

**CAPITALS HELD BY MINISTERS OF CARDOSO AND LULA GOVERNMENTS:  
MAPPING THE DISTINCTION<sup>1</sup>**

**OS CAPITAIS DETIDOS POR MINISTROS E MINISTRAS DOS GOVERNOS  
CARDOSO E LULA: MAPEANDO A DISTINÇÃO**

**CAPITALES EN MANOS DE MINISTROS Y MINISTROS DE LOS GOBIERNOS DE  
CARDOSO Y LULA: MAPEANDO LA DISTINCIÓN**

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**ABSTRACT:** Lula's return as president of the republic, in the October 2022 elections, revitalizes a theme that has never been out of fashion in the social sciences, the study of the Lula governments, especially in comparison with the Cardoso governments. The article seeks to aim at the main capitals held by the ministers of the State of the Cardoso and Lula periods, specifying the position occupied in the social space and the distinction. The study of the capitals held by these can add efforts to studies that seek to understand this period of contemporary history. In general, it was possible to conclude that the ministers of the Cardoso government, from the point of view of position, have higher cultural, economic and symbolic capitals from the perspective of the economic mainstream, configuring an elite habitus, while the Lula ministers have less economic, cultural and symbolic capital, constituting a more popular habitus. Towards this objective, we conducted a study of the trajectory of these ministers and then applied the ACM. The data were analyzed from the relational and praxiological sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.

**KEYWORDS:** Cardoso government and Lula government. Ministers. Distinction. Capital. ACM.

**RESUMO:** O retorno de Lula como presidente da república, nas eleições de outubro de 2022, revitaliza um tema que nunca esteve fora de moda nas ciências sociais, o estudo dos governos Lula, especialmente em comparação com os governos Cardoso. O artigo busca objetivar os principais capitais detidos pelos ministros e ministras do Estado dos períodos Cardoso e Lula, especificando a posição ocupada no espaço social e a distinção. O estudo dos capitais detidos por estes pode somar esforços aos estudos que buscam entender esse período da história contemporânea. De forma geral, foi possível concluir que os ministros do governo Cardoso, do ponto de vista da posição, têm capitais culturais, econômicos e simbólicos mais elevados sob a ótica do mainstream econômico, configurando um habitus de elite, ao passo que os ministros Lula possuem menor capital econômico, cultural e simbólico, constituindo um

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*habitus mais popular. Para tanto, realizamos estudo de trajetória desses ministros e em seguida, aplicamos a ACM. Os dados foram analisados a partir da sociologia relacional e praxiológica de Pierre Bourdieu.*

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Governo Cardoso e governo Lula. Ministros. Distinção. Capitais. ACM.*

**RESUMEN:** *El regreso de Lula como presidente de la república, en las elecciones de octubre de 2022, revitaliza un tema que nunca ha pasado de moda en las ciencias sociales, el estudio de los gobiernos de Lula, especialmente en comparación con los gobiernos de Cardoso. El artículo busca apuntar a las principales capitales ocupadas por los ministros y ministros del Estado de los períodos Cardoso y Lula, precisando la posición ocupada en el espacio social y la distinción. El estudio de los capiteles que poseen estos puede sumar esfuerzos a los estudios que buscan comprender este período de la historia contemporánea. En general, se pudo concluir que los ministros del gobierno de Cardoso, desde el punto de vista de la posición, tienen capitales culturales, económicos y simbólicos superiores desde la perspectiva de la corriente económica dominante, configurando un habitus de élite, mientras que los ministros de Lula tienen menos capital económico, cultural y simbólico, constituyendo un habitus más popular. Para ello, realizamos un estudio de la trayectoria de estos ministros y luego aplicamos la ACM. Los datos fueron analizados a partir de la sociología relacional y praxiológica de Pierre Bourdieu.*

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** *Gobierno Cardoso y gobierno Lula. Ministros. Distinción. Capital. ACM.*

## Introduction

Lula's return as president of the republic, in the October 2022 elections, revitalizes a theme that has never been out of fashion in the social sciences, the study of Lula's presidential terms, especially in comparison with the Cardoso governments. The interest in these two periods is so great that there is already a tradition of studies about them, often comparing these two moments in the democratic history of Brazil. Our article is interested in studying these two governments, by comparing the capital held by their respective ministers.

It is important to say that in the field of sociology, initiatives in studies on ministers are rare, a topic that has been of great interest to political science, especially research on the selection process and on the political and social trajectories of ministers. According to Codato and Franz (2017), these studies seek to raise the profile of the ministerial elite of their respective countries, considering standard variables, such as age, gender, family heritage, schooling, professional trajectory, ideological orientation of the party, experience in legislature positions and holding positions at the top of the State or in private firms.

Codato and Franz (2017) add that in Brazilian presidentialism, ministers fulfill a dual role: ensuring that the formulation and implementation of public policies are in accordance with the guidelines of the President of the Republic and his party's program; and guarantee, through political transactions, party support so that these projects have support and chances of approval by the National Congress. In this sense, the selection of ministers and the formation of cabinets would have a strategic political role and for the good conduct of the government of the President of the Republic.

