

## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL BEING AND THE MAN VS. NATURE RELATIONSHIP: FIRST APPROACHES

### A CONSTITUIÇÃO DO SER SOCIAL E A RELAÇÃO HOMEM X NATUREZA: PRIMEIRAS APROXIMAÇÕES

### LA CONSTITUCIÓN DEL SER SOCIAL Y LA RELACIÓN HOMBRE X NATURALEZA: PRIMERAS APROXIMACIONES

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**ABSTRACT:** Human beings have a relationship of dependence with natural resources, so, to ensure their existence, there is a need to act on nature. Thus, this text aims to synthesize the ontological path of constitution of the social being from the chapters "Work" and "Reproduction" of the work "Towards an ontology of social being II", by György Lukács, and is structured in three sections: "the basic spheres: the inorganic being and the organic being", "work as the genesis of the social being" and "as a conclusion: the relationship between man and nature in the process of formation of the social being". From this, it is possible to understand that the constitution of the social being takes place from work, establishing a relationship of ontological dependence with the basic spheres inorganic and organic, that permeates and influences the relationship between man x nature and, consequently, the social interactions.

**KEYWORDS:** Ontology of the social being. Relationship between man and nature. Work.

**RESUMO:** O homem é dependente dos recursos naturais, assim, para garantir sua existência, necessita agir sobre a natureza. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo sintetizar o percurso ontológico de constituição do ser social a partir dos capítulos "O trabalho" e "A Reprodução" da obra "Para uma ontologia do ser social II", de György Lukács, e estrutura-se em três seções: "as esferas basilares: o ser inorgânico e o ser orgânico", "o trabalho como gênese do ser social" e "a efeito de conclusão: a relação homem x natureza no processo de formação do ser social". A partir deste trabalho, pode-se compreender que a constituição do ser social se dá a partir do trabalho, estabelecendo uma relação de dependência ontológica com as esferas de base inorgânica e orgânica, que perpassam e influenciam a relação homem x natureza e, conseqüentemente, as interações sociais.

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**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Ontologia do ser social. Relação homem e natureza. Trabalho.*

**RESUMEN:** *El hombre depende de los recursos naturales, por lo que para asegurar su existencia, necesita actuar sobre la naturaleza. En ese contexto, el presente trabajo pretende sintetizar el camino ontológico de constitución del ser social a partir de los capítulos "Obra" y "Reproducción" de la obra "Hacia una ontología del ser social II" de György Lukács y se estructura en tres apartados: "las esferas básicas: el ser inorgánico y el ser orgánico", "el trabajo como génesis del ser social" y "como conclusión: la relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza en el proceso de formación del ser social". A partir de esto, es posible comprender que la constitución del ser social se produce desde el trabajo, estableciendo una relación de dependencia ontológica con las esferas básicas inorgánicas y orgánicas que permea e influye en la relación entre hombre x naturaleza y, en consecuencia, las interacciones sociales.*

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** *Ontología del ser social. Relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza. Trabajo.*

## Introduction

From the ontology proposed by Marx and rescued by Lukács, work is understood as the founding element of the ontology of social being, and is configured as the permanent and necessary activity of human existence, that is, of all history, i.e., man, as this social being, who makes history, needs conditions to live. But to live, it is necessary, first of all, to meet his basic needs of drinking, eating, living, and dressing, since man's biological being constitutes a fundamental moment in this ontological process of social being, which, unlike other animals, acts upon nature in a planned and previously idealized way, transforming it and transforming himself at the same time.

Thus, Marx, ratified by Lukács, ends up attributing to labor the responsibility for the ontological leap that gives a basis to social being, providing theoretical guidance for understanding the relationship between man and nature and the process of constitution of social being. In this direction, Lukács (2012, p. 199) states that work enables a double transformation, in which the human being himself who works is transformed by his work when acting on external nature and, concomitantly, modifies his own nature, developing "the powers that are latent in it and subjects the forces of nature 'to their own domain'. On the other hand, the objects and forces of nature are transformed into means of labor, objects of labor, raw materials, etc."

With this statement, Lukács (2012, p. 199) points out that labor has a "double determination [that is founded from] an insurmountable natural basis and an uninterrupted social transformation of this basis." Thus, the Hungarian thinker recognizes work as a fundamental element in the constitution of the social being and in the historical development of

socialization and/or social reproduction, that is, through it man produces and reproduces himself over the natural bases of a given historical period in a double movement of mutual transformation.

