

**PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL, THEIR CHALLENGES AND THE  
“EXPORT” OF MODELS ABROAD: ANALYZING THE PARTICIPATORY  
BUDGET IN TOKYO (JAPAN)<sup>1</sup>**

***AS INSTITUIÇÕES PARTICIPATIVAS NO BRASIL, SEUS DESAFIOS E A  
“EXPORTAÇÃO” DE MODELOS PARA O EXTERIOR: ANALISANDO O  
ORÇAMENTO PARTICIPATIVO EM TÓQUIO (JAPÃO)***

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“EXPORTACIÓN” DE MODELOS AL EXTRANJERO: ANALIZANDO EL  
PRESUPUESTO PARTICIPATIVO EN TOKIO (JAPÓN)***



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**ABSTRACT:** The objective of this paper was to expose the recent paradigm of demobilization of Participatory Institutions (PIs) in Brazil, while at the same time analyzing how the Participatory Budget (PB), an important Brazilian PI, had its model “exported” to an Asian country: Japan. The PIs, institutionalized mechanisms that promote social participation, have a unique potential for strengthening democracy, as proposed by several of the authors listed in the references of this work. Through bibliographical and documentary research, based mainly on the author’s monographic case study, it became clear that the active effort against the PIs represents a conscious undertaking to weaken democracy. On the other hand, the international dissemination of PB shows, as will be exposed, the perennial importance of this participatory experiment created in Brazil, setting up a scenario in which the referred country appears as a “laboratory” for developing participatory experiments adopted internationally.

**KEYWORDS:** Participatory institutions. Participatory budgeting. Public policies. Challenges. Tokyo.

**RESUMO:** *Objetivou-se, neste trabalho, expor o recente paradigma de desmobilização das Instituições Participativas (IPs) no Brasil, ao mesmo tempo, em que se analisou como o Orçamento Participativo (OP), uma importante IP brasileira, teve seu modelo “exportado” para um país asiático: o Japão. As IPs, órgãos institucionalizados promotores da participação social, configuram-se como portadoras de um potencial ímpar para o fortalecimento democrático, conforme defendido por diversos autores mencionados nas referências deste trabalho. Através de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, com ênfase no estudo de caso monográfico realizado pelo autor, evidenciou-se que o esforço ativo contra as IPs constitui um movimento consciente em direção ao enfraquecimento da democracia. Por outro lado, a difusão internacional do OP demonstra, como será abordado, a importância perene da referida experiência participativa criada no Brasil, posicionando o país como um “laboratório” de desenvolvimento de experiências participativas adotadas globalmente.*

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Instituições participativas. Orçamento participativo. Políticas públicas. Desafios. Tóquio.*

**RESUMEN:** *El objetivo de este trabajo fue exponer el reciente paradigma de desmovilización de las Instituciones Participativas (IPs) en Brasil, analizando al mismo tiempo cómo el Presupuesto Participativo (PP), una importante IP brasileña, tuvo su modelo ‘exportado’ a un país asiático: Japón. Las IPs, órganos institucionalizados que promueven la participación social, tienen un potencial único para el fortalecimiento de la democracia, como proponen varios de los autores citados en las referencias de este trabajo. A través de la investigación bibliográfica y documental, basada principalmente en el estudio monográfico de caso realizado por el autor, quedó claro que el esfuerzo activo contra las IPs representa un esfuerzo consciente para debilitar la democracia. Por otro lado, la difusión internacional del PP demuestra, como se verá, la perenne importancia de este experimento participativo brasileño, configurando un escenario en el que Brasil es una especie de “laboratório” para el desarrollo de experimentos participativos adoptados internacionalmente.*

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** *Instituciones participativas. Presupuesto participativo. Políticas públicas. Desafios. Tokio.*