The same authors claim that research on cabinets in the French semi-presidential regime has observed the occupation of ministries by individuals increasingly accustomed to the logic of the political field. François and Grossman (2012) have noticed the presence of new professional types, with a decrease in the number of technocrats, experts and non-partisan ministers and the consequent increase in political cadres with training and completed careers in representative entities, whether in elected positions, whether in the bureaucracy of political parties or even in social movements (FRANÇOIS; GROSSMAN, 2012).

In Brazil, D'Araújo (2009) did an X-ray of the Executive after redemocratization and identified that “ministers are experienced people in political life, with strong roots in parliamentary and executive activities at all levels of government” (D'ARAUJO, 2009, p. 25, our translation). According to Costa and Codato (2013), this would indicate the existence of political and administrative expertise as a basic condition for appointment to the ministry. Despite being appointment posts and not elective positions, ministries can also be a space for political professionalization, like legislative houses.

Codato and Franz (2017) argue that in the case of Brazil, this stems from the importance of party criteria in ministerial recruitment. In multi-party presidentialism, the President of the Republic's party hardly manages to be the majority party in the National Congress, forcing the head of government to make alliances with other parties to gain political support and approve his bills, legislative amendments and provisional measures. To guarantee this support, the president needs to attract the other parties, other than his own, to the government, allocating them to the ministries or bureaucracies subordinated to them. This bargain between high-ranking political positions and parliamentary support in the two Houses of the Brazilian National Congress significantly impacts the composition of ministries (ABRANCHES, 1988) and reveals the strategies pursued by ministerial recruitment in Brazil.

In our research agenda, the issue of ministers has gained prominence. In Jardim e Rosa (2021) a study was carried out on the biography of 151 ministers who worked between 1994 and 2010 in their portfolios. After presenting a cartography of the profile of all the ministers,

through several variables, the article highlighted three of them: occupation of the ministers' parents and grandparents, the university they went to and their international circulation. The results indicate that there is homology between the ministers' individual trajectories and the prevailing economic beliefs of the period, expressed, above all, from neoliberal or developmentalist beliefs, disseminated in the universities through which they passed, in the format of economic theory; in Jardim e Moura (2022) the positions taken by ministers linked to the economic area of the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff governments were compared, through their economic guidelines. The guiding principle of the article was to understand the economic decision-making of the PT governments, through the study of the biography of the ministers linked to the economy of the studied period, starting from the principle that economic and political decisions are rooted in sociocultural elements, namely, the worldview of ministers who make decisions, whose worldview would be socially manufactured.

Silva (2017) and Silva and Grün (2019) show how the directors of Central Banks, appointed under coalition presidentialism, present positions and take positions from a more monetarist perspective (Cardoso government) or more neo-Keynesian, but expand the look at the economy of the narratives of the chief economists of financial institutions, who, at various times, through a performative pressure, manage to create or even perform in the directors positions that diverge from expectations about their positions and dispositions.

Continuing with this study agenda already *initiated* by us, on ministers, the article that we present seeks to objectify which capitals held the ministers of the State of the Cardoso and Lula periods, specifying the distinctions between them. For that, we carried out a trajectory study of these ministers and then applied the MCA. We believe that the study of their capitals and distinction can help us to locate their positions in the social space and the profile of these ministers. Although it is not our main objective, this could, to some extent, help us to understand the profile of the projects in which they were engaged.

The article is divided as follows: in addition to this introduction and conclusion, in the next item we discuss the theoretical framework that inspires this research, based on Pierre Bourdieu's relational and praxiological sociology; then we will present a brief summary of the Cardoso and Lula governments, seeking to highlight the profile of existing projects in each government (whether more neoliberal or more interventionist); finally, we present and analyze our research data.

## **The distinction rooted in social elements: the ownership of capital and the definition of *habitus***

For Bourdieu, the trajectory study, in dialogue with the MCA, helps us to map the capital held by a social agent. For the author, trajectories would be the constructed result of a system of relevant traits of an individual biography or a group of biographies (BOURDIEU, 1998); that is, a trajectory is the objectification of the relations between agents and forces present in the field; a set of relationships can cause distinction and symbolic boundaries in the studied group. In Bourdieu (1998), there is no MCA analysis without a systematic study of trajectories.

In turn, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is part of a broader technique called Geometric Data Analysis (GDA), a statistical approach developed by the French mathematician Jean Paul Benzécri in the 1970s, with which Bourdieu worked. These works were important to counterbalance the statistical confirmatory models (GREENACRE; BLASIUS, 2006).

According to Le Roux and Rouanet (2010), descriptive analysis precedes probabilistic modeling, not depending on the size of the data. Complementing this idea, for Bertonecelo (2022, p. 17, our translation) “social causality consists of the global effects of a complex structure of interrelationships, which cannot be reduced to the combination of multiple effects”.

Concretely, the MCA is a spatial representation in the Cartesian plane of variables of great variance and individuals in a relational position between these variables and between them, in a way that this allows a reduction of data dimensionality, in which the distance between individuals represents normalized distances of social property, being, in this sense, of an exploratory nature (BERTONCELO, 2022).

Therefore, the MCA is predictive, since once the structure of purposes and contrasts has been reconstructed, individuals can be projected into this dispersion space (HUSSON; JOSSE, 2014).

