ABSTRACT: The article aims to situate the debate drawn within the theoretical field of Critical Theory between Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, in view of their main publications in the 1990s. Since the critical model formulated by Jürgen Habermas, Critical Theory has come to place a greater emphasis in the questions involving normative political theory, focusing on the new social movements that emerged after May 1968. In this sense, Honneth and Fraser present new contributions to this discussion, with a view to formulating new normative proposals. Thus, based on a qualitative bibliographic analysis of the proposed texts, we will focus the exposition on the concepts of recognition and redistribution in order to understand the importance of the main questions posed by the authors.


RESUMO: O artigo objetiva situar o debate inserido no campo teórico da Teoria Crítica entre Axel Honneth e Nancy Fraser, tendo em vista suas principais publicações na década de 1990. Desde o modelo crítico formulado por Jürgen Habermas, a Teoria Crítica passou a dar uma ênfase maior às questões envolvendo a teoria política normativa, com foco nos novos movimentos sociais que surgiram após o maio de 1968. Nesse sentido, Honneth e Fraser apresentam novas contribuições para esta discussão, com vista à formulação de novas propostas normativas. Desse modo, a partir de uma análise qualitativa bibliográfica dos textos propostos, centraremos a exposição em torno dos conceitos de reconhecimento e redistribuição a fim de compreender a importância das principais questões postas pelos autores.


RESUMEN: El artículo tiene como objetivo situar el debate elaborado dentro del campo teórico de la Teoría Crítica entre Axel Honneth y Nancy Fraser, a la vista de sus principales publicaciones en la década de 1990. Desde el modelo crítico formulado por Jürgen Habermas, la Teoría Crítica ha pasado a poner un mayor énfasis las preguntas que involucran la teoría política normativa, enfocándose en los nuevos movimientos sociales surgidos después de mayo de 1968. En este sentido, Honneth y Fraser presentan nuevos
aportes a esta discusión, con miras a formular nuevas propuestas normativas. Así, a partir de un análisis bibliográfico cualitativo de los textos propuestos, centraremos la exposición en torno a los conceptos de reconocimiento y redistribución con el fin de comprender la importancia de las principales cuestiones planteadas por los autores.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** Teoría crítica. Reconocimiento. Redistribución.

**Introduction**

Since Habermas (2000; 2012) sought to go beyond the first generation of Critical Theory by proposing the idea of a communicative reason, pointing to the limits of the critique of reason operated by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1985), social philosophy started to embark on it through the field of normative political theory, seeking to offer answers to its historical time, through the strength that the new social movements have acquired in the public sphere. In this sense, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser drew up a fundamental debate in an attempt to contribute to the new social struggles that emerged in this period, having the terms recognition and redistribution as their central axis.

Contextualizing the importance of this debate within Political Theory and Critical Theory itself, this article aims to expose and explain some fundamental points outlined by both authors, in order to reflect the relevance that the concepts of recognition and redistribution have obtained in contemporary public debate. For this undertaking, we will carry out a qualitative bibliographic analysis, having as main reference the book *Fight for recognition*, work in which Honneth embodies the concept of recognition for the first time, and the text “Redistribución y Reconocimiento”, in which Fraser summarizes his main criticisms to the notion of recognition and proposes its reconciliation with the struggles for redistribution.

**The struggle for recognition in Axel Honneth**

Axel Honneth rescues the centrality of political philosophy as a science capable of developing knowledge that can effectively understand the new social struggles that were developing within increasingly complex, tensioned and plural societies. In his work entitled *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, arising from his thesis of free teaching, the author undertakes a cognitive effort in an attempt to articulate theory and empirical reality, since, in the social reality in which he was inserted, new struggles for recognition were manifested, which placed the author in the face of the need to elaborate a
critical thought that was capable of understanding the sense and the meaning of concrete social relations and, from that, of the inherent contradictions, paradoxes and ambivalences contained within the new social struggles that were manifested in its historical time.

