ABSTRACT: This article offers a theoretical overview of the connection between accumulation and educational change in the capitalist periphery. Civilizational dynamics, educational structure, transformation, and overcoming of cultural-religious radical discontinuities in modernity are determined by "vital redundancy" localization mechanisms and human existence crisis form neutralization, possibilities of their removal in rationalization, everyday asceticism, law and "serving" science. Unlike traditional culture, where the vital energy of man was poured into religious and festive rituals (carnival acts, dances, mystical ecstasy, etc.), in the culture of modernity, "anthropological redundancy" is displaced into the asceticism of labor and sublimated into the energy of capital accumulation, including symbolic capital (knowledge, status, etc.), into mass secular art. Based on the results, there is a rigid appropriation of vital and social redundancy of human existence in production, administrative, education, military, judicial, mass-cultural and other practices.

Keywords: Traditionalism. Educational structure. Modernity. Capitalism. Rationalization.
Introduction

Behind all the modern disputes about capitalism, "modernity" and their end (WALLERSTEIN, 2008; HABERMAS, 1985; HABERMAS, 2003), its suspension and the onset of "postmodernity" or a new, "late" stage of modernity and capitalism, somehow the meanings are being forgotten and escaping from the scientific field: what is called modernity or "new age"? And what does capitalism have to do with it? The answer to these questions implies the search for identification markers of the cultural project "Modernity".

The common etymology of the word "modernity," if following its strict translation, is absurd: the Latin word "modernus" should be translated as "modern" and the English word "modernity" as "modern time" or "contemporaneousness" which means "happening now", "at the moment", "these days". Then how is it possible to apply this word to the nomination of an entire civilization (about five hundred years, as many researchers, including us, claim, identifying "modernity" with the Western European industrial capitalist civilization)? Or even only to the European technogenic epoch - two hundred years (courtesy of postmodernists, and before them according to Spengler "modernity" is calculated from the Enlightenment, from the 18th century, and ends in the early or late 20th century)?
Within the framework of the civilizational approach, which after O. Spengler and A. J. Toynbee acquired a "revival of its spirits" only by the end of the 20th century, when the discussion of modernity and postmodernity took place, the interest in the civilizational antinomy appeared: traditionalist civilizations versus technogenic civilization, a radical discontinuity of which created the situation and "time of modernity".

This discontinuity between traditional civilizations and the technogenic civilization of modernity is most clearly presented in the sociology of A. Giddens, who distinguishes and contrasts them, first of all, by the ways of presentation and organization of time: "Tradition as a means of connecting present and future; past-oriented in reversible time" vs "Future-oriented, counterfactual thought as a mode of connecting past and present" (Giddens, 2011, p. 236). Namely, in the traditionalist model of time the past "pulls" the present and the future on itself, which get stuck and "conserved" in it (conservatism of time); in the modern model of time the future "attracts" the past and the present, depriving them of stability, generates new in increasing progression (progressivism of time and culture). A. Giddens accurately points out and affirms the stereotypical, widespread among researchers distinction between "time of tradition" and "time of modernity". However, we have doubts both about the sharp contrast between tradition and modernity, and about their corresponding temporal narratives and models.

There are also doubts that "the time of tradition" and "the time of modernity" were some absolutely and abstractly identical "time-in-itself". We proceed from the fact that it is necessary to talk about the pluralism of the modern chronotope and the variety of concepts of the "time of modernity", especially since "pluralism" lies in the most profound, cultural-civilizational and cultural-mental foundations of modernity. "The time of modernity" was hardly only some abstract and "cold" time of mathematical natural science and "working time" of capitalism and "indust-reality" (A.Toffler) (MELNIK, RIMSKY, 2014), or "empty time" (DMITRIEV, 2011, P. 19). Let us try to develop and substantiate this position by solving the problem of traditionalism and modernity and the radical "discontinuity" between them.

About the radical "fractures" and "discontinuities" of modernity A. Giddens writes: "The modes of life brought into being by modernity have swept us away from all traditional types of social order, in quite unprecedented fashion. In both their extensionality and their intensionality the transformations involved in modernity are more profound than most sorts of change characteristic of prior periods. On the extensional
plane they have served to establish forms of social interconnection which span the globe; in intensional terms they have come to alter some of the most intimate and personal features of our day-to-day existence. Obviously there are continuities between the traditional and the modern, and neither is cut of whole cloth; it is well known how misleading it can be to contrast these two in too gross a fashion. But the changes occurring over the past three or four centuries—a tiny period of historical time—have been so dramatic and so comprehensive in their impact that we get only limited assistance from our knowledge of prior periods of transition in trying to interpret them (GIDDENS, 2011, p. 115). Acknowledging the "transitivity" from tradition to modernity, their certain coexistence, A. Giddens nevertheless insists on their progressive discontinuity that has reached its peak now, in the "late" or "mature" modernity.

