

**COLLECTIVE FARM CONSTRUCTION IN KUBAN IN THE 1930S:
DISCREDITING AND CRIMES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES, SABOTAGING THE
POPULATION**

***CONSTRUÇÃO DE FAZENDA COLETIVA EM KUBAN NA DÉCADA DE 1930:
DESCRÉDITO E CRIMES DE AUTORIDADES LOCAIS, SABOTANDO A
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1930: DESCRÉDITO Y CRÍMENES DE LAS AUTORIDADES LOCALES,
SABOTAGANDO A LA POBLACIÓN***

Sergey A. CHUPRYNNIKOV¹

Karina S. CHIKAEVA²

Sergey G. VOSKOBOYNIKOV³

Valery V. KASYANOV⁴

Tatyana V. SCHUKINA⁵

ABSTRACT: The article is devoted to the problem of reorganizing agriculture on a socialist basis – collective farm construction, in particular, the activities of local party and Soviet bodies and the opposition of the population. The chronological framework of the study is the 1930s. This is a period of tough socialist pressure in the agrarian sphere, when the old traditional institutions for the life of the peasantry were being replaced by fundamentally new ones – collective and state farms. The relevance of the study is due to the need to study the historical experience of interaction between the state as an institutional authority and government on a regional scale, and civil society (local population) in modern conditions of modernization and transition to a market economy. The article is based on a large amount of factual material state archives and documentation centers of the modern history of the Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory. The materials of these archives made it possible at the local level to investigate the contradictory nature of the process of collective farm development, which consisted both in the crimes of the local authorities and in the sabotage of the population, both collective and individual farmers. It is concluded, that by the end of the 1930s collective farms had become a natural and effective form of life in the countryside, which played a significant role in ensuring victory in the Great Patriotic War.

¹ Kuban State Technological University, Krasnodar – Russia. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4993-3891>. E-mail: chuprynnikov@mail.ru

² Kuban State Agrarian University, Krasnodar – Russia. Doctor of History, Professor of the Department of Sociology and Culture of Kuban State Agrarian University FSBEI HPE. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4396-104X>. E-mail: chikaevakarina@mail.ru

³ Don State Technical University (DSTU) – Russia. PhD in Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of History and cultural science. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8014-8969>. E-mail: voskoboynikov1968c@yandex.ru

⁴ Kuban state University, Krasnodar – Russia. Doctor of Social Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, head of chair of history of Russia. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6870-7673>. E-mail: culture@kubsu.ru

⁵ Don State Technical University (DSTU) – Russia. PhD in Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of Document science and the language communications. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6461-4915>. E-mail: vuzprepod@mail.ru

KEYWORDS: Local authorities. Individual farmer. Collective farm peasantry. Grain procurement. Grain supplies.

RESUMO: *O artigo é dedicado ao problema da reorganização da agricultura em uma base socialista - construção de fazendas coletivas, em particular, as atividades do partido local e dos órgãos soviéticos e a oposição da população. O quadro cronológico do estudo é a década de 1930. Este é um período de forte pressão socialista na esfera agrária, quando as velhas instituições tradicionais para a vida do campesinato foram sendo substituídas por outras fundamentalmente novas - fazendas coletivas e estatais. A relevância do estudo se deve à necessidade de estudar a experiência histórica de interação entre o Estado como autoridade institucional e governo em escala regional, e a sociedade civil (população local) em condições de modernização e transição para uma economia de mercado. O artigo é baseado em uma grande quantidade de arquivos estatais, materiais factuais e centros de documentação da história moderna da região de Rostov e do território de Krasnodar. Os materiais destes arquivos permitiram apurar a nível local o carácter contraditório do processo de desenvolvimento das explorações agrícolas coletivas, que consistiu tanto em crimes das autarquias locais como na sabotagem da população, tanto os agricultores coletivos como os agricultores individuais. Conclui-se que, no final da década de 1930, as fazendas coletivas se tornaram uma forma natural e eficaz de vida no campo, que desempenhou um papel significativo para garantir a vitória na Grande Guerra Patriótica.*

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: *Autoridades locais. Agricultor individual. Campesinato da fazenda coletiva. Compra de grãos. Fornecimento de grãos.*