In this sense, "social being - as a whole and in each of its singular processes - presupposes the being of inorganic and organic nature" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 17), that is, the "activity of the natural entity man on the basis of inorganic being and the organic originated from it gives rise to a specific stage of being, more complicated and more complex, precisely the social being" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 47).

Thus, according to Vaisman and Fortes (2010, p. 20), to understand the social being in its precise sense, it is necessary to look at all the dynamics existing between the complexes that make up its totality. Thus, it is necessary to look at the relationship established between the sphere of social being and the other forms of being - the inorganic sphere and the organic sphere. Lukács himself (2010) points out that in order to understand the essence of social being, one should not ignore the connection and differentiation of the three major types of being - inorganic and organic natures and society. Without understanding this dynamic, one cannot correctly formulate the ontological specificities of social being.

Following Lukács' orientation, this paper is structured in three sections: "the basic spheres: inorganic and organic being", "work as the genesis of social being", and "the conclusion: the man-nature relationship in the process of formation of social being", and aims to synthesize the ontological path of constitution of social being based on the chapters "*Work*" and "*Reproduction*", from György Lukács' "*For an ontology of social being II*".

### **The basic spheres: inorganic being and organic being**

For Lukács (2010; 2012; 2013), the general being is formed by three ontological spheres: the inorganic, organic and social spheres, whose formation goes through two important evolutionary moments that make up the continuous evolutionary processuality: the rupture with the inorganic sphere, firstly, that made the organic sphere possible, and its consequent rupture, in a second moment, that made the social sphere possible (PASCHOALOTTE, 2014).

The inorganic sphere originates from "chemical-physical [*sic*] reactions, purely spontaneous" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 219), reorganizing and constituting inorganic matter. Thus, the "relation of objects to each other in this sphere of being is essentially a mere being-other" (LUKÁCS, 2012, p. 80). "Inorganic nature does not presuppose any biological or social being. It can exist completely autonomously" (LUKÁCS, 2016, p. 140), because its existence does not

depend on any form of life, configuring itself, in this context, as the only sphere absolutely independent of the others.

The development of the inorganic sphere has reproduction as its limit, because the continuous movement that ensures the development of its forces, relations, categories, laws, etc. is revealed only in the reorganization of inorganic matter into new forms, that is, it becomes another from the overcoming of the contradictions of the very dialectics of nature existing in its elements (ANDRADE, 2016).

Current science allows us to identify traces of the genesis of the organic from the inorganic in an endless process of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa in the different evolutionary periods of planet Earth, whose certain circumstances (air, atmospheric pressure, among other elements of nature) of the organization of inorganic matter make possible the emergence of extremely primitive complex organisms. These organisms, in their origin, already contained fundamentally organic characteristics, starting to reproduce themselves and enabling the genesis and development of life, which gives rise to an ontological leap through the emergence of a higher form of organization of matter, life (LUKÁCS, 2013). This transformation of the quantity of inorganic matter in continuous movement and development entails the passage from the inorganic quality of matter to the organic quality, developing in the new matter life.

This new ontological sphere, the organic being, constantly contains an interrelationship with the being that serves as its basis, the inorganic being, but at the same time establishes new categories, relations, laws, etc. of its own. The reciprocal relations established between the two beings preserve the nexuses of the founding being, but inserting it into the new nexuses originating with the new being.

The emergence of a living organism, which gives rise to a new complex driven by internal forces and a new way of being, enables a radical change in relation to inorganic nature. In the organic sphere, development occurs in such a way that the impulses of the external world in the organism acquire specifically biological manifestations, and these determinations "become more and more purely, more specifically biological" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 142), which is only possible in a higher degree of development, that is, a more complex and qualitatively new form, thus configuring an ontological leap.

For Lukács (2013), the leap manifests itself through a new and effective constitution of being, being the result of a long, unequal and contradictory process that culminates in an intensive and extensive level of development, allowing the new degree of being to constitute itself as a defined and grounded fact in itself.

[...] every leap implies a qualitative and structural change of being, where the initial phase certainly contains in itself certain conditions and possibilities of the successive and superior phases, but these cannot develop from that in a simple and rectilinear continuity. The essence of the leap is constituted by this break with the normal continuity of development and not by the birth, suddenly or gradually, in time, of the new form of being (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 36).

