THE (NON)IMPLEMENTATION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS IN GOIÁS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A (NÃO) IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DE ESCOLAS CHARTER EM GOIÁS: UMA ANÁLISE DA TENTATIVA DE IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DE UM PROGRAMA E SUAS CONSEQUÊNCIAS

LA (NO) IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE ESCUELAS CHARTER EN GOIÁS: UN ANÁLISIS DEL INTENTO DE IMPLEMENTAR UN PROGRAMA Y SUS CONSECUENCIAS

Henrique Dias Gomes de NAZARETH

ABSTRACT: The present text is the result of a doctoral research that analyzed the Program of Management Contracts with Social Organizations in basic education in Goiás. It was developed through a qualitative research with document analysis, using as sources edicts, draft contracts, actions of the Public Ministry, reports and interviews granted to the media. The main objective here is to understand the attempt to implement the program, describing its nuances and analyzing its unfoldings. By discussing the lessons that can be extracted from the case, it is believed that the analysis of the program and its outcome can contribute to researchers interested in understanding and resisting the advances of privatization movements in Brazilian public education. In sum, the article is about a program that was not effectively implemented, but that, in spite of this, presents consequences and developments for the advance of privatizing policies identified with charter schools in the Brazilian context.


RESUMO: O presente texto é fruto de uma pesquisa de doutorado que analisou o Programa de Contratos de Gestão com Organizações Sociais na educação básica de Goiás. Desenvolveu-se, por meio de uma pesquisa qualitativa com análise documental, tendo como fontes editais, minutas de contratos, ações do ministério público, reportagens e entrevista concedidas aos veículos de comunicação. O principal objetivo aqui é entender a tentativa de implementação do programa, descrevendo suas nuances e analisando seus desdobramentos. Ao discutir sobre as lições que podem ser extraídas a partir do caso acredita-se que a análise do programa e seu desfecho pode contribuir com pesquisadores interessados em compreender e resistir aos avanços de movimentos privatizantes na educação pública brasileira. Em suma, o artigo é sobre um programa que não foi efetivamente implementado, mas que, a despeito disso, apresenta consequências e desdobramentos para o avanço de políticas privatizantes identificadas com as charter schools no contexto brasileiro.


1 Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO), Rio de Janeiro – RJ – Brazil. Adjunct Professor. PhD in Education (UNIRIO). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9833-0010. E-mail: henrique.dias@edu.unirio.br
RESUMEN: Este texto es el resultado de una investigación doctoral que analizó el Programa de Contratos de Gestión con Organizaciones Sociales en educación básica de Goiás. Se desarrolló, a través de una investigación cualitativa con análisis documental, teniendo como edictos fuentes, borradores de contratos, actuaciones del ministerio público, informes y entrevistas concedidas a los medios de comunicación. El objetivo principal aquí es comprender el intento de implementar el programa, describiendo sus matices y analizando sus consecuencias. Al discutir las lecciones que se pueden extraer del caso, se cree que el análisis del programa y su resultado puede contribuir a los investigadores interesados en comprender y resistir los avances de los movimientos de privatización en la educación pública brasileña. En cierto modo, el artículo trata sobre un programa que no ha sido implementado de manera efectiva, pero que, a pesar de esto, presenta consecuencias y consecuencias para el avance de las políticas de privatización identificadas con las escuelas Charter en el contexto brasileño.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Escuelas Chárter. Implementación de Políticas Públicas. Privatización de la educación. Organizaciones sociales en educación

Introduction

The present text is the result of a doctoral research that analyzed the Program of Management Contracts with Social Organizations in basic education in Goiás. Based on qualitative research through document analysis, the research included the public notices launched by the state government of Goiás, draft contracts, actions of the Public Ministry, reports and interviews granted to the media. Thus, it was possible to understand the assumptions, designs and trajectories that were part of the formulation and attempt to implement the program.