RESUMEN: *El artículo está dedicado al problema de la reorganización de la agricultura sobre una base socialista: la construcción de granjas colectivas, en particular, las actividades de los partidos locales y los organismos soviéticos y la oposición de la población. El marco cronológico del estudio es la década de 1930. Este es un período de fuerte presión socialista en la esfera agraria, cuando las viejas instituciones tradicionales para la vida del campesinado fueron reemplazadas por otras fundamentalmente nuevas: las granjas colectivas y estatales. La relevancia del estudio se debe a la necesidad de estudiar la experiencia histórica de interacción entre el Estado como autoridad institucional y gobierno a escala regional, y la sociedad civil (población local) en condiciones modernas de modernización y transición a una economía de mercado. El artículo se basa en una gran cantidad de archivos estatales de material fáctico y centros de documentación de la historia moderna de la región de Rostov y el territorio de Krasnodar. Los materiales de estos archivos permitieron investigar a nivel local el carácter contradictorio del proceso de desarrollo de la finca colectiva, que consistió tanto en los delitos de las autoridades locales como en el sabotaje de la población, tanto campesina colectiva como individual. Se concluye que a fines de la década de 1930 las granjas colectivas se habían convertido en una forma natural y efectiva de vida en el campo, lo que jugó un papel importante para asegurar la victoria en la Gran Guerra Patria.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Autoridades locales. Agricultor individual. Campesinado agrícola colectivo. Compra de cereales. Suministro de cereales.*

Introduction

The study of history is one of the ways to understand, especially in periods of great tribulation and changes, how transitions, large or small, happen and how this can impact events, both past and future. When studying the transition of an agrarian system in Russia, it is possible to see not only how this change took place, but also its effects and, from that, to understand postulates that may be shaping peasant life even today. In addition, it is also possible to learn from the past so that, given the continuous movement of transition in society, new changes can occur more effectively, through an education system that is capable of preparing people, especially those directly affected. For the changes, for what is happening, seeking not only a smoother transition, but also a greater acceptance and participation of a population more prepared for such events. By shedding light on what happened at the beginning of the 20th century in Russia, we seek to understand the impact of this movement on other events and also the relevance and form of the transition from one agrarian system to another and the consequences of this in that population.

In 1931, it was announced that the collective farm movement had "won decisive victories" throughout the country. In the Kuban alone, over a thousand collective farms were created in one year. The collective farms had expanded the sown area and achieved higher yields. The party documents of that time noted an increase in the monetary and in-kind income of each collective farm household. So, in the Kuban, the following figures were indicated: income increased from 45 rubles in 1930 up to 640 rubles in 1931, natural benefit per collective farmyard increased from 7 centners to 9.31 centners of grain (MATTINGLY, 2019).

In January 1932, the secretariat of the North Caucasian regional trade union council adopted a resolution "On practical measures to implement the decision of the regional committee of the CPSU(b) (the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) and the regional executive committee on the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms", in which all organizations of the region were obliged to take an active part in this matter, attaching each party unit, labor collective to each collective farm brigade and providing in this matter both direct logistical and cultural assistance (CHUPRYNNIKOV, 2009; EPPINGER, 2018).

Collective farm construction in the 1930s was accompanied by both discrediting and crimes by the side of local authorities and sabotage of collective and individual farmers. The authorities dealt mercilessly with both the kulak and the middle individual peasant. Mass evictions in the 1930s were planned, targeted and harsh actions. Moreover, they were supported

by the farm laborers, middle peasants, and collective farmers (YAKHUTL; KASYANOV, 2020). Here are some statements:

Why the authorities have been fiddling with their kulaks for so long, they tortured us by threatening that we too will have such a fate. They must not only be evicted but shot (former red partisan of the stanitsa Ladozhskaya).

This is how we will evict the kulaks, then things will go much better with the collective farm, these bastards don't let us build a collective farm (a poor woman, from stanitsa Vostochnaya).

We must expel all the white officers - our enemies, who shot red in batches. If you are afraid to evict them, then entrust it to us, we will cope with them in one night (former red partisan of the stanitsa Novo-Pokrovskaya) (Report "On the results of the elimination of the kulaks as a class in the North Caucasus. October 1, 1930") (CDNI RO. F.12. Op.5. D.185. L.45).

Methods

To meet the aim of the study, the descriptive method is utilized. The article is based on a large amount of factual material state archives and documentation centers of the modern history of the Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory.

Results and Discussion

Crimes of local authorities, discrediting of collective farm construction

The creation of collective farms during the period under study is a complex contradictory process that deepened the differentiation of both rural and urban populations, a process that ruined people's lives. Refusal to work in rural areas, no matter for what reasons, was regarded as a misdemeanor that deserved severe punishment. For Party members, this is a personal matter with expelling from the Party, publicly condemn and with consequences both in their careers and lives. Thus, on 22 December 1931, the bureau of the Krasnodar GC of the CPSU (b) considered the issue "About Comrade Zdorenko". Zdorenko, who refused to comply with the decision of the Civil Code Bureau of 6 and 7 December 1931 to travel to permanent work in the Krasnodar region and decided to exclude him from the ranks of the CPSU (b). This decision should be published in the press (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D. 133. L.20).