Thus, it is important to delimit the tradition that Honneth joins, namely: Critical Theory. In a restricted sense, this term refers to the authors of the beginning of the 20th century who participated in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (case, for example, of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Macurce). In a broad sense, in view of the programmatic text written by Horkheimer in 1932 entitled “Traditional Theory and Critical Theory”, the term refers to authors who affiliate with Marx based on two fundamental principles, they are: critical behavior and the orientation towards emancipation (NOBRE, 2004). The first generation, which Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno were part of, sought to understand the meaning and significance of capitalism in the 20th century, as well as of a capitalist society that was consolidating itself as a new totality that developed from the decline, always more accelerated, of the old “powers of cultural formation” (HOKHEIMER, 1990). In general, we can say that Critical Theory is concerned with understanding the reasons, the causes of an accumulation of social crises (the predominance of the economic, political system, the rise of new values and from there the capacity of a social force rewriting morality), as well as understanding how a new social order arises, what the sense of history is, passing, finally, through the new forms of authority, domination and power.

In Struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts, Honneth points to the fact that Critical Theory is also associated with the processes of social construction of identity (personal and collective), having in its grammar a struggle for recognition and giving great emphasis to the notion of a “conflict” as a constitutive element of subjectivity and identity (personal and collective) of the members of a certain sociability. In his doctoral thesis entitled Crítica del Poder, in which Honneth proposes a “reckoning” with fundamental authors of the 20th century, namely Adorno, Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault, he seeks to present a critical analysis of social reality that is not neutral. In this sense, resuming immature normative ideals, that is, starting from intra-mundane potentials for the transformation of social reality, the German philosopher proposes a critical model inspired by Max Horkheimer's interdisciplinary materialism. However, in a different sense from that put in the 1920s. With a view to the emergence of new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s, he defends the use of the idea of struggle for recognition to understand the structure of the form of claiming rights in the current world. Thus, by placing social conflict as fundamental in his critical project, Honneth believed that he was surpassing the critical standards established by
Horkheimer, insofar as he was closed in a cycle between capitalist domination and cultural analysis, which would characterize a sociological deficit in his work, since he would not be able to distinguish the practical contexts of Critical Theory from those of traditional theory. In this way, the author (HONNETH, 2009) chooses conflict as the central point of his theory.

Honneth (2009, p. 30) uses Hegel's writings during his youth in Jena, to oppose the paradigm present in modern political philosophy (in Machiavelli and Hobbes), namely: the understanding that society precedes itself. A selfish calculation of self-preservation of individuals, this is how:

[...] Machiavelli’s political writings prepare the conception according to which individual subjects are opposed in a permanent competition of interests, not unlike political collectivities; in the work of Thomas Hobbes, it finally becomes the basis for a theory of the contract that underlies the sovereignty of the state (HONNETH, 2009, p. 31, our translation).

Such conception is in opposition to the one presented by Aristotle and Cicero, in a way that assumes that men are social and political beings (zoon politikon), life in the polis being inherent to human nature itself, the purpose of beings, and not arising of a mere mechanistic choice. The family, for Aristotle (2002), would be a natural demand and would form a “first” society, followed by the village and the city. Thus, for the Greek, the ultimate cause of the city is the sovereign good and man, that as a social being is complemented in public life. It is from this that Hegel, as a reader of classical philosophical theories, will become familiar with a current of political philosophy that attributes to the intersubjectivity of public life a very great importance, differently from what was established in the thoughts of Hobbes and Machiavelli, opposing, firstly to the conception of social struggle developed by these two authors and, also, to the individualist assumptions apprehended by him in the Kantian system.

The writings of the young Hegel thus indicate, in the reading of Honneth, the fact that the subjects only abandon and overcome the ethical relations in which they find themselves to the extent that they feel that they are not able to fully recognize the particular character their identities. The "social struggle" that would be formed from such a finding would not be socially organized as a confrontation of "all against all", but as a socially morally motivated struggle, since it aims at the broad recognition of human individuality (HONNETH, 2009, pp. 47-48). What makes us conclude that the need for the struggle for recognition highlights the importance of the subjects' subjective identity, of their values, even characterizing a struggle for freedom and justice to be constantly expanding. It is a struggle for the right to be free and recognized as equal (fully human), so that the construction of reciprocal recognition generates
moral and substantially political progress: it forms a new totality, a power that has the capacity to unify different human beings through the force of universal values.