## Introduction<sup>3</sup>

The concept of Participatory Institutions (PIs) is defined by Côrtes (2011, p. 137, our translation) as “[...] mechanisms of participation created by law, constitutional amendments, resolutions, or governmental administrative regulations that allow for the regular and continuous involvement of citizens with public administration [...]”. They are designated as ‘institutions’ due to their progressive and repeated implementation within public administration, thus distinguishing them from merely sporadic or episodic mechanisms (Côrtes, 2011). The importance of PIs, as proposed by Côrtes (2011), lies in their potential to strengthen democratic governance. This democratic benefit materializes through popular participation in decision-making in the public sphere. Through management councils, conferences, or participatory budgeting—these being only some of the operative PIs in Brazil—individuals are afforded a certain degree of influence and the ability to exercise their preferences regarding policy formulation and budget allocation. Democracy is thereby enhanced as citizens are empowered to exercise these capacities in the interval between electoral processes, extending their decision-making power beyond merely selecting their leaders through voting (Côrtes, 2011, p. 137). In this sense, PIs enable more profound civil participation in the public administration process.

In Brazil, PIs have recently faced a significant process of demobilization under Jair Bolsonaro’s administration. Decree No. 9759, implemented in April 2019, introduced severe limitations to participatory bodies, particularly affecting councils, thereby weakening their effectiveness and potential as mechanisms for expressing civil society’s demands. For instance, this Decree mandates the dismantling of so-called “collegiate bodies” of the Federal Government, defined in the Decree as follows:

Art. 2 For the purposes of this Decree, the concept of collegiate includes: I - councils; II - committees; III - commissions; IV - groups; V - boards; VI - teams; VII - tables; VIII - forums; IX - rooms; and X - any other designation given to the collegiate body. [...] Art. 5º As of June 28, 2019, the collegiate bodies referred to in this Decree are hereby dissolved. Sole paragraph. The provision in the **caput** does not apply to collegiate bodies: I - provided for in the bylaws or statutes of a federal educational institution; and II - created or modified by an act published as of January 1, 2019 (Brasil, 2019, p. 1-2, our translation).

<sup>3</sup> This article is the result of the final work prepared by the author for the course “State, Society, and Public Policies,” taught by Professor Carla Gandini Giani Martelli. It was inspired by the Monograph work undertaken by the same author on the theme: “The Cases of Participatory Budgeting in Japan: An Analysis of Social Participation Abroad”.

This article aims, as one of its steps in textual construction, to understand the reasoning behind the weakening process of Participatory Institutions (PIs), a paradigm that will be clarified in detail later. A literature review was conducted to achieve the proposed objectives, based on the postulates of authors referenced in this work. Additionally, data was collected from the author’s monographic research (a case study based on bibliographic and documentary resources, supported by the inductive method of theoretical inquiry) on the topic “Cases of Participatory Budgeting in Japan: An Analysis of Social Participation Abroad”.

In terms of the specific topics of the operationalization of this research, the study focused on four main cases of Japanese Participatory Budgeting (PB): Nabari, Ichikawa, Kitakyushu, and Tokyo (with a fifth ‘sub-case,’ Suginami, within Tokyo), investigated in greater detail due to its extensive territorial reach and potential for citizen engagement. The research prioritized the analysis of each city’s PB cases within the timeframe of 2000-2022, as PB initiatives in Japan have predominantly emerged from the beginning of the 21st century. This timeframe was also chosen because of the significant attention this topic has garnered in Japan, where there has been an exponential proliferation of experiments and discussions related to PB in recent years (Silva, 2023).

Finally, data collection on these participatory experiences involved searching for specific terms on the digital platforms of each Japanese municipality. The primary search term used was “*sankagata yosan hensei*” (参加型予算編成, in the original), which translates literally as Participatory Budgeting. These four cases were selected due to the greater availability of information compared to other PB cases in Japan. This access to data is facilitated by the unique significance each case holds in the theoretical debate on Japanese PB, representing four participatory experiments with distinct, important, and unique characteristics.