Later such practice became the norm. In 1934, at the fourth Krasnodar City Party Conference, it was noted, "72 people were expelled from the Party for not going to the village" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D. 438. L. 355).

Work on collective farms was organized by the local leadership often extremely ineptly. Let us give an example from the resolution of the Krasnodar city asset on 10 October 1932.

On the results of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) ... 7-8% were sown in Elizavetskaya, 42% in Kalinino. In Elizavetskaya they are constantly have meetings, but do not sow. They must break up huge clods of earth, rather than blame the drought. In other collective farms, everyone takes part in sowing. There (in Elizavetskaya) we engage in it the entire city Council of activists (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.288. L. L. 4.15).

From the minutes of the meeting of the Bureau of the GC of the CPSU (b) on 21 October 1932 about the course of sowing in the village of Elizavetskaya, "Completely unsuccessful. The percentage of the traction equipment involved in sowing and plowing does not exceed 40-50%, and for some collective farms 20-25%. ... The quality of plowing: depth 1-1.5 cm and they sow by hand" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.276. L.21) and as a result – "small seeding and grain is all on the surface. ... tractors plow "idle" - they pull only one seeder" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.291. L.95), and at the same time there is a "huge overspending of fuel", since the leaders do not know how to rationally use the rapidly growing tractor fleet (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.318. L.15).

Extremely inept organization of labor on collective farms was often "deliberately inept". Thus, in a letter from the bureau of the Krasnodar GC of the CPSU (b) dated 22 August 33 to the directors of the MTS, chairmen of the station councils, secretaries of collective farm party members and chairmen of collective farms, the following example was given,

... The threshers are idle... they attribute everything to malaria. In fact, on 20 August 1933, hundreds of people from the collective farms "Red Giant" and "Proletarian Dictatorship", listed as malaria patients, roamed the village. During the survey, it was found that the matter was not in malaria, but mainly in the "Spas", which was celebrated with the tacit consent of the collective farm administrations, at a time when hundreds of hectares of grain fields were in haystacks, and bread-making in the first two decades was thwarted (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.351. L.15).

The matter was aggravated by the fact that food funds were given exclusively for days worked. However, on collective farms, especially in the early years, work was not organized the way everyone was busy. Therefore, farmers were left without work and workdays and accordingly without provision. This was noted in the decree of the Bureau of the GC of the CPSU (b) dated 21 April 1933 "On additional food assistance" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.332. L.10a). In our opinion, this was a "human factor" or one of the "man-made" reasons for the famine of 1933.

Here is how local leaders showed themselves. From a speech at the joint plenum of the GC of the CPSU (b), SCC and RCG of the CPSU (b) 01 February 1933 by Comrade Paperny,

When we checked the amount of fodder available for horses, it turned out that it would be enough for a whole year. Why are horses bad and dying? Because the secretaries of the party cell do not want to visit the stables, they consider it a humiliation for themselves, they do not talk to stablemen, do not delve into the process (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.317. L.19).

Moreover, in the Maryanskaya MTS (Machine-Tractor Station)

there were cases when on the coldest days, barefoot tractor drivers, covering their legs with straw, carried out shock work. The collective farm itself never provided workers with overalls. People were often forced to spend the night in the field, while there was a camp not far from this place (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.318. L.21).

The collective farmers "... mowed at night, plowed at night, harrowed, when it was possible, also at night" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. L.14). In the village of Starokorsunskaya, "on cold frosty days, the collective farmers worked barefoot, undressed, half-starved, on an emaciated draft, on a battered tractor park. And yet, under such conditions, the plan for spring sowing was fulfilled on time" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. L.10).

The practice of coercion was used when it came to caring for crops, in particular, weeding the future harvest. So, the bureau of the Krasnodar GC of the CPSU (b), in its resolution of 2 July 1933, "On the progress of weeding and preparation for harvesting and grain delivery", noted that the resolution of the regional committee on involving the entire population in weeding work "from dawn to dawn" and decided,

to consider it necessary that the entire working-age population of the villages, *including adolescents, old people, old women, worked in the field from dawn to dawn with an obligatory overnight stay in the brigade* (emphasis added by S.A. Chuprynnikov). Those maliciously not going out to weeding, must be deprived of food loans (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.341. L.3).