We can see from Honneth's reading of Hegel, a similarity in relation to the theory of communicative action developed by Jürgen Habermas (1987; 2012), of which the author was a disciple. Both share the idea of an intersubjective reason, against a reason centered on the subject, according to the reading of Hegel's Jena writings. However, while Habermas thinks about action within the field of language, understanding it as oriented towards understanding between individuals constituting the intersubjective reason, the author considers that, within the idea of the struggle for recognition, present in the constitution of the thought of Hegel (returning to Fichte and Hobbes), intersubjective relations are not reduced to just language and do not necessarily aim at understanding\(^2\). It is through an articulation between the reading of Hegel, that we have summarized so far, and the foundations of the social psychology of George Hebert Mead and Jessica Benjamin (Mead was the one who attributed the idea of recognition of Hegel in Honneth), from Winnicott's psychology, and from Marshall's theoretical developments on citizenship, that the philosopher formulates his conception of recognition, which is divided into three spheres, namely: affections (love), rights (law) and social esteem (solidarity).

The first sphere, that of love, deals with this in the sense of primary relationships “insofar as they consist of strong emotional bonds between few people, according to the pattern of erotic relationships between two partners, friendships and parent/child relationships” (HONNETH, 2009, p. 159, our translation). Honneth, at this point, refers to Hegel's idea that love constitutes the first stage of reciprocal recognition, since it is the place where the subjects recognize their needs, and understand the need of the other.

In this sense, the German philosopher points out that this idea of Hegelian philosophy had its development in the studies of the English psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott. The English psychoanalyst proposes, based on Freud's idea of “primary narcissism”, the idea that the child has, in a first stage, the tendency to omnipotence based on maternal behavior, just as the mother perceives all the relationships of the child as a single cycle of action. It is as if the mother and child are just one being. Thus, in the process of child maturation, the intersubjective cooperation between mother and child, through mutual recognition, makes the child recognize itself as an autonomous being. And not only the child, but also the mother

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\(^2\) As Bressiani (2010, p. 51) points out, Honneth follows Habermas' steps in the sense of effecting a shift from the production paradigm to a distinct form of action. However, he does it in a different way, as he is focused on the issue of social interaction aimed at recognition and not to obtain understanding.
undergoes a maturation in the process of dealing with motherhood (HONNETH, 2009, p. 164-165). This is the sphere, therefore, that the individual acquires self-confidence.

The second sphere of recognition is that of the legal sphere, represented in law. Here, Honneth deals with the question also posed by Hegel, but which is present in Mead, that human beings develop within a structural core of all ethics: “Just that symbiotically feed bond, that arises from the reciprocally wanted delimitation, creates the measure of individual self-confidence, which is the indispensable vase for autonomous participation in public life” (HONNETH, 2009, p. 178, our translation). Thus:

From the way of recognizing love, as we present it here with the aid of the theory of object relations, the legal relationship is distinguished in almost all decisive aspects; both spheres of interaction can only be conceived as two types of the same pattern of socialization because their respective logic cannot be explained properly without recourse to the same reciprocal recognition mechanism. For the law, Hegel and Mead perceived a similar relationship in the circumstance that we can only reach an understanding of ourselves as bearers of rights when we have, conversely, a knowledge about what obligations we have to observe in relation to the respective other: only from the normative perspective of a "generalized other", which already teaches us to recognize other members of the community as rights holders, we can also understand ourselves as a person of law, in the sense that we can be sure of the social fulfillment of some of our claims (HONNETH, 2009, p. 179, our translation).