The new sphere of being, resulting from the ontological leap, is characterized by new forces, relations, laws, categories, etc., completely different from the existing sphere(s) up to the moment of the leap. However, no matter how much it moves away from the sphere(s) that gave it its basis, the new being and the "new categories will never manage to completely suppress those that predominate at the base of its being" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 240), thus it is not possible to eliminate the existing dependence between the original being and the one that gave it its basis.

The first living organisms arise from an ontological leap. Although simple and highly dependent on the inorganic being, this leap gives rise to new and different determinations resulting from a long historical process, in which "the constant reproduction of the new form of being produces the categories, laws, etc. specifically characteristic of it, in an increasingly developed, self-sufficient manner [...], dependent only on itself in its connections" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 141). Thus, even the simplest organisms already bring determinations distinct from the one that originated it.

According to Lukács (2013, p. 33-34),

[...] the development of organisms shows us how gradually, quite contradictorily, with many dead ends, the specific categories of organic reproduction achieve supremacy in organisms. It is characteristic, for example, of plants that all their reproduction - in general, the exceptions are not relevant here - takes place on the basis of metabolism with inorganic nature. It is only in the animal kingdom that this metabolism takes place solely, or at least mainly, in the organic sphere and, always in general, the inorganic material that intervenes is itself elaborated only by passing through this sphere. In this way, the path of evolution maximizes the dominance of the specific categories of the sphere of life over those that base their existence and efficacy in the lower sphere of being.

In moments close to the leap, before or after, the determination of the inorganic over the organic and the dependency relationship between the two spheres is still quite present, but over time "the complexification of living beings submits their metabolism to the determinations of organic reproduction, restricting and reconfiguring on a reproductive basis the categories dependent on their inorganic base" (MACENO, 2017, p. 27).

Thus, with the emergence of life, the predominant moment, that is, interaction that constitutes meaning and direction in a dynamic way to all evolution and development of the new being, is the biological reproduction of life, but, as Lukács (2013, p. 148) points out, "the reproduction that occurs in organic nature is the reproduction of the singular living being," or rather, phylogenetic reproduction.

In this direction, Lessa (2015) points out that what differentiates the organic sphere from the inorganic sphere, from the analysis of the genesis of life, is the fact that the former only exists through an uninterrupted process of replacing the same, while the inorganic processuality is marked by an endless becoming-other. In this way, there is an ontological rupture between these spheres, that is, they are distinct forms of being.

However, even if a new sphere is constituted, "the biological being presupposes a special constitution of the inorganic and, without the uninterrupted interaction with it, is not able to reproduce its own being even for an instant" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 140) thus demonstrating the ontological dependence between the new sphere and the one that gives it basis, because in the dependent sphere qualitatively new categories arise, in which forces, relations, laws, etc. are preserved, present at the base, without being able to transform the essence of the new being, so the new "categories will never be able to completely suppress those that predominate at the base of being" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 140).

From a progressive biological development, the leap that gave rise to the organic being created conditions that enabled the genesis of a new being, the social being.

### **The constitution of a new being: the social being**

For Lukács (2010, p. 75), the ontological basis of the leap from organic to social being was the "transformation of the passive adaptation of the organism to the environment into an active adaptation, with which sociability emerges as a new form of generativity (*sic*) and gradually overcomes, procedurally, its immediate purely biological character". In this way, by reacting to his environment and transforming it to meet his needs, man, as a worker, separates himself from every living being existing up to that moment. Thus, by acting on the basis of



inorganic and organic being in an intentional and previously idealized way, man brings about a new and more complex specific stage of being, the social being.

Man certainly remains irrevocably a biologically determined living being, sharing the necessary cycle of such being (birth, growth, death), but radically modifies the character of his interrelationship with the environment, by the fact of arising, through the teleological put at work, an active interference in the environment, by the fact that, through this put, the environment is subjected to transformations consciously and intentionally (LUKÁCS, 2013).

In this context, what occurs is no longer a passive biological adaptation, what occurs with the leap is a reorientation toward active social relations, enabling the development of a higher level.

The responsible for this ontological leap is work, which is

[...] capable of awakening new capacities and needs in man, the consequences of work go beyond what has been put into it immediately and consciously, they bring into the world new needs and new capacities for the satisfaction of these, and no aprioristic limits to this growth in "human nature" are pre-drawn - within the objective possibilities of each well-determined formation (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 219).