"8-9-year-old boys were sent to weeding" (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. D.418. L.3). To ensure mass participation in weeding, the leaders of some collective farms even set up cordons and asked permission to close the bazaars (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. L.5). Even the townspeople, and first family members of communists and trade unionists, should not have stayed away from this "duty". So, at the city party meeting on 2 June 1933 the following proposals were sounded,

We need to talk and agitate less. Now the main thing is weeding. We see that every day hundreds of workers' wives (party and Soviet - author SA Chuprynnikov) walk the streets; they must be assigned to certain collective farms. The task should be set to 100% mobilize for weeding the second members of the families of communists and trade unionists. Cancel vacations.

It is necessary not to give our wives ration cards, if they do not go to the village - to take away the cards. It is necessary to establish an inspection of how the wives of communists and trade unionists work in the countryside (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op. 1. L.3).

Another example, "The party organization has 19 communists, only 3 of them work in the field. It was decided that every communist should be directly at the plow, at the planter. They worked one day, but the next day, there were no communists in the field. It turns out that a small group of people is working, and there is a chairman, a quality inspector, a foreman, etc. the group walks around, doing nothing" (CDNI KK. D.318. L. 18). Moreover, the reports are completely different. "... the foreman at the collective farm "Revvoensovet" stated that 3-4% do not go to work, but in fact 40% and they turn a blind eye to it" (CDNI KK. L.21). Further, "... the chairman of the collective farm is not a comrade for the collective farmer, but he is someone like an overseer. There are no incentive events. The collective farmers absolutely do not know how many workdays they have, how much they will receive and when" (CDNI KK. L.23.), "Accounting is confused, collective farmers do not feel like masters" (CDNI KK. L.22). As a result, "Collective farmers do not see vegetables; they eat only dumplings, at a time when it is quite possible to get butter, etc." (CDNI KK. L.25), "... in collective farms, as a rule, there has been established an exclusively boorish attitude towards the needs of collective farmers" (CDNI KK. D.438. L.155), the village councils and the chairpersons of the village councils themselves have made it a rule to "fine for ... everything" (CDNI KK. D.443. L.389). At the plenum of the GC of the CPSU (b) on 2 August 1932, a deadly fact was cited, "We talked with the collective farmers - it made a *tremendous impression on them, they were surprised that they were being talked to, while they were used to being only commanded* (emphasis added by S.A. Chuprynnikov). The next day they all went plowing" (CDNI KK. D.205. L.27). In addition, in the localities, they practiced giving out not grain for workdays, but baked bread, which was strictly prohibited (CDNI KK. D.348. L.21), in case they gave out grain, then it was 600-700 gr. instead of the prescribed 1.5-2 kg (CDNI KK. D.348. L.21).

The above examples of accounting for the income of collective farmers refer to 1932-1933. Five years later, the state of affairs on the part of the local authorities did not change in any way. In 1937, the regional newspaper "Bolshevik" reported, "... a lot of workday records are made "by eye"; accounting is in disrepair, there are no collective farm accountants. The chairpersons are not involved in accounting. Even the first secretaries do not know the state of affairs with the distribution of income" (BOLSHEVIK. 17 November 1937).

In 1938 the Krasnodar Territory was included in the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the GC of the CPSU (b) dated 19 April 1938 "On the

Prohibition of the Exclusion of Collective Farmers from Collective Farms" as a region in which local authorities allowed the facts of unjustified exclusion of collective farmers from collective farms, without any serious reason or for the most unimportant reasons, and the boards and chairmen of collective farms themselves were carriers of illegal actions.

Pursuant to this decree, it was forbidden to carry out cleansing of collective farms under any pretext and to be expelled from collective farms for violation of internal regulations. For violation of this resolution, the perpetrators were brought to trial as criminals.

Widespread theft by the leadership was also a problem. At the city party session on 22 January 1933, an employee of the justice authorities, Chepurin, noted in his speech,

Take the village of Novo-Velichkovskaya. Here *the commissioners themselves* plundered bread with whole trucks (emphasis added by S.A. Chuprynnikov). In the village of Maryanskaya, there were not any target control figures, which gave the opportunity to bury bread, squander and steal it" (CDNI KK. Form 1072. Op. 1. D.417. L.6).

Theft came together with drunkenness and bribery. Here is how it was mentioned in one of the speeches at the meeting of the city party activists on 25 October 1935, "the secretary of the Stansoviet can sell everything for a bottle of wine. In the village of Maryanskaya, seven secretaries of the Stansoviet were replaced during the year, because they were on the booze. Any certificate could be bought for a bottle: no matter a kulak or not" (CDNI KK. D.634. L. 52).

