; note a comma and a space between year and "p.", and between "p." and the number, e.g. (MUNFORD, 1949, p. 513).

References of the same author with the same year should be distinguished by using lower case letters in alphabetical order, e.g. (PESIDE, 1927a), and (PESIDE, 1927b). For references with one author and up to two co-authors, semi-colons are used to separate the surnames, e.g. (OLIVEIRA; MATEUS; SILVA, 1943); for references with more than two co-authors, the expression "et al." substitutes for the surnames of the co-authors, e.g. (GILLE et al., 1960).

Quotations longer than three text lines should be set in 11-point font size, and set out as a separate paragraph (or paragraphs) on a new line. The paragraph (or paragraphs) should be 4.0 cm from the left margin throughout, without any quotation marks. Quotations shorter than three text lines should be included in double quotation marks in the running text. Quotations from texts in foreign languages must be translated into Portuguese. Published

translations should be used whenever possible. The original text should appear in a footnote.

### 3.3.3. Italics, bold, underlining and quotation marks

*Italics:* Use italics for foreign words, book titles in the body of the text, or for emphasis.

**Bold:** Use bold only in the title of the article and in the text headings and subheadings.

Underlining: Avoid using underlining.

*Quotation marks:* can be used to highlight parts of the major works, such as titles of poems, articles, chapters. The major works should be highlighted in italics, as the statement above; quotation marks must be used in the body of the text for quotations of excerpts of works. Example:

A linguística é uma disciplina que "[...] se baseia na observação dos factos e se abstém de propor qualquer escolha entre tais factos, em nome de certos princípios estéticos e morais" (MARTINET, 1972, p.3).

### 3.3.4. Footnotes

Footnotes should be kept to a minimum and placed at the bottom of the page. The superscript numerals used to refer to a footnote come after any punctuation sign (comma, semicolon, period, question mark, etc.).

### 3.3.5. Figures

Figures comprise drawings, graphs, charts, maps, diagrams, formulas, models, photographs, x-rays. The identifying caption should be inserted above the figures, centered, preceded by the designation word designative (Chart, Map, Figure etc); if there is more than one, figures must be numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals using the same font and size of the body of the text. Indication of the source and other information necessary for its understanding should appear below the figure. Figures should be submitted as separate files, saved in the program in which they were generated. Maps, photographs and radiographs should also be submitted as separate files, high-resolution (300 dpi). Author(s) are responsible for image copyrights.

### 3.3.6. Tables and text frames

Tables should be used to present statistical information, and text frames should be used to summarize and organize textual information. The title is inserted above the table, centered, beginning with **Table 1** in bold, followed by a hyphen and the title without emphasis, in the same font and size of the body text; the title of figures should be presented above the figure, centered, beginning with **Figure 1** in bold, followed by a hyphen and the title without emphasis, in the same font and size of the body text. The numbering is consecutive, in Arabic numerals; if you need to specify the data source, it must be placed below the table or the

table and the text aligned to the left. Tables should be built with the open side borders and no lines separating columns.

### 3.3.7. Appendixes and Annexes

When absolutely necessary to the text comprehension, and within the limit of 30 pages, Annexes and / or appendixes, following the subsection style, should be included in the end of the paper, after the references or bibliography.

### 3.3.8. Review format

The review should contain, at the beginning, the complete reference to the book being reviewed, including number of pages, in Times New Roman, 14 point size, single spaced, no title, no summary, no keywords. The name(s) of the review author(s), in 12 point size, must appear on the third line below the reference of the book reviewed, preceded by "reviewed by [name(s) of author(s)]". Names must be followed by an asterisk referring to a footnote containing the following information: full name and acronym of the institution to which the review author(s) belong; city; state; country; zip code; email. The text of the review should begin on the third line below the name(s) of the author(s) in Times New Roman, 12 point size 12 and spacing 1.5.

Page format is as follows: paper size: A4 (21.0x 29.7 cm); left and top margins 3.0 cm, right and lower 2.0 cm; minimum length of 4 and maximum of 8 pages, including bibliographic references and annexes and/or appendixes;

indentation: 1.25 cm to mark the beginning of the paragraph; spacing: 1.5.

### **3.3.9. Translation format**

Translated articles are subjected to a peer review process, to decide on the opportunity and the convenience of their publication. They should follow the article format, where applicable. In the second line below the name of the author of the translated text, right-aligned, the name(s) of the translator(s) should appear in the following format: "Translated by [name(s) of the translator(s)]", with an asterisk referring to a footnote with the following information: full name and acronym of the institution to which the translator(s) belong; city; state; country; zip code; email. The translated text must be accompanied with a written authorization of the publisher responsible for the original publication.

### **3.3.10. Interview format**

Interviews are subjected to a peer review process, which decides on the opportunity and the convenience of its publication. The format of the interview is the same required for articles, but the title should contain, besides the general theme, the expression "Interview with [interviewee name]", without emphasis, with an asterisk referring to a footnote containing a brief review of the biography of the interviewee, which clearly demonstrates her/his scientific relevance. The author(s) of the

interview should follow, according to the rules established for articles.

### **3.3.11. English version**

The author(s) of paper accepted for publication in Portuguese, French, Spanish or Italian must provide the English version of the text until the deadline shown in the e-mail notification of acceptance. The standards for citation of authors in the text and the references of the English version are the same as the ones in Portuguese. *Alfa* appoints reviewers to evaluate the English version of the article. The review is restricted to checking the quality of translation, i. e. adequation to the standard norms of English usage for research papers.

In case there are citations of works with an English-language edition, this edition should be used both in the text and in the references. In case there is no English edition, the quoted text should be translated into English, and the text in the original language of the edition used must be included in a footnote.

If the text contains figures scanned from advertisements in newspapers, magazines or similar media, in Portuguese or another language, the English version of the text must be included in a footnote.

When the text contains examples the understanding of which involves the need to clarify morphosyntactic features, a literal version of them in gloss should be included, followed by the common English translation in single quotation marks. Example:



(1) isso signific-aum aument-o de vencimento-s (D2-SP-360)  
this mean-IND.PRS.3.SG a.M raise-NMLZ of salary-PL  
'this means a raise in salary.'

Conventions for the glosses: ***The Leipzig Glossing Rules: conventions for interlinear morpheme-by-morpheme glosses***, edited by the Department of Linguistics of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (Bernard Comrie, Martin Haspelmath) and the Department of Linguistics at the University of Leipzig (Balthasar Bickel); available in <http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/resources/glossing-rules.php>.

### **3.3.12. Copyright transfer – publication authorization**

Following acceptance of the paper, the AUTHOR AGREES PROMPTLY TO ASSIGN COPYRIGHT to UNESP, which is granted permission to reproduce it and publish it in the journal. The terms “reproduce” and “publish”

are understood according to their definitions in the Sections VI and I, respectively, of the Article 5 of the Law 9610/98. The PAPER is permanently available to be used in both print and electronic media, and readers have FREE-OF-CHARGE ACCESS through the Internet to read, download, copy, or print the FULL TEXTS of the PAPERS. This publication authorization is permanent, and UNESP is responsible for keeping the identification of the PAPER AUTHOR(S).

### **3.3.13. Privacy Policy**

All names and addresses appearing in *Alfa* are used exclusively for the stated purposes of the journal and will not be made available for other purposes or to third parties.



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