The investigated program was inspired by the American charter schools and intended to privatize the management of about 30% of the state schools in Goiás that would be administered by Social Organizations (SOs) and monitored by the State Department of Education, Culture and Sports (SEDUCE-GO in the Portuguese acronym) through management contracts.

Launched at the end of 2015, the Program for Management Contracts with OSs was expected to begin in the 2016 school year; however, legal disputes meant that it was not implemented as it had been designed. During this time, there were unfavorable decisions for the Goiás government, which even selected the SOs, but had the public notices embargoed. The Public Ministry of Goiás (MP-GO in the Portuguese acronym) pointed out weaknesses and unconstitutionality that ended up causing the management contracts not to be implemented in regular schools.

One of the problems pointed out was the violation of the constitutional determination of valuing education professionals, since the program would allow up to 70% of the teaching staff
and 100% of the administrative staff to be hired by SOs, without a direct link to the State. Another questionable issue was related to the conflict between the principle of democratic management and the proposed private management model. In addition, the inexperience of the SOs in managing public education was another factor that contributed to the failure of the program.

This article will describe the main actions of the government in its attempt to implement the program and will present the events that help to understand the process, that is, the formulators' manifestations, the publications of policy documents, the resistance of students and the teachers' union, and the legal dispute with the MP-GO.

The main objective is to describe the nuances of the attempt to implement the Management Contract Program in Basic Education in Goiás (2015-2019) in order to understand the advance of privatizing movements in Brazilian public education and processes of public policy implementation. As specific objectives, the article sought to analyze the unfolding of the program and discuss the lessons that can be drawn from the case.

In analyzing the charter-inspired policy, the focus of the article is on the formulation and implementation phases. Even without ever reaching the schools, the government's actions in trying to implement the program were part of the implementation phase and, as will be noted later, required redesigning the policy. In short, the article is about a program that was not effectively implemented, but that presents consequences and developments for the advancement of privatizing policies identified with charter schools in the Brazilian context.

**Inspiration and program design**

The Management Contract Program in Basic Education in Goiás was inspired by U.S. charter schools; its creators visited U.S. charter schools and received specialists who offered advice to the State Secretariat of Education, Culture and Sports (SEDUCE-GO), school principals and representatives of Social Organizations (SOs).

In short, the charters model refers to public schools, financed with public resources and managed by private organizations. In free translation charter means license or permit. In other words, it is the authorization that a private entity receives to run public schools.

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2 Among the experts were: Alex Medler, World Bank technician, consultant on educational reform and specialist on charter schools in the United States; Martin Carnoy and David Plank, researchers at Stanford University and consultants for organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Ford Foundation.
The formats of charters are multiple, since the proposal formulated in the late 1980s by Budde (1988) defends the idea that public schools with more autonomy from state regulation are able to provide a better educational service. Autonomy to choose curricula, to formulate pedagogical proposals, to hire and fire educators, are among the arguments for the adoption of the model. This was the original conception, but, contrary to what the advocates of charters preach, with the strengthening of large-scale evaluation systems, these schools began to enjoy only relative autonomy, since they were bound to greater accountability (ADRIÃO, 2014).

Subsequently, charter schools were seen as possibilities to foster a lucrative market with large transfers of public funds to the private sector. In addition to serving as an alternative for families who claimed the right to choose their children's school, because, unlike other public schools, in the U.S., charter schools are not subject to enrollment by geo-referencing (NAZARETH, 2019).

In Brazil, the participation of private entities in the provision and management of public education is not new. For decades, there have been agreements to offer early childhood education; however, in recent years there has been an expansion of private management of public schools to other stages of schooling. Besides the Goiás initiative, which will be discussed in this text, recently charter-inspired models were implemented in Porto Alegre (Community Schools in Elementary Education) and Minas Gerais (Somar Project).