The training of local personnel, for which the local leadership was responsible, also left much to be desired. From the same speech by Paperny, "The courses are targeted at the attendance of 80 people, when they began to check the attendance, it turned out that 70 people do not live in the village, and two people died two years ago" (CDNI KK. D.317. L.20).

Local authorities and an individual farmer

A harsh and often criminal practice was carried out in relation to the individual farmer. At the plenum of the GC of the CPSU (b) on 30 November 1993, the secretary of the GC of the CPSU (b) Dvolaitzky gives the number of individual farmers in the Krasnodar region of two thousand people with their sowing plan of 1.5 thousand hectares. However, they sowed only 270 hectares. Then he concludes that from among them there are people who are engaged in theft, do not sow, the pressure on the individual peasant has weakened (CDNI KK. D.318. L.33).

The question arises why there is such situation. Here is an extract from the minutes of the Bureau of the GC of the CPSU (b) dated 14 April 1933 "About the village of Andreevskaya" with facts that only discredited the collectivization policy

The sowing plan has been fulfilled by 37%. Despite the direct instruction of the seeding committee to allocate land to the individual farmers of the village at the expense of public plowed lands, the stansovet (chairman Galaev and secretary of the council Polovyanov) not only did not allocate land to individual farmers, but pursued a direct policy of intimidating them, thereby disrupting sowing in the individual sector. The leadership ... practiced bullying of certain individual farmers, in some cases, direct beating (just like Makar Nagulnov in "Virgin Soil Upturned" - author's note by SA Chuprynnikov). ... The secretary of the Stansoviet, using his official position, bought up kulaks' property sold at auction, and inspector Koretsky detained for a long time the cases of specific perpetrators of the theft of fodder (CDNI KK. D.331. L. 42).

The point, in our opinion, in relations with the individual farmer was set by the Resolution of the SNK of the USSR and the GC of the CPSU (b) "On obligatory grain deliveries to the state by collective farms and individual farms from the harvest of 1933" of 19 January 1933 (Izvestiya of CEC and VTsIK of the USSR, No. 20. Of 20 January 1933) and the Establishment of the SNK of the USSR and the GC of the CPSU (b) "On the mandatory supply of grain to the state by collective farms and individual farms from the harvest of 1933. Based on the law of 19 January 1933" (Izvestiya CEC and VTsIK of the USSR No. 155 of 21 June 1933). According to them, grain procurements of the old type were replaced by grain deliveries based on a firm and indisputable law, obligatory for all collective farms and individual farmers. This meant that no evasion of obligations to deliver grain on time should be allowed under any guise. The delivery of grain to the state itself began to be carried out not according to changing plans, but according to firm and unchanging norms established by law, which was supposed to strengthen the position of the collective farms and provide the collective farm and individual farmer with the opportunity to firmly calculate their income. No counter plans for the delivery of grain should henceforth be allowed under any circumstances.

Here are some paragraphs from the first document:

7. For individual farms, the current procedure for determining the amount of grain delivery to the state, remains, namely: village councils establish for each individual farm firm obligations to deliver grain to the state, based on the actually sown area of winter crops and a firm plan for sowing spring grain crops established by the village council for each individual farms, and also proceeding from the fact that the delivery per hectare by individual farms was 5-10 percent higher than the norm established for collective farms in the region.

15. ... Individual farms that have not fulfilled their obligations to deliver grain to the state by the deadline established by this Resolution are brought to justice under Art. 61 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and other republics - according to the relevant articles of the criminal codes of these republics.

The second specified that, in contrast to previous years, when the first 2-3 months of grain procurements, July-August-September, were wasted on the so-called "swing", and in the following months they tried to make up for lost time using repressions; in grain deliveries the decisive months should be the first three months - July-August-September. This meant that the supply of grain to the state had to be launched from the very first days of threshing, and the collective farm and individual trade had to be suspended from the very first days of grain deliveries. Then came the decree:

4) Assign personal responsibility for the successful course of grain supplies to the secretaries of the territorial and regional committees and the chairmen of the executive committees of the territories and regions, in the regions to the secretaries of the regional committees and the chairmen of the regional executive committees, and in the villages to the chairmen of the agricultural councils, the chairmen of collective farm boards, the secretaries of the collective farm cells, the heads of the political departments of MTS.

The decrees are tough, but they are correct for solving the problems of collective farm development in the period under study.