For Lukács (2010; 2012; 2013), as for Marx, work is the founding activity of the social being. Through it, human beings establish relationships with natural nature in order to meet their needs and ensure their survival; in doing so, man himself modifies and changes his relationship with his surroundings, moving away from his natural barriers. However,

[...] insofar as the human being, [...] in his sociability surpasses his mere biological existence, can never cease to have a basis of biological being, and reproduces biologically, he can also never break his link with the inorganic sphere. In this double sense, the human being never ceases also to be a natural being. But in such a way that the natural in him and in his (socially) remodeled environment, is ever more strongly dominated by determinations of social being, while the biological can only be qualitatively modified, but never completely suppressed (LUKÁCS, 2010, p. 82).

In this context, Lessa (2010, p. 55) clarifies that the social being cannot exist without having nature as its basis, however, social reproduction has as its predominant moment a purely social category, not natural, labor. Thus, work has by ontological essence a transitional character, essentially establishing an "interrelationship between man (society) and nature, both inorganic (tool, raw material, object of work, etc.) and organic" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 35), resulting in the transition from merely biological being to social being, that is, the man who works.

Work arises as a response of the human species to environmental determinations, in order to satisfy its biological needs such as eating, drinking, dressing, living and reproducing itself. However, work produces subsequent consequences, by producing objects, means, knowledge etc., human beings also indirectly produce social complexes, processes, relations, connections etc. that go far beyond the immediate need for human-biological reproduction (ANDRESE, 2016).

Lessa clarifies (2010, p. 135), that work "always refers beyond itself. By transforming nature to meet his most immediate needs, the individual also transforms himself and society." For, as Lukács (2013) argues, the man who works is transformed by his work, by acting on external nature and modifying it, at the same time he produces his own nature, develops powers hidden in it and subordinates the forces of nature, transforming them into means for work. Thus, "social being, in its totality and singular processes, presupposes the being of inorganic and organic nature. One cannot consider social being as independent from the being of nature" (LUKÁCS, 2012, p. 199).

However, Lessa (2010) points out that what determines the development of man is not his natural-biological portion, but the quality of social relations established by him. Although the natural barriers (the need for biological reproduction) cannot be abolished, they become more and more "removed", so that they exert on men throughout history a lesser influence, although always present.

Thus, one can consider that social development is based on the process of objectification, because work produces, objectively and subjectively, the "new", embodying throughout human history a long and contradictory process of accumulation and development of "human capabilities", in an increasingly efficient way, in order to meet their needs and transform the environment into the material products necessary for production and social reproduction.

In this new form of being, according to Lukács (2013), work brings as a consequence the human consciousness, which ceases to be, in an ontological sense, an epiphenomenon, passing through it from its end and means to be directed by itself, it is, therefore, in this sense that the consciousness goes beyond the mere adaptation to the environment and performs in nature itself modifications that would be impossible and even inconceivable for the other beings that compose the organic sphere.

Work is capable of awakening and developing new capacities and needs in man, the consequences of work go beyond what was put into it immediately and consciously, they bring to the world new needs and new capacities to satisfy them, and no aprioristic limits are pre-



drawn - within the objective possibilities of each well determined formation - for this growth in "human nature" (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 219).

Social development mediated by labor embodies the "human capacities" to produce the material goods necessary for reproduction. This development entails two distinct articulated poles: the development of the productive forces and the development of individualities. The first promotes the passage of sociability to more complex modes of production and the second, concomitantly, operates increasingly complex social relations involved in the passage of society to increasingly developed modes of production (LESSA, 2015, p. 135).

In this regard, ontologically it was labor that made possible the development of the decisive transformation of natural being into social being, which ceaselessly produces the new through labor. Thus, labor is the ontological foundation that objectifies the changes in the social structure and dynamics and the genericity of man. For, as Lukács (2013) argues, man's superiority over nature extends in the meaning he gives to the objects and relations he can name, such that:

[...] the central ontological category of work is enunciated: through it is realized, in the sphere of material being, a teleological put as the emergence of a new objectivity. Thus, work becomes the model of all social praxis, in which, in effect - even if through mediations sometimes very complex (LUKÁCS, 2013, p. 37).