In modern times, the law means the possibility of recognizing the other, the different, as a free person and equal to all others. Here Honneth follows as references Hegel and Mead. “As far as the law is concerned, both realized that we can only come to an understanding of ourselves as bearers of rights when we know what obligations we have to observe in the face of the other” (ALBORNOZ, 2011, p. 137, our translation). From the moment we conceive of others as persons endowed with rights, it is that we can also understand ourselves as persons of law, and thus we can become sure of the social fulfillment of some of our pretensions.

In view of the historical process of constitution of citizenship described by T. H. Marshall, Honneth demonstrates how the historic conquest of political, civil and social rights, meant a “struggle for recognition” by the citizens, which took place through the legal sphere (HONNETH, 2009, p. 191-192). Given the situation of being able to recognize the human being as a person, not necessarily considering their achievements or their character, it indicates, as Honneth shows us, two distinct forms of respect: cognitive recognition, in which there is a distinguished esteem for a certain human being, and respect for a particular human being. Thus, it is in the sphere of recognition of rights that the notion of “selfrespect” develops.
Following Hegel and Mead, Honneth describes the third sphere of reciprocal recognition that refers to social esteem, given that “in addition to the experience of affective dedication and legal recognition, of a social esteem that allows them to refer positively to their concrete properties and capabilities” (ALBORNOZ, 2011, p. 139-140, our translation). Such sharing of mutual esteem between individuals, becomes understandable only to the extent that there is a horizon of values shared among themselves by the subjects involved. Unlike modern legal recognition that has a universal view in relation to subjects, social esteem considers the particular qualities that differentiate human beings, based on intersubjective bonds.

In this way, "this form of reciprocal recognition is also linked to the assumption of a context of social life whose members constitute a community of values through guidance by conceptions of common objectives" (HONNETH, 2009, p. 200, our translation). As Honneth demonstrates, the concept of “honor” has historically been replaced by the ideas of “prestige” and “reputation” within the public sphere. These two concepts refer to the degree of social recognition that the individual achieves in society, given that he somehow contributed to the abstractly defined objectives (HONNETH, 2009, p. 206). Modern societies, therefore, are characterized, in the relations of social esteem, by a permanent struggle between social groups to raise the value attributed to the capacity of their ways of life.

However, what decides on the outcome of these struggles, stabilized only temporarily, is not only the power of having the means of symbolic strength, specific to certain groups, but also the climate, which is difficult to influence, of public attention: the more the social movements manage to draw the attention of the public sphere to the neglected importance of the properties and capacities represented by them collectively, the more for them the possibility of raising social value in society or, more precisely, the reputation of its members (HONNETH, 2009, 207-208, our translation).

According to the author, with this development, social esteem takes on a pattern capable of giving the forms of recognition associated with it the character of asymmetric relationships between subjects who are biographically individuated. The subjects' reputations are measured by the achievements they present socially within the framework of self-realization. Hegel and Mead express precisely this organizational character of social esteem, since the model of both aimed at a social order of values “in which the social purposes undergo an interpretation so complex and rich that, in the end, every individual ends up receiving the chance to obtain social reputation” (HONNETH, 2009, p. 208, our translation). This third sphere, therefore, aims at the idea of solidarity, that is, the idea of symmetrical
relationships, in terms of society, that enable any subject to have recognized their abilities as valuable and necessary. As a result, the practical self-relationship developed in this sphere is “self-esteem”.

Each of the spheres of recognition described by the author represents a practical relationship. When there is disrespect for some of them, it is when social struggles take place, so that the struggles for recognition are characterized, for the German philosopher, as engines of social change. Honneth intends to complement the idea of ethics based on the concept of an intersubjective reason, that is, practices and values that form the structure of reciprocal recognition. In other words, the individual finds recognition as autonomous and within the group, being able to develop himself. The set of institutions is what guarantees the three spheres of recognition.