A. Giddens focused primarily on the civilizational foundations of modernity (he writes about institutional complexes), expressing "disagreement with those classical sociologists who tried to reduce the institutional aspects of modernity to a single dimension, be it capitalism by Marx, industrialism by Durkheim, or mental rationalism by Weber" (DMITRIEV, 2011, p. 33).

He identified four institutional dimensions of modernity (Giddens, 2011, p. 177-187; Dmitriev, 2011):

1) *capitalism* as a mode of commodity production characterized by private property, wage labor and class differentiation, capital accumulation and competition in markets (on this point he clearly follows K. Marx);

2) *industrialism* as the transformation of nature and the creation of an artificial environment, the use of new, non-living energy sources and machine technology in the mass production of goods for the purpose of sale in the market and profit (here he includes electronic engineering);

3) *surveillance*, associated with the *state* and its power and administrative practices of controlling people and knowledge (including information in the "information society"), the use of political technology (following M. Foucault, he writes not just about the biopolitics of modernity, but about the transition in the "maturity" stage to *vitapolitics*);

4) *military power* as centralized and monopoly Control of the means of violence in the context of the industrialisation of war.

Note that in this case the problem of freedom, collective and individual, disappears in the concept of "reflexivity": he does not consider the latter as an institutional complex,
understanding it only as a certain personal project, aimed at man's choice of forms of identity and life styles. In principle, there is nothing new here, no matter what other philosophers and sociologists have written about, from K. Marx and M. Weber to I. Wallerstein and M. Foucault. The merit of A. Giddens is in his attempt to synthesize these "civilizational foundations" to characterize comprehensively all the stages of modernity. However, we have certain doubts.

The question arises: was the radicalism of modernity radical? Did traditionalism disappear forever from cultural space and time? As we can see, A. Giddens himself agrees with the fact that tradition is preserved in "early modernity" (it is not clear whether as a "continuity" or as a "relic"). Let us try to answer these questions using the example of religious radicalism and extremism of the modern era.

As M. Weber showed, anthropological and cultural rationalizations of various kinds are an integral part of religiosity, including those associated with radicalism, redundancy, and extremist potencies. Holding the viewpoint of his own logic of religion, he writes: "Instead of the acute and out-of-the-day, hence transient state of holiness achieved by orgy, ascesis or contemplation, a lasting and therefore salvific state was required: this was, in abstract terms, the rational goal of religion of salvation" (Weber, 1994, pp. 10-11). Since M. Weber speaks of "types of behavior" of religion adherents driven by the idea of salvation, it is not entirely clear how these ideas relate to the problem of radicalism and extremism. However, the inherent rationality of this behavior further actualizes the different nature of rationalization and the fundamental difference between the orgiastic behavior of traditionalist cultures and religions, clearly expressed in religious and carnival acts with their dance-music and ecstatic mysticism, and behavior in salvation religions. The crisis character "originally" inherent in the former must manifest itself in sacrificial radical crises, presenting a prototype of extremism. The excessiveness of the sacred exceeds the possibilities of the sacrifice sublimation mechanism.

Religions of "salvation," to use M. Weber's notion, use a fundamentally different mechanism of absorbing excess, in a certain sense sacralizing everyday life, forcing crisis, a strictly regulated, programmed "failure" of the excluding violence mechanism into the space of life itself, thus making it increasingly less extraordinary and giving some scope for human freedom. Despite the fact that M. Weber writes about the difference between orgiastic religions and salvation religions in their rejection of the world, the idea of sublimation exposes the essence of the violence exclusion, its normalization and codification. The basis remains the same: the exclusion of violence out of a community formed on the
principle of faith. The transition from an ecstatic sublimation of redundancy to a "rationalist" one is an important point in the study of the forms that preceded modern extremism.

