

**INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE OPERATION OF THE AMÉRICO BRASILIENSE CITY HALL BASED ON DRAFT LAWS (2010-2018)**

***INSTITUIÇÕES INFORMAIS E PODER LOCAL: O FUNCIONAMENTO DA CÂMARA MUNICIPAL DE AMÉRICO BRASILIENSE A PARTIR DOS PROJETOS DE LEI (2010-2018)***

***INSTITUCIONES INFORMALES Y PODER LOCAL: EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DEL AYUNTAMIENTO DE AMÉRICO BRASILIENSE BASADO EN LOS PROYECTOS DE LEY (2010-2018)***

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**ABSTRACT:** This work aims to analyze the political-institutional variables that guide the behavior of the councilors in the Municipality of Américo Brasiliense - SP and the relationship between Legislative and Executive at the local level. The theoretical model used emphasizes the role of informal rules and institutions in decision-making processes that regulate political practice, that is, those that guide and constrain the behavior of agents, although they are not formally instituted. The projects considered were the individual parliamentary amendments of the councilors, which figure as an informal institution from which the councilman seeks to meet a specific demand from the electorate and, in return, approaches the agenda proposed by the Executive. The results point in the direction of a complementary relationship between formal and informal institutions - that is, relationships that increase the efficiency of legislative activities -, in view of the increasing role of parliamentary amendments as the main action tools of councilors.

**KEYWORDS:** Informal institutions. Legislative studies. Américo Brasiliense. Individual parliamentary amendments.

**RESUMO:** *Este trabalho objetiva analisar as variáveis político-institucionais que orientam o comportamento dos vereadores na Câmara Municipal de Américo Brasiliense – SP e a relação entre Legislativo e Executivo no âmbito local. O modelo teórico utilizado enfatiza o papel das regras e instituições informais dos processos decisórios que regulam a prática política, isto é, aquelas que orientam e constroem o comportamento dos agentes, embora não se encontrem formalmente instituídas. Os projetos considerados foram as emendas parlamentares individuais dos vereadores, que figuram como uma instituição informal a partir da qual o vereador procura atender a uma demanda específica do eleitorado e, em troca, aproxima-se da agenda proposta pelo Executivo. Os resultados apontam na direção de uma relação de complementaridade entre instituições formais e informais – isto é, relações que aumentem a eficiência das atividades legislativas –, tendo em vista o crescente protagonismo das emendas parlamentares como principais ferramentas de ação dos vereadores.*

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**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Instituições informais. Estudos legislativos. Américo Brasiliense. Emendas parlamentares individuais.*

**RESUMEN:** *El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las variables político-institucionales que guían el comportamiento de los concejales en el Municipio de Américo Brasiliense - SP y la relación entre Legislativo y Ejecutivo a nivel local. El modelo teórico utilizado enfatiza el papel de las reglas e instituciones informales en los procesos de toma de decisiones que regulan la práctica política, es decir, aquellos que guían y limitan el comportamiento de los agentes, aunque no están formalmente instituidos. Los proyectos considerados fueron las enmiendas parlamentarias individuales de los concejales, que figuran como una institución informal desde la cual el concejal busca satisfacer una demanda específica del electorado y, a cambio, se acerca a la agenda propuesta por el Ejecutivo. Los resultados apuntan en la dirección de una relación complementaria entre las instituciones formales e informales, es decir, las relaciones que aumentan la eficiencia de las actividades legislativas, en vista del papel cada vez mayor de las enmiendas parlamentarias como las principales herramientas de acción de los consejeros.*

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** *Instituciones informales. Estudios legislativos. Américo Brasiliense. Enmiendas parlamentarias individuales.*

## Introduction

This research is a continuation of the previous year's research, also financed by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), with the objective of understanding the political-institutional variables that guide the functioning of the Legislative branch at the local level.

The previous survey had the period from 01 January 2013 to 31 December 2016, referring to a single government administration of Américo Brasiliense. In this new research, the clipping was extended from 01 January 2010 to 31 December 2018. Another change was the theoretical model applied in the case study, in view of the difficulties of the model previously used to explain some important issues of the functioning of the City Council.

