Capitalism, nature and COVID-19: the biological crisis in the social crisis
Rev. Sem Aspas, Araraquara, v. 13, n. 00, e024005, 2024. e-ISSN: 2358-4238
DOI: https://doi.org/10.29373/sas.v13i00.19011 8
Georg Lukács points out that history serves not merely as a descriptive tool for the socio-
historical context surrounding an object, in this case, a social relationship to be studied, but as
the very root of which all social relations derive. With this, Lukács offers a rich interpretation
of Marx’s historical-materialist dialectical method, explaining how dialectics is historical and
how history is movement, construction, and process.
[...] a historical critique. It primarily dissolves the fixed, natural, and
unrealized character of social formations; it unveils them as historically
arisen and, as such, subject to historical becoming in all aspects, thus as
formations predestined for historical decline. Therefore, history does
not occur merely within the scope of validity of these forms, according
to which history would mean only the change of contents, people,
situations, etc., with eternally valid social principles. [...]. Rather, it is
precisely the history of these forms, their transformation as forms of
human social organization, as forms that, initiated from objective
economic relations, dominate all relations among men (and thus also
the relations of men with themselves, with nature, etc.) (Lukács, 2003,
p. 135- 36, our translation).
Nature has been and continues to be part of society's historical and dialectical process.
This implies that nature is not purely biological, geographical, physical, or chemical; its analysis
and study are not limited to “natural” aspects, because, in society, nothing is purely natural,
including nature itself, in terms of its functioning or developments, but also its historical aspect.
Thus, nature is also historical and social.
The dialectical relationship between the natural and social environment does not imply
that it occurs between diametrically opposed poles or extremes. The explanation of historical
nature (both of human beings and nature) reveals the view that nature and history are not
contradictory and separate concepts, as if the only circumstance in which they interacted were
in a “yin and yang” figure. Both are simultaneous. That is, neither Natural History nor the
History of Nature should dissolve into the perspective of the historical nature of society, the
“history of humanity,” or vice versa, because, in reality, the history of humanity is also the
history of nature—not only as it has been described until now, but in the sense that nature
constitutes human history, being intrinsically linked to our subsistence and mode of production.
As mentioned, nature has historicity and constitutes the stage on which social life
develops, not merely as a backdrop or setting but also as both medium and content. The way
we interact with and act upon nature has not always been the same, both chronologically and
geographically, due to various social and cultural reasons. Thus, according to each mode of
production and reproduction, the rhythm and dynamics between society and nature change and