The Program of Management Contracts in Basic Education in Goiás differs from other Brazilian initiatives in that it intended to transfer the management of a significant portion of state schools already in operation. If the process had gone as the formulators had hoped, 30% of the schools would be managed by newly qualified SOs. Each OS would be responsible for managing regional "small networks. A single SO would manage 23 schools in the macro-region of Anápolis; another would manage 11 units in the macro-region of Águas Lindas/Planaltina; while another would be in charge of 14 schools in Luziânia/Novo Gama.

The expected annual disbursement for the program would be approximately 150 million reais, with 38,460 students impacted. Between 2016 and 2017 public call notices were published in order to select the entities that would sign Management Contracts with the State of Goiás.

**Implementation Attempts**

In late 2015, the Goiás state government tried to hand over the management of part of its schools to newly qualified social organizations (OS). Despite being treated as a priority issue...
by SEDUCE-GO, the implementation suffered from obstacles and resistance that prevented it from becoming effective. There was resistance from teachers and students, and, especially, a strong action of the Public Ministry of Goiás, which managed to impugn the selection notices of the OSs. Finally, the model was implemented only in professional schools.

Since the beginning of 2015, news circulated in the media about the Goiás government's intention to implement management contracts in education. During the year, feasibility studies and visits to countries such as the US and England were conducted. The initial intention was that, already in the 2016 school year, the management of part of the schools would be transferred to a social organization as a pilot project, including the budget for 2016 already provided funds for this (SOUZA; FLORES, 2017).

By means of decrees, commissions and working groups were created with the goal of formulating the program, carrying out the procedures to discipline the selection and to judge the proposals submitted by social organizations. Thus, on December 29, 2015, the Public Call Notice (001/2016) was published.

Following the procedures set forth in the public notice, the SOs delivered their qualification documents and presented their technical and financial proposals. After analysis, the Special Commission suggested that all entities should be disqualified for not reaching the minimum score.

The organizations showed unpreparedness to meet the requirements and did not present consistent plans for the implementation of the management model, for the implementation of the pedagogical model of SEDUCE-GO and for pedagogical and technological innovation, among other criteria.

With all the SOs disapproved, SEDUCE-GO opted to hold a new call, and to try to ensure the submission of adequate proposals, it organized workshops and technical meetings to guide the SOs.

At least three such events took place. They were workshops that worked to guide the subjects involved in the implementation of the program (SOs, undersecretaries, principals, and teachers). The need to hold events like these was one of the changes that the policymakers made in an attempt to make the program viable. The incompetence of the SOs to present proposals that met the minimum standards established led the state government to act also in preparing the entities.

Thus, for careful observers, there was already an indication that one of the main assumptions of the formulators was wrong; after all, the program was presented to society as a
means to bring the supposed efficiency of business management to public schools. How could one believe that the SOs would be more competent to manage regional networks with dozens of schools if they were not able to present adequate projects or prove their experience in the area?

Program resistance and inconsistencies

During the period of publication of the first public notice, there were many opposing manifestations, such as student occupations and positions of the teachers' union. The students occupied twenty-seven state schools in Goiânia and five other units in the interior of the state. In January 2016, they even occupied the SEDUCE-GO headquarters.

Another force that positioned itself against the program was the Brazilian Bar Association - Goiás section (OAB-GO). The OAB-GO recommended the suspension of the public notice. Among the reasons, the entity claimed that it was necessary to reopen the dialogue with the sectors to be affected by the program (representation of teachers, students, administrative assistants, and parents) and denounced the absence of information on the relationship between cost and benefit in the case of hiring SOs (VERDÉLIO, 2016).

On February 16, 2016, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF), the Public Prosecutor's Office of Goiás (MP-GO), and the State Audit Office (MPC) recommended the postponement of the public notice until some of the irregularities pointed out were resolved. A deadline was set and, after considering that SEDUCE-GO had not met the recommendation, the MPs filed an injunction requesting the suspension.

The recommendation highlights the prosecutors' concern with the valuing of education professionals; the questioning of the principle of economy and the use of FUNDEB resources; the incompatibility of the program with democratic management; and the fear of the lack of proof of professional capacity and moral suitability of the SOs.