First, the specialized literature on the subject was selected in order to obtain a better basis on the subject, as well as to understand the methods and instruments necessary for the analysis of the object of study. Then, the bills approved in the period, the Organic Law of the Municipality and the Internal Regulations of the Chamber were collected, in order to know the institutionalized rules that allow and limit the performance of agents in the political system.

The current theoretical model, however, emphasizes the weight of informal rules in decision-making procedures, that is, the conduct agreed upon by political practice that also influences the action capacity of the parties involved. Our hypothesis is that the informal rules

are significant during the City Council proceedings, with a complementary relationship between them and the rules formally instituted. This means that the coexistence between the two types of rules allows an efficient relationship from the political point of view, both within the City Council and in the relationship between the two powers.

This work intends, from the case study, to contribute to the deepening of legislative studies at the local level, fostering the debate on the role of institutions and informal rules of the political game, as well as providing material for new studies in this area that emphasize new variables, such as the profile of local elites, the size of the municipality, the heterogeneity of the electorate, among others.

### **Legislative studies in Brazil**

At least since the end of the 20th century, legislative and institutional studies have been the focus of contemporary Political Science. In view of the unprecedented democratization process that took place in the period 1990-2015, the demand for knowledge about the political-institutional pillars that make the functioning of representative democracy viable has also grown intensely (LEVITSKY; ZIBLATT, 2018).

Within this context, Brazil had its first major contributions in the scope of legislative studies in the late 1990s, paving the way for the debate between the neo-institutionalist theoretical models that best explain the decision-making procedures in the beginning of the following decade, such as Limongi and Figueiredo (2001) and Ames (2003). Over time, institutional and legislative analyzes have been extended to state spheres of power and have recently turned to the municipality as an object of study.

Until the military regime, local power was interpreted from the perspective of *coronelismo* and personal vote, in which the figure of the colonel<sup>2</sup> assumed the role of mediator of his voters with the state and federal public power. In this model, large rural properties are considered determinants in the voting process and in the political-party structure of Brazilian democracy, although they have already shown signs of exhaustion (LEAL, 2012).

Such signs were linked to the reformulation of the national territory. During that same period, Brazil went from being mostly rural to a mostly urban nation. This accelerated reconfiguration had important socioeconomic consequences, increasing the role of large cities

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<sup>2</sup> Landowner.

in the economy and bringing new social agents, who started to influence the electorate previously dominated by *coronelismo*.

According to Kerbaux (2016), the elections of 1982 marked the end of local *coronelismo* and rule in its traditional sense. This is because the military government bet on the colonels' ability to direct the votes of families at the municipal level, thus maintaining the "old political alignments"; what was seen, however, was the significant victory of the opposition in the prefectures of the state of São Paulo, which elected 310 of the 572 possible prefectures.

The enactment of the 1988 Constitution brought new political and administrative prerogatives and functions, such as greater autonomy for states and municipalities and the strengthening of the national legislature. The process of democratic consolidation increased the demand for legislative studies capable of encompassing the main political-institutional agents and mechanisms of Brazilian democracy, including innovations in the institutional design of municipalities.

### **The limitations of the party model**

In the previous research, the model used to analyze the local decision-making procedures was the neo-institutionalism of the party version, idealized by Limongi (1994) when looking at federal legislative studies. Opposing the literature that points to the weakness of the parties in guiding the votes of their parliamentarians and the role of the internal commissions, it is emphasized that the political parties have an important role as mediator of the votes, articulating the votes of their deputies with the proposals of the Executive.

The party version was defended and applied by Figueiredo and Limongi (2001), in which the authors sought to understand the decision-making processes at the Brazilian federal level. Having control of the budgetary agenda and relying on the high level of party discipline on the part of parliamentarians - that is, the party's ability to guide the vote of deputies that belong to the party - the Executive appears in the political system as preponderant in the legislative agenda. This relationship was observed from the interpretation of the formalized rules of the game, understood as those that are taken into account by the agents involved in making their decisions.