To begin an introductory understanding of Participatory Budgeting (PB), a participatory institution of unique significance to this work, given its widespread international adoption and its distinct participatory dynamics (which will be discussed later), it is pertinent to reaffirm PB's role as an essential tool for social participation. This tool, initially created in Brazil, has since been adopted by a range of countries around the globe, including South Africa, Ecuador, and Spain, as highlighted by Porto de Oliveira (2013).

Porto de Oliveira (2016) provides a general summary of PB, defining it as a Participatory Institution (PI) aimed at incorporating civil society into the budgetary decision-making process. Teixeira and Teixeira (2019, p. 36) concur with this definition, characterizing

PB as a democratic innovation that allows members of civil society to participate in decisions related to public budgeting.

The discourse surrounding PB in Brazil is extensive. However, studies on international PB from a Brazilian perspective remain under development, with researchers such as Porto de Oliveira (2013) and Martelli (2021) contributing significantly to this field. The discussion regarding Asian PB, however, is notably less prominent in Brazil, and when it comes to Japanese PB, the debate is almost nonexistent. The search for Portuguese-language literature on PB operations in Japan for this analytical endeavor proved unfruitful; only materials in English and Japanese were available.

Therefore, one of the notable contributions of this research is to expand the availability of literature and documentary material on international PB for Brazilian researchers dedicated to studying social participation. To this end, the present study proposes a bibliographic and documentary analysis of a specific PB case currently operating in Japan: the initiative conducted in Tokyo by the *Tokyo Metropolitan Government* (TMG). This PB initiative encompasses the entire Tokyo metropolitan area, which has a population of approximately 37 million people. With such a large number of residents, Tokyo stands as the most populous city in the world<sup>4</sup>, a fact that justifies the author's interest in studying its participatory budgeting process.

In this context, the objective is to understand how a Participatory Institution (PI) originally created in Brazil, Participatory Budgeting (PB)—is implemented in Japan, taking into account the country's unique social and political characteristics as a member of the Asian continent (Uddin; Mori; Adhikari, 2017). Another relevant aspect of this study is to highlight the international recognition directed toward Brazilian PIs, with a particular emphasis on Participatory Budgeting. As will be detailed, despite the recent decline in participatory engagement within Brazil, a PI initially developed in Brazil has been adopted in Japan, a fact that has not yet been widely reported in Brazil and, as proposed here, further underscores the progressive and widespread adoption of Brazilian participatory mechanisms. Let us now proceed to the exposition.

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<sup>4</sup> Available at: <https://www.archdaily.com.br/br/983059/as-cidades-mais-populosas-do-mundo-em-2022>. Access: 10 Oct. 2024.

## **The Dismantling of Social Participation in Brazil**

Before delving into the internationalization of PB and the Japanese case, it is pertinent to establish the recent paradigm of social participation in Brazil—a paradigm marked by the national degradation of PIs during the federal administration of President Jair Bolsonaro. Romão, Bezerra, and Rodrigues (2021) highlight that under this administration, there was a severe dismantling of various PIs, with management councils among the most affected participatory bodies. This large-scale demobilization of social participation was formalized legally through the enactment of Decree No. 9759, as introduced earlier and emphasized by the authors in the following terms:

On April 11, 2019, through Decree 9759/2019, Jair Bolsonaro abolished collegiate bodies (councils, committees, and other mechanisms) that allowed civil society to participate in federal public administration. The objective was clear: to demonstrate to his political base that he would spare no effort to put an end to all forms of “activism”—a term he used since his 2018 campaign to refer to public demonstrations and social movements that diverge from his narrow worldview—that could challenge his central authority over the Republic (Romão; Bezerra; Rodrigues, 2021, p. 1, our translation).

This decree explicitly revealed a governmental stance aimed at weakening PIs, exposing an ideological dimension underlying the Bolsonaro administration’s approach to public policy, as will be further detailed. However, through the mobilization of civil society actors engaged in social participation, the original draft of Decree No. 9759 was modified.