Regarding the first problem, the violation of the constitutional determination to value education professionals, the MP-GO highlights that the project allows up to 70% of the teaching staff and 100% of the administrative staff to be hired by SOs. Art. 206 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 (BRAZIL, 1988) legislates in favor of valuing education professionals, with admission only through public examinations, career plans, and a national salary floor.

The program proposes to improve the labor situation of temporary teachers by replacing them with teachers hired by the OSs under the CLT (Consolidation of Labor Laws) regime.
as stated in Section V of Article 206 of CF/88 (BRAZIL, 1988). According to the MP-GO document recommending the postponement of the public notice:

The Governor of Goiás intends to improve public education in the state, contrary to the will of the federal legislature, because he considers it too costly to hold public competitions for teachers, and makes it obvious that improving the salaries of teachers does not produce results. Therefore, it allows up to 70% of teachers and up to 100% of administrative staff of schools managed by SOs to be private employees (GOIÁS, 2016, p. 6)

Another point of disagreement of the Public Ministry is related to the resources allocated to the program. The prosecutors claimed that the government did not explain how the calculation of the amount per student to be transferred was made, besides indicating the transfer of FUNDEB (Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Valuation of Education Professionals, in the Portuguese acronym) resources for the entities to pay the hired professionals, which is not allowed (GOIÁS, 2016).

The first call provides for the use of FUNDEB resources and extraordinary revenues. In it, the formulators determine that the SO must open an exclusive current account to handle the funds from the fund, in addition to imposing, in a contract, that the organization waives its bank secrecy.

It is evident that the Goiás government believed it could use FUNDEB's money to pay the professionals linked to the private "partners". This revealed the unpreparedness of the program's creators. The problem, besides being object of MP-GO's challenge, was also questioned by the Union of Education Workers of the State of Goiás (SINTEGO, 2016). The union consulted the National Fund for Education Development (FNDE in the Portuguese acronym) about the use of the resources and the FNDE replied that the resources "are intended for the remuneration of public teachers of basic education, in effective exercise in the public network and in the sphere of priority action of the federated entity" (SINTEGO, 2016, p. 5). The manifestation of FNDE also elucidates that for the use of FUNDEB funds the professional must be directly linked to the federated entity, therefore, hiring via SOs could not be funded with these resources.

At this point, SEDUCE-GO was forced to back down. The public notices published later no longer included the requirement to open an account to transfer FUNDEB funds. In addition, notes were included explaining that no resources from the fund would be transferred to the SO.

In the years planned for the implementation of the program, 2016, 2017 and 2018, the resources from the fund represented more than half the budget of SEDUCE-GO, leaving about
41% (2016), 43% (2017) and 41% (2018). From this perspective, it would still be mathematically possible to transfer the management of 30% of the network to the Social Organizations even without the FUNDEB resources. This does not apply to any school network, since many do not count on other significant sources of funds. It is also necessary to consider that in the schools managed by the OSs, part of the teachers (at least 30%) would continue to be linked to the State and could be paid by the fund.

The FUNDEB issue created a difficulty for the implementation and demanded the redesign of the program, but in the case of Goiás it did not become an insurmountable barrier, since the state can reallocate the budget to pay the contracts. It is clear then that, from the funding point of view, the larger the size of the program, the more difficult it will be to fund it without the use of these resources. So much so that, later, in the approval of the New FUNDEB, there were several attempts to include models similar to charters in the scope of the fund (NAZARETH, 2021).

Returning to the manifestation of the Public Ministry of Goiás (GOIÁS, 2016), the prosecutors stated that the project also conflicts with the principle of democratic management. The document contests the transfer of school management to OSs without the effective participation of the school community in the decision-making process, demonstrating that, in Order No. 596/2015 (GOIÁS, 2015), Governor Marconi Perillo (PSDB) makes it clear that the decision has already been made.