Since the municipality was a federative entity since the 1988 Constitution, federal rules and legislation were brought into local politics. Thus, it would be possible to start from the hypothesis that the same relations observed at the federal level would be found in local institutions:

The constitutional rules that convey the principles of the legislative process are binding on the three spheres of government. Except for the mechanism of the provisional measure, the legal framework that governs the municipality is basically the same as that identified at the federal level. In relation to the private powers of the Executive and Legislative, organic laws are under the framework of the Federal Constitution. In this way, the mayor is delegated the same arsenal as the Presidency has to dictate the legislative process. The hypothesis drawn here is that there is a strong preponderance of the Executive in the formulation and approval of the legislative work agenda. To see its agenda approved, the Executive must set up a party coalition government, bringing to its support base from a series of parties, which will support the government in approving its legislative agenda. Thus, the main hypothesis of the work is linked to the partisan model of the relationship between the powers (CAETANO, 2005, p. 105, our translation).

Like Caetano (2005), the first research sought to apply the party model to the local level. However, the existence of the same formal rules does not imply their effectiveness in political practice. Although the institutional mechanisms that allow party leaders to guide the behavior of parliamentarians are provided for in the legislation, in the case of Américo Brasiliense, those leaders did not figure as active in decision-making processes.

Another factor that drew attention was the high capacity of the Executive to create consensus in the City Council despite the low partisan performance. In the absence of parties as mediators of interests between parliamentarians and the Executive, the model finds limitations in explaining the occurrence of such consensus.

### **Informal rules and institutions**

Considering the limitations of the model previously applied, the present research was centered on the role of informal institutions in the political game, that is, those that are not official or instituted, which can be defined as

expressions about the way in which relationships have been carried out - and continue to be carried out - within a society. Thus, they constitute modes that collect the history and culture of entire communities and are condensed into codes of conduct, social norms and conventions that are established not tacitly but over time and take shape and meaning within the framework of uses and customs prevailing in the society (ROCHA, 2006, p. 04, our translation).

Rocha's definition is quite broad, since “codes of conduct”, “social norms” and “conventions” established over a long period of time by customs, can be identified and analyzed in different groups of social interaction. It must be emphasized that the concept of informal institutions should not be taken as a synonym for culture. Thus, it is necessary to establish the relevance and specificities of those institutions with regard to the understanding of political

institutions, as well as to compare their impact in relation to the established rules, which have long been considered as decisive in decision-making processes. In this way, informal institutions

[...] they are a relevant source of behavioral expressions and not a simple complement - or, on the contrary, a residue - of the 24 formal institutions. This means that even when formal limitations prescribe individual behavior, in the sense that they regulate it and, with this, it is possible to know what the expected behaviors may be, in human interactions there is always an area that is not covered by them. Human behavior, and particularly political behavior, is so complex that you expect to see it embodied in some formulations. If this were the case, in societies that share similar formal institutions, the same results should be observed, but the truth is that institutional products can vary and differ considerably (ROCHA, 2006, p. 04, our translation).

The author further argues that, compared to formalized rules, informal institutions are of equal importance, in view of the complexity of human and political behavior, which could hardly be reduced to a set of formulations previously placed. If so, political behavior would be expected to be the same in different contexts as long as the rules are the same, but what is observed is the considerable variety of behavior even under such conditions.

Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define the concept of institution as “rules and procedures (formal and informal) constraining and allowing the action of the actors” involved, a definition considered standard for the term, and then differentiating formal from informal institutions:

We define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official. This includes state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations), but also what Robert C. Ellickson calls "organization rules," or the official rules that govern organizations such as corporations, political parties, and interest groups. Distinguishing between formal and informal institutions, however, is only half the conceptual task. "Informal institution" is often treated as a residual category, in the sense that it can be applied to virtually any behavior that departs from, or is not accounted for by, the written-down rules (HELMKE; LEVITSKY, 2004, p. 727).

However, the distinction between formal and informal institutions is not consensual and it is often understood as “informal” everything that is not explicitly represented in the formally instituted rules, confusing it with weak rules, corruption or simply culture. Thus, the authors propose four basic differentiations in order to make the concept more precise.

The first is that informal institutions should not be confused with weak formal institutions. This is because ineffective institutions do not necessarily imply the existence of

informal institutions; the rules may simply not exist or have been institutionalized in an inefficient way, opening space for unwanted behaviors and procedures, such as clientelism or the abuse of power by the Executive (HELMKE; LEVITSKY, p. 727).