Now, because of what was discussed, we see that from the recovery of the concept of recognition and intersubjective relations present in Hegel's work, Honneth formulates, also anchored in the psychology of Mead and Winnicott, a notion of recognition that seeks to account for the formulating a normative notion in relation to society, in order to seek a criticism based on such formulation. However, we will now see with Nancy Fraser that the struggle for recognition alone is insufficient, inasmuch as, many times, not taking into account the principle of distribution leads to only affirmative measures, but not aimed at social transformation and emancipation.

Nancy Fraser: recognition and redistribution

Nancy Fraser, like Honneth, joins the tradition of Critical Theory. Thus, she begins her argument in order to present the panorama of social struggles, in which the so-called struggle for recognition gains strength. In post-socialist struggles, the group's identity supersedes class interests as the main mechanism of political mobilization, making cultural recognition more valuable than economic redistribution. In view of the issues of global reconfiguration after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the author poses, as a question, how should we understand the end of the socialist imaginary centered on definitions such as interests, exploitation and redistribution? And, at the same time, how to interpret the emergence of a new political imagery centered on the notions of identity, difference, cultural domination and recognition? Does this change represent a fall into a state of “false consciousness?”.

In the author's opinion, none of these postures taken to the extreme results in an adequate form. For Fraser, it is necessary to develop a Critical Theory on recognition, which
defends only those versions of cultural policy that make it possible to combine with policies of equality and redistribution. She assumes that justice today requires both distribution and recognition, and that the relationship between the two must be examined first. This means an attempt to imagine cultural recognition and social equality in a way that both support each other, and do not exclude each other.

The author proposes, at the outset, to analyze the paradoxical dilemmas when comparing recognition and distribution policies. Within the contemporary post-socialist political scenario, with the detachment of classes, different social movements change the directions of their claims. The demands of economic change lose ground to those of cultural change, both within and between social movements. In this way, the claims based on identity tend to predominate more and more, while the perspectives of redistribution tend to recede, resulting in a political field with programmatic obstacles (FRASER, 1997, p. 19-20). Fraser proposes an analytical distinction between the two conceptions of injustice. The first is socioeconomic injustice, rooted in the political and economic structure of society. Examples of this kind of injustice are “exploitation (that is, the appropriation of the usufruct of one's own work for the benefit of others); economic marginalization; and the deprivation of material goods essential to lead a decent life” (FRASER, 1997, p. 20, our translation)

The second form is cultural or symbolic injustice. In this case, injustice is at the root of social standards of representation, interpretation and communication. Examples of this type of injustice include cultural domination, recognition and disrespect (FRASER, 1997, p. 22). Such injustice and the struggles around it, send us back to Honneth, and how there is a struggle for recognition among individuals around their honor. Fraser herself returns briefly to Honneth, and to Charles Taylor, in order to demonstrate her thesis.

Despite their differences, both economic and cultural injustices are, in Fraser's view, widespread in contemporary societies. They are rooted in processes and practices that systematically put a group of people at a disadvantage compared to others, and therefore must be resolved. In practice, the author shows us, that the two are intertwined. Material economic institutions have a constitutive cultural dimension, being crossed by meanings and norms, and the most discursive cultural practices have a constitutive political-economic dimension, being tied to material bases. These injustices are usually intertwined in a way that reinforces each other in a dialectical way, and results in a vicious circle of cultural and economic subordination (FRASER, 1997, p. 23).

However, for analytical reasons, Fraser maintains the distinction of both injustices, and in that sense she proposes, in the same way, different solutions. Thus, the solution to
economic injustice is some kind of political and social restructuring, centered on the notion of redistribution. The solution to cultural injustice is seen in the change in symbolic relations between individuals, around the notion of recognition. There may be, in many cases, as Fraser shows us, a conflict between both solutions, since while the demands for recognition seek to affirm a group identity, for this reason they tend to promote the differentiation of the groups, the demands for redistribution advocate for the abolition of economic privileges that support the specificity of groups, such as the fact that the proletarians have an enormous disadvantage in relation to the bourgeois. As a consequence of these differentiations there is a tension between them, which can cause conflict.