The document (GOIÁS, 2016) also questions the notorious professional capacity and moral suitability of the eleven SOs accredited to work in the area of education in the State. Organizations that are under investigation for crimes of ideological falsehood and administrative misconduct were identified. Furthermore, according to the prosecutors' evaluation, none of the qualified OSs presented notorious professional capacity.

Despite the recommendations of the public ministries, the selection process of the SOs went on, but without success. As seen above, the failure of the first call for proposals was not only due to the resistance processes. SEDUCE-GO tried to proceed with the selection process, however, the organizations proved to be unprepared, not being able to at least approach the score required to be eligible for the contract.

Disappointing the formulators' argument, this was a sign that these "entrepreneurs" had no concrete proposals to improve school management, only improvisations. The fact is that the OSs that competed for the bids were created in 2015 and 2016, i.e., during the process of designing the program. Some already existed as associations, but without a strong presence in
education; others were new and probably appeared only with the intention of competing for the calls.

Finally, with no technical proposal considered satisfactory and with the granting by the courts of the MP-GO's injunction request, SEDUCE-GO focused its efforts on launching a new edict, while seeking to guide social organizations to avoid the same problem.

The second call for proposals (003/2016) and the reformulations in the program design

Public Call Notice 003/2016 was the second version of the program and presented some modifications aimed at incorporating necessary improvements after initial criticism and questioning. This version made technical visits to schools optional; provided for the creation of the Center for Follow-up, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Management Contracts; and modified the verbs of the items that correspond to the pedagogical attributions of the SOs. For example, where it previously stated that the organization should "plan" (the continued training of teachers), it replaced this with expressions such as "guarantee the elaboration" or "accompany.

No substantial changes were found in the item that deals with democratic management, only changes in the wording to emphasize the permanence of an elected principal, as well as an observation indicating that the SO will be obliged to, bimonthly, send minutes that prove the participation of the community and the School Council in the unit's decisions, without further details on the subject. Despite this, SEDUCE-GO still could not prove that the project would guarantee democratic management and continued to be criticized on this issue.

Regarding the specific projects for schools, an example of a change in the new document is that the OS would keep the attribution of guaranteeing innovative teaching practices, but the need to submit these projects to SEDUCE-GO is underlined.

The second call also better specified the indicators to be evaluated and created some objective indexes that were not found before. The proficiency in Portuguese and Mathematics became the focus of the evaluation of the contract. Before, only IDEB and IDEGO were considered. Another index included was the Directed Sample Evaluation.

In the second version, the secretariat published a note of clarification making "the presentation of copies of Criminal Clearance Certificates [...] mandatory for all leaders of the SO" (SEDUCE-GO, 2016a, p. 1). It was a response to the MP-GO's questioning, which found, in the qualified SOs, people answering to administrative misconduct lawsuits and even with convictions.
On the issue of the management contract's disbursement, there are important changes. The public notice now indicates the projected monthly cost per student, based on a calculation presented in Annex V of the document (SEDUCE-GO, 2016b). The cost was estimated at R$351.11/pupil/month (three hundred and fifty-one reais and eleven cents, per student, per month), the same amount that was invested in the other schools.

The difference between the two versions of the program is that the first one required the private entity to submit a financial proposal between R$250.00 (two hundred and fifty reais) and R$350.00 (three hundred and fifty reais). SEDUCE-GO did not explain the calculation or how it arrived at the values.

Critics, such as SINTEGO and MP-GO, argued that the initial format could lead to precarious conditions in the schools, which would receive fewer resources than they currently do, or, on the other hand, could require the need for contractual amendments, undermining the principle of economy. The fact that there was a change at this point shows that the policy makers were not convinced about the issue, even though in their discourse they defended that the efficiency of the private sector was capable of generating significant savings.

With the reformulation of the policy design, SEDUCE-GO modifies the element of economy that had been pointed out as important in Dispatch N. 596/2015 (GOIÁS, 2015). Now, the SOs would not have to "do more with less," they would have to "do more with the same."