The second distinction is related to the tendency to consider any regular and informal behavior as signs of the existence of informal institutions. Such institutions can only be found based on informal and regular behaviors that, if not met, imply some level of "external punishment". If the informal action does not present any counterpart that constrains it, it cannot be treated as an informal institution. The third distinction proposed is between informal institutions and informal organizations. In the authors' view, it is useful to differentiate the rules of the actors involved.

The fourth and final distinction is in relation to the concept of culture. Although the authors recognize that informal institutions can be created and transmitted through culture, the latter is always treated as a shared network of corporate values. Informal institutions, from the authors' point of view, should be understood more through the sharing of expectations, expectations that may or may not be rooted in culture (HELMKE; LEVITSKY, 2004, p. 728).

By specifying the concept of informal institutions, the authors contribute to the dissociation between that concept and political or institutional inefficiency. The direct implication of this contribution is that the articulation between the formal and the informal defines the type of behavior expected in the institutions to be analyzed. In other words, informal and formal institutions can converge for both good and bad decision-making.

**Table 1** – Typology of informal institutions

<b>Results</b>	<b>Effective informal institutions</b>	<b>Ineffective informal institutions</b>
<b>Convergent</b>	Complementary	Substitutive
<b>Divergent</b>	Accommodative	Competitive

Source: Helmke e Levitsky (2004, p. 728)

In order to classify the different combinations between informal and formal institutions, it is necessary to compare them with the degree of convergence or divergence between them. Informal institutions are understood as *complementary* to those that, when put into practice, facilitate political procedures, in order to guarantee the achievement of the results expected by the written rules. Complementary convergence tends to be positive in the foundation of new institutions, creating or increasing incentives for the practice of rules that only exist on paper (HELMKE; LEVITSKY, 2004, p. 728).

Informal *accommodative* institutions are expected when informal institutions encourage results that substantially alter the effect of formalized rules, but without violating them; formal rules are contradicted in spirit, but not in their content (HELMKE; LEVITSKY, p. 729). In these two cases, formal institutions function effectively.

When the expected results are divergent and formal institutions are ineffective, there are *competitive* informal institutions. That is, they are institutions incompatible with the formalized rules, making it necessary, in order for one of the rules to be followed, to violate the other (HELMKE; LEVITSKY, p. 729). The most worked examples by contemporary Political Science are clientelism, patrimonialism and corruption, being more found in countries that have gone through a decolonization process.

Finally, *substitutive* informal institutions are those in which formal institutions are ineffective, but share the same results. Like complementary informal institutions, substitutive ones seek a convergence of results with formal institutions, but they gain space where formal rules are not reinforced and disseminated, like competitive institutions (HELMKE; LEVITSKY p. 729). Such institutions tend to appear where the state structure is weak, in the sense of not having the proper authority.

Martins and Kerbaury (2018), when analyzing the behavior of the Executive and Legislative, in the municipality of São Carlos - SP, make use of informal institutions to understand it. To this end, the authors analyze parliamentary amendments, understood “as an informal rule that focuses on political exchanges, the behavior of councilors and the legislative process in the municipality of São Carlos - SP” (MARTINS; KERBAUY, 2018, our translation). The low number of studies related to the local sphere, in this perspective, opted for the case study.

Generally, studies that focus on the relationship between powers address “portfolio distribution and political appointments as a resource for coalition management” (MARTINS; KERBAUY, 2018, our translation). On the other hand, in the case of the municipality,

[...] depending on his size and electoral magnitude, sometimes the councilor is the only representative of his party, so the party may not exercise effective legislative coordination. Thus, parliamentary amendments that are individual provisions can condition behaviors, meeting the specific interests of councilors. This does not mean that the distribution of positions - recognized as formal rules - does not have significant weight at the local level; but it is important to pay attention to other devices (MARTINS; KERBAUY, 2018, p. 14).



The study by Martins and Kerbauy, when turning to the local sphere, analyzes the role of the informal institution with an impact on political behavior as important as the properly formalized rules. The present work hopes to contribute to the creation of more material on this subject, so, in the future, studies can analyze the impact of informal institutions on local power from a comparative point of view.