Finally, Bertonecelo (2022) states that MCA has good results when we produce qualitative differentiations, in which the categories cannot be ordered directly. This means that in our case, for example, the number and complexity of the variables that make up the capital of the leading ministers cannot be hierarchized between dependent and independent variables in a clear way, given their volume and complexity. Based on these assumptions, Bourdieu was able, in his studies, to reconstruct the space of social positions (BOURDIEU, 2008), aiming at capitals and distinctions.

Regarding the concept of capital in Bourdieu (1996; 2006), it is first necessary to say that capital is, in Bourdieu, a “resource” that can be owned and transmitted by an individual, a couple, an establishment, a community, or even a country. For the author, there are four types

of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic, where the original capital would be linked to the family and the incoming capital would have to do with the reconversion in the social space.

**Economic capital** corresponds to the notion of equity and is evaluated in monetary terms. Money from Pierre Bourdieu's perspective is symbolic. Economic capital in Bourdieu, can be converted into symbolic, social and cultural capital.

**Social capital** is the set of personal relationships possessed by an agent, family and company, constituting a relationship network.

**Cultural capital** was used by Bourdieu to explain social inequalities in educational and cultural matters. It is a multidimensional set of skills (for example, mastery of language and calculation) and dispositions (a certain sensitivity to the world), which constitutes the embodied version of cultural capital. There are three embodied states of cultural capital in Bourdieu: 1) Corporal Hexis; 2) Institutionalized (through diplomas, works of art etc.) and; 3) Objectified: work of art, painting, music etc. Cultural capital would be responsible for forming taste, which in turn promotes distinction and reveals domination.

The fourth and last capital, the **symbolic capital**, is defined by the “look” deposited (the value given) by society to a social agent, family, company. There is, therefore, a relational and collective dimension, since symbolic capital means recognition and prestige. In Bourdieu (1996) capitals exist in a relational way, since one can reinforce the other.

According to Bourdieu's method, in order to measure the social origin of an agent and, therefore, his origin capital, it is fundamental to objectify the profession of the parents, especially the father, since in the text *The contradictions of inheritance*, from the book *The Weight of the World* (1993), Bourdieu shows the role of the family in the transmission of cultural heritage, with emphasis on the father, who, according to the author, would be most responsible for transmitting the inheritance to the heir.

The same argument appears in Bourdieu and Passeron (2014, p. 28) for whom: “(...), social origin is, of all determinants, the only one that extends its influence to all domains and all levels of the students' experience and primarily the conditions of existence”. Thus, the school becomes the sole and total agent for the transmission of social positions. The idea that social origin, as well as legitimacy markers (symbolic capital, socialization processes) is natural, loses relevance in the face of Bourdieu's theses (1996; 2006), which shows the school's “magical” work, reproducing and valuing the culture formed in the ruling class.

As Bourdieu (2006) demonstrates, familiarity with the legitimate culture – the legitimate, dominant culture – brings gains in school life, in the university field and in the labor

market, favoring those who in early childhood had access to this legitimate culture, “as a direct experience”, a “simple delight”, at first, “outside school subjects”, marked as “pedant”. Thus, “the acquisition of legitimate culture through insensitive familiarization within the family tends to favor an enchanted experience of culture, which implies forgetting the acquisition and ignoring the instruments of appropriation” (BOURDIEU, 2006, p. 10, our translation).

Another important issue in Bourdieu's sociology concerns the formal education received by social agents. The educational trajectory of individuals, basic and higher education and the institutions in which they studied, are constitutive – although not exclusively – of what Bourdieu called legitimate cultural capital.

In Bourdieu (2014) there would be a correlation between the class of origin and the years of study, which is reflected in aspects such as age when they started studying, sex and the geographic issue. In the case of France, Bourdieu informs that the legitimate heirs enroll in prestigious courses at the best French universities, while the children of the popular classes - when they enroll in higher education - end up attending courses without much prestige. For the author, school aspirations unfold in objectivities referring to the reality of each social agent, that is, the choices are delimited according to the trajectories

On the above argument, Bourdieu defends in the book *La Noblesse d'Etat: Grandes écoles et esprit de corps* (1989), that in elite higher education courses, there is an action of “consecration” and a rite that produces a separate and sacred group, which occurs in a masked way, producing and reproducing nobility. Therefore, for Bourdieu (2007), the school system, before being characterized by a liberating mark, is one of the most intense forms of social conservation, as it tends to legitimize social inequalities based on cultural heritage.

From this perspective, an act or an agent's choice cannot be explained by itself, since, according to the author, these acts are linked to the social context: in addition to suffering the social constraints of a group, they are associated with their individual experiences, family (social origin) and also their secondary socialization (university and other social spaces). The choices, therefore, do not only occur subjectively, but are circumscribed to historical and cultural elements and, mainly, to a given field of possibilities. Priorities will be given according to inherited and socially constructed resources within unique life stories.

### **Habitus: expressing worldviews**

In Bourdieu, ownership of capital helps to generate a *habitus*, which in turn forms an agent's worldview, which is socially constituted. To this end, the individual trajectory of the agents helps build their *habitus*, which are incorporated pre-dispositions (placed in the body and mind) by social agents throughout their socialization process. In this context, the *habitus* integrates past experiences and acts as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, actions, tastes and decision-making. This “matrix”, or set of provisions, provides the necessary schemes for the intervention of social agents in daily life, in a way that is not necessarily conscious.