This modification, however, did not guarantee the security of the councils, which, instead of being entirely abolished, were emptied by a government action that altered their composition (Romão; Bezerra; Rodrigues, 2021). Romão, Bezerra, and Rodrigues (2021, p. 2) use the example of the National Council to Combat Discrimination and Promote the Rights of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transvestites, and Transgender People to illustrate how this depletion was enacted:

[...] retained only the first acronym, with the term LGBT removed from its name and scope, which were generically referred to as “combating discrimination.” In addition to erasing an entire segment of the population, there was a drastic reduction in the number of civil society members, from fifteen to just three.

The decision by the aforementioned government to implement Decree No. 9759 can be explained or associated with the agenda-setting processes described by Souza (2007).

According to the author, in light of the analytical framework known as the ‘policy cycle’, government decisions are supported by three distinct situational categories: problems, politics, and participants (Souza, 2007, p. 74). Here, the focus is placed on the first of these dimensions, namely, problems. In the author’s terms, “[...] problems enter the agenda when we assume that something must be done about them. The recognition and definition of problems affect the outcomes of the agenda” (Souza, 2007, p. 74, our translation). In this regard, the decision to dismantle social participation demonstrates that this aspect of public policy was viewed by the Bolsonaro administration as a problem. This problem was “solved” through the emptying of the management councils, implemented by Decree No. 9759. The perspective of social participation as a problem, characteristic of the Bolsonaro government, can be elucidated through a statement analyzed by Martelli (2021) from Onyx Lorenzoni, the former Minister of Labor and Social Security, who led Decree No. 9759:

When presenting the measure, the political operator of this proposal to abolish the councils and restrict social participation, the Chief Minister of the Civil House, Onyx Lorenzoni, suggested that the councils were “leftovers from the Workers’ Party administrations.” In the words of the minister, “these councils came from a completely distorted vision of what representation and participation of the population are. Their origin lies in the ideological vision of the previous governments to weaken the representation of society itself,” argued Lorenzoni (Rodrigues, 2020 *apud* Martelli, 2021, p. 72, our translation).

In order to complement the explanatory analysis regarding the Bolsonaro administration’s decision to weaken participation, we now turn to Capella (2006). The author, when addressing the multiple streams analytical model proposed by John Kingdon<sup>5</sup>, emphasizes that this proposition views the process of “agenda change” (the definition of administrative courses of action) as the result of the confluence of three factors or streams: “[...] problems; solutions or alternatives; and politics” (Capella, 2006, p. 26, our translation). However, in an update to Kingdon’s theory, which the researcher examines through the propositions of Nikolaos Zahariadis<sup>6</sup>, the combination of three factors from the political streams is condensed into a single category:

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<sup>5</sup> Kingdon's text, to which the author refers, is called *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, published in 2003 and available at: [https://www.academia.edu/31665627/Agendas\\_Alternatives\\_and\\_Public\\_Policies\\_Second\\_Edition\\_With\\_new\\_foreword\\_by](https://www.academia.edu/31665627/Agendas_Alternatives_and_Public_Policies_Second_Edition_With_new_foreword_by). Accessed on: 11 Nov. 2023.

<sup>6</sup> The text by Zahariadis (1995), to which Capella refers, is entitled *Markets, States, and Public Policies: privatization in Britain and France*.

A final methodological modification made by the author consisted of combining the three variables of the political stream—national mood, interest groups, and government turnover—into a single variable, which he termed “ideology.” [...] The model focuses on the dynamics of ideas: policy development is seen as a contest over problem definitions and the generation of alternatives (Capella, 2006, p. 36, our translation).