In summary, the modifications in Public Call Notice 003/2016 presented the intention to explain some points that generated doubts in the competing organizations or to answer questions that were contested by the Public Ministry. It is noted that not all the prosecutors' points were met. A new recommendation of suspension was made, but Public Call Notice 003/2016 continued the process until a SO was declared the winner of the competition.

_Gestão, Transparência e Resgate Social_ - Management, Transparency and Social Responsibility- (GTR) was the selected SO, as it was the only one that achieved the minimum score required in the public notice (seventy points). On December 27, 2016, the secretariat ratified the result and indicated the signing of the management contract for a total amount of R$69,810,197.00 (sixty-nine million, eight hundred and ten thousand, one hundred and ninety-seven reais).

Despite this, the management contract was not signed. This, because Judge Eliana Xavier Jaime accepted another injunction request from the MP-GO and also suspended the second public notice. The understanding was that, even with some changes in the new bid, the
prosecutors’ recommendations were not met and that the new call presented an identical object to the first.

The ability of the GTR association to assume this management contract continued to be questioned. The entity has existed since 2009, but was only qualified as a Social Education Organization in February 2016, on the eve of the call. For the MP-GO, besides being newly qualified, the entity did not present any record that it had experience in the area of education.

Even with the suspension of the public notice, SEDUCE-GO proceeded with the publication of two other calls for proposals that aimed to transfer the management of schools in the macro-regions of Águas Lindas/Planaltina and Luziânia/Novo Gama. The two calls for proposals launched in 2017 faced the same legal problems, as well as the lack of SOs prepared to take over the management of public schools.3

Non-implementation and the uncertainty of tomorrow

In August 2018, the government achieved the first, and only, judicial victory that allowed the continuity of the process related to the Luziânia/Novo Gama edict. Despite this, the government decided to resume the implementation of the program only after the elections. This did not happen, since the successor was not elected.

Even without a definitive court decision, the delays in the process materialized the government's failure to implement the program in the 2015-2018 administration. The first judicial victory came late, at a political moment when SEDUCE-GO no longer had the same confidence in the proposal and the party that represented the continuity of the Goiás government did not seem willing to defend the idea during the electoral campaign.

Until 2017, SEDUCE-GO's discourse still showed confidence in the success of the program. Despite highlighting the difficulties, the secretariat believed that the model created was innovative and capable of overcoming the obstacles. Despite this belief, at that time there were already some problems that, in the end, led to the program not being implemented. As can be seen in the interview granted by Raquel Teixeira (PSDB) to Jornal Opção on 02/25/2017 (JORNAL OPÇÃO, 2017). The secretary admits she had some fears, such as the difficulty of finding competent SOs and the incompatibility of the charters with the educational legislation;
however, at the time of the interview, Teixeira still showed optimism and affirmed that the program would be implemented that year.

In 2018, Teixeira stepped down as secretary to run for vice-governor of Goiás. Again, she assumed that she was concerned about the absence of social organizations with competence to manage the schools and demonstrated that there was no longer the same determination to continue the implementation attempt, even if her slate was elected (TEIXEIRA, 2018).

It is noted that the lack of SOs with technical capacity and suitability to manage the schools was one of the major problems, only assumed after the failure in the implementation of the program. The strategy for SOs to gain experience in public education management was to implement a similar program in professional education, as a pilot project not only to test the model, but also to test the SOs.

Finally, the slate composed of José Eliton (PSDB) and Raquel Teixeira (PSDB), successors of Marconi Perillo (PSDB), was defeated in the 2018 elections, which had Ronaldo Caiado (DEM) as the winner. For the new management of SEDUCE-GO, Fátima Gavioli (PSB) was appointed, who in one of her first actions announced the extinction of the Center for Follow-up, Monitoring and Evaluation of Management Contracts. Confirming that the new government did not intend to give continuity to the program. However, it was not a question of moral, pedagogical or legal disagreement. According to Gavioli (SEDUCE-GO, 2019), the reasons were financial.