As the author treats, these dispositions are not fixed. Furthermore, they are neither the personality nor the identity of individuals: “*habitus* is an operator, a matrix of perception and not an identity or a fixed subjectivity” (BOURDIEU, 2002, p. 83, our translation). Being a product of history, the *habitus* is an open system of dispositions, permanently confronted with new experiences and permanently affected by them. It is durable, but not immutable (BOURDIEU, 2002, p. 83). It is a **symbolic marker** that can express distinction or disqualification (BOURDIEU, 1979). It shows distinction when it expresses the dominant culture, which in turn contributes to the integration of the dominant class, through *habitus*, ensuring immediate communication between all its members and **distinguishing** them from other social classes. It expresses disqualification when it presents the culture of the dominated.

Considering the contributions of Pierre Bourdieu (2002), we can define the concept of *habitus* as a conceptual instrument that will help us to think about the relationship and mediation between external social conditioning and the subjectivity of the ministers studied, taking into account that the *habitus* is a cultural matrix that predisposes individuals to make their choices, and the similarity or affinity of *habitus* forms **the class habitus (bundle of similar relationships)**.

Important in this discussion is the concept of State in Bourdieu, which we will present.

### **The State in Pierre Bourdieu**

For Bourdieu (2007), the State would be the result of the thought categories of the agents that act in it. From this perspective, agents, through their worldviews, influence and are influenced by the State. In the case of the ministers of the studied periods, they would have power to act in the State, helping to build categories of thought reproduced by it. In addition to an abstract State, the State in Bourdieu is a State embodied and objectified in social agents; that influences and is influenced by other agents and the State.



In addition, the social agents that participate in the State are represented as embodying the State; a State constituted as a relatively autonomous space in relation to the social forces in struggle for power and ensuring a position of arbiter in political conflicts. To say that the State is legitimate in Bourdieu is to say that it can obtain submission to the order it imposes, with symbolic power as the only form of constraint. Thus, generalized obedience does not pass through coercion in Bourdieu. The recognition of the legitimacy of obedience is an act of knowledge, which is an act of unconscious submission to the social order, that is, it is an act of belief, even more, of collective belief.

From this perspective, Bourdieu alerts us to the fact that the State does not necessarily have the need to issue orders, or to exercise physical coercion to produce an ordered social world, “at least as long as it can produce embodied cognitive structures that are in line with the objective structures, thus ensuring the belief that Hume spoke of, the *doxic* submission to the established order” (BOURDIEU, 1996, p. 119, our translation). That is, the power of the State is to produce and impose categories of thought to the agents of the social world, whose categories are applied to all things in the world, including talking about the State itself. Therefore, Bourdieu calls our attention to the fact that we think the State from the very thought created by the State, because the State is itself our own thought. More concretely, the thought of the State is not just a discourse or a meta-discourse. This thought is inscribed in the social world, since the State would be the social world in the form of discourse. Thus, the State produces and inculcates cognitive structures, according to which the social order is perceived and incorporated, especially by the school system, which inculcates common cognitive structures, implicitly contributing to the production and reproduction of the social order. These structures are so naturalized that social agents are not even aware of the belief production process.

More than legislating on economic and political issues, the State legislates, in Bourdieu, on cognitive issues, that is, in the production of beliefs, creating mental forms of classification and exercising symbolic violence over the social world. In this sense, the reigning projects during the analyzed governments (of a more neoliberal or more interventionist nature) would be the result of an international conjuncture, but without ignoring the worldview of the ministers engaged in the periods (JARDIM; MOURA, 2022), which may have a connection with the capital held by the ministers.

This time, the State establishes, through the symbolic order that it imposes, two forms of power: the objective structure of the State and the mental structure to think about the State, which are homologous. Thus, it comes to exist in the objectivity, in the material structures, and

in the subjectivity of the agents, that is, in the representations about the form of vision and division of the classification system.

In Bourdieu's discussion of the State, it is important not to lose sight of his metaphor of the “right hand and the left hand of the State”, created by him to refer to the neoliberal French State, which in the 1980s would have used the right hand, giving greater autonomy to the markets, than the use of the left hand, which would have started its atrophying process, due to little use. Still for Bourdieu, the left hand would be the regulatory State, that is, the hand that would have greater social concerns and greater control over the market. This metaphor is important when looking at the data of the ministers who made up the State in the governments studied.

Finally, it is considering the importance of the State, not only institutionally, but above all cognitively, that we begin to present a summary of the main points of the Cardoso and Lula governments, in which the analyzed ministers acted.

## **Cardoso and Lula years: brief approximation on the prevailing projects during the periods**

### **Cardoso years (1994-2001)**

In view of the theoretical framework presented, the Cardoso and Lula governments will be studied in this article, considering that every State has the power to produce and impose categories of thought to agents in the social world, whose categories are applied to all things in the world, including speaking of the State itself and the decisions taken by State agents (BOURDIEU, 2014).