From these inferences, it can be determined that the factor “ideology,” as analyzed by Capella (2006) based on Zahariadis (1995), represented an important aspect of the agenda change implemented during the Bolsonaro administration. Again, drawing on the words of Onyx Lorenzoni, it becomes evident that, from the perspective of the former minister, participatory policies constituted undesirable remnants of the administrations led by the Workers’ Party (PT). Thus, in the face of an ideological divergence regarding the spread of social participation in Brazil, which culminates in a perspective that views participatory institutions (IPs) as problems, Decree No. 9759 emerges as the ultimate representative of the consolidation of the agenda change proposed during this period.

### **The Participatory Budget: A Brazilian Creation and Its Global Adoption**

The Participatory Budget (*Orçamento Participativo*) emerged in Brazil in the 1980s, specifically in 1989, when it was created in the city of Porto Alegre (RS), then governed by the Workers’ Party (PT) (Porto de Oliveira, 2016). Designed as a measure to strengthen democracy by involving the population in the municipal definition of the public budget, the OP gained international popularity (Porto de Oliveira, 2016). Its initial format, implemented in the aforementioned city in Rio Grande do Sul, consisted of allocating 10% of the city’s budget to a process of popular voting, detailed by Porto de Oliveira (2016, p. 219, our translation) as follows:

In the model developed in Porto Alegre, about 10% of the municipal budget was submitted to the OP, which took place in an annual cycle. During this period, assemblies were held across the city’s neighborhoods, where the entire population could participate and vote on the priorities for public works to be carried out by the city hall. At the same time, thematic assemblies were held in sectors such as transportation, sports, culture, and others. Subsequently, representatives elected from the neighborhoods, the “Participatory Budget Councilors,” deliberated on the most voted demands in a central forum, the Participatory Budget Council (COP). A set of public policy demands was



selected by the COP and then analyzed by the city hall. Once their feasibility was verified, the policies were implemented, and the councilors could oversee and monitor the execution of the projects.

Having expanded intensively both nationally and internationally, the Participatory Budget (OP) sometimes exhibits diverse characteristics (Côrtes, 2011). However, Côrtes (2011) identifies certain common features that serve the purpose of defining and analytically identifying cases of OP. Among these elements, the author highlights:

1. The entities responsible for creating the budget proposals to be put to a vote in the OP are, at least in Brazil, invariably members of the Executive Branch, as required by the constitution;
2. All citizens of voting age in a given municipality are allowed to participate in the OP;
3. “Decisions primarily concern the allocation of capital expenditures and, occasionally, current expenditures” (Côrtes, 2011, p. 141, our translation);
4. Regarding the last common point of OPs, as outlined by Côrtes (2011), it is emphasized that the decision-making process resulting from such participatory institutions has its operational dynamics derived from an agreement between civil society and the State. In the author’s words:

The municipal Executive Branch is the primary determinant of the existence and operational dynamics of OPs. Nevertheless, the rules governing their operations are, in practice, the result of an agreement between the initial proposals of the government and the civil society representatives involved (Côrtes, 2011, p. 141, our translation).

Côrtes (2011) also reiterates the existence of a unique characteristic inherent to OPs that distinguishes them from other mechanisms of popular participation in the definition of the public budget: the right to voice guaranteed to all citizens. In OP assemblies, the opinions and demands of civil society are highlighted, and in such processes, civil society holds a certain level of power to ensure the realization of its claims.

Regarding the factors that led to the internationalization of OP, or the “export” of this model of budget management from Brazil, Porto de Oliveira (2016) highlights three theoretical dimensions within the field of public policies that underscore this process. The first relates to “institutional induction,” an explanatory mechanism for the diffusion of public policies that emphasizes the intention of a given institution to adopt a specific policy, motivated by the adoption (or imposition) of the same measure by another institution (Porto de Oliveira, 2016).