### **Informal rules and parliamentary amendments**

As previously stated, the data referring to projects approved between 01 January 2010 and 31 December 2018 allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the procedures of legislative activities. In table 2, the approved projects were classified according to the authorship and type of law. 243 legislative matters were recorded, 193 of which are Ordinary Laws, 36 Complementary Laws, 2 Organic Laws and 14 Resolutions. The official data of the Municipality of Américo Brasiliense are not released in a standardized manner, which made it impossible to recognize the authors and vote by the councilors of the projects approved between 2010 and 2012:

**Table 2** – Bills approved by authorship and type (2013-2018)

	Ordinary	Complementary	Organic	Resolution
Municipal Executive	143	28	2	-
Councilors	48	1	-	-
Board of Directors	2	7	-	14
	193	36	2	14

Source: City Council’s website<sup>3</sup>

From this first list of data, it is possible to note the preponderance of the Executive over legislative activity, both in Ordinary Laws (74.8%) and in Complementary Laws (77.7%). However, these numbers are not sufficient to suggest a conflicting relationship between the Executive and the Legislative, in the sense that parliamentary action is being guided by threats or possible sanctions from the Executive. It is important to note that the data suggest that the activity of parliamentarians is almost entirely centered on the projects of Ordinary Law, representing 24.08% of the total of Ordinary Laws approved.

<sup>3</sup> Available: <http://www.camaraamericobrasiliense.sp.gov.br/>. Access: 29 June 2020.

Individual parliamentary amendments consist of “transferring funds to municipal entities”, which can have different purposes, aiming to meet the multiple demands of the electoral bases of the councilors (KERBAUY; MARTINS, 2018, p. 15). Thus, the legislative matters coming from the councilors were classified according to their purpose, in order to identify the amendments among such projects.

In the table below, parliamentary amendments were classified according to the content stated. The “Others” category includes projects whose contents were private, that is, they did not present any thematic similarity with any other project (18.7%). The projects were divided into two different periods, 2013-2016 and 2017-2018, as significant changes were found in the predominant contents of the approved legislative matters:

**Table 3 – Amendments sorted by content (2013-2018)**

Content/Theme	2013-2016	2017-2018
<b>Public streets designation</b>	17	1
<b>Denomination of Municipal Public Property</b>	6	3
<b>Amendment/ repeal of law texts</b>	1	4
<b>Institution of events/programs</b>	1	6
<b>Others</b>	6	3
<b>Total</b>	31	17

Source: City Council’s website

### **Amendments as informal rules**

Looking at Table 3, it is noted that, in the period 2013-2016, the legislative activity in Américo Brasiliense was predominantly marked by projects that dealt with the designation of public roads or Municipal Public Properties, plus one - which is represented in “Others”-, referring to the denomination of a local square. Altogether, such activities represent 77.4% of the projects of the period, a finding that seems to confirm the “common sense” of the specialized literature, which treated the municipality as an environment of “parochial” decisions (CAETANO, 2005, p. 102).

The period 2017-2018, in relation to the previous years considered for this research, presents a greater precision with regard to the systematization of the official data of the City Council. It is important to highlight that, in the same period, there is a significant increase in

the number of legislative matters approved, when compared to previous years. In 2013-2016, the total was 119 projects, whereas in 2017-2018 - therefore, half the duration of the previous period - 126 projects were counted.

However, in the 2017-2018 period, projects on the designation of public roads decrease dramatically, appearing only once. On the other hand, there was a significant increase in the number of projects that involved alteration or repeal of texts of law and mainly the institution of events/programs of different categories, such as cultural, assistance, sports, awareness and entertainment events.

The latter (amendments referring to the institution of events/programs) tend to be in accordance with the demands of specific groups in the municipality, all sent by councilors and approved as Ordinary Laws. It can be noted, therefore, that, in the period under analysis, parliamentary amendments begin to gain space in legislative matters. Thus, individual amendments, along with changes and repeals of the law, have proved to be the main activity of councilors in terms of project approval.

Of the projects sent by the councilors who had their respective votes available, the vast majority were approved unanimously in the Chamber, 97.5%. Although the possibility for party benches to intervene in the political process is established, the decisions seem to have followed paths agreed by the councilors and mayors themselves, with no evidence of a significant intervention by party legends.