Final remarks

From the course of the attempt to implement the Goiás program, a question arises: despite the efforts made by the government, what prevented the management contracts from being implemented?

Raquel Teixeira (PSDB), when questioned about the reasons for the program's failure as a candidate for the post of vice-governor, was categorical in answering that this occurred because there were no "qualified" SOs to manage the schools. The interviews published in newspapers showed that there were always doubts about the capacity of these organizations, but the state government preferred to try anyway. For it, it was a model that should be tested, regardless of the risks and consequences.

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4 The previous government had left the employees of the education network without salaries in December and 13th (Christmas bonus), so the order was to cut costs. According to Gavioli, "it doesn't mean that one day someone won't take up the matter again, but, for now, we're going to put a stop to it.” (SEDUCE-GO, 2019, p. 1).
The lack of competent SOs was only one of the reasons that prevented the implementation of the program. The inexistence of capable social organizations could have already been verified with the publication of a public notice for a Social Interest Expression Procedure, an instrument that can precede the public call notice.

A Procedure for the Expression of Social Interest would already indicate to the public power what was found years later: there was a lack of competent entities for what was desired. However, the formulators had already decided to transfer the management and preferred to publish a public call notice right from the start.

It was verified throughout the investigation that, in the first call for bid, no SO was able to present a proposal that contemplated the minimum required by SEDUCE-GO. For a careful observer this would be a clue to the lack of capable SOs. Despite this, the government kept trying to implement the project and offered training events for SOs to present better proposals, but the problem is that workshops do not make organizations more competent and experienced, they only help them in the competition process.

In fact, despite the large number of registered entities, the bids ended with the victory of organizations that could only achieve the minimum score required, and even then, SEDUCE-GO defended that they should manage the schools. At no time did the secretariat itself take the initiative to paralyze the actions due to the lack of a qualified organization.

Not by chance, as SEDUCE-GO makes it seem, the inexistence of OSs capable of doing the work that is currently done by the state is proof of the inadequacy of the program's assumptions. In other words, the idea that the private sector alone has more capacity and efficiency to manage public schools has proved to be mistaken.

In the end, even without the effective implementation, it is possible to note that the program has unfolded and created bases for the emergence of proposals similar to the charter in Goiás or in other networks. The most direct consequence was the implementation of a similar model in professional education, including the participation of the same SOs. The program implemented in professional education can also serve for the OSs to gain experience and conceptualize themselves to participate in other competitions.

Another explanation for the failure of the program's implementation is the inconsistencies between the proposal and the Brazilian educational legislation. It was observed that even trying, SEDUCE-GO was not able to resolve the conflicts pointed out by the MP-GO. With the mismatches between aspects of the educational legislation and the charter models, SEDUCE-GO tried to create its own design to mitigate the antagonisms. The model did not
convince the MP-GO. Although there has not been a definitive court decision on the case, the requests for injunctions caused delays that were enough to compromise the effective implementation in the period.

In any case, the program created, or aspects of it, can still be used in Goiás or in other contexts in the future, and the participation of the World Bank can help in the transit of the experience to other public networks.

For all these reasons, it is understood that the non-implementation of the program does not mean its definitive infeasibility in Brazilian basic education. The actions of the Goiás state government in trying to remove the legal obstacles, and the modifications that have been made in response to them, can serve to propose new policies, whether in Goiás or elsewhere.

We live in a moment in which we see threats to the pluralism of pedagogical ideas and to the idea of collective construction of the school. A panorama in which, in the name of supposed efficiency, everything public is seen as low quality, so it is necessary to understand between the lines of proposals such as the one under analysis. Thus, it is possible to instrumentalize the dispute for the guarantee of the right to education and for the maintenance of historical achievements of Brazilian education such as the principles of democratic management and the valuing of education professionals.

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