Regarding the State of the Cardoso period, it defended the project of giving greater freedom to the markets, distancing the State from economic and social issues; moreover, it was based on orthodox economic theory, which defends the priority of the economy and with a strong fiscal adjustment, to the detriment of social issues. This set of postulates is conventionally called neoliberalism; which, in turn, was in dialogue with the criteria required by international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which proclaimed the pursuit of a primary *surplus*, understood as the positive difference between government revenues and expenditures, excluding interest of the debt. The search for a primary surplus, control of inflation and public accounts became the mantra of the moment, from an orthodox perspective of expenditure control and a progressive tax reform. To some extent, this

is the project defended by the ministers of the Cardoso government, of a neoliberal nature and more focused on the right arm of the State.

In this context, the Cardoso government - understood here with its ministers, agents embodying the State - was favorable to macroeconomic stabilization with integration to globalization and cooperation with foreign investment. In that scenario, the State reform agenda was directly associated with the general orientation of the macroeconomic adjustment, in the direction of what Sallum (1999) warned: “For the dominant neoliberal current, the priority was the stabilization of prices” (SALLUM, JR. 1999, p. 33, our translation).

According to Santos (2000), in 1995, with the Real Plan in progress and with parity in relation to the dollar, the Cardoso government sought to contain inflation by causing an imbalance in the trade balance, causing an unprecedented level of bankruptcy of national companies and using unemployment (consumption restraint) as an instrument to control inflation.

At first, with a 15% appreciation against the dollar and higher inflation than the US, the strategy led to a continuous appreciation of the real until February 1995. (SANTOS, 2000). Monetary policy was used to stabilize economic conditions, seeking to attract short-term international capital to finance the constant imbalance in the current account, strongly dependent on the international scenario and the US interest rate. The government resorted to raising interest rates and restricting credit to curb demand. Thus, due to the already mentioned opening policies to contain inflation, there was a significant number of bankruptcy filings, due to companies not being prepared for this opening. Asian countries with an exchange rate advantage, in addition to the United States and European countries, began to export significantly to the country.

With a total focus on economic issues, this neoliberal project aimed at initiatives that institutionally changed the relationship between State and market, in order to break with the legal arrangements of the Vargas national-developmental State. In that context, the Cardoso government began to defend that the State does not have a business function, which should be the responsibility of the private sector; thus, its finances should be balanced and with direct stimuli to private companies and it could no longer sustain privileges for categories of employees, among other beliefs (SALLUM; GOULART, 2016).

As a result, the neoliberal belief reduced the State's participation in economic activities and placed national and foreign capital companies on an equal footing, through the approval of a set of laws in the National Congress. Finally, it preserved the trade liberalization program,

which had already been implemented during the Collor government, including the privatization program and the sale of concessions at both the federal and state levels.

In this process, the State under the Cardoso government began to attract multinational companies to the two key sectors of the industry, automotive and telecommunications, not only by modulating the tax legislation and the financing system, but also through invitations. This set of incentives contributed to the increased participation in Brazilian markets of foreign capital companies to the detriment of national capital companies (SALLUM; GOULART, 2016).

Within the scope of the National Development Bank (BNDES, Portuguese initials) - the main financial agent for the country's industrialization - the sectorial diversification of the companies served was remarkable. In addition to industry, it also financed commercial activities (shopping centres), tourism (amusement parks) and agriculture. In this sense, state-owned companies ceased to be the pillars of state policy, as a result of the federal government's lack of interest in developing a national industry, since the neoliberal project sought to attract foreign investment and promote its association with national companies.

Finally, state companies were privatized, or their services were transferred to private companies, as is the case with the highways, whose maintenance was granted to private companies in exchange for the exploitation of the services they provide – tolls and leasing of the public lands that border them. This reduction of the State's business functions did not eliminate but transformed state interventionism. The State expanded its normative and control functions, preserving the ability to shape economic activities through purchases of goods and services.

What we conclude from this is that even in economic systems of the neoliberal type, in which the market is seen as an autonomous field, capable of creating its own rules, as an invisible hand, with its “natural laws”, that is, even in economies where the categories of thought produced by the State presuppose the free market and individualism, even in these economic systems the State does not stop doing its work of symbolic domination. In the Cardoso government, the work of symbolic domination became precisely the creation of categories of thought that defend freedom for the market and strengthening what Bourdieu called the “right hand of the State”, to the detriment of its “left hand” (BOURDEU, 1997). From this perspective, there is no absent state in the Cardoso government, since the state is always present, even to legislate institutionally and cognitively in favor of the market, giving it total autonomy.

As a result of the previous argument, in economic systems – as in the Cardoso administrations – where the “right hand” overlaps the “left hand”, the market gained an apparent naturalness, autonomy and sacredness, becoming almost an “entity”, which it began to prescribe absolute truths and “magic” in the solution of problems, which theoretically only economists (from a school linked to orthodoxy) would have the solutions. The prevailing neoliberal belief in institutions and agents who were in command at that time, brought social consequences, such as unemployment and increased poverty.

### **Lula governments (2002-2009)**

For Sallum and Goulart (2016), in the Lula government, the economic liberalism of the Cardoso period was maintained. According to Mesquita (2014), despite never having formally abandoned the basic macroeconomic tripod established in 1999, the PT government deviated from it, in terms of both short-term objectives and strategies. However, the main lines of the Cardoso government's macroeconomic policy regime (inflation targeting systems, primary *surpluses* and floating exchange rates) were maintained by the Lula government, especially in the first term.