Exploring the relationship between religious ethics and human behavior, M. Weber both uses and criticizes F. Nietzsche's ideas about resentment, where the thirst for power gives rise to religious feeling. He writes that unsatisfied feelings of revenge, underlying resentment can give rise to certain feelings, but the motives for religious behavior are somewhat different. Guilt, suffering, are feelings that follow or accompany the phenomena we study, such as exclusion, sacrificial offering, and extremism. The parallel we draw is direct, we are talking about the forms that precede extremism, and suffering is the experience that fills these forms. Here the understanding of suffering changes significantly. Weber associates this transition with the "rationalization" of religious behavior, the transition to a new religiosity. It is replaced by a different mechanism, about which M. Weber writes the following: "... more complicated are the paths that lead to the opposite understanding, the religious enlightenment of suffering. First of all, the experience played a role here, according to which the charisma of the ecstatic, visionary, hysterical, generally non-daily state, recognized as 'sacred' and arising under the action of magical ascesis, was awakened or at any rate more easily induced through various kinds of self-mutilation - abstinence from food, sleep and sexual relations" (Weber, 1994, p. 47) - these kinds of restrictions were a significantly new mechanism.

The mechanism that emerged worked not only for the individual himself, but also for others forced to turn to the bearer of "enlightened suffering," the ascetic, to sublimate their own excesses: "Thus the institution of the religious community, connected with individual "suffering" and "deliverance" from it, emerged. Prophecy and promises were naturally addressed to the mass of those who needed salvation... The typical activity of magicians and priests at this stage was reduced to establishing the guilt that caused suffering, to demanding repentance of "sins", i.e. primarily the violation of ritual injunctions, and instructions on how to eliminate suffering" (Weber, 1994, pp. 47-48). Thus redundancy is encoded into suffering and then into guilt when it is transferred to the inner plane. The magician or ecclesiastic, who, according to Weber, acquire the function of establishing guilt, closely approaches the sphere of law, since the establishment of guilt and its very understanding belong to law. To find guilt, to find it in another, is one of the functions of the clergyman, as is the elimination of guilt, albeit partial and temporary.

Suffering is transformed into guilt. A peculiar interiorization of the victim takes place, not external, but the person himself becomes the bearer of guilt. The institution of sacrifice undergoes an equally significant change. The radical transcendence of the object of
redundancy replaces the real sacrifice with a symbolic one. Henceforth, both the extremists themselves, or the forms that preceded them, and their opponents in the rhetoric of the extremists, are invariably removed from the objective world and extremely symbolized. The religiously motivated extremist fights not against a concrete, real phenomenon or individual or group, but against extremely idealized objects such as world evil, sin, etc.

Obviously, in the New Age the practices of redundancy sublimation undergo changes. Here man's energy, his activity, previously aimed at achieving transcendent goals, changes its localization. The contradiction of the medieval model, splitting man between the world of the earthly and the heavenly, finds resolution in the Protestant model of the everyday life and labor sacralization: "... the passion for profit is also a passion, and its similarity to religious asceticism is that it is anti-natural. It is continuative of the spirit of early Christianity, weakened in Catholicism. In both, earthly pleasures and goods are forbidden - those that pass through the hands of the entrepreneur every day. But he does not leave the world, but subjects himself to an uninterrupted fast among groups of wealth" (Shkuratov, 1997, p. 299). Hence the stricter ethics and regulation of life, which is the strengthening of LAW. The asceticism of the Middle Ages is replaced by earthly ascesis.

And this at that point in time is nominated as excessive, if you will, as religious radicalism and extremism. It is sufficient to recall the history of many Protestant communities and movements of the time, which from the perspective of modernity are seen as more than extremist, if not terrorist in spirit and practice. Although the actions of traditional institutional Catholicism also fall under the rubric of religious extremism. The high moon of the Inquisition, both Catholic and Protestant, falls precisely in the 16th-17th centuries.

The new practices are more individualized and the essential new thing that appears in them is a shift in emphasis from mystical experience (the rational as auxiliary) to the rational (the birth of empiricism and rationalism). The law takes on the meaning of naturalness, the divine law is identical with the natural law. M. Foucault writes about this in his study of the security idea in modern times, drawing our attention to the fact that it is in Europe that the phenomenon of political population management appears (Foucault, 2011, p. 74). This is a qualitative change, according to M. Foucault, which united under the name of the "security" concept a number of practices, also redundancy localization tools, tools of rationing. Though by "norm" various things can be understood, rationing itself remains localization, exclusion of the determined excess.

