A virtue-theoretic account of the value of knowledge

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29051/el.v7iesp.7.16339

Keywords:

Value of knowledge, Epistemology, Virtue epistemology, Epistemic value, Value, Knowledge, Pritchard, Kvanvig, Zagzebski

Abstract

The article examines the knowledge value in connection with virtue epistemology. Several kinds of value are examined to set up theoretical framework for discussion about value of knowledge. The traditional pragmatic theory of value of knowledge is considered with objections to it. It is shown that at the center of value problem is the concept of T-value monism (value of truth above everything else). Different strategies of overcoming T-value monism are exposed. The reliabilist virtue-theoretic account of value of knowledge is defended. Different strategies of reliabilist answer to the value problem are analyzed, proposed by A. Goldman, J. Greco, D. Pritchard. Some objections against the reliabilist account are considered: the “coffee machine” objection by Zagzebski and the objection from the existence of trivial knowledge. Another virtue-theoretic alternative to value problem by Zagzebski is analyzed. Against Zagzebski’s account it is maintained that knowledge has fundamental value, even if it does not have final value.

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Author Biographies

Artur Ravilevich Karimov, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

Doctor of philosophy, Head of the department of Social Philosophy, Institute of Social and Philosophical Sciences and Mass Communications

Vladimir Jurevich Yurinov, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

PhD in philosophy, associate professor of the of the department of Social Philosophy, Institute of Social and Philosophical Sciences and Mass Communications

Mikhail Gennadievich Khort, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

Graduate student, Institute of Social and Philosophical Sciences and Mass Communications

References

BROGAARD, B. (2007). Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36, 335–54.

GOLDMAN, A. (1979). Reliabilism: What Is Justified Belief. Justification and Knowledge, ed. G. S. Pappas. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1–23.

GOLDMAN, A., OLSSON, E. (2009). Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge. Epistemic Value. A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. H. Pritchard (Eds.). Oxford University Press.

GRECO, J. (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Kindle Edition.

KVANVIG, J. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Kindle Edition.

PRITCHARD, D. (2010). What is this thing called knowledge? Second edition. New York: Routlege.

PRITCHARD, D., TURRI, J., CARTER, J. (2018). The Value of Knowledge. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/knowledge-value/>.

SOSA, E. (2007). А Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

SWINBURNE, R. (1999). Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

WILLIAMSON, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ZAGZEBSKI, L. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

ZAGZEBSKI, L. (2003). The search for the source of epistemic good. Metaphilosophy, 34(1/2), 12-28.

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Published

30/12/2021

How to Cite

KARIMOV, A. R.; YURINOV, V. J.; KHORT, M. G. A virtue-theoretic account of the value of knowledge. Revista EntreLinguas, Araraquara, v. 7, n. esp.7, 2021. DOI: 10.29051/el.v7iesp.7.16339. Disponível em: https://periodicos.fclar.unesp.br/entrelinguas/article/view/16339. Acesso em: 13 nov. 2024.

Issue

(2021) v . 7, n. esp. 7, dez. (Pre-Print Articles)

Section

Artigos

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