### **Complementary informal institutions**

As Kerbauy and Martins (2018) point out, municipalities of small electoral magnitude generally have low participation of the subtitles - as is the case of Américo Brasiliense -, since the councilors may be the only representatives of their parties (KERBAUY; MARTINS, 2018, p. 14). In this context, parliamentary amendments may appear as important tools through which councilors guide their behavior, approaching the municipal executive and seeking to meet the demands of specific groups that make up the electorate.

Following the typology proposed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), the research points to a possible complementary relationship between the formal and informal rules of decision-making processes, since parliamentary amendments do not violate any established rule and seem to converge to the results expected by formal institutions, favoring the efficiency of decision-making processes.

Although not written, the amendments appear as an informal rule that allows approximation with the Executive's proposals, in a context of increasing the number of legislative matters - mainly in the period 2017-2018 - and of changing the content of the projects. Such content has gone from matters predominantly referring to official names to matters that deal with changes or repeal of laws and mainly about the creation or officialization of events and programs for specific groups and purposes.

In the case of a change that seems to have gained strength in the last two years, it is difficult to say that parliamentary amendments have already consolidated themselves as an indispensable mechanism for the progress of decision-making processes, as in the case of São Carlos analyzed by Kerbauy and Martins (2018). Anyway, taking them into account, as well as any other informal institutions that may be identified, is necessary, so that it is possible to understand more precisely the behaviors of the actors and rules that effectively constrain and guide them.

### **Final considerations**

Starting from the bills approved in the 2013-2016 period, the previous research sought to analyze the variables that guide the behavior of the actors involved in the legislative activities of Américo Brasiliense. In this first data collection, the theoretical model used was the one proposed by Limongi and Figueiredo (2001), who defended the Executive's preponderance in legislative matters when considering the political-institutional mechanisms formalized in the Internal Regulation and the Municipal Organic Law as forms of constrain the behavior of parliamentarians, such as the possibility of asking for the Urgency Request and control over the budgetary agenda.

With these rules in place, party leaders would appear as important figures to guide the behavior of their parliamentarians and in negotiations with the executive branch. However, two notes are necessary: 1) The model was originally created for the analysis of the federal sphere; simply applying it to the municipality without paying attention to the specificities of the latter could weaken the analysis, as, as pointed out by Martins (2015) and Kerbauy (2014). The profile of local elites, regional variations and the magnitude of the electorate influence the progress of the political system. Although the rules instituted in the municipality were similar to the rules at the federal level, their application did not occur in the same way. As Rocha (2006) puts it, the mere existence of equal rules in different contexts does not imply equal results and behaviors.

In the case of Américo Brasiliense, party leaders exercised little influence over their councilors; decisions were made in a direct relationship between parliamentarians and the municipality City Hall. During this process, the voting of legislative matters was unanimous in the majority of times, suggesting an approximation between the actors involved. Bringing informal rules as variables to be observed opened up new possibilities for explaining decision-making processes in this context, since the political-institutional mechanisms that benefit the Executive and the captions were not put into practice.

The period between 2016 and 2018 suggests a change in the types of proposals that passed through the Chamber. As analyzed in section 4, there was an increase in the number of legislative matters to be voted on and a significant change in the content on which the matters dealt. Legislative work was markedly marked by the name of public roads and Public Ownership until 2016, but, from this period on, these denominations fell dramatically.

Councilors began to send amendments to programmatic content, such as altering or repealing legal texts and making cultural events official, events that tend to be of interest to specific groups within the electorate. Thus, the analysis suggests that parliamentary amendments begin to gain space in the municipality's legislative activity as a way of bringing the powers together.

This research, being a case study, does not intend to cover all relevant variables for the analysis of the behavior of local politicians. Although the data in this case study point in the direction of complementarity between formal and informal rules, more comparative studies are needed that seek to qualify the impact of informal rules on the political game.

There are other important variables that guide the performance of those rules, such as the socioeconomic characteristics of each municipality (KERBAUY, 2014), the profile of local political elites (MARTINS, 2015), the magnitude of the electorate (KERBAUY; MARTINS 2018) and the composition of the City Council, which varies with each electoral period. We hope to contribute to this discussion, providing data for future research that can cover these variables and deepen the knowledge about the functioning of municipal policy.

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