However, at first, the situation in the work of collective farms did not change. At the beginning of July 1933, the Bureau of the GC of the CPSU (b) decided to investigate the fact in the Ogorodnik commune (the village of Starokorsunskaya), the board of which, contrary to the decree of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, decided first to trade vegetables in the bazaar, and then fulfill obligations to the state (CDNI KK. Form 1072. Op. 1. D.341. L.5).

The relations with the individual farmer under the conditions of undivided but legitimate domination of public property relations, when "socialist property is sacred" could not but be built as with the enemy (for the individual farmer, the tax system was indeed formed according to the well-known saying: to friends - everything, to enemies - the law), but correctly (by law).

Here are examples from the information of the chairpersons of the station councils on the fulfillment of financial obligations for individual farms (December 1934):

Comrade Engelhardt (Pashkovskaya MTS), "With regard to individual farms, most of those who left the village did not pay. We took the property from whom it was possible to seize.

There were farms, when checking which, nothing turned out to be found” (CDNI KK. D.291. L. 151).

Comrade Dubodel (station Elizavetinskaya),

On 345 households (with kulak households), 118,132 rubles were charged. On average, 342 rubles per a household. 52 households paid, 93 did not pay. Seized 34 households for a one-time tax (taken cows, horses, and small livestock). Failure to comply with the one-time tax was due to the fact that during the grain procurement for fines, 73 households were seized, from which everything was taken (emphasis added by S.A. Chuprynnikov) and 48 households left the village. There are 17 kulak households with 45,412 rubles of lump-sum tax. This tax was charged when the kulak households were already withdrawn; the kulaks were driven out of their homes. There is absolutely nothing to take from them now (emphasis added by S.A. Chuprynnikov) (CDNI KK. L.L. 151.152).

The village of Kalinino: 24 households fled from the village with an accrued tax of 44,360 rubles. (CDNI KK. L.L. 151.152).

Vasyurinskaya MTS: Lump-sum tax of 15,437 rubles, 6,055 rubles were collected, since the lump-sum tax was collected after the state insurance tax, self-taxation and others, there was nothing to take (there were really many taxes at that time, as in our present: -economic tax, self-taxation, cultural collection, collection on road construction, industrial tax, income tax, local tax, personal insurance, voluntary insurance, loan of the 2nd five-year plan, etc., a total of 16 items (CDNI KK. F.1222. Op.1. D.215. L.95)). Few pay voluntarily. They made an inventory of property in several farms, *everything of value was seized earlier* (emphasized by the author - S.A. Chuprynnikov) (CDNI KK. Form 1072. Op. 1. D.291. L. 152).

Comrade Nikienko, village Novomyshastovskaya: We will conduct a continuous inventory of the individual farmers. We will collect everything by 20 December 1934, which can be exacted (CDNI KK. L. 153).

Stanitsa Maryanskaya: Nothing came from the kulaks (they owe 21,650 rubles). Everything was confiscated from them (CDNI KK. L. 153).

Sabotage of collective farm construction by the population

By the mid-1930s, when the collective farms got stronger on their feet, the attitude towards the individual farmer as a supplier and executor of state orders was changing dramatically. At the bureau of the GKP (b) on 17 May 1935, it is noted,

... a significant part of them (individual farmers) evades the fulfillment of state obligations and, in fact, deceive the state by not fulfilling the established

sowing plan, refusing to commit grain deliveries, in every possible way evading meat supplies and financial payments. To take into account the message of the prosecutor, comrade Kudryavtsev, that 26 individual farms are being *held liable for failure to fulfill state obligations* (emphasis added by S.A. Chuprynnikov). Instruct comrade Kudryavtsev to prosecute the evading individual farmers of the villages of Vasyurinskaya and Maryanskaya (CDNI KK. D.534. L. 295; D.644. L.13).

Most of the collective farmers did not fulfill their state obligations. At the plenum of the GC of the CPSU (b) on 30 October 1933, it was noted,

The main reason for our lag is that out of 3 thousand people, only 127 people work in the field (!) The collective farmers who were on our collective farm in May-June dropped out (left). Out of 100% of collective farmers, only 30% can be called our collective farmers. Those whom we expel from the collective farm as the simulators for tomorrow are in another and come there to work (CDNI KK. D.318. L.13).