Regarding the events that led to the diffusion of OP and fit within this theoretical mechanism, one can emphasize the encouragement provided by key institutions to ensure the extensive adherence of this participatory institution. This process of recommendation began, according to Porto de Oliveira (2016), with the Habitat II conference, held in Istanbul in the 1990s, as well as the World Social Forums, including those held in Brazil. As the author states:

The diffusion cycle of Participatory Budgeting (OP) began in the 1990s, with its first milestone being the Habitat II conference, held in Istanbul in 1996, when Porto Alegre was awarded as one of the best urban management practices in the world. From this moment, OP began to internationalize, as it had previously been known primarily among Brazilian cities and their neighbors in the Southern Cone. The tipping point in the diffusion process occurred with the succession of the first World Social Forums (WSF) in Porto Alegre, starting in 2000 (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, p. 226, our translation).

With the succession of the World Social Forums as the turning point for the diffusion of OP in the early 2000s, Porto de Oliveira (2016) emphasizes the beginning of an intensive process of recommendation of this participatory institution by essential organizations, highlighting the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank. Furthermore, amid this paradigm of widespread interest in the OP experience, Porto de Oliveira (2016, p. 227, our translation) notes the formation of various interest groups in the expansion of this participatory institution:

With the succession of the WSFs, a broad network of "friends" and those interested in OP was forged, starting with the local authorities in power in Porto Alegre. The Forum of Local Authorities for Social Inclusion and Participatory Democracy (FAL) expresses this movement concerning local authorities, but the WSF is broader and includes NGOs, social movements, unions, and other organized political forces.

The second explanatory mechanism employed by Porto de Oliveira (2016) pertains to what he calls "social construction," referring to the idea that theoretical propositions about a given public policy can lead to the intention to adopt it. In summary, once the academic community recognizes a particular public policy as inherently beneficial and effective, there will be a tendency among various actors to desire the implementation of this measure (Porto de Oliveira, 2016). In the case of OP, Porto de Oliveira (2016, p. 225, our translation) highlights the technical-academic arguments that postulate the potential of this participatory institution to "[...] promote social justice, combat corruption, etc".

The third explanatory mechanism addressed by the author refers to the actions of individuals at the international level who promote a given public policy. In the case of OP, such individuals are what Porto de Oliveira (2016) refers to as "ambassadors of participation." These individuals are characterized by high international mobility and by their intense advocacy and promotion of OP, seeking to stimulate its implementation in various locations. According to the author, these actors possess a specific set of attributes that define them, among which he highlights:

- 1) They have authority over OP, which may be political, theoretical, practical, or technical in nature;
- 2) They promote OP regardless of the institution in which they operate;
- 3) They engage in continuous action throughout the process (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, pp. 225-226, our translation).

In summary, it can be stated that the encouragement of important institutions for the adoption of OP, the theoretical defense of its importance, and the actions of "ambassadors of participation" have decisively contributed to the massive international diffusion of this participatory institution.

### **The Participatory Budgeting (PB) and Social Participation in Tokyo**

The presence of Participatory Budgeting (PB) in a country such as Japan, which has been scarcely explored in Brazilian discussions regarding the diffusion of this Participatory Institution (PI), highlights its growing dissemination. This dissemination, as evidenced by the lack of specific reports on the Japanese case, may go unnoticed by PB theorists in Brazil. Therefore, updating and documenting the development process of PB becomes essential for expanding studies on the topic in Brazil.

Regarding the PB in Tokyo, the Japanese case chosen for this discussion, it is pertinent to analyze its structure. Created in 2018 by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), this PB has been implemented annually (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2022). As mentioned earlier, the PB in Tokyo covers the entire metropolitan area, home to a population of 37 million people, and includes various districts that, due to their high resident numbers, often have their administrative entities.