It is possible, however, to identify in his second term a certain flexibility in the management of the economic policy in effect until then (JARDIM; ROSA, 2021; JARDIM; MOURA, 2022). In this direction, Grün (2014) states that after the monthly allowance scandal, the Lula government shifted its macroeconomic policy. For Jardim (2015), even though the defense of an interventionist State only started in 2006, when there were changes in the composition of the government, especially the replacement of Antônio Palocci by Guido Mantega and José Dirceu by Dilma Rousseff, the changes were reinforced during the 2008 crisis, from investment in the domestic market, materialized in the increase of credit in the economy, aiming at increasing household consumption and the availability of bank credit, especially public banks (Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal, especially).

Also according to Jardim (2015), the fiscal policy adopted by the Lula government from 2008 - when the global *suprime* crisis began - was guided by market stimuli, such as the introduction of bank credit mechanisms, which allowed wage earners registered and retired from the private sector, belonging to the National Institute of Social Security (INSS), had access to loans with lower than usual costs (“consignment loan”), through deduction from their salaries or pensions. Another strategy was the investment of pension fund resources in the PAC,

generating jobs and income, especially in the civil construction sector, which began to employ beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família program (JARDIM, 2007; JARDIM, 2009; JARDIM, 2013).

Therefore, during the 2008 crisis, trying to protect Brazil from external impacts, the Lula government increased incentives in two ways: tax relief and granting subsidized financing to companies, adopting the so-called expansionist policy to stimulate the economy and consumption of Brazilians.

In this direction, the current project was the strong presence of the State, especially in the creation of the internal market. Among the strategies aimed at developing the internal market, we mention the measures that include the reduction of the basic interest rate by the Central Bank, such as: measures to stimulate credit; postponement of tax collection to increase the capitalization of companies and avoid liquidity problems at production units; tax cuts to stimulate consumption; strengthening of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), as an inducer to public investments in the productive sector; expansion of the functions of the National Development Bank (BNDES), which previously lent money only to large companies or was a financier of privatizations in the Cardoso government and in this context started to lend to small and medium-sized companies; expansion of the National Monetary Council (CMN); and alteration of the regulations of the financial system on a preventive basis. Likewise, social programs such as the Bolsa Família Program were maintained, and there was an increase in the number of beneficiaries of the program, in addition to occasional increases in the minimum wage during the period.

Still on the construction of the internal market, the government reduced the Tax on Industrialized Products, favoring sectors linked to construction materials, automakers and the white line of home appliances, stimulating consumption and the creation of new jobs in these sectors.

As part of the interventionist project, the government promoted, in the same period, the reduction of the Contribution for the Financing of Social Security (COFINS), to increase the sale of motorcycles, and also increased the IPI on cigarettes, aiming to compensate for the loss in collection. The strategy of investing in the domestic market was based on the statement that "Brazil can compensate for the downturn in the world market by strengthening the domestic market" (MANTEGA, Inovação Unicamp, 29 August 2008, our translation).

In addition to implementing the reduction of various types of taxes on industrialized products and encouraging microcredit via public banks, the government used public banks to recover credit in the country, offering lines of credit and giving financial incentives to BNDES,

Banco do Brasil and Caixa Federal Economy, so that they could provide credit to companies from different sectors of the economy at low interest rates (D'AGOSTINO, 2012).

The government expanded state intervention through mechanisms considered heterodox, designed to offer productive long-term financing with low interest rates for PAC works; sought to encourage state-owned companies that were not privatized in the Cardoso government (the case of Eletrobras, for example) and allowed them to associate with private companies to increase investments with Treasury resources; finally, the BNDES redirected its priorities towards structural investments, under the logic of the development of national companies, different from the previous government, whose project privileged the financing of the privatization of national companies. Finally, it sought to encourage the competitiveness of Brazilian companies in relation to multinationals operating in the country, in addition to encouraging national companies to expand abroad.

As part of its strategies to leverage Brazilian industries, the government created the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE, Portuguese initials), focusing on strategic options (information and communication technologies, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and software), betting on vanguard sectors, such as biotechnology or nanotechnology.

In addition to a purely economic development project, the Lula government presented social elements in the definition of its development project, with a strong presence of the State (JARDIM, 2007), since despite the strong presence of finance in the Lula government, these were under state control. There was also the suspension of the privatization program and subsequent creation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), in 2004, aiming to raise funds for the implementation of infrastructure works of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC, Portuguese initials).

As a result of the above policy, the Lula government brought protection to national capital companies, especially via the BNDES and better distribution of income and protection for the poorest workers, through strategies to expand access to higher education, with emphasis on the University Program for Todos (PROUNI, Portuguese initials), for the Student Financing Fund (FIES, Portuguese initials), for the Restructuring and Expansion of Federal Universities (Reuni, Portuguese initials) and the policy of quotas. As a whole, these programs sought to include poor young people in a space considered elite until then, the universities, with a focus on the public university, highlighting the cognitive and institutional importance of the quota policy.

Finally, during his government, especially the second, Lula defended a government project in which the State would act as an articulator and inducer of public policies. On the occasion of the 2008 crisis, Lula declared: "It is customary to say that the State only gets in the way and, when the [2008] crisis happened, those who looked like gods of the economy sought the State, which knew nothing, to save them" (O GLOBO, 26 March 2009, our translation).