Another example is also indicative, which, in fact, speaks of direct sabotage on the part of the "collective farmers" themselves. On the collective farm "Red Banner", the village of Pashkovskaya 75 collective farmers worked 25 workdays for the whole year (BOLSHEVIK, 3 June 1939), and in the collective farm named after K. Liebknecht, Anapa region, 36 collective farmers did not work out a single workday during the year. On the collective farm named after the 17th Party Congress, out of 230 able-bodied collective farmers during the year, 44 people did not go to work at all, and 63 had only 50 workdays (BOLSHEVIK, 10 June 1939). In the Temryuk district of imaginary collective farmers who earned no more than 50 workdays in a year - about 2.5 thousand, and more than 400 - not a single workday (BOLSHEVIK, 4 June 1939).

As a result, by 1939, there were only 12 suburban collective farms in Krasnodar, in which there were 9 thousand people, 800 people (9%) did not have a single workday, 1800 (19%) - from 1 to 50 workdays (with a guaranteed minimum 80-100 workdays). On the whole, in the Krasnodar Territory, 29,380 collective farmers did not work out a single day, 141,293 collective farmers worked from 1 to 50 workdays, and from 50 to 100 - 97,153 (CHUPRYNNIKOV, 2013, p. 59-60).

That is, the first two groups, which are over 170 thousand people, either did not go to work at all, or went out from once a year to once a week (by today's standards, they are like, "fighters against the regime" or "saboteurs"?).

As a rule, such "collective farmers" themselves carved out land for their own farming and forgot about working on the collective farm. At the meeting of the Krasnodar city party activists on 7 June 1939, it was noted, "... in the collective farms there are a large number of

imaginary collective farmers, who either do not work at the collective farm at all, or for show. ... They join a collective farm in order to get a personal smallholding ... and as soon as they get it, they stop going to work” (CDNI KK. Form 1072. Op. 1. D.1171. L.L.7-8).

Moreover, the tone was set by the local elite, who began to "get fat" (it got to the point that the local authorities organized collective farms of their own names (CDNI KK. D.198. L.30.)) and being reborn, they became an opponent of collective farm construction, "... in the Nezamayeysky district, the chairman of the district executive committee and 60 employees of the district executive committee, the district financial department, cut out for themselves 25 hectares for melon cultivation” (CDNI KK. D.1171. L.5).

In a number of cases, the chairpersons of collective farms, collective farmers disposed of the household plots at their own discretion: they sold them, leased them, the collective farms also leased the plots. There are many facts of a fictitious division of land: some people live together but receive plots as if for two families (CDNI KK. D.1171. L.5). Therefore, collective farmer Petrenko (collective farm "Krasnoe Znamya" stanitsa Pashkovskaya) sold half of his estate for 1,500 rubles, and collective farmer I. Lugovoi from the same collective farm sold a house, an estate, and then, to the amazement of the collective farmers, he again received a personal plot (BOLSHEVIK, 29 May 1939). On the collective farm "Mirovoy Oktyabr", Labinsk District, 25 hectares of collective farmland are used by unauthorized persons. In Dubinin - 1 hectare of collective farmland, in Kosenko - more than 1 hectare, they have no workdays, and in the "collective farmer" Sentsov - more than 1 hectare, and even to weed his garden hires collective farmers (BOLSHEVIK, 4 June 1939).

Moreover, the workers, students sent to help in the same collective farms through public organizations, in particular trade unions, were treated in the ugliest way. The local population (as a rule, these are the Cossacks according to author S. A. Chuprynnikov) greeted newcomers, even workers, even former orphanages, with an extremely spiteful attitude, “used to simulate in the city, do not want to work”; “They picked you up from the bazaar, it’s not up to you to push the speech here”. So, the workers who arrived to weed and harvest vegetables at the Berezansky grain state farm, lived in "huts" like herring in a barrel, “ate soup for breakfast, soup and porridge for lunch, soup and herring for dinner. Moreover, the soup was seasoned at best with cabbage, and everything else was plundered by the service personnel. Those sick were removed from the allowance, get sick where you want” (CDNI KK. F. 1072. Op. 1. D.400. L. 15-17). In a similar situation, there were also students of Kuban Medical workers’ faculty, from the collective farm they did not get a crumb of bread; they ate bread on the cards in the city. For food they were given 200 grams of flour a day and 150 grams of unmilled barley, and the

chairman of the collective farm said, "We did not give anything and we will not give, but they will force you to work" (CDNI KK. D.348. L.29).

At the same time, the local authorities raised the issue of the shortage of labor in the collective farms, the need to import it.

To correct this situation with the aforementioned land abuses, a resolution of the GC of the CPSU (b) and the SNK of the USSR of 27 May 1939 "On measures to protect public lands of collective farms from squandering" was adopted, according to which any attempt to cut the public lands of the collective farm in favor of the collective farmers' personal use, as well as any increase in household plots in excess of the size provided for by the Charter of the agricultural cartel, began to be considered a criminal offense, and the perpetrators should be brought to justice.