For Lukács (2010, 2012; 2013), work emerges as a complex of complexes, whose categories, laws, relations, and connections establish something qualitatively new and superior before the inorganic and organic being of nature. Thus, this "teleological putting," the labor and social praxis derived from the social division of labor, language communicative acting, law, politics, education, art, etc. - where they reach increasingly pure and complex forms -, allows man, through this rich mesh of determinations, generated by labor, to change the totality that is immediately expressed in everyday life.

In this direction, Lessa (2002) in his work "World of Men", says that from the complex of mediations that, under the primacy of the centrality of work, produces the "world of men", its historical movement, its daily life and the process of construction of its thought, occurs the denaturalization of nature itself, thus creating a world increasingly produced by men themselves.

## **In conclusion: the man-nature relationship in the process of constitution of the social being**

The social being has its genesis in work, with this there is the development of new categories and social practices that underlie the new form of being and essentially differentiate it from the inorganic and organic being, however, because of the ontological dependence, however much there is a departure from natural barriers the social being will not become independent.

Work, an intentional and previously planned activity, mediates between the social being and the organic and inorganic spheres of nature, establishing interrelations between human beings (society) and the inorganic and organic nature. Thus, for Lukács (2013, p. 35):

Only labor has, as its ontological essence, a clear character of transition: it is essentially an interrelationship between man (society) and nature, both inorganic (tool, raw material, object of labor, etc.) and organic, an interrelationship that may appear at certain points in the chain to which we refer, but above all it marks the transition, in man who works, from merely biological being to social being.

Thus, work is considered, as a human practice, the original phenomenon of social being, as Lukács (2013, p. 35) argues: "society, the first division of labor, language etc. arise from work". Thus, the three spheres of being are indissolubly articulated from an evolutionary processuality; from the inorganic sphere life arises and from this the social being. This means that, for the existence of the social being and its reproduction, a continuous and inalienable articulation with nature is necessary, or as Lukács (2012, p. 03) states, "the social being can only arise and develop on the basis of an organic being and that the latter can only do the same on the basis of the inorganic being".

Even with this ontological dependence, Lukács (2013) points out that, in its metabolism with nature, the natural entity man exercises the work that makes a new specific stage of being emerge, more complete and more complex, with new laws, categories, relations, connections etc., and as a consequence brings in human consciousness the conditions that can overcome from simple to the most complex adaptation to the environment, and performs its own nature and specificities.

However, by transforming nature, the human being no longer has his survival guaranteed by it, needing in a continuous process to produce his existence. It is in the mediations created and developed by work - as a practice of social production - that human beings interact with nature, produce their means of existence and of knowing the existing reality.

The whole of this historically produced knowledge is called human culture, on which the new generations will depend for the appropriation of new modes of material and spiritual production built by the collective of men - society - thus ensuring the development and the political and social emancipation of the human being.

The way individuals manifest their lives reflects exactly what they are. What men are, in Lukács' Marxian thought, coincides with their production - with what they do with their work, that is, both what they produce and how they produce. The full development of the ontological vocation of social being, therefore, depends on the material conditions of its production.

In this process of social production, in order to carry out the activity of labor, humanity needs new "domains" over nature uninterruptedly. It is new knowledge of science and technology, originating from the work they promote, that is demanding other qualities of relations in relation to those already produced, assimilated and socialized.

Knowing that work, above all, creates all these relations, we can refer to Lukács' reading of the "*Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*", where Marx (2004) says: "Therefore, only when man works on the objective world is he realized as a social being", what Lukács understands is that this production is his "generic" life, because through it nature becomes evident as the result of his work and as his reality.

Finally, the ontological relationship established between man and nature, according to Lukács, is a relationship of ontological dependence, mediated by labor, in which the social being constantly moves away from the inorganic and organic spheres, becoming more and more social, without, however, overcoming them.

Since the object of work is the "objectification" of human life, man, according to Lukácsian understanding, duplicates himself not only intellectually, as it happens in the formation of the social being by the development of consciousness, but also actively, when he feels himself belonging to a world made by him.

The ontological thesis raised by Lukács, and discussed in this reflection, in which man, to the extent that he is a man, is a social being, where, in every act of his life, whether he is aware or not of his being in the world, without exceptions, he will realize at the same time, and in a contradictory way, himself and the respective stage of development of his productive forces as a human being, a being who is not only **in** the world, but essentially **with** the world.

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