### **MCA: presenting the research protocol**

The ministers' trajectories data were analyzed from the MCA, following the following protocol:

1. For the elaboration of the MCA, we created an excel database with the trajectories of 151 titular ministers of the periods studied; we mapped the trajectories in CPDOC, from FGV.
2. Next, we create the variables that guide this article: to talk about social capital, we look at the social origins of ministers; to talk about cultural capital, we look at schooling, passage through the international, type of economics school you went through (if more orthodox or more heterodox), if a prize was awarded, if were books written, etc. For economic capital, we expand Pierre Bourdieu's notion of economic capital and look at parents' occupation (which gives us a sense of class of origin), since we have no data on equity.
3. The data were rotated in the R software, using the FactoMineR package, for Multiple Correspondence Data Analysis, grouping analysis (cluster) and also ellipses, which help to analyze a fixed variable and compare in the MCA itself how it behaves in relation to other variables
4. As a result of the MCA, we have a reduction in the dimensionality of the data, in which the dimensions of the axes are built based on the variables with the highest variance, in which the distance between individuals represent distances from social properties; the cluster helps to see which individuals have similar characteristics and the ellipses allow to see, with the identification by colors, how variables of interest behave.

### **Research data**

First, we demonstrate only the cloud of active categorical variables, in order to understand where individuals will be located with respect to capitals. Only the 100 categorical variables that most contribute were selected, and for us, the lack of information for some agents is already a fact in itself; that is, the available data represent agents who have greater cultural



capital, to the detriment of agents who do not have this capital and who, therefore, do not have family, personal and professional data publicly available. We understand that families with greater cultural capital would be more sensitive to the production of biographies of family members than those with less capital, who do not have a cognitive interest in the production and maintenance of the family's symbolic heritage.

We will therefore have an MCA between individuals with missing data (left side of the graph), upper right quadrant (individuals with greater capital) and lower right quadrant (individuals with lower capital).

To facilitate the interpretation of the graph, the table of acronyms below was prepared, with the variables that we highlight, first from the upper right quadrant:

**Table 1**

Capital	acronym/description
Cultural Capital -> academic	un_pub - studied at a public university in graduation Curso_econ - graduation in economics curso_cien_pol&hum - graduation in political science and other courses in human sciences prof_econ - professor of economics at universities form_pgr_s - completed post-graduation strictu - did a master's or doctorate lato - did specialization
Symbolic Capital	circ_inter_s - has international circulation eua - international circulation in the United States eur - international circulation in Europe dec_80&90 - years in which you completed your postgraduate course dec_60&70 - years you completed your postgraduate course proj_impl_tip_fiscal - projects implemented in ministries with a focus on fiscal dominance (right hand) data_form - date of graduation in higher education

Source: Devised by the authors


The table below serves as a reference to read the important abbreviations in the lower right quadrant

**Table 2**

Capital	acronym/description
Cultural capital	curso_grad_adm - undergraduate course in administration prof_pai_trab_brac - handyman father prof_mae_prof_lib - liberal professional mother prof_mae_out - mother with other professions
Symbolic capital	pmdb_s - is part of the MDB party pt_s - is part of the workers' party psdb_n - not part of PSDB prof_prof_lib - liberal professionals ocup_conjunc_func_pub - career in civil service Proj_impl_tip_estrutura - projects more related to infrastructure (left hand)
Economic capital	class_baix - from social classes with low economic capital

Source: Devised by the authors

**Figure 1** – The 100 active categorical variables that most contribute to the distinction between individuals




Source: Devised by the authors

As can be seen, in the upper right quadrant, we have the ministers linked to the Cardoso government, with greater cultural capital, in general with a degree in economics, master's and doctorate in the United States and Europe; some are professors of economics at universities and their projects are more linked to a perspective of fiscal dominance (right arm of the State), more linked to economic orthodoxy, as well as they did their postgraduate studies in periods when monetarist theories were in vogue in the major US universities.

In the lower quadrant, we can observe that ministers in the Lula government are generally affiliated with parties such as the MDB and PT, come from a lower social class, have links with social movements and trade unions, fathers who are manual workers and mothers who work at home, are civil servants at lower and intermediate levels and has projects more linked to infrastructure and social (left arm of the State). Next, we have the ministers identified by color (red for Lula and blue for Cardoso)

**Figure 2**




Source: Devised by the authors

As we can observe, the ministers of the Lula government are mostly in the lower right quadrant, with less capital, while the ministers of Cardoso are in the majority in the upper right quadrant (greater capital). Next, we have a cluster of individuals that show the three groupings (considering that there are agents that have homologous capitals on the frontier).

**Figure 3**


**Factor map**



Source: Devised by the authors

Now we focus on the analysis of the cultural and symbolic capital related to the parents, with the support of the MCA analysis with *ellipses*. Next, we have kinship with people from the elite, middle class or lower class from the point of view of economic capital (social origin):

Figure 4




Source: Devised by the authors

As we can see in the graph, on the left side of the graph, the absence of data indicates probable belonging to lower social classes, since the elites generally have their data more publicized in accessible secondary data. It is possible to observe the blue ellipse (with a more overlapping gravitational axis in the upper right quadrant), where there is a predominance of ministers from the Cardoso government, who in general have family members more connected to the elite, while there are more family members from the middle and popular classes among the ministers from the Lula government, as well as most of those with missing data, are also in the lower right quadrant and left side; most of them linked to the Lula government.