Under the People's Commissariat for Land, a resettlement administration was created to provide labor for the Far East and other regions of the country. From the Krasnodar Territory, 7,680 households of individual farmers were planned for resettlement. In 1939, 1,680 households were resettled, and by 10 May 1940, out of the remaining 6,000, there were only 90 households. For those resettled from the region, the state allocated 4 thousand of timber, 16 tons of nails and issued a loan of 800 thousand rubles (BOLSHEVIK, 27 May 1940).

Local resettlement was postponed and often for far-fetched reasons, since often it was necessary to resettle either the same local "elite" or their loved ones.

Conclusion

1930s became the time of the most active, revolutionary (if by revolutionaryness we mean a radical breakdown of existing relations) socialist pressure. The Soviet regime was consolidated through its substantive activities. The restructuring of the economy is being carried out, which is becoming mobilization in its characteristics. Factories, schools, hospitals, housing were built, people received education. In agriculture, collectivization is being carried out, a tragic, but in essence strategically correct modernization of the village. The established collective farms, by the end of the 1930s became a natural and effective form of life in the countryside (by 1940 in the Krasnodar Territory there were more than 70 collective farms - millionaires (BOLSHEVIK, 17 March 1940)) and subsequently allowed to withstand the Great Patriotic War, and later to become a Great Power. No individual peasant would have provided enough bread to the warring army, through which 35 million people passed, and the rear that supported it. Moreover, at the same time, the 1930s became a continuation of the Civil War in

its "cold version". Collective farm construction, as a contradictory process (on the one hand, tragic and at the same time breakthrough), was accompanied by both crimes on the part of the authorities and sabotage of the population. Therefore, any economic, technical, organizational, household, etc. shortcomings and crimes in the process of collectivization and collective farm development immediately acquired a political connotation (component) and were qualified as "Aiding the class enemy".

If before the start of collective farm construction, the individual farmer was simply an alternative subject in the developing property relations in the agrarian sector, then after that he becomes a criminal in essence if he does not join the collective farm or, having become a collective farmer, does not work out a minimum of workdays. The state, the economic basis of which was the relations of public property and "socialist property is sacred" could not tolerate the presence of an individual farmer - an owner by definition and treated him like an enemy, that is, "Not good" (for the individual farmer, the tax system was indeed formed according to the well-known saying: everything to friends, law to enemies), but correct (according to the law). A rhetorical question can be asked, if today's state, which is based on private property relations, would tolerate collective farms.

It should be noted that the attitude of the party and state bodies to these actions was not unambiguously unanimous. Often, in the localities, the position of government agencies was radically different from that of the party. Thus, in the memorandum of the inspector of the Tikhoretskaya KK-RKI Tovstenko to the secretary of the RK VKP (b) Lyashenko in December 1932, it is noted that

Tikhoretskaya regional KK-RKI categorically prohibits a house search, and only those for whom there is material and subject to a warrant from a district policeman. There are cases when you take the last 1-2 pood. This is a perversion of the decisions of the party and government, especially in relation to the poor and farm laborers. Immediately give an explanation on what directives and permits you conduct searches from yard to yard and on what basis you bring the grain procurement plan to a collective farmer who received four poods without sowing, you give a notice for five poods or more (CDNI RO. F.7. Op. 1. D.1345. L. 59).

In addition, here is the position of party structures: The same Lyashenko writes to Sheboldaev, the secretary of the North Caucasian KK VKP (b), that he is

prevented from fighting the kulak and his "helpers" by the representatives of the authorities in the person of the prosecutor, the judge and says, We are fighting hard for bread. You have to press hard. In an open struggle, not without catching someone, although basically I think we hit the enemies, be it

a kulak or just an individual farmer who does not hand over grain or a collective farmer who also does not hand over grain to us (CDNI RO. L. 58).

In addition, the local elite began to "swim in fat" (it came to the point that the leaders of the local authorities organized collective farms of their own name (CDNI KK. F.1072. Op.1. D.198. L.30)) and they themselves became opponents of collective farm development.

Adopted in the 1930s the Soviet Party decrees on collective farm development in their substantive component, proceeding from the realities of the time and the logic of circumstances, were fundamentally correct. In addition, the collective farms themselves were the only and, as mentioned above, effective form of solving the agrarian-peasant question, and in the conditions of the Kuban, to a certain extent, the Cossack question, since they solved not only economic problems, but also the tasks of developing a single, non-class national identity.

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