Conflict and peace economics
Keywords:
Exchange economy, Appropriation economy, Conflict economics, Peace economics, Rational choice model, Game theory, Network economics,Abstract
We present an overview of the field of conflict economics. We begin by explaining important distinctions between standard textbook economics and conflict economics regarding assumptions, subject matter, and interrelations between economics and conflict. We then provide summaries of selected economic theories and empirical evidence that together help reveal important aspects of conflict – and peace – through an economics lens. Among the topics covered in the theoretical and empirical overview are why violence is sometimes chosen over peaceful approaches to address intergroup disputes, why it is “rational” for political leaders to sometimes mass kill civilians (and what can be done to prevent this), how social norms of committing harm against outgroups can propagate (or be stopped), why it can be difficult to develop laws and institutions to promote stable peace, and how third-party efforts to promote peace can sometimes make things worse. Lastly, we provide samples of data resources, working paper archives and journals, and readings consisting of major textbooks, handbooks, and edited books in the field of conflict economics.
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