Next, we have the MCA as an ellipse presenting the father profession:

Figure 5




Source: Devised by the authors

We can observe the predominance of fathers who are manual workers and low-level public professionals in the lower right quadrant, linked to Lula; and the predominance in the upper right quadrant of career civil servants.

With respect to the university, the predominance is of graduation in public universities. Regarding the courses we have:

Figure 6




Source: Devised by the authors

As can be seen, in Cardoso's government there is a predominance of economists and engineers, while in Lula's government there is greater diversity, with a predominance of administrators, human sciences, doctors and the military. With respect to the ministries, belonging was classified into right arm (Cardoso government) and left arm (Lula government) of the State.

Here are the professions:

Figure 7



Source: Devised by the authors

It is possible to see that ministers in the Lula government predominantly took on more political positions and also liberal professionals, while those in the Cardoso government worked in the private sector as economists (financial institutions or the public sector) and engineers (part of them reconverted to finance).



## Some analyzes

The application of the MCA suggests, based on the analyzed categories, that the Lula ministers' ancestry is mostly from the lower middle class and a good part of the popular class, since the profession of the ministers' parents is of popular origin (farmer, manicure, housewife, cleaning lady, seamstress, mechanic). The MCA shows something common among almost all agents, which we are tentatively denominating *class habitus* (BOURDIEU, 1996). That is, with few exceptions, all agents are affiliated and/or supporters of the Workers' Party (PT), linked to social movements and come from technical occupations.

On the other hand, ministers in the Cardoso government come from an upper-middle-class background (doctors, lawyers, farmers, diplomats, businessmen) and international circulation is almost a rule for this group. Here we have a *class habitus* closer to that of the elite.

We remember that the *habitus* is a symbolic marker that can express distinction or disqualification (BOURDIEU, 1979). In the case of ministers Cardoso expresses distinction when he shows the dominant culture; in the case of ministers Lula expresses disqualification when he presents the culture of the dominated.

The data allow us to suggest that there is a strong distinction between the ministers analyzed and this distinction is marked, in particular, by the passage through the market in the case of ministers Cardoso and by participation in union and social movements, in the case of ministers Lula.

As we observed in the bibliographic review, the Cardoso government was more committed to a neoliberal project and the Lula government to a more interventionist project. The neoliberal or interventionist project orchestrates the social origins of the ministers, since the Cardoso ministers were more involved in projects linked to the right arm of the State (fiscal adjustment, pursuit of surplus, development project with more autonomy from the market), while the projects of Lula's ministers were more linked to the left arm of the State (investment in social policy; support for public banks and development projects of a developmental nature).

In this sense, the application of the MCA allows defending that Lula ministers would be less sensitive to the neoliberal project, since their socialization in spaces, with people and values that stimulate contact with the neoliberal project, was more restricted than for ministers of the Cardoso government. On the contrary, the MCA shows that Cardoso ministers have training that roots them in the neoliberal project and in neoliberalizing beliefs, acquired in passages through American universities and in socialization in spaces sensitive to this type of project.

In dialogue with Bourdieu (2006) we point out that the ministers' choices are not only subjective, but are limited to historical and cultural elements and, above all, to a given field of possibilities. Priorities will be given according to inherited and socially constructed resources within unique life stories. Therefore, even if it is not the objective of this research, the study allowed us to understand, from the capitals of the ministers, their choices and commitments in projects for the development of Brazil.

### **Final considerations**

Through the MCA, we seek to empirically verify the distinctions between the ministers of the Cardoso and Lula periods, identifying the main capital held by these ministers.

After applying the MCA, we found low cultural, economic and symbolic capital in Lula's ministers, as well as a *habitus* closer to the popular and middle classes. We also identified greater participation in infrastructure projects and state interventionism. In the case of the Cardoso ministers, we identified a strong economic, cultural and symbolic capital, passed from generation to generation, configuring what we are calling a class *habitus* closer to the elites.

Considering Bourdieu's discussion (2006) about the State, in which the author states that through the classification system, the State molds mental structures and imposes principles of common vision and division and ways of thinking, we suggest, based on the bibliographic review, which shows greater neoliberal sensitivity in the Cardoso government and interventionist sensitivity in the Lula government, that the Lula government coordinated the markets, producing goods and services through state-owned companies and partnerships with private capital; implemented projects based on resources from the financial market - more especially from pension funds, via the issuance of public bonds and through direct investments in companies - as well as coordinating certain regulations, "domestication" of the financial market (JARDIM, 2009), in dialogue with heterodox economic policies.

On the other hand, in dialogue with the current international doxa, the Cardoso government operated the privatization of state-owned companies, in the name of the publicized efficiency of the State and gave greater space to foreign companies, to the detriment of the policy of valuing public companies, public banks and the national domestic market. Thus, the Cardoso government maintained an economic policy in dialogue with international capital, which was only possible because the State legislated all the legal aspects that enabled the implementation of the neoliberal project.

We conclude that for the realization of one project or another, the adhesion and engagement of the ministers was fundamental and that, to some extent, the neoliberal or interventionist engagement orchestrates the capital and the position in the social space occupied by them.

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