Despite the contradictory nature of this process (let's not forget the religious wars of this period), the sanctification of profane activity leads to the expansionist orientation of
Europeans in this period. Traditionalism's self-absorption, which directed activity *inward*, is replaced by an *outward* orientation. This principle is at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism as a whole can also be viewed as a self-sufficient and independent form of absorbing excess human energy. Of course, we are talking about early capitalism, when the Protestant work ethic looped all possible human energies in the Marx scheme "commodity – money – commodity - money". We only need to modify this scheme a bit, since we should say that by commodity we mean its production, which involves the expenditure of human effort, while capital means crystallized labor or estranged labor, which is transformed into greater expenditure of effort. As we can see, K. Marx quite accurately described the strategy of eliminating possible redundancies, only freeing them from the religious component. Combined with the ideas of M. Weber, which clarify this point, the deeply *quasi-religious* character of capitalism as a set of redundancy sublimation practices becomes clear.

It is also clear that early capitalism itself can be considered redundant, i.e. extreme, with the only correction being that it was legitimized. Perhaps the best example to illustrate our thesis would be to turn to the French Revolution of 1789-1794, when the struggle of the bourgeoisie for its rights gave rise to rationalized forms of religion, like the new Jacobin religion, involving terrorist practices, more than radical and extremist methods of government and ways of exercising power. This revolution can be considered the most exemplary because it vividly demonstrated the relationship between violence and law, religion and rationalization.

The development of redundancy use and control mechanisms is realized in its rigid appropriation in production, administrative, military, judicial and other practices, up to mass culture. As an example, let us turn to the work of M. Foucault, "Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason", where he showed that already in the New Age the disposition of *rationing practices* significantly changes, when the religious component is obscured and replaced by the "objectivist" *discourse of science* (let us add - and *art*, which before that did not exist as it is). Thus the leper as a sacral figure of the outcast concentrating the "wrath of God" on himself is replaced by the sick with venereal diseases and further by the insane (Foucault, 2010, p. 30). Insanity is a fragment of the holistic system of exclusion that is taking shape in the Classical period along with the disciplinary practices of the panopticon, the rationing of urban space, the reform of medicine, etc. Sexuality is also included in this system of regulation (Foucault, 2010, p. 25). In this way Foucault approaches the notion of biopower, a power which operates with natural categories, formats space and makes the human body its subject. There is a *desymbolization of man*, his reduction to *bios,*
"naked life" about which G. Agamben speaks (Agamben, 2011). Is the sacred preserved as belonging to mechanisms of exclusion? Certainly yes, because the other pole will be all those mechanisms of everyday life sacralization followed by numerous Protestant sects with their exalted religiosity.

The "internal mechanism" we have described so to speak does not exclude an "external" one, namely the active expansion of capitalism with the rationalized goal of fighting for raw materials and markets. If we analyze this manifestation of capitalism autonomously, out of the general context, then we will find only the economic background of capital expansion, the logic of an economic system in need of resources for self-reproduction. But considering the above, deciphering capital as estranged labor, i.e. human strength and energy, as well as the sacralized nature of capitalism as a whole, we should recognize the expansion of capitalism as one of the ways of eliminating redundancy. The redundancy appears no longer in the immediate form of aggression removed in the ritual of sacrifice, not in the form of desire removed in the paroxysm of celebration, but in the removed labor-capital.

Perhaps today, more than ever, this side of capitalism becomes apparent, when the displaced redundancy of Western European civilization and the most economically developed countries is realized in the rest of the world in a conflictual way: "peacekeeping operations" to maintain "democracy," "color revolutions," wars of various kinds. What is more indicative is the support of religious extremism and terrorist organizations, that is, the displaced redundancy finds adequate forms outside: the energy of capital is converted into the energy of extremist movements, as global as capital itself.

We discover the presence and significance in the cultural identification of the "civilization of time" not only as such "modern" structures and cultural markers, but also "premodern", traditionalist ones, which go nowhere and never "go away", are not simply appropriated as inherited traditions, but are reproduced as new "traditions of modernity". Simultaneously, modernity as a cultural project produces "non-modern" and "post-modern" temporal structures and practices as its own and appropriates them as property and cultural capital. Modernity itself as a cultural and civilizational system constantly assumed in its foundations the negation of the past, affirmation of the present and projection of the future, which often acquired in their collision the form of its own negation of modernity (modern nihilism, radicalism and extremism).
References