The structure of the PB in Tokyo consists, in summary, of a system where projects are proposed by society to the local government. These projects are then submitted for online voting by the population. The TMG chooses not to intervene in the themes or propositions of the

projects developed by the people, emphasizing that the goal of the PB is to promote social participation based on the following principle: "Proposed by the people of Tokyo, selected by the people of Tokyo" (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2022, our translation). After the voting phase, a process begins in which the population has the opportunity to express their opinions on the Participatory Budgeting (PB) carried out, and they may make recommendations to improve the process. These suggestions are directed to the logistical organization of the TMG and to the proposers of the voted projects (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2022). Finally, it is relevant to highlight that the PB currently operational in Tokyo, run by the TMG, is based on the following procedural stages (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2022, our translation):

1. Opening for proposal submissions (duration of 3 months);
2. Publication of a guide document to instruct the population on the voting process and submission of proposals;
3. End of the proposal submission period;
4. Start of the public voting on projects (duration of approximately one month);
5. End of the voting period;
6. Publication of voting results;
7. Publication of the popular projects to be included in the next year's budget.

It is important to emphasize that the Participatory Budget (PB) promoted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) structurally differs from the original formulation of the aforementioned Participatory Institution (PI) implemented in the city of Porto Alegre. One initial difference that can be noted pertains to the percentage of the municipal budget allocated to the PB. In Porto Alegre, as highlighted by Porto de Oliveira (2016), approximately 10% of the municipal budget was dedicated to the PB, and in Tokyo, approximately 0.002% of the municipal budget was allocated to this PI<sup>7</sup>. Another difference that can be discussed concerns the existence of assemblies. While in Porto Alegre, assemblies were held in person with the population to vote on the city's budgetary priorities, no such assemblies were conducted in Tokyo. In fact, the PB process is entirely digital, with no face-to-face dialogue between civil society and the government. These differences highlight the changes in the structures of the PB

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<sup>7</sup> The calculation to obtain this data was based on information provided by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, available at: [https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/documents/d/zaimu/4aramashi\\_englishver;](https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/documents/d/zaimu/4aramashi_englishver;)  
<https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/zaisei/teian/4tomin.html>. Accessed on: 13 Nov. 2023.

resulting from its diffusion process, a phenomenon noted by Porto de Oliveira (2013) and Côrtes (2011), which demonstrates the constant transformation and adaptation of PB to new contexts.

### **Final considerations**

In conclusion, it is pertinent to establish some analytical inferences regarding the discussion presented. Through the analysis of Romão, Bezerra, and Rodrigues (2021), it was observed how the administration of Jair Bolsonaro intensely and negatively impacted the recent configuration of social participation in Brazil. Through an ideological attack (Capella, 2006), there was a direct assault on Participatory Institutions, described by Côrtes (2011) and Teixeira and Teixeira (2019) as fundamental to strengthening democracy. Therefore, it can be inferred that a governmental attack on democracy was observed, or, in other words, a deliberate choice was made to weaken its institutional foundations. It can be determined that social participation, in this sense, and light of Souza's (2007) postulates, was seen as a problem, or an obstacle, to the objectives of the recently concluded Bolsonaro administration. This problem was supported by ideological dimensions (Capella, 2006) inherent to the agenda-setting process of that governmental administration.

It is, however, important to state that this problematic paradigm shows signs of diminishing. With the return of the Workers' Party to power following the 2022 elections, it is expected that social participation will return to the state administration's agenda. The practical confirmation of this hope is evident through the revocation of Decree No. 9759, carried out in early 2023, and the proposal of the Participatory Multiannual Plan currently being implemented by the new federal government.

Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize the ongoing importance of Participatory Institutions (PIs), which, despite facing intense efforts at disempowerment, continue to thrive and, on the international stage, have been consolidated in various countries, such as Japan. Notably, Brazil has garnered international recognition due to the Participatory Budget (PB) creation and its administrative dynamics in participatory policies. This achievement goes beyond the ideological dimension, presenting results that can now be considered enduring. In other words, the relevance of the PIs established in Brazil has become deeply embedded in the ideals of various groups and institutions, which can ultimately be recognized as a significant national accomplishment.

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