The philosopher then presents us with a distinction between the policies of recognition and redistribution that the various social movements demand, with some focusing only on the agenda of redistribution and others only focusing on guidelines for recognition or, also, in cases where both demands are present. An extreme example in which the guidelines for redistribution appear as hegemonic, are those of political economy, in which, as we have already exemplified, in a Marxist view of society, the proletariat claim, within a class struggle, social equality and the consequent end of the bourgeoisie, so that there would be no more social classes. In contrast, Fraser (1997, p. 26) considers another end of the conceptual spectrum, postulating the ideal type of collectivity that fits the justice model through recognition. The root of injustice is wrong cultural recognition. An example that can be interpreted, according to Fraser, in an approximate way would be the underestimated sexuality, in which sexuality is a way of social differentiation, whose roots are not found in political economy, since there are homosexuals in all social classes. Thus, the struggle is for the valorization of different modes of sexuality, so that they can be freely expressed, against the authoritarian construction of society around a “heteronormativity”.

Until then, Fraser has focused on showing the paradoxical dilemmas facing the struggles for recognition and distribution, based on the assumption that redistributive solutions tend to reduce the difference between groups, while those for recognition tend to increase the difference. Thus, in order to delve deeper into the complexities of these issues, the author begins to examine alternative conceptions of redistribution and recognition, called affirmation and transformation. First, we will follow the author's line of argument, go through the definitions of affirmation and transformation, and then relate them to redistribution and recognition. Finally, we will demonstrate how it resolves impasses abstracted from these considerations.
With affirmative solutions to injustices, Fraser refers to solutions aimed at correcting the uneven results of social agreements, without affecting the general framework that originates them. By transformative solutions, on the contrary, the author understands those solutions aimed at correcting unequal results, precisely by restructuring the implicit general framework that originates them. The essential point of the contrast is while affirmative action seeks gradual change, transformative action seeks radical change in these injustices. To better distinguish ourselves, we can stick to the example of cultural injustices. Affirmative solutions to this type of injustice are currently associated with the so-called “central multiculturalism”, very widespread in the figure of Charles Taylor.

This type of multiculturalism aims to repair the lack of respect through group identities but leaves the content of these identities intact as implicit group differentiations. Transformative solutions, on the contrary, are currently associated with deconstruction. The elimination of lack of respect, in this case, would happen through the transformation of the cultural and symbolic structure of society. By destabilizing existing group identities and differentiating factors, these solutions would not only raise the self-esteem of members of disrespected groups, but also the image of all members of society about themselves (FRASER, 1997, p. 39).

In the sphere of economic injustice, affirmative solutions have historically been associated with the welfare state. They seek to repair the poor distribution of the resulting resources, leaving the current economic and political structure intact. To this end, it seeks to increase the consumption of groups at an economic disadvantage, without restructuring the production system (FRASER, 1997). Transformative solutions, in contrast, have historically been associated with socialism, restructuring the relations of production, not only affecting the consumption of individuals, but changing the social division of labor and the conditions of existence for all. Thus, Fraser demonstrates that while affirmative solutions tend to promote differentiation between individuals, privileging certain classes, for example; those of a transformative type resort to diluting such differences given their universalist conception. Affirmative solutions can also have a secondary effect of recognition injustices, while transformative solutions can help to remedy some of them.

Such considerations suggest a way to reshape the redistribution-recognition dilemma. Fraser then asks: for those groups that are subject to injustices of both types, what combination of solutions would work to minimize, if not to eliminate from the whole, the mutual interferences that can arise when redistribution and recognition are pursued.
simultaneously? The author will propose a comparative table around the notions of transformative and affirmative actions considering redistribution and recognition:

Let's imagine a four-cell matrix. The horizontal axis includes the two general types of solutions that we have just examined, that is, affirmative and transformative. The vertical axis includes the two aspects of justice that we have been considering, that is, redistribution and recognition. On this matrix we can locate the four political statements that we have discussed. In the first cell, where redistribution and affirmation intersect, is the project of the liberal welfare state, which superficially reassigns the distributional proportions among the existing groups, tends to support the targeting between the groups, and can generate, as a secondary effect, the disrespect. In the second cell, where redistribution and transformation intersect, is the socialist project that, aimed at a deep restructuring of the relations of production, tends to erase the differentiation between groups and can also contribute to redressing some forms of disrespect. In the third cell, where recognition and affirmation intersect, is the project of central multiculturalism, centered on the superficial redistributions of respect between existing groups and which tends to support the differentiation between groups. In the fourth cell, where recognition and transformation intersect, is the deconstruction project; aimed at the deep restructuring of recognition relationships, tends to destabilize the differentiating factors between groups (FRASER, 1997, p. 44-45, our translation).

This matrix identifies central multiculturalism as a cultural analogue of the welfare state, while identifying deconstruction as a cultural analogue to socialism (FRASER, 1997, p. 46). Based on these differentiations, Fraser believes she can differentiate to what extent the solutions interfere with each other and are applied at the same time. Affirmative solutions for the redistribution of the welfare state seem to contradict, for Fraser, affirmative recognition policies, insofar as one tends to increase differences and the other to decrease. Similarly, socialism's transformative redistribution policies seem to contrast the affirmative policies of recognizing grassroots multiculturalism, given that the former tend to dilute the differentiation of groups and the latter to promote them.

However, at the same time, we see solutions that combine. The solutions centered on the state of social welfare and central multiculturalism, both tend to promote the differentiation of groups, even though the first can lead to disrespect. In the same vein, Fraser considers that the transformative policies for the redistribution of socialism are compatible, both of which tend to dilute the differentiation factors between groups, which brings the author closer to a deontological conception.

We see that, from the exposure of Nancy Fraser's ideas, based on Honneth's theory of recognition, she brings back the class struggle and the political-economic agendas to think about the social transformations towards the emancipation of society. Fraser, however, does
not rule out recognition as an agenda, and for that she formulates a bilateral theory, which seeks to cover both recognition and redistribution guidelines. Thus, Fraser returns to socialism while thinking about it as the transforming route of social structures, capable of really modifying the economic-political structure of society, at the time when the state of social welfare does not handle this task. Also, in relation to issues of recognition, it presents the deconstruction in the quality of efficient transformative action in the disruption of relations of cultural domination, and in the recognition of subjugated groups, in contrast to the affirmative actions of central multiculturalism.

**Final considerations**

In view of what has been discussed, we begin the discussion by presenting the conception of recognition developed by Axel Honneth in his book *The struggle for recognition*. The central thesis points out that the identity of individuals is determined by an intersubjective process mediated by conflict over recognition. Therefore, the search for a normative proposal occurs through the unfolding of its three dimensions - love, solidarity and law. In this sense, subjects and social groups are only able to shape their identities to the extent that they are recognized in relations with others, in institutional practice and in social interaction.

Without discarding the importance of the notion of recognition erected by Honneth and by communitarian authors, such as Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser brings up for discussion the issue of political and economic issues of redistribution. According to the author, redistribution, together with recognition, appears as a problem of institutionalized relationship of social subordination, not constituting an essentially cultural problem, but a status problem. The existence of laws that do not designate equal status for all social subjects and the relationships they establish, generate the need for recognition, their solution is to deinstitutionalize the codes that bring social subordination. When attributing rights to a universalist dimension, she understands that redistributions should not be made aimed at specific groups, since this would end up generating the non-recognition of these specific groups.

The critical models presented by the authors in the 1990s remain current within the normative field. Both offer important critical instruments for assessing social reality and, especially, public policies aimed at repairing economic, social, political and historical injustices. In addition, the discussion revives the historical impasse between thinking policies
aimed at specific social groups, historically oppressed, and policies with a deontological basis, that is, of a universal character. Regardless of the path chosen, both intellectuals offer paths for reflection within the field of Critical Theory around questions of a normative political nature, going beyond merely descriptive criticism, pointing to the possibilities for transforming reality.

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Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser: dilemmas between recognition and redistribution